In the Matter of Rak

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)

In the Matter of RAK

[2009] SASC 288

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray

11 September 2009

SUCCESSION - WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION - THE MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - IN GENERAL

SUCCESSION - WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION - THE MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS - KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL OF CONTENTS - GENERALLY

SUCCESSION - WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION - THE MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - SOUNDNESS OF MIND, MEMORY AND UNDERSTANDING - FORMS OF UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND

Statutory wills - application for order authorising the making of a will on behalf of person lacking testamentary capacity – not opposed – whether person lacks testamentary capacity – likely intention of proposed testator - whether proposed will accurately reflects likely testamentary intentions – whether reasonable in the circumstances – whether costs of the application should be paid out of the estate of the intended testator.

Held: permission to proceed granted – order authorising making of will in terms proposed - person lacks testamentary capacity – proposed will accurately reflects likely intentions – costs to be paid out of the estate of intended testator.

Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s 72J; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) s 6(i) and 6(j); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 22(b), referred to.
Hill v Hill [2001] VSC 83; Bryant v Blake (2004) 237 LSJS 23; Hoffmann v Waters (2007) 98 SASR 500; Monger v Taylor [2000] VSC 304; Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495; Re Fenwick [2009] NSWSC 530; Re Palmer [2003] VSC 21; Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; In the Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277; Re D (J) (1982) Ch 237; Re C (a Patient) (1991) 3 All ER 866, considered.

In the Matter of RAK
[2009] SASC 288

Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction

GRAY J.

Background

  1. This is an application pursuant to section 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for an order authorising the making of a will. The applicants are Valarie Rak and Jurik Rak, the parents of the proposed testator, Anthony Keith Rak.

  2. Anthony Rak is 30 years of age.  He was born on 12 September 1978.  Anthony suffered a severe hypoxic brain injury as a result of choking on part of a toy at the age of five and half years.  He received a substantial sum by way of compensation, which is currently managed on his behalf by a chartered accountant, Paul Victor Jorgensen.  His estate, as at 10 August 2009, had an estimated value of $4,192,086.00.

  3. Anthony has never made a will, has no children or spouse, and if he were to die intestate, such of his parents who survive him would receive his whole estate, and if both, then in equal shares.[1]

    [1]    Pursuant to Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) section 72J.

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rak, the court was tasked with determining whether to authorise the creation of a statutory will for Anthony, who lacked testamentary capacity. The application was unopposed and involved deciding if Anthony had the capacity to make a will, if the proposed will accurately reflected his likely intentions, and if the costs associated with the application should be covered by Anthony’s estate. The case hinged on statutory provisions under the Wills Act, specifically sections 7(4) and 7(8), which guide the court in assessing testamentary capacity and the reasonableness of making a will under such circumstances.

The court examined whether Anthony lacked testamentary capacity, considering his inability to understand and approve the contents of a will due to his cognitive impairments. It was established that Anthony had never made a will and did not have the mental capacity to do so. The court also considered the likely testamentary intentions of Anthony, concluding that the proposed will was consistent with his probable wishes, given his close relationships with his parents and siblings, and the substantial value of his estate. The court took into account the size of Anthony’s estate and the lack of any evidence suggesting other individuals who might have provided care or support, or that Anthony would make charitable bequests. These considerations led the court to determine that the proposed will was a reasonable reflection of Anthony’s likely intentions.

Based on the findings, the court granted permission for the creation of a statutory will in the terms proposed. It was determined that Anthony lacked testamentary capacity and that the proposed will accurately reflected his likely intentions. The court exercised its discretion under section 7(8) of the Wills Act to order that the costs of the application be paid from Anthony’s estate, considering the genuine nature of the application and the absence of any opposition. This decision ensured that the application process was reasonable and that the costs were appropriately allocated.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Either of the approaches outlined above taken to the present enquiry, will lead to the same conclusion in the circumstance of this case. I am satisfied that in light of the substantial value of Anthony’s estate, it is likely that he would wish to benefit those persons close to him who have provided care and comfort to him, and that it is likely that he would seek to provide funds to be held in a protective trust for the benefit of his brother Damien. Consideration of the Application As earlier stated, it is appropriate to consider the application with regard to the matters set out in section 7(4) of the Wills Act. In the course of my reasons I have done so, but it is appropriate to make further references to this section notwithstanding that it has been observed that the terms of subsection (4) “provide little guidance to the court on that question, especially in the case of an intended testator who has never made a will and who has never had the mental or intellectual capacity to consider how he would like to distribute his estate”.[27][27] Hoffmann v Waters (2007) 98 SASR 500 at [15]. I am satisfied that Anthony lacks testamentary capacity. I am satisfied that the proposed will accurately reflects the likely intentions of Anthony if he had testamentary capacity, to reflect his close relationship with his parents and siblings, and that it is reasonable in all the circumstances that the order should be made. In reaching the latter two conclusions I have considered the matters referred to in section 7(4). No previous wills have been made, and there is no likelihood of Anthony acquiring testamentary capacity. I have had regard to those persons who would be entitled to benefit from the estate if Anthony were to die intestate, in addition to those who would be entitled to claim benefit under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act. I have had regard to the size of Anthony’s estate. No evidence was adduced as to the existence of persons, other than the plaintiffs and Katrina who have cared for or provided emotional support to Anthony. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that there exists any need for provision of a gift for a charitable or other purpose that Anthony might reasonably be expected to give by a will. Costs The terms of section 7(8) of the Wills Act confer on the Court a wide discretion as to costs in these matters. It was submitted by the plaintiffs that their costs, in addition to the costs of Katrina and Damien in relation to and incidental to this application, should be paid from the estate of Anthony. As earlier observed, the application in the within proceeding is a genuine one, made in the absence of any will. The circumstances are such that the application is a reasonable one. It is for these reasons that I consider it appropriate that the costs of the aforementioned parties be paid from the estate of Anthony.[28][28] For discussion of the competing considerations in this context see Hoffmann v Waters (2007) 98 SASR 500 at [21]-[26].Order