Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

HENDERSON v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST

[2024] SASCA 55

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Lovell, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Kimber)

9 May 2024

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

LANDLORD AND TENANT - LEASES AND TENANCY AGREEMENTS

LANDLORD AND TENANT - AGREEMENTS FOR LEASE - BREACH

LANDLORD AND TENANT - RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION

A Senior Member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“SACAT”) ordered that the lease between the appellant and respondent be terminated, and that the appellant vacate the premises. The appellant sought an internal review of that decision. On review, the President of the SACAT affirmed the decision of the Senior Member.

The appellant appeals the decision of the President on the grounds that the President erred in finding the appellant failed to keep the premises in “good tenantable condition”, thereby breaching a condition of the tenancy agreement (“the Agreement”); and in finding the breach to be “sufficiently serious” and ordering vacant possession of the premises under s 87(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA).

Held, per the Court, granting leave to appeal on Ground 1, but dismissing the appeal:

1.The findings of the President that the appellant breached cl 6(c) of the Agreement are upheld.

2.Observations as to the meaning of “good tenantable condition” in the context of a tenant with an excessive accumulation of possessions.

Held, per the Court, refusing leave to appeal on Ground 2:

1.There is no obvious merit, or point of general principle or importance, in the appellant's proposed challenge to the President's decision that the breach was “sufficiently serious” and warranted an order for termination and vacation.

Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) ss 87(1), 87(1)(a), 87(1)(b) and 93(4); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 70 and 71, referred to.
Abrahams v Shaw (1969) 72 SR (NSW) 225; Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349; BC v Public Advocate (2019) 133 SASR 587; Credit Suisse v Beegas Nominees Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 803; Fletcher v South Australian Housing Trust [2019] SACAT 36; Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority [2023] SACAT 21; GM v Department of Human Services [2024] SASC 23; Graham v Markets Hotel Pty Ltd (1943) 67 CLR 567; Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2023] SACAT 46; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 125 SASR 1; Lee v Leeds City Council [2002] 1 WLR 1488; Lurcott v Wakely [1911] 1 KB 905; Minister for Primary Industries and Regional Development v Scali [2024] SASC 4; Pipeclay Lawson Ltd v Brand Ventures Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 909; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust (2016) 125 SASR 10; Proudfoot v Hart (1890) 25 QBD 42; Re AKS [2016] SACAT 19; Schinckel v Registrar of Firearms [2020]…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between a tenant, Ms Henderson, and the South Australian Housing Trust (SAHT) regarding a residential tenancy agreement. Ms Henderson, who suffers from various psychological conditions including a hoarding disorder, had been a tenant of SAHT since 2007. The core of the dispute revolved around alleged breaches of her tenancy agreement, specifically clauses requiring her to keep the premises clean and in good tenantable condition, and to give vacant possession upon termination. The matter came before the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) and subsequently the Court of Appeal.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether leave to appeal should be granted, and if so, whether the President of SACAT had erred in upholding the Senior Member's decision that Ms Henderson had breached clause 6(c) of her tenancy agreement. Specifically, the court had to determine if the accumulation of possessions constituted a breach of the requirement to maintain the premises in good tenantable condition and if this breach was sufficiently serious to justify the termination of the tenancy and an order for vacant possession under section 87 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA).

The Court of Appeal reasoned that Ms Henderson's accumulation of possessions, which created an increased risk of fire, constituted a breach of clause 6(c) of the agreement. The court found that this breach, when considered cumulatively with the associated fire risk and the significant period over which it persisted, was sufficiently serious to justify termination of the tenancy under section 87(1)(b) of the Act. The court also concluded that the Senior Member and the President had properly exercised their discretion in ordering termination and vacant possession, having taken into account all relevant considerations, including Ms Henderson's personal circumstances and SAHT's role as a public housing provider.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the President's decision. The court found no merit in the challenges to the President's conclusions regarding the breach of clause 6(c) and the seriousness of that breach justifying termination.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

