In the Matter of R, J

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction: Application)

In the Matter of R, J

[2017] SASC 153

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

31 October 2017

SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY - LOSS OR LACK OF CAPACITY AND STATUTORY WILLS

Application for the making of a statutory will pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). JR, the proposed testator, is the named defendant and is represented by a litigation guardian. The plaintiff is JR's mother.

JR was diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment and obsessive-compulsive disorder at a young age.  In January 2010, he fell from a bridge and suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and a severe spinal cord injury.  As a result of a settlement in relation to those injuries, JR now has a substantial estate.

He has been assessed as having no capacity to understand the nature of property, its ownership or administration, and even at a basic level he does not have an understanding of his assets nor the extent of his assets.  There is no prospect of improvement to his physical or intellectual functioning.

Held:  Application granted.  JR lacks testamentary capacity and it is appropriate in the circumstances for the Court to make a will.  There is evidence that the will would reflect the likely intentions of JR if he had testamentary capacity.

Wills Act 1936 (SA), referred to.
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; In the Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197; Re Fensick (2009) 76 NSWLR 22; In the Matter of K, JL [2016] SASC 53, applied.
In the Matter of Pickles [2013] SASC 175, considered.

In the Matter of R, J
[2017] SASC 153

  1. STANLEY J:       This is an application for the making of a statutory will, pursuant to s 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (the Act). The plaintiff in this matter is the mother of JR. JR is the named defendant to the application. The Court appointed Mr Philip Westover as the litigation guardian for JR. While the plaintiff propounded a will in specific terms which was opposed by the litigation guardian, ultimately, on the hearing of the application, the parties put to the Court a joint position as to the terms of a statutory will to be made.

  2. I am satisfied that the Court should make a will pursuant to s 7 of the Act in terms close to those agreed between the parties.

  3. My reasons follow.

    The proposed will

  4. The proposed will appoints Perpetual Trustee Company Limited as executor and trustee.  The will provides for the payment of all debts, funeral and testamentary expenses and then distributes the residuary estate 75 per cent to the plaintiff if she survives JR, and 25 per cent to LAT if he survives.  The will provides that, should the gift to LAT fail, the plaintiff would take his share of the estate.  If the gift to the plaintiff fails, JR’s niece, BES, and nephew, BS, should take…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASC 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves JR, a 31-year-old man suffering from autism, intellectual impairment, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, and the plaintiff, his biological mother, who seeks to establish a statutory will on his behalf. The South Australian Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether JR lacked testamentary capacity and, if so, to decide the appropriate beneficiaries of his substantial estate, valued at $3.2 million, stemming from a settlement with the State of South Australia for injuries sustained in a fall.

The primary legal issues revolved around JR's testamentary capacity and, if lacking such capacity, identifying the appropriate beneficiaries for his estate. The court needed to establish whether JR had the intellectual capacity to understand the nature of property, ownership, and administration of his assets, and if not, to determine the beneficiaries of his estate based on his likely testamentary intentions.

The court found that JR lacked testamentary capacity, as evidenced by medical reports and expert opinions, including that of Professor McFarlane. Despite the absence of subjective evidence of JR's testamentary intentions, the court relied on objective evidence, such as affidavits and the nature of relationships, to infer his likely intentions. The plaintiff, as JR’s primary caregiver, was deemed the principal beneficiary, but the court also considered the significant role played by LAT, JR's "step dad," who had provided care and support for over a decade. The court concluded that a 75/25 split between the plaintiff and LAT reflected JR’s likely testamentary intentions, excluding JR’s biological father due to the lack of any relationship.

The court granted permission to make a statutory will for JR, directing that 75% of his estate go to his mother and 25% to LAT, with provisions for other beneficiaries in the event of their predecease or failure to survive JR. This decision was made in the absence of any other potential beneficiaries who had cared for or supported JR.

The final orders authorized the making of a statutory will as per the annexed document, reflecting the court's determinations on JR’s likely testamentary intentions and the appropriate distribution of his estate.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns JR, born on 11 July 1986, who was diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment, and obsessive-compulsive disorder at a young age. His behavioural issues led to his placement at the Strathmont Centre in 2005. In January 2010, JR escaped from the Centre and suffered a severe traumatic brain injury and a spinal cord injury from a fall, which resulted in permanent disabilities. His intellectual functioning and ability to understand property and its administration are severely impaired, as confirmed by Professor McFarlane. Despite his severe disabilities, JR has an estate valued at $3.2 million from a settlement with the State of South Australia.

