Heydarkhani v The Queen
[2014] WASCA 52
•12 MARCH 2014
HEYDARKHANI -v- THE QUEEN [2014] WASCA 52
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2014] WASCA 52 | |
| THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) | |||
| Case No: | CACR:99/2013 | 4 FEBRUARY 2014 | |
| Coram: | McLURE P PULLIN JA MAZZA JA | 12/03/14 | |
| 14 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Leave to appeal on ground 2 refused Appeal dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | ALI KHORRAM HEYDARKHANI THE QUEEN |
Catchwords: | Criminal law Appeal against sentence Manifest excess Whether offending within the worst category |
Legislation: | Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IB Criminal Code (Cth), s 5.4(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 232A, s 233A, s 233B, s 233C, s 236B |
Case References: | AJ v The Queen [2011] WASCA 166 Bahar v The Queen [2011] WASCA 249 Brown v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 111; (2011) 207 A Crim R 533 Cita v The Queen [2001] WASCA 5; (2001) 120 A Crim R 307 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Haidari [2013] VSCA 149 Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9 Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520 McLeod v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 233 R v Disun [2003] WASCA 47; (2003) 27 WAR 146 Warnakulasuriya v The Queen [2012] WASCA 10 Zimmerman v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 211 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : HEYDARKHANI -v- THE QUEEN [2014] WASCA 52 CORAM : McLURE P
- PULLIN JA
MAZZA JA
- Appellant
AND
THE QUEEN
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram : SCOTT DCJ
File No : IND 1474 of 2011
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Manifest excess - Whether offending within the worst category
Legislation:
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IB
Criminal Code (Cth), s 5.4(2)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 232A, s 233A, s 233B, s 233C, s 236B
Result:
Leave to appeal on ground 2 refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant : Mr S B Watters
Respondent : Mr R J Davies QC & Mr M G A Plummer
Solicitors:
Appellant : John Rando & Co
Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
AJ v The Queen [2011] WASCA 166
Bahar v The Queen [2011] WASCA 249
Brown v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 111; (2011) 207 A Crim R 533
Cita v The Queen [2001] WASCA 5; (2001) 120 A Crim R 307
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Haidari [2013] VSCA 149
Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9
Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520
McLeod v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 233
R v Disun [2003] WASCA 47; (2003) 27 WAR 146
Warnakulasuriya v The Queen [2012] WASCA 10
Zimmerman v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 211
1 McLURE P: This is an application for an extension of time and, if an extension is granted, to appeal against sentence.
2 On 3 September 2012 the appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty of two counts of contravening s 233C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (counts 1 and 2 on indictment 1474/2011) and two counts of contravening s 233B(1)(c) of the Act (counts 5 and 9).
3 On 22 October 2012 Scott DCJ sentenced the appellant to terms of imprisonment of 7 years on count 1, 8 years on count 2, 11 years on count 5 and 14 years on count 9. He ordered that the sentences be served concurrently producing a total effective sentence of 14 years' imprisonment and set a non-parole period of 9 ½ years.
4 There are two grounds of appeal, only the first of which has been granted leave. They are that the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment on count 9 is manifestly excessive (ground 1) and that the sentencing judge erred in categorising the offending as falling within the worst category (ground 2).
5 The appeal notice was filed on 6 May 2013, more than five months out of time. Although the lengthy delay is not adequately explained, I will assume in the appellant's favour that it is largely attributable to his inability to communicate in English.
6 Where there has been a lengthy delay in commencing an appeal, exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated unless it can be established that a miscarriage of justice will eventuate without an extension: McLeod v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 233 [79].
7 For the reasons that follow, the appellant has fallen well short of establishing any error by the sentencing judge or miscarriage of justice. I would refuse an extension of time.
