Minister for Education & Child Development v M, L

Link copied
Case Copied 50 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Youth Court Appeal)

MINISTER FOR EDUCATION & CHILD DEVELOPMENT v M, L & ORS

[2018] SASC 32

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

19 March 2018

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN - GENERALLY

Appeal against the decision of a Magistrate of the Youth Court refusing to order that the third respondent be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until she attains 18 years of age, pursuant to section 38 of the Children's Protection Act 1993.

The grounds complain of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision and assert that the Magistrate should have been satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that the child would be at risk of serious harm if removed from her foster carers and further complain that inadequate reasons were given for the finding that the father was able, willing and available to provide adequate care for the child.

Held (allowing the appeal):

The Magistrate did not give adequate reasons for her failure to be satisfied of the Minister’s case.  To the extent that reasons were given, they did not justify the position reached.  The expert witnesses called by the Minister were not contradicted by other evidence.  The evidence dictated a conclusion that separation from the foster parents and removal to the father would cause severe trauma to the child of an ongoing nature.  The orders sought should have been made.

Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 38, s 47A, s 48; Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) s 22; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 359; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42, referred to.

MINISTER FOR EDUCATION & CHILD DEVELOPMENT v M, L & ORS
[2018] SASC 32

Youth Court Appeal

  1. VANSTONE J:     The Minister for Education and Child Development appeals against a decision of a Magistrate of the Youth Court refusing to order that the child “C” be placed under her guardianship until she attains 18 years of age. 

  2. The grounds of appeal complain of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision; in particular for failing to be satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that C would be at significant risk of serious harm to her physical, psychological and emotional wellbeing if removed from the care of her foster parents, and for the finding that the father was able, willing and available to provide adequate care for the child.

    Background

  3. At the time judgment was delivered, C was just over two years and eight months of age.  Since she was 10 days old, she was cared for by foster parents (“Mr and Mrs FP”), her mother having signed a voluntary custody agreement.  After an application for an investigation and assessment order made soon after C’s birth, a 12 month guardianship order in favour of the Minister was made on 7 July 2015.

  4. For a period…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Education & Child Development v M, L and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] SASC 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Minister for Education and Child Development sought an appeal against the decision of a Magistrate who dismissed the application for a Care and Protection Order for a child named C. The Magistrate declined to make the order, despite the Minister's assertion that C would be at significant risk of serious harm to her physical, psychological, and emotional wellbeing if removed from the care of her foster parents, and that the father was able, willing, and available to provide adequate care for the child. The grounds of appeal complained of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision, particularly the Magistrate's failure to be satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that C would be at significant risk of serious harm to her physical, psychological, and emotional wellbeing if removed from the care of her foster parents.

The appeal court found that the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they did not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was powerful, and opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century supported the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in relation to the importance of safeguarding a young child's parental or quasi-parental attachments. The Magistrate was extremely critical of Ms Watherston's change of mind regarding whether unification should take place, but the appeal court found that her change of mind did not discredit her opinion. The appeal court considered that the Magistrate's failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises that did not bear scrutiny.

