Williams v Canberra Urology Pty Ltd
[2012] FMCA 945
•16 October 2012
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WILLIAMS v CANBERRA UROLOGY PTY LTD | [2012] FMCA 945 |
| INDUSTRIAL LAW – Small claim – payment on termination in lieu of notice – later allegations of ‘serious misconduct’ against employee not made in earlier correspondence with Fair Work Inspector – claims of set-off – inter-play of ‘small claims procedure’ and principles regarding admission of ‘new evidence’. |
| Fair Work Act 2009 ss.12, 117(3)(a) & (b), 123(1)(b), 324, 548(3) Fair Work Regulations 2009 reg.1.07(1)-(3) |
| Bing! Software v Bing Technologies (No.2) [2008] FCA 1761 Buonouar v The Spanish Club Ltd (1998) 94 IR 166 Finance Sector Union v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2000) 104 IR 33 Lee v Professional Services Review Committee No.292 (No.2) [2010] FCA 1490 Logan v Otis Elevator Co Pty Ltd (1999) 94 IR 218 Miller v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2001) 183 ALR 419 Pastrycooks Employees, Biscuit Makers Employees & Flour and Sugar Workers Union (NSW) v Gartrell White (No.3) (1990) 35 IR 70 Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Givoni Pty Ltd (2002) 121 IR 250 Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Purcell [2009] NSWSC 1079 |
| Applicant: | MICHELLE WILLIAMS |
| Respondent: | CANBERRA UROLOGY PTY LTD |
| Amicus curiae: | FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN |
| File Number: | CAG 1 of 2012 |
| Judgment of: | Neville FM |
| Hearing date: | 20 August 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 September 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Canberra |
| Delivered on: | 16 October 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Self Represented |
| Counsel for the first Respondent: | Self Represented |
| Advocate for the amicus curiae | Ms Kovalsky |
| Solicitors for the amicus curiae | Fair Work Ombudsman |
ORDERS
Within 14 days the Respondent pay the Applicant the sum of $998.08.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA |
CAG 1 of 2012
| MICHELLE WILLIAMS |
Applicant
And
| CANBERRA UROLOGY PTY LTD |
Respondent
| FAIR WORK OMBUDSMAN |
Amicus curiae
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
According to the Form 5 filed with this Court on 3rd January 2012, on 19th May 2008 the Applicant was employed as the practice manager of the Respondent, whose sole director and share-holder is Dr M.J. Mulcahy. He is the principal of the specialist medical practice which is operated through the Respondent company. The Applicant remained in her position until her services were terminated, with immediate effect, on 10th March 2011. It was Dr Mulcahy who terminated Ms Williams’ employment.
Upon the termination of her employment, Ms Williams received two weeks pay in lieu of notice, pursuant to s.117(3)(a) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (“the Act”).
The current application, brought in this Court’s ‘small claims division’, seeks to recover a further amount of $998.08, being an amount said to be owed to Ms Williams pursuant to s.117(3)(b) of the Act. That sub-section provides that the periods set out in the table in s.117(a) shall increase “by 1 week if the employee is over 45 years old and has completed at least 2 years of continuous service with the employer at the end of the day the notice is given.”
Ms Williams contends that she was employed under the “Health Professionals and Support Services Award 2010”, and was, under that award, a level 8 support services employee.
A formal response was not filed by the Respondent until 18th May. In that document, the Respondent, who at that stage was legally represented, opposed the making of the payment sought, and alleged that the Applicant engaged in conduct “constituting gross misconduct.” In the alternative, the Respondent contended that Ms Williams had received “entitlements well in excess of the applicable Modern Award.”
At the hearing, upon an application by Ms Kovalsky from the office of the Fair Work Ombudsman, I granted leave for her to appear as an amicus curiae, and further, upon the filing of written submissions by the parties, she would also be permitted to file written submissions.
The Fair Work Ombudsman (“the FWO”) supports the claim and the relief sought by Ms Williams. In short, the FWO submitted that “subject to the respondent’s claim of serious misconduct, the applicant would otherwise be entitled to one week’s payment in lieu of notice of termination in accordance with subsection 117(3) of the … Act for the reasons set out in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the applicant’s submissions filed on 31 August 2012.”
