Murdock v Bettcher

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

MURDOCK & ANOR v BETTCHER

[2008] SASC 79

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Debelle and The Honourable Justice David)

26 March 2008

LANDLORD AND TENANT - TERMINATION OF THE TENANCY - FORFEITURE - RE-ENTRY AND PROCEEDINGS TO RECOVER POSSESSION

Tenancy of commercial premises – appellants in default – respondent served appellants with notice of termination and notice to quit – appellants did not quit premises – respondent commenced proceedings for possession – order for possession made – stay of order for possession upon appellants paying sum of money to respondent each month – whether payment of money was rent – whether appellants held over for six months and thereby have five year lease pursuant to s 20B of Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 – whether proceedings are competent given bankruptcy of first appellant – appeal dismissed.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 58(3); Real Property Act 1886 Part 17; Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 s 20B; District Court Rules 2006 R 204, referred to.
Croft v Lumley (1858) 6 HL Cas 672; (1858) 10 ER 1459; Davenport v The Queen (1877) App Cas 115; Evans v Enever [1920] 2 KB 315, applied.
Civil Service Co-operative Society v McGrigor’s Trustee [1923] 2 Ch 347; Ezekiel v Orakpo [1977] QB 260; Hinton v Fawcett [1957] SASR 213, considered.

MURDOCK & ANOR v BETTCHER
[2008] SASC 79

Full Court: Duggan, Debelle and David JJ

  1. DUGGAN J.         I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons prepared by Debelle J.

  2. DEBELLE J.        This is an appeal from a judge of the District Court of South Australia ordering the appellants to give up possession of premises to the respondent.

  3. The respondent owns premises at 138 Grange Road, Flinders Park.  The respondent had leased those premises to Emacord Autos Pty Ltd (“Emacord”) for some years.  Emacord experienced financial difficulties.  On 4 November 2005 a receiver and manager was appointed.  Emacord was in arrears in payment of rent.  By an agreement to lease dated 16 December 2005 the respondent agreed to lease the premises to the appellants.  The appellants entered into possession on 22 December 2005. 

  4. In the events which have happened, the appellants have remained in possession of the premises since December 2005 notwithstanding defaults by them in complying with the terms of the agreement for lease.  On 28 June 2007, the respondent applied for an order for possession pursuant to Part XVII of the Real Property Act 1886 and Rule 204 of the District Court Rules 2006.  The appellants contended that they have a lease within the terms of the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 so that in all the circumstances, fresh notices of breach and notices to quit had to be served.  It is necessary, therefore, to trace in some detail the events leading to the application for possession. 

  5. After the appellants had entered into possession on 22 December 2005 they…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 79
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Murdock v Bettcher involved the appellants, who were tenants of commercial premises, and the respondent, the landlord, who had issued a notice of termination and a notice to quit due to the tenants' default. Despite these notices, the tenants did not vacate the premises, prompting the respondent to initiate proceedings for possession. The court granted an order for possession, which was stayed upon the tenants making monthly payments to the landlord. The central legal issues were whether these payments constituted rent and whether the tenants had acquired a five-year lease under section 20B of the Retail and Commercial Leases Act 1995 by holding over for six months. Additionally, the court had to determine if the proceedings were competent given the bankruptcy of one of the tenants. The appeal was dismissed by the court.

The court examined the precedent set in Davenport v The Queen, where it was established that accepting rent after notice of forfeiture can waive the right to forfeiture. However, the court distinguished this case from the present one as proceedings for possession had already been initiated. Consequently, the court held that a protest accompanying the acceptance of rent does not negate the act of receiving rent, and this could not countervail the fact of receipt. The court concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated any grounds for this court to interfere with the District Court's order.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found no merit in the appellants' arguments. They had not shown that the court should intervene in the District Court's order. The reasoning of Debelle J was affirmed, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. The appellants were unsuccessful in their attempts to argue that the monthly payments were not rent, that they had acquired a five-year lease, or that the proceedings were improper due to the bankruptcy of one tenant.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J DEBELLE J DAVID J (dissent)
Mr Manetta called in aid the decision of the Privy Council in Davenport v The Queen (1877) 3 App Cas 115. In that case, a lessee was in breach of the terms of the lease of Crown land and was liable to forfeiture of the lease. The Crown with full knowledge that the lease was liable to be forfeited received rent from the lessee. It was held that by accepting the rent the Crown had waived the events giving rise to forfeiture. The Privy Council applied the reasoning of Williams J in Croft v Lumley (1858) 6 HL Cas 672; (1858) 10 ER 1459 to this effect:It was established as early as Pennant’s Case that if a lessor after notice of a forfeiture of the lease accepts rent which accrued after, this is an act which amounts to an affirmance of the lease and a dispensation of the forfeiture. In the present case the facts, I think, amount to this, that the lessor accepted the rent, but accompanied the acceptance with a protest that he did not accept it as rent, and did not intend to waive any forfeiture. But I am of opinion that this protest was altogether inoperative. As he had no right at all to take the money unless he took it as rent, he cannot, I think, be allowed to say that he wrongfully took it on some other account. And if he took it as rent, the legal consequences of such an act must follow, however much he might desire to repudiate them. (Citations omitted).While they did not find it necessary to invoke this opinion to its fullest extent, Their Lordships held that, where money is paid and received as rent under a lease, a mere protest that it is accepted conditionally and without prejudice and the right to insist upon prior forfeiture, cannot counter-vail the fact of the receipt. The position here is altogether different in that proceedings for possession have been commenced. The decision in Davenport v The Queen has no application in these circumstances. Conclusion The appellants have, therefore, failed on all the arguments on which they seek to rely. They have not demonstrated that there is any ground on which this court should interfere with the order of the judge of the District Court. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Debelle J. I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J, DEBELLE J,

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