The appeal court considered that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The court found that the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they did not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was powerful and opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century supported the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in relation to the importance of safeguarding a young child's parental or quasi-parental attachments. The Magistrate's failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises that did not bear scrutiny. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The appeal court found that the Magistrate's reasons for declining to make the order were inadequate and that the Minister's appeal should be upheld. The Minister's appeal was upheld and the decision of the Magistrate was set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The grounds of appeal complain of a lack of adequate reasons for the decision; in particular for failing to be satisfied on the uncontradicted evidence that C would be at significant risk of serious harm to her physical, psychological and emotional wellbeing if removed from the care of her foster parents, and for the finding that the father was able, willing and available to provide adequate care for the child.Background At the time judgment was delivered, C was just over two years and eight months of age. Since she was 10 days old, she was cared for by foster parents (“Mr and Mrs FP”), her mother having signed a voluntary custody agreement. After an application for an investigation and assessment order made soon after C’s birth, a 12 month guardianship order in favour of the Minister was made on 7 July 2015. For a period of some months it was unclear who was the father of C. By November 2015, when that was established, C’s father “F” had long lived separately from C’s mother, “M”. At that time F had recently undertaken care of C’s brother “B”, who is about five years older than C. C’s half-sister “S” has lived with the foster parents, Mr and Mrs FP, at all relevant times. C first met F, her father, during an access visit in January 2016, by which time C was aged about nine months. Access visits were then continued with varying regularity until suspended in mid-May 2017. The judgment was delivered on 5 January 2018 and C then went to F immediately. From before C’s birth, personnel of Families SA had a good deal of contact with C’s mother, her two children to another man, and C’s father, as well as with C’s full brother, B. The social worker in charge of C’s case was Ms Vogelsang, under the supervision of Ms Goepfert. On 29 June 2016, an application for a second 12 month guardianship order in favour of the Minister was lodged. It was supported by a report signed by Ms Vogelsang and countersigned by Ms Goepfert. It set out a good deal of history of the interaction of both M and F with Families SA in relation to the children, S and B, as well as C’s circumstances. It outlined something of the access which had taken place between F and C, once he had been established to be her father. It noted F’s attitude that he would like to see C in his own care, along with her brother, B. The authors advised that C was happy in the care of Mr and Mrs FP and that C and her sister had formed a strong bond. Some notable reservations were expressed with regard to F’s parenting abilities, in particular his ability to engage with C and to read her non-verbal cues to him. The boy, B, was also noted to have displayed jealousy about the interaction between F and C. The purpose of seeking an additional Care and Protection Order was given as allowing time for further assessment to occur regarding F’s parenting capacity and to allow for C to further attach with her father, given that the authors were not satisfied that F was able to meet the collective needs of C and B, or that a strong connection between father and daughter had been established. Nonetheless, if matters progressed satisfactorily, then unification with the father was seen as a goal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At trial, counsel for the Minister tendered a large volume of materials comprising all the reports I have mentioned and others, reports of access visits, documents which supported the previous applications for (limited duration) guardianship orders and academic articles relating to attachment theory. Counsel for the Minister called Ms Connor, Ms Vogelsang and Ms McNichol. The father, F, gave evidence as did his parents. The foster parents did not give evidence and were not represented by counsel.The Magistrate’s judgment The Magistrate gave detailed and lengthy reasons for her decision to decline to make any order. I shall subject the reasons to further analysis in due course. The Magistrate explained the application, its grounds and the statutory framework in which it sat. Her Honour correctly noted that the burden of proof was on the Minister on the balance of probabilities. She then undertook a summary of previous applications made in relation to C, their grounds and some of the evidence in support of them. The Magistrate noted that once F’s paternity was confirmed, he advised Ms Vogelsang and Ms Goepfert that he wished to have C in his care along with B. The Magistrate said that the early reports of access visits were generally positive, although there were reservations in relation to F’s lack of engagement with C and B’s behaviours towards her. The Magistrate examined in some detail Ms Watherston’s report of 27 June 2016 which, despite acknowledgement of the very positive attachment C had with Mr and Mrs FP, favoured unification. She noted that from mid-September 2016 the focus was on unification with F and the case was allocated to Ms Nicolaou on 14 September 2016 with that in mind. The Magistrate