The Competing Contentions
In two letters annexed to Ms Williams’ affidavit filed on 13th August, from Dr Mulcahy to the Fair Work Inspector, dated 7th November 2011 and 19th December 2011, he stated:
It is clear that Michelle Williams should be paid for a third week after dismissal from Canberra Urology, provided she can demonstrate to me through the production of a birth certificate what her exact age is.
If she wants to claim this entitlement she needs to prove to us by production of her birth certificate. [Letter of 7th November]
My requirements to pay Michelle Williams are that she proves conclusively that her date of birth is such that her age was 45 years or older at the time of her dismissal from Canberra Urology. As I stated to you she always told myself and my staff that she was 39 years of age. [Letter of 19th December 2011]
Also annexed to Ms Williams’ affidavit of August 2012 are copies of a birth certificate and a marriage certificate that she affirmed referred to her. Further, at the hearing on 20th August, Ms Williams produced her drivers’ licence; a copy of it became Exhibit D. The driver’s licence clearly shows her date of birth to be 12th April 1965, thus confirming that, at the date of her dismissal, she was 46 years of age.
In the letters to which I have referred, Dr Mulcahy also contended that it was, in effect, a condition of making the payment to Ms Williams that she return certain documents which, he said, she had [improperly] taken from Canberra Urology. In the letters, he outlined the documents that he said Ms Williams had removed.
In his November letter to the Fair Work Inspector, Dr Mulcahy also said that he would be pursuing Ms Williams for damages in relation to his costs “in her pseudo claim to Fair Work Australia and for my own loss of income as a result of this, as well as damages in relation to her harassment of some of her co-workers.”
At the hearing, Ms Williams denied (a) any ‘harassment’ of any of her co-workers, (b) that she had misappropriated any documents from the Respondent, and (c) claims made by Dr Mulcahy in relation to any serious misconduct, which he sought to substantiate by calling three of his current employees as witnesses (none of whom had provided any affidavits in the proceeding). Indeed, although Dr Mulcahy provided written submissions, and said that they were “given under oath at the hearing”, he never filed an affidavit in the proceeding.[1]
[1] Dr Mulcahy gave oral evidence (under oath of course) in the course of the hearing. Having regard to s.548(3) of the Act, I do not take particular issue with the fact that Dr Mulcahy’s submissions, (a) are not, as he contends, formally sworn, and (b) otherwise do not comply with the Rules of this Court in relation to font size and not a few other matters. However, I do not take s.548 to be a blanket absolution for parties otherwise to put evidence properly before the Court, including that it be done in a timely way and in a manner that does not prejudice either the other party or the fair conduct of the proceedings.
More particularly, Dr Mulcahy contended that Ms Williams’ “serious misconduct” was constituted by theft (of documents and money), bullying and harassment, and racism towards a patient or patients.
Discussion and Resolution
First, Dr Mulcahy did not address, or address directly, how or why the position he confirmed to the Fair Work Inspector in November and December 2011, where he acknowledged Ms Williams’ entitlement to the payment she seeks, had now changed such that he resisted her claim. More particularly, he did not address why he had not made the allegations against Ms Williams in relation to her alleged ‘serious misconduct’ in November and December 2011, and waited until May 2012 to do so. Presumably the information upon which he sought to rely at the hearing in August 2012 he had available in November and December 2011. If so, it was not explained why he did not raise such matters then, and why did he now resile from the two written acknowledgements in late 2011 that the amount claimed by Ms Williams would be paid upon him being satisfied of her age.
Indeed, a number of the allegations made by Dr Mulcahy should, if they are to be pursued, be put before other authorities, including the police. In my view, it is not appropriate to raise such serious allegations, such as theft of documents and money, and essentially give details (such as they are) only at the hearing, and not pursue the significant allegations with the relevant authorities. There has certainly been ample time and opportunity to do so.
“Serious misconduct” (not “gross misconduct” as alleged by the Respondent) is defined in s.12 of the Act by reference to the Fair Work Regulations 2009. Thus, regulation 1.07(1) provides that “in section 12 of the Act, serious misconduct has its ordinary meaning”, while regulations 1.07(2) & (3) more helpfully provide that ‘serious misconduct’ includes both of the following:
(2) For subregulation (1), conduct that is serious misconduct includes both of the following:
(a) wilful or deliberate behaviour by an employee that is inconsistent with the continuation of the contract of employment;
(b) conduct that causes serious and imminent risk to:
(i) the health or safety of a person; or
(ii) the reputation, viability or profitability of the employer’s business.