8 The counts on which the appellant was convicted provided:
(1) On and between about 1 June 2010 and 12 July 2010 at Indonesia and elsewhere, [the appellant] facilitated the bringing or coming to Australia [of] a group of at least five persons, being non-citizens who had, or have, no lawful right to come to Australia, and did so reckless as to whether the group of at least five persons had, or have, no lawful right to come to Australia, contrary to section 233C of the … Act;
(2) And further on and between about 1 October 2010 and 3 November 2010 at Indonesia and elsewhere, [the appellant] facilitated the bringing or coming to Australia of a group of at least five persons, being non-citizens who had, or have, no lawful right to come to Australia, and did so reckless as to whether the group of at least five persons had, or have, no lawful right to come to Australia, contrary to section 233C of the … Act;
(5) And further on and between about 1 November 2010 and 15 December 2010 at Indonesia and elsewhere [the appellant] facilitated the bringing or coming to Australia of Sayed Hussain Hussaini (Mr Hussaini), a non-citizen who had, or has, no lawful right to come to Australia, being reckless as to whether Mr Hussaini had, or has, no lawful right to come Australia and [the appellant's] conduct gave rise to a danger of death or serious harm to Mr Hussaini and [the appellant] was reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm that arose from the conduct, contrary to section 233B(1)(c) of the … Act;
(9) And further on and between about 15 November 2010 and 4 January 2011 at Indonesia and elsewhere [the appellant] facilitated the bringing or coming to Australia of Raheem Abdul Khani (Mr Khani), a non-citizen who had, or has, no lawful right to come to Australia, being reckless as to whether Mr Khani had, or has, no lawful right to come to Australia and [the appellant's] conduct gave rise to a danger of death or serious harm to Mr Khani and [the appellant] was reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm that arose from the conduct, contrary to section 233B(1)(c) of the … Act.
Sentencing judge's findings
9 The facts relating to the offending and the appellant were summarised by the sentencing judge as follows. In respect of each offence, the appellant dealt with the passengers. He took passports and mobile phones from them before the boats left Indonesia or instructed the crew to do so during the journey. This was done to prevent the authorities from tracking the appellant.
10 As to count 1, the passengers on the boat SIEV 169 negotiated with the appellant and directly paid him a fee which was somewhere between US$7,000 for an individual and US$30,000 for a group. The appellant told two passengers that the journey to Australia would be on a new boat with a fast engine and good food. SIEV 169 carried 71 passengers and three Indonesian crew. The boat was extremely overcrowded. It was in poor condition when it was stopped by the Australian Navy. The condition of the hull was observed to be poor with water coming through ineffective caulking in the bilge planking. In order to keep the water level in the boat satisfactory, hourly pumping was required. The steering was unserviceable due to broken cables. The main and auxiliary engines were in poor condition. There was no firefighting equipment, inflatable life rafts, life buoys, dinghy or outboard. There were approximately 40 life jackets.
11 Count 2 related to a combination of two boats, SIEV 205 and SIEV 206. Due to an engine breakdown, SIEV 206 was being towed by SIEV 205 when it was intercepted by the Australian Navy. The fees paid by passengers on those boats varied from US$5,000 for an individual to US$16,500 for a group. SIEV 206's engine broke down after it had travelled for two or three days. A passenger contacted the appellant on his mobile phone. SIEV 206 was adrift for two or three days before SIEV 205 met up with it and took it in tow. There were 71 passengers, seven of whom were children, and one Indonesian crew member on board.
12 SIEV 206 was in very poor condition. It had been towed for three days and was taking a lot of water when it was boarded by the Australian Navy. The main engine was unserviceable. The propeller shaft was missing. It had an independent bilge pump constantly running due to water coming through the stern gland and through the planks. Water ingress, when inspected, was 3 to 4 inches per hour. The timber was rotten in most areas. The vessel met no survey conditions and was assessed as unseaworthy. There was no auxiliary engine, generator, radio, GPS, firefighting equipment, life jackets, inflatable life rafts, life buoys, dinghy or outboard on SIEV 206.
13 A number of passengers had transferred from SIEV 206 to SIEV 205. SIEV 205 was made entirely of timber that was in very poor condition and the boat was taking water at the rate of 4 to 5 inches an hour. The bilge was running constantly. SIEV 206 also met no survey conditions and was unseaworthy.
14 Count 5 related to SIEV 221, referred to as the 'Christmas Island boat'. There were 89 passengers and four crew on board. One crew member left the boat before reaching Christmas Island, boarding a second vessel that had followed SIEV 221 from Indonesia. There were only about 20 life jackets on board. Passengers paid somewhere between US$4,600 per individual to US$63,000 for a group. SIEV 221 travelled for three nights. When the boat departed from Indonesia the weather was good. However, it deteriorated throughout the journey and the sea conditions became very rough.
15 At about 5.55 am on 15 December 2010, when close to shore at Christmas Island, SIEV 221 began making little headway under power in heavy seas and strong winds. The boat was in distress. People aboard were shouting for help. The boat was hit by an incoming swell of 3 m to 4 m and backwash. At one point, it tipped to the port side and a large fuel drum rolled off the deck into the water. The engine failed and attempts to restart it were unsuccessful. Passengers were helping the crew bail water out of the vessel. The bilge pump had stopped working. The engine room eventually filled with water. At about 7.00 am, SIEV 221 was washed against rocks at Christmas Island causing it to break apart and sink. There were only 42 survivors, including three crew.
