FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Huntley Management Limited v Timbercorp Securities Limited (No 2)
[2010] FCA 623
Citation: Huntley Management Limited v Timbercorp Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 623 Parties: HUNTLEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED ACN 089 240 513 and FOOD AND BEVERAGE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 007 996 081 v TIMBERCORP SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 092 311 469 (IN LIQUIDATION) and MARK ANTONY KORDA AND LEANNE KYLIE CHESSER AS LIQUIDATORS OF TIMBERCORP SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 092 311 469 (IN LIQUIDATION) File number: NSD 198 of 2010 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 17 June 2010 Dates of written submissions: 15 and 16 June 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 12 Counsel for the First Plaintiff: BL Jones Solicitor for the First Plaintiff: Piper Alderman Counsel for the First and Second Defendants: O Bigos Solicitor for the First and Second Defendants: Arnold Bloch Leibler
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 198 of 2010
BETWEEN: HUNTLEY MANAGEMENT LIMITED ACN 089 240 513
First PlaintiffFOOD AND BEVERAGE AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 007 996 081
Second Plaintiff
AND: TIMBERCORP SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 092 311 469 (IN LIQUIDATION)
First DefendantMARK ANTONY KORDA AND LEANNE KYLIE CHESSER AS LIQUIDATORS OF TIMBERCORP SECURITIES LIMITED ACN 092 311 469 (IN LIQUIDATION)
Second Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 JUNE 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.From the time the First Plaintiff was recorded in ASIC's record of registration under section 601FJ(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act) the following agreements to which the First Defendant is a party in relation to the 2005 Timbercorp Mango Project ARSN 113 969 216 (2005 Project), have effect as if the First Plaintiff were a party in lieu of the First Defendant and the rights, obligations and liabilities of the First Defendant under those documents became the rights, obligations and liabilities of the First Plaintiff, with the exception of the First Defendant’s rights referred to in ss 601FS(2) and 601FT(2) of the Act:
1.1each of the following licence agreements entered into by each Grower in the 2005 Project with the First Defendant and a related entity of the First Defendant, Mango Land Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Mango Land):
(a) Orchard 1 Licence Agreement [Orchard 1 (Ooloo) – Term 1];
(b) Orchard 1 Licence Agreement No. 2 [Orchard 1 (Ooloo) – Term 2];
(c) Orchard 2 Licence Agreement [Orchard 2 (Mataranka) – Term 1];
(d) Orchard 2 Licence Agreement [Orchard 2 (Mataranka) – Term 2];
(e) Orchard 3 Licence Agreement [Orchard 3 (Dimbulah) – Term 1];
(f) Orchard 3 Licence Agreement [Orchard 3 (Dimbulah) – Term 2],
referred to in Fourth Schedule of the Constitution for the 2005 Project (2005 Project Licence Agreements);
1.2each agreement titled "Mangolot Management Agreement" (2005 Project Mangolot Management Agreement) referred to in the Third Schedule of the Constitution for the 2005 Project entered into by each Grower in the 2005 Project with…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 623
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Timbercorp and the liquidators had positioned themselves in a contradictory manner, asserting benefits for Timbercorp at the expense of the schemes. Their arguments forced Huntley and Food and Beverage to bring proceedings to establish the operation of sections 601FS and 601FT. Timbercorp failed to achieve the result it contended for in the proceedings, and the plaintiffs were wholly successful against it. The court exercised its discretion under section 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiffs’ costs, with the second defendants' liability limited to the assets of the first defendant available to indemnify them. Additionally, the second defendant or the second defendant on behalf of the first defendant undertook to execute necessary documents for the novation of rights, obligations, and liabilities under certain agreements and leases related to the 2007 Avocado & Fruit Project from the first defendant to the second plaintiff.
Orders
Orders of the court
7. The First Defendant and/or the Second Defendant on behalf of the First Defendant execute or cause to be executed all such documents necessary to effect a novation of the rights, obligations and liabilities arising under:
7.1 the 2005 Project Licence Agreements;
7.2 the 2005 Project Mangolot Management Agreements;
7.3 the 2005 Project Grower PBR Sub-Licence & Marketing Deeds;
7.4 the Ooloo Lease;
7.5 the Mataranka No. 1 Lease;
7.6 the Dimbulah Lease 1.
7.7 the Dimbulah Lease 2;
7.8 the Dimbulah Lease 3,
from the First Defendant to the First Plaintiff within 14 days of a request by the First Plaintiff to execute such documents.
8. The First Defendant and/or the Second Defendant on behalf of the First Defendant execute or cause to be executed all such documents necessary to effect a novation of the rights, obligations and liabilities arising under:
8.1 the 2006 Project Licence Agreements;
8.2 the 2006 Project Mangolot Management Agreements;
8.3 the 2006 Project Grower PBR Sub-Licence & Marketing Deeds;
8.4 the Mataranka No. 2 Lease; and
8.5 the Katherine Lease,
from the First Defendant to the First Plaintiff within 14 days of a request by the First Plaintiff to execute such documents.
