Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd (No 1)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd (ACN 004 061 214) v
Aconex Pty Ltd (ACN 091 376 091) (No 1) [2007] FCA 2010

EVIDENCE – application to re‑open case and recall witnesses – whether rule in Browne v Dunn complied with – discretion of trial judge to re‑open case, reject submissions by cross‑examiner on witnesses’ evidence, or consider other alternatives – not necessary for cross‑examiner to put every detail to witness – cross‑examining party gave adequate notice of some issues in pleadings and opening statements – where rule not complied with, no issue of unfairness arose – application refused.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): s 46

Browne v Dunn [1893] 6 R 67, applied
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, cited
Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612, cited
Re Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (WA Branch); Ex parte Ferguson (1986) 67 ALR 491, cited
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (A Firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169, cited
Jardein Pty Ltd v Stathakis [2007] FCAFC 148, cited
Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1977) 19 NSWLR 219, cited
McCarthy v McIntyre [2000] FCA 1250, cited
Payless Superbarn (NSW) Pty Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551, cited
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR 1, cited
Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 42 FCR 206, cited
Marelic v Comcare (1993) 47 FCR 437, cited
Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88, cited
Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471, cited
Goldsmith v Landilonidis (2002) 190 ALR 370, cited
Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, cited

HAWTHORN GLEN PTY LTD (ACN 004 061 214) v ACONEX PTY LTD

(ACN 091 376 091), ROBERT WILLIAM PHILLPOT & LEIGH MATTHEW JASPER

VID 420 of 2007

GOLDBERG J
14 DECEMBER 2007
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 420 of 2007

IN THE MATTER OF ACONEX PTY LTD (ACN 091 376 091)

BETWEEN:

HAWTHORN GLEN PTY LTD
(ACN 004 061 214)
Plaintiff

AND:

ACONEX PTY LTD
(ACN 091 376 091)
First Defendant

ROBERT WILLIAM PHILLPOT
Second Defendant

LEIGH MATTHEW JASPER
Third Defendant

JUDGE:

GOLDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The defendants’ notice of motion filed on 14 November 2007 is dismissed.

2.The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of, and incidental to, that motion, including the costs of the hearing of 15 and 16 November 2007.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 420 of 2007

IN THE MATTER OF ACONEX PTY LTD (ACN 091 376 091

BETWEEN:

HAWTHORN GLEN PTY LTD
(ACN 004 061 214)
Plaintiff

AND:

ACONEX PTY LTD
(ACN 091 376 091)
Defendant

ROBERT WILLIAM PHILLPOT
Second Defendant

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 2010
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd, the primary dispute concerned the defendants' application to adduce further evidence after judgment had been reserved. The court had to determine whether the defendants should be granted leave to call additional witnesses and present new evidence, particularly in light of the defendants' earlier defence of mistake, which had since been abandoned. The legal issues before the court involved the application of the rule in Browne v Dunn, which pertains to the necessity for a party to inform a witness of the evidence or submissions that will be relied upon to discredit their testimony. The court also had to consider whether the proposed evidence was relevant to the issues at hand and whether it would serve the interests of justice to allow such evidence.

The court found that the defendants had not strictly complied with the rule in Browne v Dunn, as they had not adequately alerted their witnesses to the evidence that would be used to challenge their credibility. However, the court held that this did not necessitate a grant of leave for the defendants to adduce further evidence. The proposed evidence, which pertained to the intentions of certain individuals and their discussions about the offer documents, was deemed largely irrelevant to the proper construction of the offer documents and the other causes of action, including oppression, improper purpose, and breach of directors’ duties. Although the evidence might have had some relevance to the defendants' earlier defence of mistake, this defence had been abandoned. The court concluded that the evidence was of marginal probative value and not critical to the resolution of the issues in the case.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the defendants' application to adduce further evidence. The court found that granting leave would not serve the interests of justice and that the evidence was peripheral to the main issues of the proceeding. The court also noted that the defendants had ample opportunity to seek such leave before judgment was reserved. Consequently, the defendants' motion was dismissed, and they were ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs associated with the motion, including the costs of the hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendants’ notice of motion filed on 14 November 2007 is dismissed.