JR has resided in supported accommodation provided by CARA in Murray Bridge since his discharge from hospital in 2010. His primary caregiver since birth has been the plaintiff, who is now 65 years old and continues to provide significant care and support. JR has no contact with his biological father and believes him to be deceased. He is aware of his niece and nephew but has limited contact with them. Since 2004, the plaintiff has lived with LAT, who is 46 years old, divorced, and has no children. LAT has a partial disability due to a brain aneurysm and a damaged knee, and he has formed a close relationship with JR, visiting him regularly and referring to LAT as his "step dad".

Given JR's lack of testamentary capacity, the court is tasked with determining the appropriate distribution of his estate. The court considers that JR’s biological father should not benefit from his estate due to their lack of relationship. Instead, the court focuses on the evidence of JR’s likely testamentary intentions, considering the close and supportive relationship between JR and LAT. The court concludes that the distribution of JR’s estate should reflect the plaintiff’s lifelong care for him as his biological mother and the significant support provided by LAT over the past 13 years. The court proposes a division of 75 per cent to the plaintiff and 25 per cent to LAT, believing this to be in line with JR’s likely intentions if he had testamentary capacity.

The matter before the court involves an application for the making of a statutory will in the case of JR, who has been diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. JR suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in 2010, which has rendered him incapable of making his own testamentary dispositions. The plaintiff, JR’s primary caregiver since his birth, applied for the court to authorise the making of a statutory will. This application was brought pursuant to section 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). JR’s biological father was served with the application but has indicated no wish to participate in the proceedings. The court considered the evidence presented, including affidavits and expert medical opinions, and was satisfied that JR lacks testamentary capacity. The court found it appropriate to make a statutory will to ensure JR’s estate is distributed according to his likely intentions, considering the lack of evidence of his subjective testamentary intentions. The court also took into account the significant relationship between JR and LAT, who has provided substantial care and support for over a decade, and deemed it appropriate to include LAT in the distribution of JR’s estate.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While in Re Fenwick Palmer J referred to the relevant inquiry in a nil capacity case being entirely objective, as Doyle J points out in K, JL,[17] this is merely a reflection of the fact that evidence of subjective intention is generally unavailable, rather than it being irrelevant as a matter of principle. The Court’s focus is upon the nature of the facts and evidence in the particular case.[17] [2016] SASC 53 at [53].Evidence I have received in evidence and had regard to affidavits of the plaintiff dated 16 May 2017, Judith Ann Elkson dated 31 January 2017, Errol Kaplan dated 26 June 2017, 6 July 2017 and 18 July 2017 and Philip Westover dated 18 July 2017. The proposed testator, JR, was born on 11 July 1986. He is currently 31 years of age. He was diagnosed with autism, intellectual impairment and obsessive-compulsive disorder at a young age. There is a long history of behavioural issues with aggressive outbursts prior to JR being accommodated in the Strathmont Centre in July 2005. In January 2010, he escaped from the Strathmont Centre and fell from a bridge suffering a severe traumatic brain injury and a severe spinal cord injury. There is no prospect he will recover from his injuries, nor will his intellectual functioning improve. Professor McFarlane considers that JR does not have the intellectual reasoning capacity to understand the nature of property, its ownership or its administration. Even at the most basic level, he does not have an understanding of his assets and the extent of his property. As a result of a settlement with the State of SA in relation to the injuries suffered in the fall from the bridge, JR now has an estate currently valued at $3.2 million. From shortly after JR’s discharge from hospital following the 2010 injury, he has resided in supported accommodation provided by CARA in Murray Bridge. Since JR’s birth, his primary caregiver has been the plaintiff. She is now 65 years of age. She continues to provide significant care and support to him. By contrast, JR has had no contact with his biological father since he was a newborn baby. He does not know his father and, in fact, believes him to be deceased. JR has a niece and nephew. He is aware of their existence, but has had limited contact with them. Since 2004, the plaintiff has resided with LAT. He is currently 46 years of age, is divorced and has no children. The plaintiff is LAT’s carer. He has a partial disability due to having a brain aneurism and a damaged knee. The plaintiff and LAT have lived in a mutually-supportive but non-romantic relationship for over a decade. He provides the plaintiff with companionship and some household support. Importantly, for the purposes of this application, he has formed a close relationship with JR. He visits JR on a regular weekly basis and takes him on outings. JR described him to Mr Westover as his “step dad”. The occupational therapist’s report described JR as referring to LAT as a “father figure”. There is independent evidence of the care, support and companionship LAT has provided to JR over a lengthy period of time. This continues.