SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Youth Court Appeal)
MINISTER FOR EDUCATION & CHILD DEVELOPMENT v M, L & ORS
[2018] SASC 32
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
19 March 2018
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN - GENERALLY
Appeal against the decision of a Magistrate of the Youth Court refusing to order that the third respondent be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until she attains 18 years of age, pursuant to section 38 of the Children's Protection Act 1993.
The grounds complain of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision and assert that the Magistrate should have been satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that the child would be at risk of serious harm if removed from her foster carers and further complain that inadequate reasons were given for the finding that the father was able, willing and available to provide adequate care for the child.
Held (allowing the appeal):
The Magistrate did not give adequate reasons for her failure to be satisfied of the Minister’s case. To the extent that reasons were given, they did not justify the position reached. The expert witnesses called by the Minister were not contradicted by other evidence. The evidence dictated a conclusion that separation from the foster parents and removal to the father would cause severe trauma to the child of an ongoing nature. The orders sought should have been made.
Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 38, s 47A, s 48; Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) s 22; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 359; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42, referred to.
MINISTER FOR EDUCATION & CHILD DEVELOPMENT v M, L & ORS
[2018] SASC 32Youth Court Appeal
VANSTONE J: The Minister for Education and Child Development appeals against a decision of a Magistrate of the Youth Court refusing to order that the child “C” be placed under her guardianship until she attains 18 years of age.
The grounds of appeal complain of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision; in particular for failing to be satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that C would be at significant risk of serious harm to her physical, psychological and emotional wellbeing if removed from the care of her foster parents, and for the finding that the father was able, willing and available to provide adequate care for the child.
Background
At the time judgment was delivered, C was just over two years and eight months of age. Since she was 10 days old, she was cared for by foster parents (“Mr and Mrs FP”), her mother having signed a voluntary custody agreement. After an application for an investigation and assessment order made soon after C’s birth, a 12 month guardianship order in favour of the Minister was made on 7 July 2015.
For a period…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Education & Child Development v M, L and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] SASC 32
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal court found that the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they did not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was powerful, and opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century supported the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in relation to the importance of safeguarding a young child's parental or quasi-parental attachments. The Magistrate was extremely critical of Ms Watherston's change of mind regarding whether unification should take place, but the appeal court found that her change of mind did not discredit her opinion. The appeal court considered that the Magistrate's failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises that did not bear scrutiny.
The appeal court considered that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The court found that the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they did not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was powerful and opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century supported the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in relation to the importance of safeguarding a young child's parental or quasi-parental attachments. The Magistrate's failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises that did not bear scrutiny. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The Minister's appeal was upheld and the decision of the Magistrate was set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Similar arguments were made by counsel for the mother. Additional case law on the question of adequacy of reasons was cited by counsel.Consideration The Minister’s appeal should be upheld. In my opinion, the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they do not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was, on its face, powerful. In essence, it was that removal at age two from the only carers C had known, to whom she was deeply attached, would cause serious harm to her welfare and development (Ms Nicolaou) or, “a major trauma” in C’s life with a negative impact on all areas of her future development (Ms Connor). These opinions were not simply personal opinions of the three witnesses, nor even simply common sense, but opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century. While Mr Abbott was inclined to dismiss attachment theory as a mere theory which the Magistrate was free to reject, the articles tendered show it has been well-documented and accepted. Not only that, its relevance in this case was attested to by the expert witnesses. There was no evidence to the contrary. Her Honour’s failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises. I shall deal with them in turn. The Magistrate implicitly rejected the significance of a removal of a child of C’s age from the only family/carers she had known and found that (mere) grief would result. While the Magistrate referred at [145] to the articles tendered, she set them aside by saying that the case studies they contained were irrelevant, dealing as they did with children who had been subjected to multiple foster placements. However, the purview of the articles was far wider than the case studies. What they did was lend support to the fundamental importance of safeguarding a young child’s parental or quasi-parental attachments. They supported the strength of the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in that regard. The Magistrate was extremely critical of Ms Watherston’s change of mind regarding whether unification should take place. There are a number of observations to be made about that. Firstly, Ms Watherston’s views in favour of unification were always premised on access visits being positive and on the development of a relationship between F and C. Then, her change of mind did not rest – as the Magistrate said – solely on her being influenced by Ms Nicolaou’s views. Certainly one would hope that Ms Watherston would remain open‑minded throughout the process and, bearing in mind Ms Watherston’s lack of experience in the field, it is not surprising that she would pay attention to the considered views of another psychologist, far more experienced than she herself was. However, in changing her opinion, Ms Watherston expressly relied on reports of access visits made since her first report, the great majority of which were very negative in terms of the development of warmth between C and F and in relation to F’s capacity to manage both B and C. Since satisfactory progress in those matters was a stipulated condition of Ms Watherston’s original support for unification, her ultimate change of mind does nothing, in my view, to discredit her. Indeed, it only brought her opinion into line with those of the other psychologist and the senior social worker who gave reports on the advisability of unification. I consider that in this instance the change of mind of Ms Watherston indicated some maturity. She having withdrawn her original views, no expert witness supported unification with F.