(3) For subregulation (1), conduct that is serious misconduct includes each of the following:
(a) the employee, in the course of the employee’s employment, engaging in:
(i) theft; or
(ii) fraud; or
(iii) assault;
(b) the employee being intoxicated at work;
(c) the employee refusing to carry out a lawful and reasonable instruction that is consistent with the employee’s contract of employment.
Both Ms Williams and the Fair Work Ombudsman rely on the decision of Hungerford J in Pastrycooks Employees, Biscuit Makers Employees & Flour and Sugar Workers Union (NSW) v Gartrell White (No.3),[2] which confirmed that the onus of proving the serious misconduct alleged rests with the employer.
[2] Pastrycooks Employees, Biscuit Makers Employees & Flour and Sugar Workers Union (NSW) v Gartrell White (No.3) (1990) 35 IR 70 at p.83.
Dr Mulcahy contended that this case is now dated and should not be followed, at least in the circumstances of the current matter. However, such a submission overlooks the fact that it continues to be relied upon and or considered to be relevant in cases such as Buonouar v The Spanish Club Ltd, Miller v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia) and Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd) v Purcell (from the New South Wales Supreme Court).[3]
[3] Buonouar v The Spanish Club Ltd (1998) 94 IR 166 (affirmed on appeal – (1998) 94 IR 173); Miller v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2001) 183 ALR 419; Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd) v Purcell [2009] NSWSC 1079.
Dr Mulcahy relied in support of his allegations against Ms Williams on the oral evidence of three of his current employees, notwithstanding (as I have already observed) that none of these witnesses had provided any affidavit evidence in the proceeding. Indeed, it was not explained (or explored) why no affidavit evidence had been forthcoming from these witnesses between January 2012 (when the application was first filed) and the hearing (in August). The witnesses were: Ms Lynda Lawson, Ms Barbara Hodge, and Ms Natasha Micic. All of these ladies said that they were former work colleagues of the Applicant; each of them confirmed that they currently work for Dr Mulcahy, via the Respondent company.
In relation to the evidence of these witnesses – in relation to which no formal application for leave was sought by Dr Mulcahy, but their evidence was given in the course of the hearing nonetheless – and in relation to other matters set out in Dr Mulcahy’s submissions, the FWO submitted as follows:
Although no formal request for leave has been made, it appears that the respondent is attempting to seek leave to adduce new evidence after the conclusion of the hearing. The respondent’s submissions filed on 4 September 2012 are stated to be “given under oath” and contain evidence in support of the respondent’s case (referred to hereafter as the ‘New Evidence’). Additionally, the respondent’s submissions make reference to affidavits of Gillian Moyes, Barbara Hodge and Lynda Lawson. The referred affidavits are not annexed to the respondent’s submissions and have not otherwise been filed or served in relation to this matter. The respondent’s submissions also refer to a series of documents (under the heading ‘Supporting Documentation’). Several of the supporting documents are already in evidence, however, where this is not the case the supporting documents have not been annexed to the respondent’s submissions or otherwise filed and served.
The FWO further submitted that the Court should consider various cases that deal with applications to adduce fresh or new evidence in circumstances where, as here, the hearing has concluded. It is sufficient to recall the comments of Collier J in Bing! Software v Bing Technologies (No.2) (“Bing Software”).[4]
[4] Bing! Software v Bing Technologies (No.2) [2008] FCA 1761. Collier J’s comments in Bing Software have recently been considered and applied by Katzmann J in Lee v Professional Services Review Committee No.292 (No.2) [2010] FCA 1490 at [20] & [21].
At [12] – [15] in Bing Software, her Honour said:
[12] It is not in dispute that the Court has the power to grant leave for further evidence-in chief to be adduced after the trial of the proceeding has concluded and judgment reserved. Indeed this jurisdiction is well recognised: Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612, Gulf Pacific Pty Ltd v Londish [1992] FCA 502, Urban Transport Authority of New South Wales v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471, Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, McCarthy v McIntyre [2000] FCA 1250, Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22, Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd (No 1) [2007] FCA 2010.
