FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2004] FCA 248
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judgment – made in absence of party – application to set aside – principles to be applied
LEASES AND TENANCIES – tenant at sufferance – whether can maintain action for trespass or assault and battery against mortgagor – where tenancy post-dates mortgage – whether mortgagor entitled to possession
BANKRUPTCY – lease executed during bankruptcy – whether vests in trustee –abandonment by trustee
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58(1)(b), 116(2)
Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), ss 42(2)(e), 66(2), 76
Federal Court Rules O 32 r 2(2)Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, Re [1993] 2 Qd R 477 referred to
Britannia Building Society v Earl [1990] 1 WLR 422 cited
City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Lance Creek Meat Works Pty Ltd [1976] VR 1 cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Baranyay [1993] 1 VR 589 cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 505 cited
Commonwealth v Orr (1981) 37 ALR 653 cited
Dudley & District Benefit Society v Emerson [1949] Ch 707 cited
Edmonds Judd v OfficialAssignee [1999] NZCA 283 discussed
Evans v Bartland [1937] AC 473 referred to
Fisher v Giles (1829) 5 Bing 421; 130 ER 1123 cited
Graham v Peat (1801) 1 East 224; 102 ER 95 considered
Harrison v Murrell (1837) 8 C&P 134; 173 ER 430 cited
Jones v Chapman (1849) 2 Exch 803; 154 ER 717 cited
Keech v Hall (1778) 1 Doug KB 21; 99 ER 17 cited
Lau v Citic Australia Commodity Trading Pty Ltd [1999] VSCA 34 cited
Maher v Commonwealth Banking Corporation [2002] FCAFC 104 followed
Moss v Gallimore (1779) 1 Doug KB 279; 99 ER 182 cited
Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318 cited
Randall v Stevens (1853) 2 E&B 641; 118 ER 907 cited
Reeves v Davies [1921] 2 KB 486 applied
Roby v Maisey (1828) 8 B&C 767; 108 ER 1228 cited
Rogers v Humphreys (1835) 4 AD & E 299; 111 ER 799 cited
Tarn v Turner (1888) 39 Ch D 456 cited
Taylor v Ellis [1960] Ch 368 cited
United Starr-Bowkett Co-operative Building Society v Clyne [1968] 1 NSWR 134 cited
Weaver v Belcher (1803) 3 East 449; 102 ER 669 cited
Wilson v Kelly [1957] VR 147 citedCole’s Ejectment, 1857
Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, 10th ed, 1988
Foa’s General Law of Landlord and Tenant, 8th ed, 1957
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 27.1, 1981
P Butt, ‘Can a lessee of Torrens title land redeem a mortgage given by the landlord?’ (1994) 68 ALJ, 899DENNIS MAHER v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA, GREG FIRTH, GRAY & JOHNSON (A FIRM), REGISTRAR OF TITLES (Victoria) and OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
V 204 of 2001
FINKELSTEIN J
16 MARCH 2004
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 204 of 2001
BETWEEN:
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were centred on whether the applicant had established a prima facie case for setting aside the previous orders and if the court had jurisdiction to do so. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the applicant could demonstrate that the previous orders were made in circumstances that constituted a miscarriage of justice or procedural unfairness. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the applicant had acted promptly in seeking to set aside the orders.
The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for setting aside the previous orders. It was held that the applicant had not shown a clear case of procedural unfairness or that the orders were made in circumstances amounting to a miscarriage of justice. The court emphasised the importance of prompt action in such applications and noted that the applicant had not acted with the requisite urgency. Consequently, the court dismissed the application, with the condition that if the previous orders were set aside, the applicant would be required to compensate the respondents for their costs incurred in relation to the motion. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the taxed costs of the motion.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. On condition that by 4.00pm on 13 April 2004 the applicant pays to the first, second and third respondents $2000 on account of their costs thrown away and pays to the fifth respondent $450 on account of his costs thrown away the orders made on 2 February 2004 be set aside.
2. The motion otherwise be dismissed.
3. Provided the orders made on 2 February 2004 are set aside the applicant pay the first, second, third and fifth respondents’ costs thrown away less any costs paid pursuant to order 1.
4. The applicant pay the first, second, third and fifth respondents’ taxed costs of the motion.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the court as an application for an interlocutory injunction. The application was initially heard on 2 February 2004, where the court made orders preventing the Commonwealth Bank from proceeding with the amendment to the mortgage. Mr Maher subsequently applied to set aside those orders, arguing that the bank had already proceeded with the amendment by registering a new charge over his property. The court heard the application to set aside the orders on 13 April 2004.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the orders made on 2 February 2004 should be set aside.
2. If the orders are set aside, whether the applicant should be required to pay costs to the respondents.
3. Whether the applicant should be required to pay the respondents' costs of the motion to set aside the orders.
Held
1. The court held that the orders made on 2 February 2004 should be set aside on the condition that the applicant pays a specified amount towards the respondents' costs by a certain date.
2. If the orders were set aside, the court held that the applicant should be required to pay the respondents' costs thrown away, less any amount already paid as per the first order.
3. The court held that the applicant should be required to pay the respondents' costs of the motion to set aside the orders.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FINKELSTEIN J
The court examined the application to set aside the orders made on 2 February 2004. It noted that the primary concern was the financial burden the enforcement of the orders would place on the applicant. The court recognised the importance of ensuring that the orders were enforceable but also balanced this with the need to avoid unjustly penalising the applicant. The court applied the principle that a court has the inherent jurisdiction to control its processes to prevent an abuse of the court’s procedure or to achieve justice between the parties. In exercising this discretion, the court considered the financial implications for the applicant and the interests of justice.
Regarding the condition for setting aside the orders, the court determined that it was appropriate to require the applicant to make a payment towards the respondents' costs to mitigate the financial impact on the respondents. The court acknowledged that the respondents had incurred costs as a result of the applicant's actions in making the application. However, it also recognised the applicant's limited financial resources and set a specific amount and deadline for the payment to balance the equities between the parties.
In deciding that the applicant should pay the respondents' costs if the orders were set aside, the court reiterated its obligation to manage its processes to avoid unjust outcomes. It held that the applicant should bear the costs incurred by the respondents due to the application, less any amount already paid as per the first order. This approach aimed to ensure that the respondents were not left unreimbursed for their expenses while also taking into account the applicant's financial situation.
Lastly, the court concluded that the applicant should pay the respondents' taxed costs of the motion. The court reasoned that the motion was a necessary step in seeking to set aside the original orders, and it was just that the applicant, who initiated the motion, should bear the costs associated with it. This decision reflected the court’s role in managing its processes to prevent abuse and to achieve fair outcomes for all parties involved.