Zimmerman v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   ZIMMERMAN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 211

CORAM:   McLURE P

OWEN JA
PULLIN JA

HEARD:   8 OCTOBER 2009

DELIVERED          :   1 DECEMBER 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 12 of 2009

BETWEEN:   ROBERT CHARLES ZIMMERMAN

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :GOETZE DCJ

File No  :IND 1032 of 2008

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentences - Sexual penetration without consent - Whether fact victim was under 16 years old was relevant in sentencing if appellant had an honest and reasonable belief the victim was over 16 years old - Mitigatory value of pleas of guilty

Legislation:

Acts Amendment (Criminal Penalties and Procedure) Act 1982 (WA)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 31(4)(a)
Criminal Code (WA), s 1(1), s 24, s 325, s 326, s 582, s 656
Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (WA), s 4
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 126
Sentencing (Consequential Provisions) Act 1995 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 7

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr A E Eyers

Respondent:     Mr J A Scholz

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Sam Vandongen

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6; (2002) 209 CLR 339

Caporn v The State of Western Australia (No 2) [2008] WASCA 26

H v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 53; (2006) 163 A Crim R 151

Ibbs v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 447

Moody v French [2008] WASCA 67; (2008) 36 WAR 393

The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383

The State of Western Australia v Majok (2005) 152 A Crim R 25

Turan v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 140

Wade v The Queen [2001] WASCA 252

  1. McLURE P:  I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Owen JA and Pullin JA.  I differ from them on the question of whether the sentencing judge erred in taking into account the age of the complainant when sentencing the appellant.  However, I too would dismiss the appeal because I am of the opinion that a different sentence should not have been imposed: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 31(4)(a). These are my reasons for that conclusion.

  2. The facts are set out in the reasons of Pullin JA and not repeated here. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the appellant was charged with two offences of sexual penetration of the complainant contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code). Section 326 provides:

    Aggravated sexual penetration without consent

    A person who sexually penetrates another person without the consent of that person in circumstances of aggravation is guilty of a crime and liable to imprisonment for 20 years.

    Alternative offence:  s 321(2) or (4), 322(2) or (4), 323, 324 or 325.

  3. The maximum penalty…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Zimmerman v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Zimmerman, appealed against his convictions and sentences for two offences of sexual penetration without consent, arguing that the trial judge erred in taking into account the age of the victim during sentencing. The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual penetration without consent, but denied the aggravating circumstances that the victim was under 16 years old and that he caused her bodily harm. The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have considered the victim's age as it was not a proven fact and that the late plea of guilty should have been given more weight in mitigation of sentence.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge erred in taking into account the victim's age in sentencing, and whether the appellant's late plea of guilty should have been given more weight in mitigation. The court considered the relevant legislative provisions and case law, including the principle that a plea of guilty may be taken into account in mitigation if it is a genuine indication of remorse and willingness to facilitate the course of justice. The court also considered the appropriate weight to be given to the age of the victim in sentencing, and whether it was a relevant aggravating factor in this case.