16 Mr Hussaini, the complainant in count 5, travelled on SIEV 221 with his wife and a 3-month old infant, both of whom did not survive. Australian authorities were unable to examine the boat.
17 At about the time SIEV 221 was travelling to Australia, the appellant had significant involvement in facilitating the coming to Australia of SIEV 222. The appellant had told one of the passengers on board that the boat would be in very good condition. When SIEV 222 was intercepted by the Australian Navy, the engines had stopped and would not start and the sea anchor was streaming in water.
18 Count 9 relates to SIEV 226. It carried 90 passengers, 25 of whom were children, and two Indonesian crew. The amounts paid by passengers varied from US$5,000 for an individual to US$20,000 for a group. The appellant had contact with passengers in Jakarta after SIEV 221 foundered on rocks at Christmas Island on 15 December 2010. SIEV 226 was intercepted by the Australian Navy on 4 January 2011. The complainant in count 9, Mr Khani, travelled in SIEV 226 with his two children. He and a number of other passengers met with the appellant and an associate in Jakarta. The appellant told the group that a boat he had sent to Australia had crashed and people had died. The appellant told the group that there was a risk and that the people could change their minds about travelling. Mr Khani told the appellant he still wanted to go.
19 SIEV 226 was a large Indonesian fishing vessel fitted with main and auxiliary engines, both of which were poorly maintained and in an extremely degraded condition. They were barely serviceable. The main engine was leaking oil. The throttle line running from the wheelhouse to the engine was badly damaged and on the verge of breaking. The steering system was severely degraded. The vessel was nearly unmanageable even in the most benign of conditions. There was water ingress into the bilge from damaged sealing and rotten deck boards. It had to be pumped out every 20 minutes. There were large bora, termite and ant infestations throughout the hull. The deck was in poor condition with missing planks and insect infestation. The interior hull was also rotting and insect infested. There was no firefighting equipment, inflatable life rafts, life buoys, dinghy or outboard on board. There were approximately 80 life jackets in poor condition.
20 The appellant admitted that he had been involved in facilitating the coming to Australia of passengers on other boats that were not the subject of any charge.
21 The trial judge found that the appellant played an essential role in the people smuggling business which was substantial, generating enormous income. He misrepresented to passengers the suitability of the boats on which they would travel. He arranged for false passports where necessary to enable them to travel to Jakarta. He recruited crew members and arranged for them to dispose of their mobile phones so he and those associated with him could not be traced.
22 Notwithstanding his knowledge of the SIEV 221 tragedy and loss of life, shortly thereafter the appellant organised another people smuggling boat to travel to Australia. The passengers on that boat (SIEV 226) were, to the appellant's knowledge, in the main desperate people in search of a safe haven in Australia. They could not return to their country of origin and were easily persuaded to take the risk notwithstanding their knowledge of the fate of SIEV 221.
23 The sentencing judge was satisfied that the appellant did not have any genuine concern for the safety of passengers on any of the boats and that his primary motivation was financial reward in what is a very profitable business. The sentencing judge continued:
The passengers were people who were desperate to travel to Australia, for whom, as you knew, there was little alternative. You were aware that these boats would be likely intercepted by the Australian Navy and then forfeited or sunk. It was for this reason that the cheapest mode of transport was arranged, irrespective of the unsuitability of these boats and a lack of regard for the safety of the passengers, each of whom had already paid up-front the required fee (ts 8).
24 The appellant was born in Iran and was aged 41 at the time of sentencing. In August 1995 he began work as a seaman with a large shipping company and travelled extensively. In March 2000 the appellant sailed on a ship that travelled to Australia. He remained in Australia after the ship left. The appellant claimed, and was granted, refugee status. In 2004 he was granted Australian citizenship.
25 In July 2009, the appellant travelled to Indonesia and became involved in people smuggling. After his arrest in January 2011, he voluntarily returned to Australia. He pleaded guilty on the first day of what was to be a very lengthy trial. However, the case against him was strong.
26 The sentencing judge identified general deterrence as the primary sentencing consideration. He said:
For those like you who are higher up the organisational chain in this substantial business enterprise and who act in a manner giving rise to a danger of death or serious harm, there is a need to send a very clear message to those involved, both in this country and overseas, that for those who are apprehended and convicted, they can expect our courts to impose severe sentences on them in the hope that they may be deterred from acting unlawfully in this way.
As I have observed the revenue generated from the activity of people smuggling is substantial and the business thrives on the desperate and vulnerable circumstances of passengers prepared to take the risk for their safety by taking passage on vessels which are unseaworthy and unsafe.
…
It is difficult to imagine a more uncaring and reckless attitude towards the safety and [lives] of other human beings [in] facilitating their passage on unseaworthy, overcrowded boats in the open sea without even basic safety facilities (ts 11).
