Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

HENDERSON v HOUSING CHOICES SOUTH AUSTRALIA LTD

[2019] SASC 121

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

12 July 2019

BANKRUPTCY - ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY - PROPERTY AVAILABLE FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS - PROPERTY DIVISIBLE AMONGST CREDITORS - CAPACITY TO EXERCISE POWERS

REAL PROPERTY - TORRENS TITLE - LEASES - GENERALLY

REAL PROPERTY - LICENCES - GENERALLY - LICENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND

Ms Patrina Kelly Henderson (Henderson) seeks permission to appeal to this Court from orders made by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) in relation to her residential tenancy agreement (RTA), including an order requiring her to vacate the subject premises (Henderson’s application).

In March 2018, Housing Choices SA (HCSA) served a breach notice on Henderson for unpaid rent and subsequently lodged an application with SACAT seeking vacant possession. SACAT granted HCSA vacant possession on 6 June 2018.

On 30 July 2018, Hughes P stayed the vacant possession order pending resolution of Henderson’s various applications but on 29 October 2018, Hughes P dismissed the last of Henderson’s applications and lifted the stay. On 21 October 2018, Henderson filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court; and on 26 October 2018, filed an interlocutory application for, inter alia, a stay of the vacant possession order.

On 1 November 2018, the first directions hearing in this Court was held. A stay and other orders were made. It became apparent that a sequestration order had been made by the Federal Circuit Court Registrar against Henderson’s estate on 13 June 2018 and that she had appealed against that order to Federal Circuit Court Judge Brown.

On 21 February 2019, Henderson’s appeal against the sequestration order was dismissed by Judge Brown. On 18 March 2019, the second directions hearing in this Court was held and various orders were made concerning a timetable for determination of the respondent’s contention that Ms Henderson had no standing to seek permission to appeal against the SACAT orders (the respondent's no standing application). On 28 March 2019, the Court received confirmation that Henderson’s Trustee in Bankruptcy would not continue Henderson’s application.

On 26 April 2019, the respondent's oral submission on its no standing application was heard. Henderson was permitted to file written submissions in reply by 7 June 2019, which date was extended to 5 July 2019. In the event, she filed no written submissions.

The issue now for determination is whether, by reason of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act), Henderson’s application for permission to appeal vested in her Trustee in Bankruptcy.

Held, dismissing Ms Henderson’s application for permission to appeal:

1. Exclusive possession is the decisive factor in distinguishing a lease from a licence. Henderson’s RTA granted her vacant possession of, and the right to peaceably occupy, the premises; further, ss 65 and 66 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 granted her the right to quiet enjoyment and security of the premises. Accordingly, the RTA granted her exclusive possession of the…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd involved a dispute over the administration of property available for the payment of debts during a bankruptcy. The primary issue before the court was whether a right to appeal concerning a lease, which is considered "property" under the Bankruptcy Act, vests in the trustee upon the bankruptcy of the individual. The court examined the nature of the appeal right and whether it constituted property that could be administered by the trustee.

The court reviewed the reasoning in previous cases, particularly Cummings, Boaler v Power, and Bagshaw v Scott, to determine the scope of the trustee's powers in relation to appeals. The court found that an appeal concerning a monetary judgment entered against the bankrupt did not constitute property of the bankrupt and, therefore, did not vest in the trustee. However, the court clarified that an appeal concerning a lease, being "property" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, would indeed vest in the trustee.

The court emphasised that the right to appeal concerning a lease, which is property within the definition of the Bankruptcy Act, vests in the trustee. This approach aligns with the broader definition of property in the Act and the principle that the capacity to bring proceedings to protect property vested in the trustee falls within the concept of divisible property. The court concluded that the right to appeal concerning a lease was property and, as such, vested in the trustee upon the bankruptcy of the individual.