As the appellant seeks to appeal from a decision of the President to the Court of Appeal, she needs leave to appeal under s 71(1) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (“SACAT Act”).Background The appellant has been a tenant of the respondent since 2007. In addition to some physical medical issues, the appellant suffers from numerous psychological conditions including post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, a panic anxiety disorder with agoraphobia and a hoarding disorder. While the respondent may not be aware of the precise nature and extent of the appellant’s circumstances, it is aware that she is a person who has special needs. On 19 October 2019, the appellant entered into a residential tenancy agreement with the respondent for a premises in Adelaide for a fixed term of three months. Thereafter it became a periodic tenancy. There are two clauses of the Agreement relevant to this appeal. Clause 6(c) of the Agreement required the appellant to “keep the premises and any surrounding area clean and in good tenantable condition, free from vermin and clear of refuse”. Clause 8(b) required that the appellant at the expiration or termination of the tenancy give vacant possession of the premises to the respondent. On 9 April 2021, the respondent served a Notice of Breach (“the Notice”) alleging that the appellant had breached cl 6(c) of the Agreement in that she had not kept the premises in “good tenantable condition”. The Notice did not specify the way the appellant had allegedly breached cl 6(c). The Notice stated that if the breach was not remedied within 14 days, the tenancy would be terminated by force of the Notice and the appellant must then give up possession of the premises on or before 27 April 2021.The involvement of the SACAT In order to understand the arguments on appeal, it is necessary to briefly set out the course of proceedings before the SACAT. On 29 April 2021, the respondent applied to the SACAT for an order for vacant possession of the property relying on the Notice. The application stated that the “[t]enant has not kept premises and surrounding area clean and in good tenantable condition”. The application was heard on 25 May 2021 before a Senior Member of the SACAT. At the hearing, the respondent’s representative informed the Senior Member that “the application before the Tribunal was simply to enable the landlord to access the property to ensure that it is being maintained in a clean and tenantable condition. In addition, [the South Australian Housing Authority] is seeking the right to take photographs at the property”. During the hearing the appellant advised the Senior Member that she had not received the Notice dated 9 April 2021. Further, she informed the Senior Member that the respondent had inspected her property “in early March 2021 and to date had not provided her with an inspection report as to what, if any work, needed to be undertaken at the property”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, we have reviewed the evidence and photographs. We would reach the same conclusion, namely, that the appellant’s accumulation of possessions presented an increased risk of a destructive and dangerous fire, and hence involved a breach of cl 6(c) of the Agreement. Conclusion We reject the challenges to the President’s decision to uphold the findings of breach of cl 6(c) by reason of both the appellant’s excessive accumulation of possessions, and the associated fire risk. While we would grant leave to appeal, we would dismiss this ground of appeal.Ground 2Was the breach sufficiently serious such as to require vacant possession to be ordered? Section 87 of the RTA relevantly states:87 – Termination on application by landlord (1) The Tribunal may, on application by a landlord, terminate a residential tenancy and make an order for possession of the premises if satisfied that – (a) the tenant has committed a breach of the residential tenancy agreement; and(b) the breach is sufficiently serious to justify termination of the tenancy.(footnotes omitted) There are thus two pre-conditions to the SACAT’s exercise of its discretion to order termination and vacant possession under s 87(1). Firstly, whether the appellant has breached the Agreement and secondly, whether the breach is sufficiently serious to justify termination of the Agreement. The President concluded that the appellant’s breach of cl 6(c) was sufficiently serious to justify termination of the tenancy (s 87(1)(b)) (in paragraph [89]) and upheld the Senior Member’s exercise of her discretion to order termination and vacant possession under s 87(1) (in paragraphs [97]-[99]). The President’s essential reasoning in support of these conclusions has been set out earlier in these reasons. We do not think there is any merit in the challenges to these conclusions. As to the conclusion that the breach was “sufficiently serious” to justify termination, the President was entitled to rely upon the cumulative effect of the two aspects of the breach identified; namely, the breach by reason of the excessive accumulation of goods, and the breach by reason of the associated increase in the risk of a destructive and dangerous fire. Given the cumulative effect of these breaches, and the significant period of time over which they have existed, we see no difficulty in characterising the breach as one satisfying the precondition in s 87(1)(b) of the RTA. It is accepted that the separate decision as to whether it was appropriate to order termination and vacant possession under s 87(1) involved the exercise of a discretion. In our view, the appellant has not identified any basis for impugning the exercise of that discretion by the Senior Member, or the President’s conclusion that this was the correct and preferable decision. Once it is accepted that the Senior Member and President correctly construed cl 6(c), and correctly held that the breach of that clause was sufficiently serious to justify termination, it cannot be said that either of them otherwise fell into error. They took account of all relevant considerations, including those relating to the appellant’s personal circumstances and the respondent’s role as a provider of public housing. We note in this respect, not only the President’s reference to these considerations in paragraphs [97]-[99] of her reasons, but also her earlier reference to the detailed consideration of the types of matters which might be relevant in the reasons of Johns DP in Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority.[31][31] Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority [2023] SACAT 21 at [12], [14] (Johns DP).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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