27 After referring to the circumstances leading up to and including count 9, the sentencing judge continued:
In my view your conduct constituting the commission of each of these four offences, from the circumstances to which I've referred, places you in the worst category of offending in respect of offences of this nature (ts 12).
The statutory framework
28 Section 233C of the Act relevantly provides:
(1) A person (the first person) commits an offence if:
(a) the first person organises or facilitates the bringing or coming to Australia, or the entry or proposed entry into Australia, of a group of at least five persons (the other persons); and
(b) at least five of the other persons are non-citizens; and
(c) the persons referred to in paragraph (b) who are non-citizens had, or have, no lawful right to come to Australia.
30 Section 233B of the Act relevantly provides:
(1) A person (the first person) commits an offence against this section if the first person commits the offence of people smuggling (the underlying offence) in relation to another person (the victim) and either or both of the following apply:
(b) …
(c) in committing the underlying offence:
(i) the first person's conduct gives rise to a danger of death or serious harm to the victim; and
(ii) the first person is reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm to the victim that arises from the conduct.
(a) the first person organises or facilitates the bringing or coming to Australia, or the entry or proposed entry into Australia, of another person (the second person); and
(b) the second person is a non-citizen; and
(c) the second person had, or has, no lawful right to come to Australia.
32 The maximum penalty for a contravention of s 233A is 10 years. There is no mandatory minimum.
33 A person is reckless for the purpose of s 233B(1)(c) if he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur and having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take that risk: Criminal Code (Cth), s 5.4(2).
34 Section 233B carries a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. Again, for an offender aged 18 and over the court is required to impose a mandatory minimum penalty, in this case a sentence of imprisonment of at least 8 years with a non-parole period of at least 5 years: s 236B(2), s 236B(3)(a) and s 236B(4)(a) of the Act.
35 For a repeat offence against s 233C or s 233B by an offender aged 18 and over, the mandatory minimum sentence is 8 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years: s 236B(2), s 236B(3)(b) and s 236B(4)(a) of the Act. A repeat offence can arise in the same proceeding: s 236B(5)(a) of the Act.
36 The appellant contends that there is no material difference in the level of seriousness of the offences in s 233B and s 233C of the Act as both carry the same maximum penalty. The offences in s 233B and s 233C are both aggravated forms of the underlying offence of people smuggling. The aggravating factor in s 233B is that the offender is reckless as to the objective fact that his conduct gives rise to a danger of death or serious harm to another person. The aggravating factor in s 233C is that there be at least five non-citizens involved.
37 The fact that there is a higher mandatory minimum penalty and non-parole period for a first offence under s 233B suggests that it is the more serious offence. However, nothing material hangs on the characterisation of the seriousness of the offences in a factual vacuum. When regard is had to the circumstances of the individual offences, the s 233B offences were more serious than the s 233C offences because the s 233B offences involved both recklessness as to death or serious harm and more than five non-citizens. Further, an increase in sentence from the first offence (count 1) to the last (count 9) is entirely appropriate.
Manifest excess
38 As the appellant was convicted of a federal offence, Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) applies to the sentencing of the appellant.
39 This court can only intervene if the appellant establishes that the sentencing judge made an express or implied material error of fact or law. A claim of manifest excess relies on the implication of an error from the sentence itself. The appellant must establish that the sentence imposed on count 9 is unreasonable or plainly unjust.
40 When considering whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, regard is had to the maximum penalty for the offence, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed for offences of that type, the place which the criminal conduct occupies on the scale of seriousness and the personal circumstances of the offender.
41 The relevance of sentences customarily imposed was explained in Brown v The State of Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533 as follows [6]:
The range of sentences customarily imposed for comparable offences is only one of a number of relevant factors in the determination of whether a sentence is manifestly excessive. Thus, the range of sentences customarily imposed does not establish the range of a sound sentencing discretion: Hili v The Queen (2010) 272 ALR 465; Fernandes v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 227 [15]; The State of Western Australia v Akizuki [2008] WASCA 267 [71]. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors: Sabau v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 3 [18].
42 In dealing with appeals against sentences passed on federal offenders there is a need for consistency of decisions throughout Australia and such consistency is to be achieved through the work of intermediate appellate courts: Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520 [56] - [57]. Sentencing dispositions at first instance are of limited assistance in this regard.
43 So too are the cases relied upon by the appellant which included Cita v The Queen (2001) 120 A Crim R 307; R v Disun (2003) 27 WAR 146; AJ v The Queen [2011] WASCA 166, Bahar v The Queen [2011] WASCA 249; and Warnakulasuriya v The Queen [2012] WASCA 10. Warnakulasuriya was an appeal against conviction. At best that case identifies the sentence imposed at first instance.