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally I am not aware of any other who would likely be entitled to bring an inheritance claim who has otherwise cared for or supported JR for whom provision should be made. Conclusion For these reasons I propose to give permission as required pursuant to s 7(1) of the Act to bring this application and authorise the making of a statutory will in terms of the document annexed hereto. ANNEXURETHIS IS THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT of me, [JR] of [address] in the State of South Australia, Unemployed.1. I REVOKE all former wills and testamentary dispositions made by me and I DECLARE this to be my last Will and Testament.2.I APPOINT PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED of Level 11, 101 Grenfell Street Adelaide in the State of South Australia to be the Executor and Trustee of this my Will (hereinafter referred to as "the Trustee").3.I GIVE to the Trustee the whole of my real and personal estate of whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever situate upon trust and I DIRECT that the Trustee sell call in and convert into money such part or parts thereof as may not consist of money and to hold the net proceeds thereof together with such part or parts of my estate as may consist of money or may for the time being remain unconverted upon the following further trusts:(a)To pay thereout all my just debts funeral and testamentary expenses including all probate death and estate duties of whatsoever kind which may be payable in my estate or in any way in consequence of my death.(b)To divide and distribute the balance then remaining as follows:(i) As to seventy five per cent (75%) thereof, for my mother [SVR] if she survives me; and(ii) As to twenty five per cent (25%) thereof, for my friend [LAT] if he survives me;4.Should the gift referred to in clause 3(b)(ii) above fail as a result of my said friend [LAT] having predeceased me, then such gift shall instead go to my mother [SVR] if she survives me.5.If my mother [SVR] fails to survive me, then her interest in my estate is to be distributed in accordance with clause of 6 herein of this my will.6.Should any of the above gifts to my said mother [SVR] fail as a result of her having not survived me, then such gifts shall be divided equally between my niece [BES] and my nephew [BS] and if either [BES] or [BS] predecease me leaving a child or children who survive me then such child or children shall take equally the share in my estate that their parent would have otherwise taken had they survived me and if [BES] or [BS] die without leaving such child or children who survive me then to the survivor of either [BES] or [BS] or their children who shall survive me.7.Should the gifts referred to in clause 5 herein fail I then give the residue of my estate to THE PARAPLEGIC & QUADRIPLEGIC ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA INC (ABN 92713327348), AUTISM ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (ABN 98164545215) and COMMUNITY ACCOMMODATION & RESPITE AGENCY INC (ABN 22813645129) (or if any of the said organisation(s) no longer exist at my death, then to the surviving intuition and if none of the named institutions no longer exist then to such other body or institution as my Trustee in its absolute discretion determines carries out the same or similar charitable or benevolent purposes) in equal shares and I DIRECT that the receipt of each such bequest by the Secretary or other proper officer of such organisation(s) shall be sufficient discharge to the Trustee for such bequest.8. I GIVE to the Trustee the following powers:(a)to sell any asset of the estate which is not the subject of a specific gift under this my Will.(b)to sell call in and convert into money such part or parts of my estate and property as may not consist of money.(c)to sell lease exchange or otherwise dispose of assets in my estate on such terms as the Trustee considers expedient as though the Trustee were the absolute beneficial owner thereof.(d)to postpone without being responsible for loss the sale calling in and conversion of the whole or any part of my estate for such period as the Trustee may think fit and notwithstanding that it may be of a wasting speculative or hazardous nature.(e)to invest in shares and debentures listed on any stock exchange, unit trusts, mutual funds, real estate of any tenure, and loans secured or unsecured in addition to the powers of investment authorised by law.(f)to invest such of the proceeds of conversion of my trust estate and my ready moneys as may from time to time be available for investment (including unapplied income) in any of the modes of investment for the time being authorised by the laws for the investment of trust funds.(g)to invest and vary investments as the Trustee may think fit with power to invest in unsecured interest free loans or other non‑income producing property including property to be used for occupation by any one or more beneficiaries under this my Will.(h)to borrow money on such terms as the Trustee may think fit and use such moneys for any purpose for which the capital of my estate may be used.(i)to make such outlay as may from time to time be considered necessary for repairs alterations or improvements to any property forming part of my estate.(j)to apply for the maintenance education or benefit of any minor beneficiary as the Trustee thinks fit the whole or any part of the capital of that part of my estate to which that beneficiary is entitled or may in future be entitled.(k)to apply for the benefit of any beneficiary as the Trustee thinks fit the whole or any part of the capital to which that beneficiary is entitled or may in future be entitled.(l)to appropriate any asset of my estate not specifically given at a price being the value determined by a qualified person without the consent of the beneficiary in full or partial satisfaction of any legacy or share in my estate.9.I DIRECT that where a distribution to a beneficiary follows realisation of an asset by the Trustee, or transmission or transfer of an asset in specie, where the Trustee is or may become liable for the payment of capital gains tax ("CGT"), that distribution is subject to the CGT liability. The amount or relevant proportion of CGT paid or payable shall be adjusted against that beneficiary's entitlement, which is charged with the amount of CGT.Dated the day of 2017

