M, L v Minister for Education and Child Development

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

M, L v MINISTER FOR EDUCATION AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT

[2018] SASCFC 131

Judgment of The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Lovell

6 December 2018

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT - FURTHER EVIDENCE

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN - GENERALLY

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CARE AND PROTECTION - EVIDENCE AND PROOF

Appeal against a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in allowing an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate of the Youth Court, dismissing the Minister’s application that C, a child of about three years of age, be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until she attains 18 years of age.

The appellant appeals on two grounds. First, that the Judge erred in making the order of permanent guardianship instead of remitting the matter to the Youth Court for rehearing. Second, the appellant challenges the finding made by the Judge that the appellant demonstrated an inability to care for both C and A when the evidence did not support such a finding and the appellant was not cross-examined on that point.

Held, per Curiam, dismissing the appeal:

1.  If an application to remit C’s matter to the Youth Court had been supported by sufficient evidence arising out of the appellant’s care of C in the intervening period, to discharge an evidentiary foundation that he had the capacity to properly care for her, then there would have been strong reasons to remit the matter (at [133]).   

2.  The evidence outlined by F on the appeal falls short of establishing a reasonable case for reversing the Judge’s order because of the absence of any concluded psychiatric or psychological opinion (at [138]). 

Per Curiam:

1.  Whether or not the Youth Court would entertain an application to vary or revoke an order would be a matter for it to determine.

Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 6, s 16, s 38, s 39, s 40; Children's Protection Law Reform (Transitional Arrangements and Related Amendments) Act 2017 (SA) s 34; Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) s 22; Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) s 7, s 8, s 10, s 11, s 53, s 55; Children's Protection Law Reform (Transitional Arrangements and Related Amendments) Act 2016 (SA) s 26A, referred to.
CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172; Minister for Education and Child Development v M, L & Ors [2018] SASC 32, applied.
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; H v W (1995) 126 FLR 159, discussed.
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; H, A v Minister for Families and Communities [2005]…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASCFC 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerned a child, C, born in April 2015, who was placed in the guardianship of the Minister for Education and Child Development. C's mother voluntarily placed her in alternative care shortly after birth, and she has remained in continuous foster care with Mr and Mrs FP since then, save for a brief period. The appellant, F, was confirmed as C's father in November 2015, and had limited supervised access to C. The appeal was brought by F against the Minister, with the court comprising Kourakis CJ, Stanley and Lovell JJ.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Youth Court had erred in making a long-term guardianship order in favour of the Minister, and whether the court should permit the introduction of further expert evidence on appeal. F sought to challenge the decision that C should remain under the Minister's guardianship, arguing for his own placement as a suitable caregiver.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that while F had limited prospects of success, the potential for him to obtain favourable expert evidence regarding C's time with him, and the passage of further time, meant the Youth Court might, in its discretion, entertain an application to vary or revoke the guardianship order on its merits. The court noted that an application brought immediately after a final order for permanent guardianship would ordinarily be an abuse of process, but this case presented exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that the limited prospects of F obtaining a favourable order did not justify prolonging the uncertainty and damage caused by C's current care arrangements while F attempted to procure further expert evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, we would dismiss the appeal. The limited prospects F may have of obtaining a favourable order do not justify protracting the damage and uncertainty caused by C’s care arrangements whilst F attempts to procure favourable expert evidence.Background In August 2014 C’s older brother, A, who was born in 2010, was removed from his parents’ care because they were taking illicit drugs.[1] C was born on 5 April 2015. [1] Pursuant to s 16 of the Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA). On 15 April 2015, 10 days after giving birth to C, C’s mother (M), signed a voluntary custody agreement placing C into an alternative care placement while an Investigation and Assessment Order was sought. From the time of her placement at 10 days old, save for the short time between the Magistrate’s order and its reversal by the Judge, C has been in the continuous foster care of Mr and Mrs FP, who also care for C’s half-sibling, S. Mr and Mrs FP’s two biological children also reside with them. S is the child of M but is not biologically related to F. On 6 May 2015, an Investigation and Assessment Order was granted. On 10 June 2015, the Youth Court made an order that C be placed under the guardianship of the Minister for a period of 12 months. M was allowed some access to C during that period. On 7 July 2015, a 12-month Care and Protection Order was granted in favour of the Minister. In October 2015 A was returned to F’s care, where he has resided since. F’s mother assists him to care for A. We note that references to ‘Families SA’ is to be understood as a reference to the Department for Child Protection.[2][2] Pursuant to s 34 of the Children’s Protection Law Reform (Transitional Arrangements and Related Amendments) Act 2017 (SA). It was not until 5 November 2015 that the appellant was confirmed to be C’s father. This is because Families SA delayed arranging DNA paternity testing. C first met F during a supervised access visit in January 2016 when she was nine months old. Access visits, supervised by social workers from Families SA, continued until mid-May 2017. The hour-long visits occurred twice fortnightly. By the time the arrangement concluded, twelve such visitations had occurred. A accompanied F on six of those occasions. On 15 May 2017, Families SA suspended access visits pending further assessment. On 2 September 2016, a second 12-month guardianship order was made in favour of the Minister. At that time Families SA was working towards placing C in F’s care. Families SA referred C to a consultant social worker, Ms Nicolaou, who was employed by a private organisation, ‘Connecting Families’, for the purpose of providing expert and independent family and reunification services, including a report on the most appropriate placement of C. After receiving that report Families SA reversed its position and decided that C should be placed in the long-term care of Mr and Mrs FP. On 22 December 2016, the Minister sought an order that C be placed under the guardianship of the Minster until she attains 18 years of age.[3] The grounds of the application were:1.There is a significant risk that the child will suffer serious harm to her physical, psychological or emotional wellbeing against which she should have, but does not have, proper protection.2.The guardians of the child are unable to care for and protect the child, or unable to exercise adequate supervision and control over the child.[3] Pursuant to s 38(1)(d) of the Children’s Protection Act 1993 (SA).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In addition to her written report, Ms McNichol was called by C’s legal representative to give evidence. In cross-examination, she denied that separation from Mr and Mrs FP would cause C nothing more than grief. Ms McNichol testified that that description minimized the probable effect on C if she were to be separated from Mr and Mrs FP.The appellant’s evidence at trial F gave evidence at trial, as did his father, DJ, and his mother, DC. F acknowledged in his evidence that he had used methylamphetamine on occasions in the past but denied being a habitual drug user. He volunteered to undertake random drug testing. He denied allegations of family violence. F gave the following evidence about his discussion with Ms Vogelsang about C’s care before she was born:ANo. I had discussions with [Families SA] around I wanted to have a room ready in Adelaide to take [C] over to Adelaide and have her in the house that I’m living in while I got [A] back but [Families SA] told me that if I set up a room for [C] in Adelaide and got ready to have [C] that that would say to them that I’m not putting enough focus into [A] and that I wouldn’t get my son back if I focused on [C]. F testified that he repeatedly asked Families SA to allow him access to C and to arrange DNA testing:AWell, I was also at the time having a lot of trouble even getting hold of Rachel [Vogelsang], me and mum were, I’d ring repeatedly, always take a message, she’ll be back tomorrow, it would take weeks just to get hold of her because I really needed referrals sent down to Adelaide, I needed to get things moving for [A] and on top of that I continued to ask for this DNA test and she kept telling me ‘Yeah, that’s underway, that won’t be long, just focus on [A] and I’ll send the referral down, that should be next week’. A month later, no referral, no test, so me and mum basically had to sort out the whole reunification with [A]. F acknowledged A’s behavioural problems but continued:AJust, you know, sometimes it was hard to get him to settle when he’s a bit amped up and, you know, sometimes he repeats the same mistakes or doesn’t listen to you when you’re telling him what to do sometimes. But he’s a lot different know that he’s – I’m guessing he’s more settled with me also but the Ritalin, as well, has really helped him with that. He’s able to focus, he can hear what you’re saying, it’s not just in one ear and out the other. He doesn’t need to bounce around a room and demand attention from everyone. DC is the paternal grandmother of C. F gave evidence at trial that A was placed in her care for about 15 months. DC testified that she rang Ms Vogelsang soon after C was born asking whether there would be a DNA test to establish paternity of C. DC gave evidence that, once F’s paternity was confirmed, she contacted Ms Vogelsang by email and informed her that she would like access to her granddaughter. She gave evidence that she would support F if C were to be placed in his care. DC confirmed that she had arranged for F to undertake courses to improve his parenting skills.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For those reasons, we would dismiss the appeal. Whether or not the Youth Court would entertain an application to vary or revoke an order will be a matter for it to determine. In the ordinary course, an application brought soon after a final order for permanent guardianship is made would be an abuse of process. However, in this case the evidence of C’s time with F has not been judicially considered. Depending on the expert evidence which F might still obtain, and depending on how much more time elapses, the Youth Court may entertain an application to vary or revoke an order on its merits.Conclusion We would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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