44 All of the cases referred to relate to the former s 232A of the Act which is in substantially the same terms as s 233C of the Act. The offenders in Cita were described as pawns in the illegal machinations of others and victims of their own impoverished circumstances [35]. The offenders in Disun were the captain of a vessel and a crewman who steered it. The offenders in Bahar had no involvement in the organisation of the people smuggling enterprise and were targeted by organisers because they were both financially vulnerable and dispensable [64]. The appellant's role in the people smuggling organisation and the circumstances of the appellant's offending the subject of count 9 involves a quantum leap in seriousness so as to deprive the cases relied on by the appellant of any meaningful comparative value.
45 The appellant also relied on the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Haidari [2013] VSCA 149. In that case the offender pleaded guilty to one count of people smuggling for which he was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment (charge 1), one count of aggravated people smuggling under the former s 232A (now s 233C) for which he was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment (charge 2), one count of importing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug for which he was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment (charge 3) and one count of aggravated people smuggling contrary to s 233C for which he was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment (charge 4). The sentencing judge imposed a total effective sentence of 11 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 8 years. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown claims that the sentence for charge 4 was manifestly inadequate, that the sentencing judge erred in failing to provide any accumulation of the sentences for charges 2 and 4 and that the total effective sentence was manifestly inadequate.
46 Charge 4 was committed on the initiation of an undercover police officer. The offender was an organiser motivated by personal financial gain. However, the offender's business was on a very small scale. Charge 1 involved one non-citizen and charges 2 and 4 only six non-citizens. There was an unchallenged finding that the offences under the Act put no one at risk of harm. The Court of Appeal accepted that the sentence on count 4 was lenient but said it had to be assessed in the broader context of the total effective sentence which was regarded as appropriate.
47 The seriousness of the circumstances of the appellant's offending the subject of count 9 and his culpability eclipse that of Mr Haidari relating to the conduct the subject of his offences under the Act. Although there is a single complainant in count 9 (and count 5) all of the circumstances of the offending that aggravate its seriousness can be taken into account. The aggravating circumstances can increase the sentence but they cannot affect the statutory maximum penalty: Zimmerman v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 211.
48 The appellant played an essential role in the people smuggling organisation in which he was involved. The offences were representative. His primary motivation was financial reward. The business was very profitable.
49 An integral aspect of the business model of his organisation was to use boats (the certain fate of which would be forfeiture or destruction after arrival in Australia at the latest) that, because of the state of the vessels and/or lack of safety equipment, were grossly unfit for the purpose of transporting men, women and children by sea from Indonesia to Australia.
50 As the sentencing judge correctly identified, the appellant was not to be sentenced for the deaths of the many passengers who did not survive the sinking and destruction of SIEV 221.
51 What elevates and aggravates the seriousness of the circumstances of the offending the subject of count 9 and the appellant's culpability is that, notwithstanding that the known risk of the danger of death or serious harm to his passengers had just materialised with extensive loss of life, shortly thereafter the appellant committed the same offence again with another boat that was grossly unfit for the purpose. The depth of the appellant's contempt for the vulnerability and safety of the people whom he exploited is truly made manifest by his conduct the subject of count 9. Disclosure to prospective passengers on SIEV 226 of the fate of SIEV 221 and many of its passengers was a token gesture for the reasons given by the sentencing judge. It was appropriate that count 9 attracted the highest penalty.
52 Having regard to all sentencing considerations, including of course all mitigating factors, the sentence of 14 years is clearly within the sound sentencing range. In any event, the penalty for count 9 is linked with the sentencing judge's intention to order that all of the sentences be served concurrently to produce a total effective sentence of 14 years' imprisonment. The total effective sentence reflects the application of the principles of totality and can legitimately impact on the length of individual sentences from within the sound discretionary range: Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9. The sentence of 14 years on count 9 is not manifestly excessive.
Worst category
53 I understand that ground 2 is confined to the sentence of 14 years for count 9. However, on my reading of the sentencing judge's reasons, he was characterising the appellant's criminal conduct as a whole as being in the worst category. Moreover, he was referring to the level of seriousness of the objective circumstances. The sentencing judge's description is entirely apt even if it is confined to the offence the subject of count 9. There is no merit in ground 2. I would refuse leave to appeal on that ground.
Conclusion
54 I would refuse leave on ground 2 and dismiss the appeal.
55 PULLIN JA: I agree with McLure P.
56 MAZZA JA: I agree with McLure P.
2
16
3