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

JR’s biological father was served with the application and has indicated he has no wish to be heard or otherwise participate in the proceedings.Consideration In this case, there is no dispute and I am satisfied that the proposed testator, JR, lacks testamentary capacity. So much is evident from the medical evidence, including, in particular, the report of Professor McFarlane. I am satisfied that it is appropriate the Court should make a will in the circumstances of this case where the proposed testator has a large estate, lacks testamentary capacity and it would not be appropriate for his estate to be administered on the basis of an intestacy, given that it would fall to be divided equally between the plaintiff and JR’s biological father who has no present relationship with him and never had anything to do with him. In these circumstances I am satisfied that if JR had testamentary capacity it is likely he would have excluded him from his estate. Accordingly, at issue is the contents of the will where the proposed testator’s biological father is excluded as a beneficiary. This is a nil capacity case. While I am satisfied that there is no evidence of the subjective testamentary intentions of JR available to the Court, there is evidence of his views which provide a foundation from which the Court can make findings which would inform the Court’s objective assessment of his likely testamentary intentions. I accept that the plaintiff’s evidence of her son’s wishes is likely to reflect his actual intentions if he had testamentary capacity. Her evidence is contrary to her interest given that she stands to be the sole beneficiary of his estate if provision is not made for LAT. There is no issue that the plaintiff should be the principal beneficiary of her son’s estate in the event she does not predecease him. The real question is whether she should be the sole beneficiary or whether LAT or anyone else should also be included in JR’s bounty, given the view I have come to that it is inappropriate that JR’s biological father should benefit from his estate. In this case I am satisfied that if he had testamentary capacity JR would have wished to make provision in his will for LAT given the nature of their relationship, as JR understands it, and the support LAT has provided to JR for more than a decade. While provision for a non-family member is unusual, it is plainly contemplated by the Act. Section 7(4)(d)(iv) provides that in considering an application for an order the court must take into account the interests of any other person who has cared for or provided emotional support to the person. In In the Matter of Pickles[18] Gray J made a specific bequest to a carer who provided significant support to a person under a disability for many years.[19] [18] [2013] SASC 175.[19] [2013] SASC 175 at [33]-[41] and [49]. In my view it is likely that the distribution of JR’s estate would reflect the fact that the plaintiff has cared for him for his entire life and is his biological mother. While LAT is not a blood relative he has been involved in JR’s life for some 13 years. I consider that a division of his estate on the basis of 75 per cent to the plaintiff and 25 per cent to LAT is likely to reflect his actual testamentary intentions if he had testamentary capacity.