Hone v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   HONE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 283

CORAM:   STEYTLER P

WHEELER JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   11 DECEMBER 2007

DELIVERED          :   11 DECEMBER 2007

PUBLISHED           :  21 DECEMBER 2007

FILE NO/S:   CACR 30 of 2007

BETWEEN:   LEVI WILLIAM HONE

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MURRAY J

Citation  :STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- HONE [2007] WASC 64

File No  :INS 135 of 2005

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Trial for wilful murder - Trial by judge alone - Issue of insanity raised by appellant - Uncontradicted expert psychiatric opinion to the effect that the appellant was of unsound mind - Whether trial judge correct in refusing to accept that opinion - Extent to which appellant's testimony relevant to issue - Whether trial judge correct to find appellant guilty of wilful murder - Application of onus of proof

Legislation:

Criminal Code, s 1(1), s 27
Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA), s 21
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 118(4), s118(9), s 110
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 32(4)(b)

Result:

Appeal allowed
Convictions quashed and verdicts of not guilty due to unsoundness of mind substituted
Custody order made pursuant to s 21(a) of Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA)

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr A S Derrick

Respondent:     Mr P D Yovich & Mr C G Astill

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Andree Horrigan

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368

Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659

R v Dick (1966) Qd R 301

R v Gemmill [2004] VSCA 72; (2004) 8 VR 242

R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368

R v Kosowicz [2005] NSWSC 234

R v Matusevich [1976] VR 470

R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159

R v Porter [1933] HCA 1; (1933) 55 CLR 182

R v Weise [1969] VR 953

State of Western Australia v Hone [2007] WASC 64

Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343

  1. STEYTLER P:  I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Miller JA.  I agree with him, for the reasons that he has given, that this was not a case in which it was open to the trial judge to reach any conclusion other than that the appellant's mental impairment deprived him of the capacity to know that he ought not do the acts of killing his mother and half‑sister.  I wish only to mention a few additional cases concerning the approach which should be taken by a judge or jury in cases concerning uncontradicted psychiatric evidence. 

  2. In Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 the appellant was charged with murder. Very strong expert medical evidence was led at the trial to the effect…

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Details
Case
[2007] WASCA 283
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hone was charged with the wilful murder of his mother and sister. The trial was conducted by a judge alone in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central issue was whether the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the killings, thereby negating the mens rea required for wilful murder. This issue arose because the appellant had raised the defence of insanity, supported by uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence.

The court had to determine whether the trial judge correctly rejected the psychiatric evidence and whether the trial judge correctly found the appellant guilty of wilful murder. Key legal questions included the standard of proof required for the insanity defence and the relevance of the appellant's testimony regarding his mental state at the time of the offence. The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by requiring him to prove his insanity beyond reasonable doubt, rather than on the balance of probabilities, and by inadequately considering the expert evidence and his own testimony.

The court found that the trial judge had indeed erred in several respects. The judge had mischaracterised the psychiatric evidence, incorrectly required the appellant to prove his insanity beyond reasonable doubt, and failed to adequately consider the expert evidence and the appellant's testimony. The court also found that the trial judge did not provide sufficient reasons for concluding that the appellant had the capacity to know that he ought not to kill his mother and sister. Given these errors, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and substituted verdicts of not guilty due to unsoundness of mind. The court made a custody order under the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA).

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed

Convictions quashed and verdicts of not guilty due to unsoundness of mind

substituted

Custody order made pursuant to s 21(a) of Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired

Accused) Act 1996 (WA)