2. The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of, and incidental to, that motion, including the costs of the hearing of 15 and 16 November 2007.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As noted earlier, it is not necessary, in order to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn, that a party put to a witness in cross‑examination every detail of the evidence or submission upon which that party intends to rely in order to discredit the witness’ evidence. As was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 101‑102 (per Tamberlin J):“In commercial litigation (including intellectual property matters), where issues are clearly defined, there will often be no point in formally challenging every aspect of the evidence which is contested. There will often be a large number of matters in respect of which it will be apparent from the pleadings and particulars there is clearly a contest. Where this is the case the principle need not be applied in an unduly technical way. …The rule may be satisfied where the witness is on notice that the version given is disputed and such notice may come from pleadings, the opponent’s evidence or opening, or from the general manner in which the case is conducted.” (at 102)THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE ADDUCED IF THE CASE IS RE‑OPENED The evidence which the defendants seek leave to adduce, in broad terms, is intended to address Aconex’s, and in particular Mr Phillpot’s, intention in relation to the offer documents sent to Hawthorn Glen by reference to documents relied upon by Hawthorn Glen in its final address. It is as follows:(a)Mr Phillpot says that on 14 or 15 March 2007 he and Mr Jasper discussed that they would try to make a parallel offer under Schedule 6 of the Facility Agreement. Mr Phillpot sets out conversations he had with Mr Spargo, exchanges of emails containing drafts of a letter to Hawthorn Glen and explains his intentions in relation to the documentation sent by Aconex. He also comments upon the board paper for the Aconex Board meeting on 14 February 2007, Mr Neil Young QC’s advice on 16 February 2007, the information memorandum sent to investors and emails to existing investors and says that he prepared his second affidavit independently of Mr Jasper;(b)Mr Jasper explains the drafting of the 14 February 2007 Board paper, his discussions with Mr Phillpot about making a parallel offer under Schedule 6 of the Facility Agreement to Hawthorn Glen and says that he prepared his second affidavit independently of Mr Phillpot;(c)Mr Spargo explains the sequence of events on 15 and 16 March 2007 relating to the drafting of documents to be sent to Hawthorn Glen including conversations he had with Mr Phillpot. None of this evidence bears upon the proper construction of the offer documents Aconex sent to Hawthorn Glen and none of it is material, relevant or admissible in relation to the issue of the proper construction of those documents. This evidence is of little, if any, probative value in relation to the other causes of action relied upon by Hawthorn Glen, oppression, improper purpose, and breach of directors’ duties. At its highest, this evidence is directed to the credit of Aconex, and Messrs Phillpot and Jasper in particular, and even then it is of marginal probative value in relation to an attack on the credit of Mr Phillpot and Mr Jasper.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GOLDBERG J
I turn to the submissions made by Hawthorn Glen in relation to Mr Spargo which were not anticipated by the defendants, namely that the Court should infer, in accordance with Jones v Dunkel, that his evidence as to the preparation of the offer documents and the 15 March 2007 letter, and as to their meaning and effect, and in relation to an email from Mr Ian Baillieu to Mr Hosking dated 20 April 2007, would not have assisted the defendants and would have assisted Hawthorn Glen. Such an inference was open for Hawthorn Glen to submit whilst the defence of mistake was alive but it was not an inference which was relevant to, or admissible in respect of, the proper construction of the offer documents. Further, Mr Spargo’s evidence in relation to the email from Mr Ian Baillieu to Mr Hosking on 20 April 2007 is of no relevance or significance in relation to the proper construction of the offer documents or the other causes of action relied upon by Hawthorn Glen. There is no purpose now in Mr Spargo giving such evidence.CONCLUSION It can therefore be seen that in relation to the submissions made by Hawthorn Glen, which were not anticipated by the defendants, in respect of which I have found that the rule in Browne v Dunn was not complied with, there is no need for the defendants to respond to those submissions, as I do not propose to have regard to those submissions for the purposes of making findings and reaching a decision in this matter, consistently with the rule in Browne v Dunn. As to those submissions of Hawthorn Glen in respect of which the rule in Browne v Dunn was complied with, I do not consider that I should exercise my discretion in favour of granting the defendants leave to call further evidence to respond to those submissions. I do not consider that the interests of justice are better served by granting such leave. In particular the evidence sought to be called does not bear directly on any critical or material issue in the proceeding which I now have to determine. It is not relevant to, or admissible in respect of, the proper construction of the offer documents or the causes of action of oppression, improper purpose or breach of directors’ duties. It is arguably relevant to the defendants’ defence of mistake, but that defence was abandoned in final submissions. Insofar as it goes to the credit of Messrs Phillpot and Jasper and their reliability as witnesses, it is of marginal significance as are the submissions on credit to which the evidence responds. Put shortly, the evidence is not of such importance as to require that the defendants be allowed to re‑open their case and call further evidence after judgment has been reserved. It is peripheral to the main issues in the proceeding. In reaching the conclusion that I should not grant the leave sought, I have also taken into account the following matters:(a)The intention of the person who drafted of the offer documents (relevant to the defence of mistake) was a significant issue identified in the pleadings and was referred to in the interlocutory hearings leading up to the trial;(b)The documents relied on by Hawthorn Glen and referred to in its final address had been brought to the attention of the defendants before, and after, the commencement of the trial;(c)The defendants’ legal advisers did not have a mistaken apprehension of the evidence. Rather they overlooked, and did not take into account sufficiently, the issue of intention and the documents referred to by Hawthorn Glen in its final address;(d)The defendants had the opportunity to seek leave to call further evidence, of the type the subject of their present application, well before the time at which judgment was reserved. In paragraph 70 of his affidavit Mr Meadows says, in substance, that as a result of observations by senior counsel for Hawthorn Glen at the hearing on 22 August 2007, the defendants’ legal advisers expected that “the alleged deliberateness of the insertion of the 30 April 2007 date would be the subject of cross‑examination by the plaintiff”. That did not occur. No application to lead further evidence from Mr Phillpot was made at the conclusion of his cross‑examination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GOLDBERG J