Hing Ling Yu and 8 Others v Henry Ph Leung

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Hing Ling Yu and others to registration of trade mark application 1068827(35) – HOT DOLLAR - filed in the name of Henry Ph Leung

Delegate:

Debrett Lyons

Representation:

Opponent: Christian Dimitriadis of Counsel, instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson, Solicitors

Applicant: Angela Bowne SC of Counsel, instructed by Rutlands Law Firm

Decision:

2011 ATMO 22

s52 Opposition – ss 42(b), 43, 58 and 60 pressed. s 58 established since Applicant was not the owner of the trade mark. Registration refused. Res judicata considered.

Costs awarded against Applicant.

Introduction

  1. In this matter, Henry Ph Leung (“the Applicant”) has applied under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”) to register a trade mark, current details of which appear below:

Application No: 1068827

Filing Date:  9 August 2005

Services:Class 35: services relating to retail sale of variety goods, including gifts, toys, homewares, packaged food, clothing, household items, greeting cards, stationery, seasonal and decorative goods.

Trade Mark:  

Endorsement:                  The registered proprietor acknowledges the non-exclusive rights of the following persons to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR:* Hing Ling Yu and Wai Kwong Yu to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of Eastwood; May Warehouse Variety Pty Ltd A.C.N. 086 003 965 to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of Brookvale; Shi Hua Chen to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of Lane Cove; Zong Sheng Chen to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of Chullora; Jian Ping Zheng to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of North Rocks; Robert Law to use the trade mark HOT DOLLAR in the suburb of Rhodes

(“the Application”)

  1. The Application was examined and the trade mark was advertised as accepted for possible registration in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 8 December 2005.

  2. On 8 March 2006 Hing Ling Yu, Wai Kwong Yu, Jian Ping Zheng, Hong Zhao, Robert Law, Shi Hua Chen, Wei Dong Gu, Zong Sheng Chen and Kwok On Tsang (“the Opponents”), served and filed Notice of Opposition (“the Notice”) to the registration of the trade mark.

  3. The Notice lists grounds of opposition which are dependent on sections 42(b), 43, 58 and 60 of the Act.

  4. After the service and filing of evidence by both sides the matter came before me, Debrett Lyons, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, on 16 November 2010 in Sydney for a hearing of the submissions of the parties.

  5. At the hearing the Opponents[1] were represented by Christian Dimitriadis of Counsel, instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson, Solicitors.  The Applicant was represented by Angela Bowne SC, instructed by Rutlands Law Firm.  Counsel made both oral and written submissions[2].

    [1] See paragraphs 18 et. seq. below.

    [2] I have also taken account of the written submissions made by the Applicant’s attorneys in their letter to the Office dated 26 October 2009 under cover of which they…

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Details
Case
[2011] ATMO 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application to register a trade mark, opposed by nine opponents. The applicant, Hing Ling Yu, sought to register the trade mark, while the opponents, including Henry Ph Leung, argued against its registration. The dispute centred on the ownership and use of the trade mark, particularly in light of prior agreements and the nature of the rights granted to the opponents. The decision was made by Debrett Lyons.

The court was required to determine whether the applicant had established ownership of the trade mark at the filing date of the application, considering the effect of a deed executed in 2003 and earlier agreements. Specifically, the court had to assess whether any assignment of trade mark rights by Mr. He to the applicant was valid, and whether any use of the trade mark by the opponents constituted authorised use under the relevant legislation, or if it rendered the mark deceptive due to a lack of quality control.

The court reasoned that if the 2003 deed constituted an assignment of an unregistered trade mark without goodwill, it would be invalid, meaning the applicant acquired no rights. Alternatively, if Mr. He had already divested himself of exclusive rights through prior agreements with the opponents, the applicant could not claim exclusive use. Even if the applicant owned the trade mark subject to the opponents' limited rights, the lack of evidence of quality control over the opponents' use rendered the trade mark deceptive and invalid. Consequently, the court refused to register the trade mark. The applicant was ordered to pay the opponents' costs, to be apportioned by their solicitors.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms. Bowne made the following written submissions, to which I have added my own emphasis in bold:[The Applicant]…accepts that the opponents have certain rights to use the mark in respect of their shops in their respective suburbs and sought the endorsement to clarify and define his rights and the opponents’ rights. However, the rights granted to the opponents were extremely limited. There is no evidence of anything more than a bare licence, with no quality control, for use of the mark in relation to specified businesses. It will be remembered that the Applicant’s arguments against section 58 were (i) that there is no evidence of an assignment of trade mark rights by Mr. He to anyone other than the Applicant, and (ii) before the date of the filing of the Application any use of the trade mark by persons other than the Applicant was to the benefit of Mr. He. Section 7(3) of the Act states that:An authorised use of a trade mark by a person (see section 8) is taken, for the purposes of this Act, to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark. Section 8(2) defines an “authorised use” as use of a trade mark to the extent that the user uses the trade mark under the control of the owner of the trade mark. In Pioneer Kabushiki Kaisha v Registrar of Trade Marks (1977) 137 CLR 670 at 683, Aickin J observed that:These cases demonstrate that the essential requirement for the maintenance of the validity of a trade mark is that it must indicate a connexion in the course of trade with the registered proprietor, even though the connexion may be slight, such as selection or quality control or control of the user in the sense in which a parent company controls a subsidiary. Use by either the registered proprietor or a licensee (whether registered or otherwise) will protect the mark from attack on the ground of non-user, but it is essential both that the user maintains the connexion of the registered proprietor with the goods and that the use of the mark does not become otherwise deceptive. In the result, my decision rests on the logic that if the transfer of rights under the 2003 Deed was the assignment of an unregistered trade mark without goodwill, then the assignment is invalid and the Applicant took nothing and so could not be the owner of the trade mark at the filing date. The alternative conclusion is that, as the Opponents argue, Mr. He had through one or more of his agreements with some or all of the Opponents and before the 2003 Deed, divested himself of the exclusive right to the trade mark and so following the principle in Re Hicks’ Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 the Applicant could not at the filing date claim to be able to use the trade mark to the exclusion of all others. In the further alternative, adopting the Applicant’s argument that the 2003 Deed gave the Applicant ownership of the trade mark subject to the limited rights of others, then both the evidence and Ms. Bowne’s own assessment of the evidence, render the trade mark deceptive and invalid in consequence of lack of control of its use such that at the filing date the Applicant could no more claim to be the owner of the trade mark than the Opponents.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:Decision55. Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:(a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or(b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.Note: For limitations see section 6. I refuse to register application 1068827. Having established its opposition, the Opponent is entitled to its costs which I award against the Applicant calculated in accordance with the official scale. Despite the nine Opponents, there was one Notice and the matter proceeded on evidence common to all Opponents. Because of that, I see no reason that each opponent should be able to claim costs separately. As previously stated, Kwok On Tsang was not represented at the hearing. To what extent he should benefit from the decision on costs is best left to his former attorneys. I direct that the Applicant make payment to the nominated trust account of Allens Arthur Robinson, Solicitors, in the understanding that it is they who will make proper apportionment as between the interested Opponents.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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