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant are as follows:Errors in Rejecting: Dr Schineanu's Evidence1.The Trial Judge erred in fact in rejecting the evidence of Dr Schineanu to the effect that the mental illness suffered by the appellant significantly impaired his thinking and his reasoning processes so that he was deprived of the capacity to know that he ought not do the acts which killed his mother and sister in that:(a)the rejection of the evidence was based upon His Honour's characterisation of the opinion of Dr Schineanu as being based entirely upon the view that the delusions and command auditory hallucinations overwhelmed the accused so as to prevent him from having any capacity to do anything but follow the instructions contained in the hallucinations; (Reasons [173] ‑ [182]); and(b)that characterisation was erroneous; Dr Schineanu's opinion was not based entirely upon that view (transcript 1036, 1063, 1098, 1101 ‑ 1104, 1161, Ex 68, p11) - rather his view was that the delusions and hallucinations were part only of the floridly psychotic state of the appellant.2.The Trial Judge erred in law in rejecting Dr Schineanu's opinion in that in testing whether the appellant's psychosis had overwhelmed his capacity to engage in ordinary reasoning and decision making processes by looking at what the appellant actually did, he applied a test which required the appellant to prove his insanity to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, when the onus upon the appellant was to prove his insanity on the balance of probabilities. (Reasons [180]).3.The Trial Judge erred in law and, or alternatively, in fact in rejecting Dr Schineanu's opinion on the ground that Dr Schineanu did not first 'independently [form] the view that the evidence [led] to the conclusion that the appellant probably lacked' the identified capacities and then 'conclude that such incapacities were probably caused by the [appellant's] mental illness'; Reasons, para [181], [182]. There was no expert evidence nor was there anything else to support the Judge's conclusion that forming a view as to whether the appellant was deprived of the relevant capacities independently of and thus prior to forming a view as to whether the appellant was suffering from a mental illness would make an opinion as to the existence of those capacities more reliable than an opinion in relation to that issue derived by first forming a view as to the appellant's mental illness.4.Further or alternatively to ground 3, the Trial Judge erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons for rejecting Dr Schineanu's opinion.Errors in finding: that the Appellant had the capacity to know that he ought not kill his mother and sister5.The Trial Judge erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant's evidence as to his state of mind while in town recited at para [164] of the Reasons was reliable evidence that he knew at the time of stabbing his mother that it was wrong to do so, in circumstances in which there was evidence to the contrary to which His Honour did not refer.6.Further or alternatively to ground 5, the Trial Judge erred in fact insofar as he relied upon the evidence of the appellant recited at para [164] of the Reasons in support of a conclusion that the appellant had the capacity to know that he ought not do the act by which he killed his mother in that:(a)any awareness that punching his mother was wrong revealed by the evidence was an awareness in the context of his deluded beliefs and auditory hallucinations summarised by the Judge at [155]-[157], accepting the appellant's evidence at T882-884; and(b)those deluded beliefs and auditory hallucinations demonstrated that he could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure. 7.The Trial Judge erred in finding at para [187] of the Reasons that the appellant had the capacity to know that he ought not kill his mother and sister in that, insofar as he relied upon the evidence the subject of Grounds 5 and 6, he erred as alleged in those grounds.8.If and insofar as the Trial Judge relied upon matters other than the evidence the subject of grounds 5 and 6, His Honour made an error of law in failing to provide adequate reasons for the conclusion in para [187] of the Reasons that the appellant had the capacity to know that he ought not to kill his mother and sister and that he had the capacity to know that it was wrong to do so in that His Honour did not identify the findings of fact that he relied upon to arrive at those conclusions.9.The Trial Judge erred in fact in finding at para [186] of the Reasons that there was no evidence that immediately preceding and at the relevant time on 14 March 2005 the appellant's psychotic symptoms were peaking or generally worsening from a severe psychotic state in circumstances where:(a)The appellant testified that:(i)on 14 March 2005 he was under a god like sense of direction, that the voices were very guiding and that they seemed very real; and(ii)while he was walking back from town to his house he felt like his brain was 'really tense' and 'cramping together'; and(b)on 14 March 2005 the appellant acted on the delusional beliefs and auditory hallucinations as summarized by the Judge at paras [155]‑[157] of the Reasons, accepting the appellant's evidence at T 882-884.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established