SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)
In the Matter of R, J
[2017] SASC 153
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley
31 October 2017
SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - LOSS OR LACK OF CAPACITY AND STATUTORY WILLS
Application for the making of a statutory will pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). JR, the proposed testator, is the named defendant and is represented by a litigation guardian. The plaintiff is JR's mother.
JR was diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment and obsessive-compulsive disorder at a young age. In January 2010, he fell from a bridge and suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and a severe spinal cord injury. As a result of a settlement in relation to those injuries, JR now has a substantial estate.
He has been assessed as having no capacity to understand the nature of property, its ownership or administration, and even at a basic level he does not have an understanding of his assets nor the extent of his assets. There is no prospect of improvement to his physical or intellectual functioning.
Held: Application granted. JR lacks testamentary capacity and it is appropriate in the circumstances for the Court to make a will. There is evidence that the will would reflect the likely intentions of JR if he had testamentary capacity.
Wills Act 1936 (SA), referred to.
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; In the Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Re Fensick (2009) 76 NSWLR 22; In the Matter of K, JL [2016] SASC 53, applied.
In the Matter of Pickles [2013] SASC 175, considered.
In the Matter of R, J
[2017] SASC 153
STANLEY J: This is an application for the making of a statutory will, pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (the Act). The plaintiff in this matter is the mother of JR. JR is the named defendant to the application. The Court appointed Mr Philip Westover as the litigation guardian for JR. While the plaintiff propounded a will in specific terms which was opposed by the litigation guardian, ultimately, on the hearing of the application, the parties put to the Court a joint position as to the terms of a statutory will to be made.
I am satisfied that the Court should make a will pursuant to s 7 of the Act in terms close to those agreed between the parties.
My reasons follow.
The proposed will
The proposed will appoints Perpetual Trustee Company Limited as executor and trustee. The will provides for the payment of all debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and then distributes the residuary estate 75 per cent to the plaintiff if she survives JR, and 25 per cent to LAT if he survives. The will provides that, should the gift to LAT fail, the plaintiff would take his share of the estate. If the gift to the plaintiff fails, JR’s niece, BES, and nephew, BS, should take…
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- Case
- [2017] SASC 153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around JR's testamentary capacity and, if lacking such capacity, identifying the appropriate beneficiaries for his estate. The court needed to establish whether JR had the intellectual capacity to understand the nature of property, ownership, and administration of his assets, and if not, to determine the beneficiaries of his estate based on his likely testamentary intentions.
The court found that JR lacked testamentary capacity, as evidenced by medical reports and expert opinions, including that of Professor McFarlane. Despite the absence of subjective evidence of JR's testamentary intentions, the court relied on objective evidence, such as affidavits and the nature of relationships, to infer his likely intentions. The plaintiff, as JR’s primary caregiver, was deemed the principal beneficiary, but the court also considered the significant role played by LAT, JR's "step dad," who had provided care and support for over a decade. The court concluded that a 75/25 split between the plaintiff and LAT reflected JR’s likely testamentary intentions, excluding JR’s biological father due to the lack of any relationship.
The court granted permission to make a statutory will for JR, directing that 75% of his estate go to his mother and 25% to LAT, with provisions for other beneficiaries in the event of their predecease or failure to survive JR. This decision was made in the absence of any other potential beneficiaries who had cared for or supported JR.
The final orders authorized the making of a statutory will as per the annexed document, reflecting the court's determinations on JR’s likely testamentary intentions and the appropriate distribution of his estate.
Background
Background to the litigation
JR has resided in supported accommodation provided by CARA in Murray Bridge since his discharge from hospital in 2010. His primary caregiver since birth has been the plaintiff, who is now 65 years old and continues to provide significant care and support. JR has no contact with his biological father and believes him to be deceased. He is aware of his niece and nephew but has limited contact with them. Since 2004, the plaintiff has lived with LAT, who is 46 years old, divorced, and has no children. LAT has a partial disability due to a brain aneurysm and a damaged knee, and he has formed a close relationship with JR, visiting him regularly and referring to LAT as his "step dad".