9. The defendants pay the plaintiffs’ costs provided that the liability of the second defendants be limited to the amount of the assets of the first defendant available to indemnify them for the purpose of paying such costs.
10. Any party has liberty to apply on 7 days notice.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
11. In relation to the 2007 Avocado & Fruit Project, the Second Defendant or the Second Defendant on behalf of the First Defendant by their counsel, undertakes to the Court to execute or cause to be executed all such documents necessary to effect a novation of the rights, obligations and liabilities arising under:
11.1 the Promised Land Licence Agreements;
11.2 the 2007 Avocado & Fruit Project Lot Management Agreements;
11.3 the 2007 Avocado & Fruit Project Grower PBR Sub-Licence & Marketing Deeds;
11.4 the Promised Land Sub-Lease;
11.5 the Promised Land First Water Allocation Sublease; and
11.6 the Promised Land Second Water Allocation Sublease,
from the First Defendant to the Second Plaintiff within 14 days of a request by the Second Plaintiff to execute such documents.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the Federal Court of Australia as a result of proceedings initiated by Huntley Management Limited against Timbercorp Securities Limited. The matter was heard on the basis of written submissions and arguments from both parties. Prior to this hearing, there had been earlier proceedings between the parties regarding the same subject matter, which had resulted in a prior decision. The current hearing was focused on the costs of the proceedings and the appropriate party to bear those costs. Key procedural steps included the filing of written submissions by both parties and the court's consideration of these submissions in determining the appropriate costs order.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Should the costs of the proceedings be borne by the property of the schemes, as in the case of costs incurred for the benefit of a trust?
2. Should there be no order as to costs since Timbercorp and the liquidators had assumed a facilitative position in the litigation?
3. Should only Timbercorp be ordered to pay any costs?
4. Should the principles stated by Hodgson JA in Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385 at 394 [52]-[53] be applied, resulting in an order that only Timbercorp, as a company in liquidation, pay the costs?
Held
1. The court decided that the costs of the proceedings should be borne by Timbercorp, the first defendant. This aligns with the argument that the costs should be paid by the unsuccessful party.
2. The court dismissed the argument that there should be no order as to costs since Timbercorp and the liquidators had assumed a facilitative position in the litigation.
3. The court did not rule that only Timbercorp should be ordered to pay any costs, as it found that the liquidators were also involved in the adversarial litigation.
4. The court applied the principles from Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385 at 394 [52]-[53], resulting in an order that only Timbercorp, as a company in liquidation, should pay the costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In their written submissions, Timbercorp and the liquidators argued that their position, both before and after Huntley commenced these proceedings, was “essentially as contradictor”. They argued that the proceedings were in substance an application for judicial advice in relation to the administration of the schemes that were, themselves, effectively trusts. Accordingly, they contended that the costs should be borne by the schemes’ property, as in the case of costs incurred for the benefit of a trust. Alternatively, Timbercorp and the liquidators argued that there should be no order as to costs since they had assumed a facilitative position in the litigation. They pointed to Huntley’s position having evolved over time as to the documents it sought be novated in its favour. Last, they argued that only Timbercorp should be ordered to pay any costs. Timbercorp and the liquidators argued that the principles stated by Hodgson JA in Silvia v Brodyn Pty Ltd (2007) 25 ACLC 385 at 394 [52]-[53] were applicable and should be given effect by an order that only Timbercorp, as a company in liquidation, pay the costs.CONSIDERATION Timbercorp and the liquidators unsuccessfully advanced a case that asserted that Timbercorp retained all entitlements that were expressed to be those “in its personal capacity” under the various documents the subject of the proceedings. As I found, Timbercorp had contended that one way of overcoming the difficulty that this created for the operation of the schemes in relation to the leases, was for Huntley to purchase the leasehold interests from Timbercorp: Huntley [2010] FCA 576 at [65]. I am of opinion that Timbercorp and the liquidator asserted a position to benefit Timbercorp’s general creditors at the expense of the three schemes of which it had been the responsible entity. They did not seek to benefit the estates of the schemes. Their arguments forced Huntley, and later Food and Beverage, to bring these proceedings to establish that ss 601FS and 601FT operated as I found. Timbercorp and the liquidators appreciated that their arguments were contrary to the interests of schemes. They engaged in the litigation as adversaries of the new registered entity of the schemes. The liquidators could, indeed should, have sought directions from the Court as to Timbercorp’s position having regard to the potential conflict in its interest that they were advancing and its fiduciary duty as the former registered entity of the three schemes. The entitlements expressed in the various disputed documents as those of Timbercorp “in its personal capacity” clearly were arguably scheme property. The Court has a general and unfettered discretion as to costs under s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): see Probiotec Ltd v University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30 at 42-44 [45]-[50] where I discussed the principles under that section with the agreement of Finn J and Besanko J at 32 [1] and 51 [82]. Timbercorp failed to obtain the result it contended for in the proceedings. The plaintiffs were wholly successful against it and they are entitled to an order that their costs be paid by Timbercorp.