DEANE, DAWSON AND TOOHEY JJ. On 4 March 1993 we granted special leave to the appellant to appeal against the refusal of the Court of Appeal of Queensland to grant an extension of time in which to bring an appeal against his conviction on one count of armed robbery and two related counts. Upon the hearing of the application for special leave both the appellant and the Crown urged us, if special leave were granted, to proceed to determine the appeal. Having granted special leave, we acceded to that request and heard such further argument as the parties wished to put on an appeal. The reason for the request and for our acceding to it will be apparent from the circumstances of the case.
2. The appellant was convicted on 21 May 1992 and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five and a half years. He was advised that an appeal against his conviction had reasonable prospects of success, but that if he were successful he would be retried and, if convicted again, might receive a considerably longer sentence than five and a half years. The appellant chose not to appeal in those circumstances. The last day for appealing was 18 June 1992. On that day the Attorney-General filed a notice of appeal against the appellant's sentence. The appellant was alerted to the intention to appeal when a notice was served on him in gaol on the night of 18 June. But, by reason of some confusion in the papers, he may not have been properly served until 7 July. It is, however, unnecessary that we pursue that aspect of the matter. The appellant rang his solicitors on Friday, 19 June 1992 but was unable to speak to the solicitor handling his matter. On Monday, 22 June 1992 the appellant managed to contact that solicitor, who sent a clerk to the gaol with a notice of appeal against conviction and sentence. The appellant signed the notice and gave instructions for it to be lodged forthwith. The notice of appeal, which is dated 23 June 1992, was lodged in the registry of the Court on 24 June 1992.
3. The appellant's matter came before the Court of Appeal on 10 September 1992 and was treated as an application for an extension of time within which to appeal. At the same time, the Attorney-General's appeal against sentence came before the Court. The Court of Appeal refused the appellant's application for an extension of time but allowed the Attorney-General's appeal and increased the appellant's sentence to a term of imprisonment of ten years.
4. The Court of Appeal held that because the appellant had "made his election, based upon the risks of a greater sentence upon conviction after re-trial, (he) should not be given an opportunity to make a decision (to appeal) outside time only after he had received…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jeffers v R [1993] HCA 11
Case
[1993] HCA 11
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Jeffers v R*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Jeffers, against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations.
The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances where the applicant had been subjected to oppressive and unfair treatment by police. Specifically, the court had to consider the application of the principle that evidence obtained unfairly or oppressively should be excluded, even if it is relevant and otherwise admissible.
The Court held that the evidence in question had been obtained in circumstances that were oppressive and unfair, and therefore should have been excluded from the trial. The judges applied the principle that the court has a discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, and that this discretion extends to evidence obtained unfairly or oppressively. In this instance, the oppressive conduct of the police in obtaining the evidence was found to be so significant that it rendered the evidence inadmissible.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.