SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
HENDERSON v HOUSING CHOICES SOUTH AUSTRALIA LTD
[2019] SASC 121
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek
12 July 2019
BANKRUPTCY - ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY - PROPERTY AVAILABLE FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS - PROPERTY DIVISIBLE AMONGST CREDITORS - CAPACITY TO EXERCISE POWERS
REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - LEASES - GENERALLY
REAL PROPERTY - LICENCES - GENERALLY - LICENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND
Ms Patrina Kelly Henderson (Henderson) seeks permission to appeal to this Court from orders made by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) in relation to her residential tenancy agreement (RTA), including an order requiring her to vacate the subject premises (Henderson’s application).
In March 2018, Housing Choices SA (HCSA) served a breach notice on Henderson for unpaid rent and subsequently lodged an application with SACAT seeking vacant possession. SACAT granted HCSA vacant possession on 6 June 2018.
On 30 July 2018, Hughes P stayed the vacant possession order pending resolution of Henderson’s various applications but on 29 October 2018, Hughes P dismissed the last of Henderson’s applications and lifted the stay. On 21 October 2018, Henderson filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court; and on 26 October 2018, filed an interlocutory application for, inter alia, a stay of the vacant possession order.
On 1 November 2018, the first directions hearing in this Court was held. A stay and other orders were made. It became apparent that a sequestration order had been made by the Federal Circuit Court Registrar against Henderson’s estate on 13 June 2018 and that she had appealed against that order to Federal Circuit Court Judge Brown.
On 21 February 2019, Henderson’s appeal against the sequestration order was dismissed by Judge Brown. On 18 March 2019, the second directions hearing in this Court was held and various orders were made concerning a timetable for determination of the respondent’s contention that Ms Henderson had no standing to seek permission to appeal against the SACAT orders (the respondent's no standing application). On 28 March 2019, the Court received confirmation that Henderson’s Trustee in Bankruptcy would not continue Henderson’s application.
On 26 April 2019, the respondent's oral submission on its no standing application was heard. Henderson was permitted to file written submissions in reply by 7 June 2019, which date was extended to 5 July 2019. In the event, she filed no written submissions.
The issue now for determination is whether, by reason of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act), Henderson’s application for permission to appeal vested in her Trustee in Bankruptcy.
Held, dismissing Ms Henderson’s application for permission to appeal:
1. Exclusive possession is the decisive factor in distinguishing a lease from a licence. Henderson’s RTA granted her vacant possession of, and the right to peaceably occupy, the premises; further, ss 65 and 66 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 granted her the right to quiet enjoyment and security of the premises. Accordingly, the RTA granted her exclusive possession of the…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 121
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reviewed the reasoning in previous cases, particularly Cummings, Boaler v Power, and Bagshaw v Scott, to determine the scope of the trustee's powers in relation to appeals. The court found that an appeal concerning a monetary judgment entered against the bankrupt did not constitute property of the bankrupt and, therefore, did not vest in the trustee. However, the court clarified that an appeal concerning a lease, being "property" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, would indeed vest in the trustee.
The court emphasised that the right to appeal concerning a lease, which is property within the definition of the Bankruptcy Act, vests in the trustee. This approach aligns with the broader definition of property in the Act and the principle that the capacity to bring proceedings to protect property vested in the trustee falls within the concept of divisible property. The court concluded that the right to appeal concerning a lease was property and, as such, vested in the trustee upon the bankruptcy of the individual.
The court's decision highlights the distinction between an appeal concerning property that vests in the trustee and an appeal against a money judgment entered in an action against the bankrupt. The former constitutes property and vests in the trustee, while the latter does not. The court's decision ensures that the trustee has the necessary authority to manage and protect the bankrupt's property, including the right to appeal concerning leases.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: PEEK J
With respect, I entirely agree. Of course, in the present case there is no monetary judgment against Ms Henderson; here the right of appeal concerns a lease, fitting precisely within the broad definition of property in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act and consequentially within s 116(1)(b). Two court decisions involving appeals commenced to protect a residential tenancy agreement after a declaration of bankruptcy Counsel for the respondent referred the Court to two decisions involving appeals commenced to protect a RTA after a declaration of bankruptcy. The first is Kostov v Amelie Housing (NCAT Appeal),[39]a recent decision of Fagan J of the NSW Supreme Court which involved circumstances almost identical to the present case. The facts in brief were as follows. [39] [2019] NSWSC 16. On 27 July 2017, the plaintiff entered into a RTA with the defendant. On 4 October 2017, the defendant commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal seeking termination of the tenancy for non-payment of rent. Orders were made requiring the plaintiff to do certain things, which orders were later breached. The proceedings were accordingly reinstated and the Tribunal issued a warrant for the Sheriff to obtain possession of the premises. The plaintiff’s appeal against that decision was dismissed as was her later review application. By summons filed on 3 October 2018, the plaintiff appealed to the NSW Supreme Court. Meanwhile, a sequestration order had been made against her on 18 July 2018 and accordingly the question arose as to whether she could proceed with her Supreme Court appeal. The defendant submitted that the definition of “property” in s 5 of the Act was broad enough to “include the interest claimed by the plaintiff under the RTA which was the subject of the litigation in the Tribunal” and that the plaintiff’s capacity to prosecute the proceedings to protect her interest under the RTA fell within the purview of s 116(1)(b) of the Act and therefore vested in the Official Trustee from a date prior to the filing of the summons on 3 October 2018.[40] Fagan J accepted those submissions and stated:[41]10. If the plaintiff’s summons had been filed before she was made bankrupt on 18 July 2018, s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act would very clearly have had the effect that the proceedings were automatically stayed until the Official Trustee made an election with respect to them. In the absence of such an election within 28 days from the sequestration order it would be deemed that the proceedings were abandoned.11. Commencement of proceedings by a plaintiff after he or she has been made bankrupt is precluded by the Act in a more indirect and less explicit fashion. The combined effect of the definition of “property” (in s 5), the vesting of property in the Official Trustee (under s 58) and the inclusion of capacity to bring proceedings within the concept of divisible property (s 116(1)(b)) is to remove the power of commencing proceedings from the hands of the bankrupt and to place it in the hands of the Trustee.12. I accept the defendant’s submissions that for these reasons the plaintiff had no standing to commence the proceedings. The Official Trustee has been given the opportunity to adopt the proceedings and to seek to regularise them but he does not wish to do so. In those circumstances the proceedings should be dismissed.[40] [2011] NSWSC 16, [9] (Fagan J).[41] [2011] NSWSC 16.