The court's decision highlights the distinction between an appeal concerning property that vests in the trustee and an appeal against a money judgment entered in an action against the bankrupt. The former constitutes property and vests in the trustee, while the latter does not. The court's decision ensures that the trustee has the necessary authority to manage and protect the bankrupt's property, including the right to appeal concerning leases.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
The plurality then referred to the judgment of Farrell LJ in Boaler v Power and stated:[37]… If the postulated appeal relates to property that became vested in the trustee on the bankruptcy, or if the postulated appeal relates to a claim by the bankrupt for money or property that would be vested on recovery in the trustee, the right to appeal is vested in the trustee, as the cases cited by Farwell LJ illustrate. But it does not follow that a right to appeal against a money judgment entered in an action against a bankrupt is property of the bankrupt and, on that account, vested in the trustee. [Emphasis added] [37] (1996) 185 CLR 124, 134 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). Thus, the difference between the two joint judgments may be stated as follows. The plurality considered that an appeal concerning a monetary judgment entered in an action against the bankrupt did not fall within the definition “real and personal property of every description” whereas Dawson and Toohey JJ considered that it did. But the important point for present purposes is that the decision of the plurality in that regard is in no way inconsistent with the proposition that an appeal right concerning a lease, being “property” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, will become vested in the Trustee. This approach to the judgments in Cummings is strongly supported by the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bagshaw v Scott where their Honours explained the disagreement in Cummings thus:[38] [38] (2002) 126 FCR 27, 32-34 (Mansfield, Conti & Allsop JJ).26. Important to that disagreement was the identification of the subject matter of the appeal. Their Honours drew a clear distinction between an appeal relating to property that became vested in the trustee and an appeal relating to a claim by the bankrupt for money or property that would, on recovery, vest in the trustee, on the one hand, and an appeal against a money judgment entered in an action against the bankrupt, on the other hand: see Cummings at 134. The distinction was relevant in the analysis as to whether the right of appeal of the bankrupt vested in the trustee as property envisaged by s 58(1). Their Honours were of the view that a right to appeal against a judgment merely creating a liability in the bankrupt was not “property”, nor did it answer the description of property divisible among creditors defined by par 116(1)(b): Cummings at 133. 27. However, their Honours seemed to accept that rights of appeal of the former kind did vest in the trustee. In this context their Honours examined the Court of Appeal decision of Boaler v Power [1910] 2 KB 229 which had been used by Adam J in W R Henry & Son v Hodge [1963] VR 111 at 112 as authority for a general proposition that any right to appeal a judgment was property divested from the bankrupt and vested in the trustee. In Boaler v Power, Farwell LJ (with whom Kennedy LJ agreed) said (at 232-233): “It is open to the Court in Bankruptcy, if it thinks fit, to allow the debtor to contest in the Bankruptcy Court the validity of the petitioning creditor's judgment on the ground of fraud, collusion, or for any other sufficient reason: In re Flatau(1888) 22 QBD 83. But this is the only way in which the bankrupt can contest it: the adjudication, while it stands, is conclusively binding on him: he cannot contest it in any other Court on the ground of fraud or on any other ground. The right to continue these three actions is a chose in action vested in the trustee, and the bankrupt has no locus standi: see Motion v Moojen (1872) LR 14 Eq 202; Rochfort v Battersby (1849) 2 HLC 388[ 9 ER 1139]; Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210.”28. An examination of the cases referred to by Farwell LJ: Motion v Moojen (1872) 14 Eq 202, Rochfort v Battersby (1849) 2 HLC 388; 9 ER 1139 and Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210, reveals that none had been concerned with an appeal against a judgment in personam, simply creating a liability in the bankrupt. Their Honours examined these cases in the following way. Motion concerned a bankrupt who filed a bill of Chancery impugning an order approving a sale of part of the bankrupt's interest in a partnership. Rochfort involved a dispute between the mortgagees of certain property and the assignees in bankruptcy as to priority in respect of the mortgaged assets. Thus each of these two cases dealt with the right to bring proceedings which, if successful, would enhance the property which had formerly belonged to the bankrupt, but was then vested in the trustee. In Metropolitan Bank the bankrupt instituted proceedings claiming damages against a defendant who, the bankrupt claimed, had tortiously maintained the proceedings which led to his bankruptcy. The damages, if awarded, would have fallen into his estate. Boaler was itself a case in which the bankrupt was seeking to impeach judgments in actions brought to enforce proprietary rights which, if they existed, vested in the trustee. In this context their Honours said (at 134): “If the postulated appeal relates to property that became vested in the trustee on the bankruptcy, or if the postulated appeal relates to a claim by the bankrupt for money or property that would be vested on recovery in the trustee, the right to appeal is vested in the trustee, as the cases cited by Farwell LJ illustrate. But it does not follow that a right to appeal against a money judgment entered in an action against a bankrupt is property of the bankrupt and, on that account, vested in the trustee. [Original Federal Court emphasis]”29. After discussing the four cases to which we have just referred in the terms we have used, their Honours said the following (at 135-136): “None of the three cases cited in Boaler v Power related to litigation in which judgment has been sought or entered against a bankrupt. Boaler v Power itself was a case in which the bankrupt was seeking to impeach judgments in actions brought to enforce proprietary rights which, if they existed, were vested in the trustee. Neither Boaler v Power nor the cases cited establish the affirmative proposition that a right to appeal is property. They do establish the negative proposition that a bankrupt has no right to bring or prosecute proceedings to protect, enhance or add to the property of which he has been divested on bankruptcy (see Rochfort v Battersby(1849) 2 HLC 388at 406, 409 [ 9 ER 1139 at 1146, 1147] and Heath v Tang[1993] 1 WLR 1421; [1993] 4 All ER 694, referred to below). W R Henry & Son v Hodge was wrongly decided. If Boaler v Power were taken as authority for the proposition that a right to appeal in an action brought to enforce a liability of the defendant is property of the defendant, it too would be wrongly decided. But Boaler v Power is explicable as a case relating to proceedings brought by a bankrupt to protect or enforce rights in or to property vested in his trustee. But that is not the present case.The appellants, believing that they had to escape from the proposition that the right to appeal in the present case was property, contended that that ‘property’ was not vested in their trustee but was analogous to those rights of action which do not pass to a trustee on bankruptcy because they are personal to the bankrupt and do not affect the quantum of the bankrupt estate (Beckham v Drake(1849) 2 HLC 579at 627 [ 9 ER 1213 at 1230]; Rose v Buckett[1901] 2 KB 449 at 454; Davies v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd(1934) 7 ABC 210 at 214; Coffey v Bennett [1961] VR 264 at 266). As the right to appeal in this case was not ‘property’ within the meaning of that term in s 58(1), the appellants' submissions miss the point. [Original Federal Court emphasis]”30. It is unnecessary to discuss what might be seen to be the tension between what their Honours said at 134 (emphasised in the extract at [28] above) and at 135 (emphasised in the extract at [29] above). The former may be seen as approval of the proposition that, in the case of the rights to appeal there postulated, the right to appeal is vested (as property) in the trustee. The latter may be seen as a drawing back from the proposition that even such postulated rights to appeal are property. Even so, the passages (at 135-136) make clear that Boaler v Power and the other cases referred to establish the negative proposition that a bankrupt has no right to bring or prosecute proceedings to protect, enhance or add to the property of which he or she was divested on bankruptcy.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