Given JR's lack of testamentary capacity, the court is tasked with determining the appropriate distribution of his estate. The court considers that JR’s biological father should not benefit from his estate due to their lack of relationship. Instead, the court focuses on the evidence of JR’s likely testamentary intentions, considering the close and supportive relationship between JR and LAT. The court concludes that the distribution of JR’s estate should reflect the plaintiff’s lifelong care for him as his biological mother and the significant support provided by LAT over the past 13 years. The court proposes a division of 75 per cent to the plaintiff and 25 per cent to LAT, believing this to be in line with JR’s likely intentions if he had testamentary capacity.
The matter before the court involves an application for the making of a statutory will in the case of JR, who has been diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. JR suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in 2010, which has rendered him incapable of making his own testamentary dispositions. The plaintiff, JR’s primary caregiver since his birth, applied for the court to authorise the making of a statutory will. This application was brought pursuant to section 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). JR’s biological father was served with the application but has indicated no wish to participate in the proceedings. The court considered the evidence presented, including affidavits and expert medical opinions, and was satisfied that JR lacks testamentary capacity. The court found it appropriate to make a statutory will to ensure JR’s estate is distributed according to his likely intentions, considering the lack of evidence of his subjective testamentary intentions. The court also took into account the significant relationship between JR and LAT, who has provided substantial care and support for over a decade, and deemed it appropriate to include LAT in the distribution of JR’s estate.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
JR’s biological father was served with the application and has indicated he has no wish to be heard or otherwise participate in the proceedings.Consideration In this case, there is no dispute and I am satisfied that the proposed testator, JR, lacks testamentary capacity. So much is evident from the medical evidence, including, in particular, the report of Professor McFarlane. I am satisfied that it is appropriate the Court should make a will in the circumstances of this case where the proposed testator has a large estate, lacks testamentary capacity and it would not be appropriate for his estate to be administered on the basis of an intestacy, given that it would fall to be divided equally between the plaintiff and JR’s biological father who has no present relationship with him and never had anything to do with him. In these circumstances I am satisfied that if JR had testamentary capacity it is likely he would have excluded him from his estate. Accordingly, at issue is the contents of the will where the proposed testator’s biological father is excluded as a beneficiary. This is a nil capacity case. While I am satisfied that there is no evidence of the subjective testamentary intentions of JR available to the Court, there is evidence of his views which provide a foundation from which the Court can make findings which would inform the Court’s objective assessment of his likely testamentary intentions. I accept that the plaintiff’s evidence of her son’s wishes is likely to reflect his actual intentions if he had testamentary capacity. Her evidence is contrary to her interest given that she stands to be the sole beneficiary of his estate if provision is not made for LAT. There is no issue that the plaintiff should be the principal beneficiary of her son’s estate in the event she does not predecease him. The real question is whether she should be the sole beneficiary or whether LAT or anyone else should also be included in JR’s bounty, given the view I have come to that it is inappropriate that JR’s biological father should benefit from his estate. In this case I am satisfied that if he had testamentary capacity JR would have wished to make provision in his will for LAT given the nature of their relationship, as JR understands it, and the support LAT has provided to JR for more than a decade. While provision for a non-family member is unusual, it is plainly contemplated by the Act. Section 7(4)(d)(iv) provides that in considering an application for an order the court must take into account the interests of any other person who has cared for or provided emotional support to the person. In In the Matter of Pickles[18] Gray J made a specific bequest to a carer who provided significant support to a person under a disability for many years.[19] [18] [2013] SASC 175.[19] [2013] SASC 175 at [33]-[41] and [49]. In my view it is likely that the distribution of JR’s estate would reflect the fact that the plaintiff has cared for him for his entire life and is his biological mother. While LAT is not a blood relative he has been involved in JR’s life for some 13 years. I consider that a division of his estate on the basis of 75 per cent to the plaintiff and 25 per cent to LAT is likely to reflect his actual testamentary intentions if he had testamentary capacity.