SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Horinack v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2000] QCA 441 PARTIES: KARINA HORINACK
(applicant/respondent/cross‑appellant)
v
SUNCORP METWAY INSURANCE LTD
ACN 075 695 966
(respondent/appellant/cross‑respondent)FILE NO/S: Appeal No 2641 of 2000
SC No 5888 of 1999DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 27 October 2000 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 21 September 2000 JUDGES: McPherson JA, White and Jones JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the court, each concurring as to the orders made.ORDER: Appeal allowed and cross‑appeal dismissed with costs. CATCHWORDS: INSURANCE - THIRD PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE - MOTOR VEHICLES - COMPULSORY INSURANCE LEGISLATION - GENERALLY - QUEENSLAND - notice of claim not provided to insurer within nine months - whether explanation for delay in providing notice of claim must be “contained” in the notice of claim - whether explanation for delay must be sworn by claimant.
INSURANCE - THIRD PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE - MOTOR VEHICLES - COMPULSORY INSURANCE LEGISLATION - GENERALLY - QUEENSLAND -scope of court’s discretion to grant leave to bring proceedings pursuant to s 39(5)(c) Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 - whether leave can be granted after expiration of limitation period.
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), s 37(1), s 37(2), s 37(4), s 39(1), s 39(5)(c), s 41
Motor Accident Insurance Regulation 1994 (Qld), s 10(1), s 10(3)Brannigan v Nominal Defendant [2000] 2 Qd R 116, considered
Hales v Bolton Leathers Ltd [1951] AC 531, considered
Jackson v Hall [1980] WLR 118, considered
McKelvie v Page [1999] 2 Qd R 259, overruled
Neill v Glacier Metal Co Ltd [1965] 1 QB 161, consideredCOUNSEL: PA Keane QC with JP Kimmins for the appellant
DB Fraser QC for the respondentSOLICITORS: Suncorp Metway for the appellant
Gilshenan & Luton for the respondent
McPHERSON JA: For the reasons given by White J, I agree that the appeal should be allowed with costs and the cross‑appeal dismissed with costs.
I reach that conclusion with some regret. It is, I predict, only a matter of time before we are asked to consider whether the written notice contemplated in s 37 of the Act "contains" an explanatory statement if it is attached by a paper clip rather than by means of a staple. On such refined distinctions are the rights of injured persons now made to depend.
Here, however, for reasons I cannot altogether fathom, the explanatory statement did not even accompany the notice.
WHITE J: The appellant, Suncorp, appeals from a decision of a chamber judge giving leave to the respondent, Ms Horinack, to bring proceedings pursuant to s 39(5)(c) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (“the Act”). The learned chamber judge dismissed Ms Horinack’s application for declarations that her notice of claim was compliant with the requirements of s 37 of the Act or, alternatively, that she had remedied any non-compliance and she has cross‑appealed from those orders. Ms Horinack sustained personal injury on…
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- Case
- [2000] QCA 441
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the explanation for the delay in providing notice of claim must be explicitly stated within the notice itself and whether it must be sworn by the claimant. Furthermore, the court had to consider the scope of its discretion under section 39(5)(c) of the Act to grant leave to bring proceedings even after the expiration of the limitation period. The court examined whether the statutory requirement for timely notice could be waived or whether it was a jurisdictional bar that could not be circumvented by the court’s discretion.
The court found that the statutory requirement for timely notice of claim did not necessitate the explanation for the delay to be contained within the notice itself nor sworn by the claimant. The court also held that it had the discretion to grant leave to bring proceedings under section 39(5)(c) even after the limitation period had expired, provided that the delay in giving notice was excusable. This decision overturned the previous authority established in McKelvie v Page, aligning the interpretation of the statutory provisions with common law principles regarding the waiver of time limits in proceedings.
The appeal was allowed, and the cross-appeal was dismissed with costs. This meant that the plaintiff's claim was valid, and the insurer was liable to pay the damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal allowed and cross‑appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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