With respect, I entirely agree. Of course, in the present case there is no monetary judgment against Ms Henderson; here the right of appeal concerns a lease, fitting precisely within the broad definition of property in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act and consequentially within s 116(1)(b). Two court decisions involving appeals commenced to protect a residential tenancy agreement after a declaration of bankruptcy Counsel for the respondent referred the Court to two decisions involving appeals commenced to protect a RTA after a declaration of bankruptcy. The first is Kostov v Amelie Housing (NCAT Appeal),[39]a recent decision of Fagan J of the NSW Supreme Court which involved circumstances almost identical to the present case. The facts in brief were as follows. [39] [2019] NSWSC 16. On 27 July 2017, the plaintiff entered into a RTA with the defendant. On 4 October 2017, the defendant commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal seeking termination of the tenancy for non-payment of rent. Orders were made requiring the plaintiff to do certain things, which orders were later breached. The proceedings were accordingly reinstated and the Tribunal issued a warrant for the Sheriff to obtain possession of the premises. The plaintiff’s appeal against that decision was dismissed as was her later review application. By summons filed on 3 October 2018, the plaintiff appealed to the NSW Supreme Court. Meanwhile, a sequestration order had been made against her on 18 July 2018 and accordingly the question arose as to whether she could proceed with her Supreme Court appeal. The defendant submitted that the definition of “property” in s 5 of the Act was broad enough to “include the interest claimed by the plaintiff under the RTA which was the subject of the litigation in the Tribunal” and that the plaintiff’s capacity to prosecute the proceedings to protect her interest under the RTA fell within the purview of s 116(1)(b) of the Act and therefore vested in the Official Trustee from a date prior to the filing of the summons on 3 October 2018.[40] Fagan J accepted those submissions and stated:[41]10. If the plaintiff’s summons had been filed before she was made bankrupt on 18 July 2018, s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act would very clearly have had the effect that the proceedings were automatically stayed until the Official Trustee made an election with respect to them. In the absence of such an election within 28 days from the sequestration order it would be deemed that the proceedings were abandoned.11. Commencement of proceedings by a plaintiff after he or she has been made bankrupt is precluded by the Act in a more indirect and less explicit fashion. The combined effect of the definition of “property” (in s 5), the vesting of property in the Official Trustee (under s 58) and the inclusion of capacity to bring proceedings within the concept of divisible property (s 116(1)(b)) is to remove the power of commencing proceedings from the hands of the bankrupt and to place it in the hands of the Trustee.12. I accept the defendant’s submissions that for these reasons the plaintiff had no standing to commence the proceedings. The Official Trustee has been given the opportunity to adopt the proceedings and to seek to regularise them but he does not wish to do so. In those circumstances the proceedings should be dismissed.[40] [2011] NSWSC 16, [9] (Fagan J).[41] [2011] NSWSC 16.