The court found that the trial judge did not err in taking into account the victim's age in sentencing, as it was a relevant aggravating factor under the Code. The court noted that the appellant had not challenged the victim's age in cross-examination, and that the jury had found that the appellant had caused the victim bodily harm. The court also found that the appellant's late plea of guilty did not warrant a significant discount in sentence, as it was not indicative of genuine remorse or willingness to facilitate the course of justice. The court noted that the appellant had not shown any remorse for his actions, and that the plea came very late in the proceedings.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction and sentence. The appellant's convictions and sentences for two offences of sexual penetration without consent were upheld. The court noted that the appellant's offences were serious and that the appropriate sentence had been imposed, taking into account all relevant factors. The court also noted that the appellant had a previous conviction for a similar offence, which was a relevant aggravating factor in sentencing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant did plead guilty to the offence on the first count, and convicted, and credit had to be given for that plea. The appellant submits that although ultimately convicted of the offence on count 2, of aggravated sexual penetration without consent contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code, the irregular plea of guilty that was entered was a mitigatory factor. The appellant submits that 'the plea' at least constituted an admission of two significant elements of the offence charged. The appellant submits that the error occurred when the sentencing judge said (ts 17):The pleas of guilty to the substantive offence are to your credit, but that did not mean that the complainant did not have to give evidence. Ultimately, she did as if everything was in issue. Although you get a credit for the plea, that didn't really facilitate the administration of justice because we had to go through the evidence as if everything was in issue, but I accept that you did plead guilty (emphasis added).and (ts 19):I'm mindful of the late plea of guilty on the first day of the trial to the substantive offences and you get some credit for that. Nonetheless, your victim was still required to give evidence so that balances that to a certain degree. (Emphasis added) The appellant points out that the issues were reduced so that all that the jury had to consider was whether the prosecution had proven the circumstances of aggravation. The appellant also points out that the trial was not conducted by the defence as if everything was in issue. The appellant points to the fact that the prosecution named 24 witnesses on the back of the indictment, but only seven gave evidence and two were not subjected to any cross‑examination. The victim's allegations of sexual penetration without consent were admitted by the appellant and were not challenged in cross‑examination. In Moody v French [2008] WASCA 67; (2008) 36 WAR 393 [38] this court stated that save in exceptional cases, the mere utilitarian value of a plea of guilty may warrant a discount in sentence. However, the rule that a plea of guilty may be taken into account in mitigation usually requires that the rule be understood in terms of a willingness to facilitate the course of justice and an indication of remorse and not on the basis that the plea has saved the community the expense of a contested hearing: Cameron v The Queen [2002] HCA 6; (2002) 209 CLR 339, [14] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Callinan JJ); H v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 53; (2006) 163 A Crim R 151 [12], [30] and [73]. The degree of discount afforded by a plea of guilty is still dependent on other factors including evidence about whether there is actual remorse and acceptance of responsibility. The saving of the need for a trial and similar 'objective benefits' are relevant to whether an inference can be drawn that an offender is remorseful and willing to facilitate the course of justice. Where there is other positive evidence of lack of remorse, the inference is less likely to be drawn and a lesser reduction for the plea is appropriate (H v The State of Western Australia [73] (McLure JA)). When a plea comes very late and is not indicative of genuine remorse, the discount for it should generally be greatly reduced (H v The State of Western Australia [12] (Steytler P)).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The facts are set out in the reasons of Pullin JA and not repeated here. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the appellant was charged with two offences of sexual penetration of the complainant contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code). Section 326 provides:Aggravated sexual penetration without consentA person who sexually penetrates another person without the consent of that person in circumstances of aggravation is guilty of a crime and liable to imprisonment for 20 years.Alternative offence: s 321(2) or (4), 322(2) or (4), 323, 324 or 325. The maximum penalty for a breach of s 326 is 20 years. Both counts alleged that the circumstances of aggravation were that the appellant did bodily harm to the complainant and that the complainant was over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years. On the morning of the first day of the trial, the appellant was permitted to enter pleas of guilty to two counts of having sexually penetrated the complainant without her consent. He was also permitted to enter pleas of not guilty to each of the circumstances of aggravation alleged in the two counts. There was a trial of those issues before a jury. As explained by Pullin JA, the course permitted by the trial judge is not in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 126. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty in relation to both circumstances of aggravation pleaded in count 1. The appellant was convicted of the alternate offence under s 325. That section makes it an offence to sexually penetrate another person without the consent of that person. The maximum penalty for a breach of s 325 is 14 years. In relation to count 2, the jury found the appellant guilty of doing bodily harm to the complainant and not guilty of the second circumstance of aggravation, namely that the complainant was over the age of 13 years and under the age of 16 years. The appellant was convicted of a breach of s 326 of the Code. In sentencing the appellant the sentencing judge took into account the proven fact that the complainant was aged 14 years at the time of the offences. The appellant contends the sentencing judge erred in so doing. The legislative history of the relevant provisions of the Code and the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides the necessary background. Under the Code as it stood prior to the commencement of the Acts Amendment (Criminal Penalties and Procedure) Act 1982 (WA) (the 1982 Act), s 582 required that '[i]f any circumstance of aggravation is intended to be relied upon, it must be charged in the indictment'. The expression 'circumstance of aggravation' was defined in s 1(1) of the Code. That section provided that unless the context otherwise indicates: 'Circumstance of aggravation' means and includes any circumstance by reason whereof an offender is liable to a greater punishment than that to which he would be liable if the offence were committed without the existence of that circumstance.