King v King

Case [2012] QCA 39


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

King v King & Ors [2012] QCA 39

PARTIES:

JOHN FRANCIS KING
(applicant)
v
SARAH LOUISE KING
(first respondent)
LYDIA ELLEN KING
(second respondent)
BENEDICT JOHN KING
(third respondent)
SAMUEL DAVID KING
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 7123 of 2011
DC No 832 of 2011

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

6 March 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 February 2012

JUDGES:

Chesterman and White JJA, and Margaret Wilson AJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The applicant has leave to appeal against the orders of the District Court made on 18 July 2011.

2.   The appeal be allowed and the orders made in the District Court on 18 July 2011 setting aside and/or striking out action BD 832/11 be set aside and instead order that the application to the District Court of 5 July be dismissed.

3.   The parties file a consent order in the District Court in the terms appearing in the agreed directions annexed to this order.

CATCHWORDS:

BANKRUPTCY – ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY – PROPERTY AVAILABLE FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS – PROPERTY NOT DIVISIBLE AMONGST CREDITORS – OTHER MATTERS – where applicant and respondents parties to a residential tenancy agreement – where respondents commenced proceedings for an order that the agreement be terminated – where order made – where execution of order stayed pending proceedings commenced by applicant – where applicant sought declaration that respondents are bound by an agreement for life, an order for specific performance of the agreement and an injunction restraining the respondents from evicting the applicant – where applicant a bankrupt – where judge below ordered claim be struck out – where no reasons were given for the order but apparent from the transcript of argument that his Honour was convinced by the respondents’ counsel’s argument that, as a matter of law, the right the applicant sought to enforce in his action was not his but had vested in his trustees in bankruptcy – where the applicant was not legally represented in the District Court – where applicant appeals order striking out his action – where the applicant’s pleading is capable of claiming a bare licence to occupy the unit for the duration of the applicant’s life or for as long as he wishes to remain in occupation – where applicant submits he has an arguable claim – whether the applicant has a distinctly arguable claim that his right to occupy the unit was a personal right or privilege, not a right of property, and that he is the only person (subject to his former wife’s conjoint right) who may enjoy the right by occupying the premises – whether the application should have been struck out

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 5, s 58, s 116, s 116(2)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 6.03(2)
Settled Land Act 1958 (Vic)

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Details
AGLC
King v King [2012] QCA 39
Case
[2012] QCA 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of King v King, the applicant, who is a bankrupt, sought to enforce a purported life-time occupancy agreement with the respondents, who are his former partners. The applicants were parties to a residential tenancy agreement, and the respondents initiated proceedings to terminate the agreement, which was subsequently ordered. The execution of this order was stayed pending the applicant's proceedings. The applicant sought a declaration that the respondents are bound by an agreement for life, an order for specific performance, and an injunction to prevent eviction. The District Court judge struck out the applicant's claim, apparently convinced that the right sought by the applicant was not his but had vested in his trustees in bankruptcy. The applicant, unrepresented, appeals this decision.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had a distinctly arguable claim that his right to occupy the unit was a personal right or privilege, not a right of property, and whether he is the only person who may enjoy this right. The court had to determine if the applicant's claim was sufficiently arguable to warrant a hearing. The applicant argued that his pleading was capable of claiming a bare licence to occupy the unit for his lifetime or as long as he wished to remain in occupation. The court also considered whether the application should have been struck out.

The court found that the applicant's pleading was capable of claiming a bare licence to occupy the unit for the duration of his life or as long as he wishes to remain in occupation. The court held that this claim was distinctly arguable. The court held that the applicant had a distinctly arguable claim that his right to occupy the unit was a personal right or privilege, not a right of property, and that he is the only person (subject to his former wife’s conjoint right) who may enjoy the right by occupying the premises. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made in the District Court, directing instead that the applicant's application be dismissed. The parties were required to file a consent order in the District Court as per the agreed directions annexed to the court's order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant has leave to appeal against the orders of the District Court made on 18 July 2011.

2. The appeal be allowed and the orders made in the District Court on 18 July 2011 setting aside and/or striking out action BD 832/11 be set aside and instead order that the application to the District Court of 5 July be dismissed.

3. The parties file a consent order in the District Court in the terms appearing in the agreed directions annexed to this order.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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