Thomas International Ltd v Humantech Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thomas International Ltd v Humantech Pty Ltd (No 2)

[2015] FCA 1517

Citation: Thomas International Ltd v Humantech Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1517
Parties: THOMAS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v HUMANTECH PTY LTD (SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMMPANY ARRANGEMENT) AND OTHERS (AS PER THE SCHEDULE)
File number: NSD 751 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 1 December 2015
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Cases cited: Apotex Pty Limited v Les Laboratoires Servier (No. 5) (2015) 324 ALR 549
Gray v Richards (No. 2) (2014) 315 ALR 1
Huntley Management Limited v Timbercorp Securities Limited (No. 2) [2010] FCA 623
Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Limited (in liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs;  Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622
Silvia v Brodyn Pty Limited (2007) 25 ACLC 385
Thomas International Limited v Humantech Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1333
Date of hearing: 1 December 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr F Assaf with Ms S Ross
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Defendants: Mr A Spencer
Solicitor for the Defendants: Norton Rose Fulbright

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 751 of 2015

BETWEEN:

THOMAS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND:

HUMANTECH PTY LTD (SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMMPANY ARRANGEMENT) AND OTHERS (AS PER THE SCHEDULE)
Defendant

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing on 6 and 9 November 2015.

2.Save for the costs payable pursuant to order 1 made today and any previous orders for costs, there be no order as to costs of the proceedings to date.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 751 of 2015

BETWEEN:

THOMAS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Plaintiff

AND:

HUMANTECH PTY LTD (SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMMPANY ARRANGEMENT) AND OTHERS (AS PER THE SCHEDULE)
Defendant

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

1 DECEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. On 9 November 2015, I ordered that the four defendant companies be wound up in insolvency for the reasons that I then gave:  Thomas International Limited v Humantech Pty Limited [2015] FCA 1333. Thomas International Limited has today applied for orders that the former administrators and present liquidators of the companies personally pay the costs of the proceedings, on the ground that they acted in their former office unreasonably in both the preparation of their report dated 15 June 2015 required by s 439A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and in the conduct of the administration.

  2. Thomas argued that first, the administrators had endorsed and supported the proposal for the deed of company arrangement when they should have…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1517
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Thomas International Ltd v Humantech Pty Ltd (No 2) was heard by the Federal Court, where the primary dispute centred around the actions of the administrators of the respondent companies, who were seeking to avoid personal liability for debts incurred during the administration process. Thomas International Ltd, the plaintiff, had initiated proceedings to set aside certain creditors’ resolutions and sought an order for the winding up of the respondent companies. The administrators, however, contended that they could not continue in their role due to incurring significant professional fees without payment, leading them to apply for relief from the Court.

The legal issues before the court involved the assessment of the administrators' conduct in the context of their refusal to be personally liable for the companies' debts, the validity of their application for relief, and the appropriateness of costs orders given that the substantive allegations had not been determined. The court had to consider whether the administrators' decision to cease administration was justified and whether there was any basis for an order for costs, given that the substantive issues had not been adjudicated upon.

The court found that the administrators' decision to seek relief from the Court was appropriate, as they could not continue to be personally liable for the companies' debts without incurring excessive professional fees. The court considered that the preferable form of relief was to order the companies be wound up by the Court in insolvency and to appoint the administrators as liquidators. As for the costs, the court held that there should be no order as to costs, except for the plaintiff to pay the costs of the hearing on 6 and 9 November 2015, due to the circumstances where the substantive issues had not been heard or determined.

The final orders of the court mandated that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing on 6 and 9 November 2015, and that, except for these costs and any previous orders for costs, there be no order as to the costs of the proceedings to date. This decision underscored the importance of the administrators' right to seek relief when facing personal liability issues and the nuanced approach to costs orders when substantive issues remain unresolved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing on 6 and 9 November 2015.

2. Save for the costs payable pursuant to order 1 made today and any previous orders for costs, there be no order as to costs of the proceedings to date.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As I have explained, it is not possible to come to a view about the rights and wrongs of the allegations that Thomas brought to set aside the deed. When the administrators came to the view that they were not prepared to be personally liable for the companies’ debts, the administration could not continue and they, quite properly, applied to the Court for relief. I considered that the preferable form of relief was to order that the companies be wound up by the Court in insolvency and to appoint the administrators as liquidators so that they would be officers of the Court rather than having a default position under Pt 5.3A of the Act where they would be treated as having been appointed by the creditors.Conclusion In my opinion, the appropriate order to be made as to costs in the proceedings is that there be no order as to costs, other than that the companies pay the plaintiff’s costs of the hearing on 6 and 9 November 2015.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thomas also argued that the administrators had unreasonably resisted its claims for setting aside the creditors’ resolutions that the companies execute the deed, and that windings up be ordered. It submitted that it was plainly contrary to the interests of the creditors of ACT as a whole for the deed to be executed and that the transaction for the sale of the OCEAN software had not been properly investigated.Consideration Thomas’ arguments attacking the conduct of the administrators reflected its pleaded allegations on the substantive issues in these proceedings. However, those issues have not been heard or determined. Rather, these proceedings unfolded in the way they did in early November 2015 because the administrators were no longer prepared to be personally liable for debts incurred by them in carrying on the business of each of the four companies in administration. They did this in circumstances where they had incurred, but not been paid, professional fees of over $720,000. Thus, there has been no substantive determination, or investigation by trial, of the allegations that Thomas made in the proceedings, and on which it relied in support of its allegation that the administrators acted unreasonably in the various ways for which Thomas contended. In a case where there are competing considerations, the power to order costs under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is one that is ultimately exercised in a way that reflects a broad judgment of what justice requires: Gray v Richards (No. 2) (2014) 315 ALR 1 at 2 [2] per French CJ, Hayne, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ; see also Apotex Pty Limited v Les Laboratoires Servier (No. 5) (2015) 324 ALR 549 at 551–553 [5]-[14] where I considered the principles. McHugh J discussed the principles applicable to cases in which a party seeks an order for costs where the issues have not been heard or determined in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622 at 624, where he said:When there has been no hearing on the merits, however, a court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order.In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties [Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194 at 201]. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. As McHugh J pointed out, there are some exceptions to such a situation, including where a defendant had acted unreasonably in exercising or refusing to exercise a power and the plaintiff had had no reasonable alternative but to commence the proceeding. He said, (at 186 CLR 625):If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. (emphasis added)