then examined Ms Nicolaou’s report in detail, noting that there were positive features of F’s parenting capacity, but other negative features. She referred to Ms Nicolaou’s observation that while B tolerated C at times, at other times he was openly resentful and hostile. The Magistrate referred to Ms Nicolaou’s assertion that Mr and Mrs FP’s interest should be taken account of in the decision making process. She then contrasted some observations of Ms Nicolaou with much earlier observations of another case worker in relation to B: [49]. The Magistrate noted that Families SA did not seem to be dissatisfied with F’s care of B: [55]. The Magistrate then dealt with a number of aspects of the reports of Ms Watherston, Ms Nicolaou and Ms Vogelsang, which she concluded showed an inconsistency in the attitudes of both Ms Watherston and Ms Nicolaou. She referred to the changed attitude of Ms Watherson in her second addendum report, which she attributed to heavy reliance on Ms Nicolaou’s report: [103]. The Magistrate asserted that there was also evidence of a significant change of mind by Ms Nicolaou. In part that was based on notes made by Ms Vogelsang of a telephone conversation between the two women in which Ms Vogelsang referred both to concerns which Ms Nicolaou held for C’s trauma at separation, but also an assertion by Ms Nicolaou that F was able to respond appropriately to B during the time that Ms Nicolaou was with F and B: [84]. The Magistrate contrasted the comment attributed to Ms Nicolaou with what she took to be the corresponding passage in Ms Nicolaou’s report. She concluded that “Ms Nicolaou has substantially changed her position”: [90]. The Magistrate concluded that Ms Nicolaou had demonstrated what she called “a perception bias” which had emanated from Ms Nicolaou’s empathy for the position of Mr and Mrs FP and which had resulted in “similar bias” in the later reports of Ms Watherston and Ms Connor: [128]. (It will be remembered that neither Ms Watherston nor Ms Nicolaou gave evidence before the Magistrate and so such a proposition was not put to them. Ms Connor gave evidence, but this suggestion was not put to her.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Similar arguments were made by counsel for the mother. Additional case law on the question of adequacy of reasons was cited by counsel.Consideration The Minister’s appeal should be upheld. In my opinion, the Magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the application and, to the extent that she gave reasons, they do not bear scrutiny. The evidence of the three expert witnesses presented by the Minister was, on its face, powerful. In essence, it was that removal at age two from the only carers C had known, to whom she was deeply attached, would cause serious harm to her welfare and development (Ms Nicolaou) or, “a major trauma” in C’s life with a negative impact on all areas of her future development (Ms Connor). These opinions were not simply personal opinions of the three witnesses, nor even simply common sense, but opinions grounded in substantial research conducted over half a century. While Mr Abbott was inclined to dismiss attachment theory as a mere theory which the Magistrate was free to reject, the articles tendered show it has been well-documented and accepted. Not only that, its relevance in this case was attested to by the expert witnesses. There was no evidence to the contrary. Her Honour’s failure to be satisfied that removal of C would entail significant risk rested on a number of premises. I shall deal with them in turn. The Magistrate implicitly rejected the significance of a removal of a child of C’s age from the only family/carers she had known and found that (mere) grief would result. While the Magistrate referred at [145] to the articles tendered, she set them aside by saying that the case studies they contained were irrelevant, dealing as they did with children who had been subjected to multiple foster placements. However, the purview of the articles was far wider than the case studies. What they did was lend support to the fundamental importance of safeguarding a young child’s parental or quasi-parental attachments. They supported the strength of the views of Ms Nicolaou and Ms Connor in that regard. The Magistrate was extremely critical of Ms Watherston’s change of mind regarding whether unification should take place. There are a number of observations to be made about that. Firstly, Ms Watherston’s views in favour of unification were always premised on access visits being positive and on the development of a relationship between F and C. Then, her change of mind did not rest – as the Magistrate said – solely on her being influenced by Ms Nicolaou’s views. Certainly one would hope that Ms Watherston would remain open‑minded throughout the process and, bearing in mind Ms Watherston’s lack of experience in the field, it is not surprising that she would pay attention to the considered views of another psychologist, far more experienced than she herself was. However, in changing her opinion, Ms Watherston expressly relied on reports of access visits made since her first report, the great majority of which were very negative in terms of the development of warmth between C and F and in relation to F’s capacity to manage both B and C. Since satisfactory progress in those matters was a stipulated condition of Ms Watherston’s original support for unification, her ultimate change of mind does nothing, in my view, to discredit her. Indeed, it only brought her opinion into line with those of the other psychologist and the senior social worker who gave reports on the advisability of unification. I consider that in this instance the change of mind of Ms Watherston indicated some maturity. She having withdrawn her original views, no expert witness supported unification with F.