[13] In Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22, Kenny J conveniently summarised the circumstances in which the Court will permit further evidence to be adduced between conclusion of the hearing and delivery of judgment as follows:
[24] The authorities indicate that, broadly speaking, there are four recognised classes of case in which a court may grant leave to re-open, although these classes overlap and are not exhaustive. These four classes are (1) fresh evidence (Hughes v Hill [1937] SASR 285 at 287; Smith v New South Wales Bar Assn [No 2] (1992) 108 ALR 55 at 61–2); (2) inadvertent error (Brown v Petranker (1991) 22 NSWLR 717 at 728 (application to recall a witness); Murray v Figge (1974) 4 ALR 612 at 614 (application to tender answers to interrogatories); Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254 at 259 (application to re-open); (3) mistaken apprehension of the facts (Urban Transport Authority of NSW v NWEISER (1992) 28 NSWLR 471 (“UTA”) at 478; and (4) mistaken apprehension of the law (UTA at 478). In every case the overriding principle to be applied is whether the interests of justice are better served by allowing or rejecting the application for leave to re-open: see UTA at 478; also The Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Baker Family Trust v Lenard’s Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1310 (“Silver Fox”) at [22] and [25].
[14] With respect to fresh evidence, Muirhead J held in Murray v Figge 4 ALR 612 that fresh evidence should be admitted only when:
(a) it is so material that the interests of justice require it;
(b) the evidence if believed would most probably affect the result;
(c) the evidence could not by reasonable diligence have been discovered before;
(d) inadvertence was established; and
(e) no prejudice was suffered by the other party by reason of its introduction at a late point of time.
[15] To that list can be added:
• it is necessary that the evidence sought to be adduced is relevant within the meaning of s 56 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and is of probative value (cf Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2006] NSWSC 826 at [18]); and
• the court must be conscious of the principle of finality of litigation in deciding whether to exercise discretion to allow evidence after the conclusion of the trial (Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22 at [25]).
On a strict application of these principles in relation to adducing ‘fresh’ or new evidence, the oral evidence of the witnesses of Dr Mulcahy should not be permitted. In my view, their evidence was potentially most unfair for any applicant, especially a self-represented person, to deal with. There was more than ample opportunity for Dr Mulcahy to ensure that all witnesses upon whose evidence he sought to rely provided their evidence by affidavit, filed with the Court, and that this occur in a timely manner. None of this occurred. Moreover, for a significant part of the proceeding Dr Mulcahy was legally represented. One might reasonably assume that his former lawyers gave relevant advice in relation to the response he filed, the evidence on which he intended to rely, and the procedure for ensuring that it was properly before the Court.
However, in all the circumstances, and having regard to s.548(3) of the Act, and notwithstanding the problems and difficulties for the Applicant and the Court, in the Court’s general exercise of discretion I propose dealing with the matter on the basis that the evidence of Dr Mulcahy’s witnesses is considered as being properly before the Court.
In relation to each of these witnesses, I have no doubt that they gave such evidence as they could to the best of their ability. In relation to Ms Micic, a young receptionist, respectfully, her evidence was of very little assistance because she had little relevant knowledge of the matters that are the subject of the current proceeding.
In relation to Ms Lawson, a long-time book-keeper of the Respondent but who is now the practice manager, for example, in relation to allegations concerning racist comments, she maintained that while she heard Ms Williams comment unfavourably about non-Caucasian persons in certain, general conversations (seemingly with other staff of the Respondent), she was not aware of any such comments being made directly with or to any patient.
Finally, in relation to Ms Hodge, a long-time employee of the Respondent, her account of relevant events was so similar to that asserted by Dr Mulcahy, and which is directly countered by Ms Williams’ contemporaneous notes (Exhibit A), that I have some difficulty in seeing that her report of events assists the Court.
In short, the evidence, such as it was, from each of the Respondent’s witnesses, did not, in my view, discharge the Respondent’s onus in establishing that the Applicant had engaged in ‘serious misconduct.’
Further, in relation to each of the witnesses, I have a general concern that, as employees of the Respondent, they would be careful to ensure that their evidence supported, to the degree that it could, the evidence of Dr Mulcahy. I say this primarily because, both in the course of his sworn testimony, and throughout the conduct of the case, the forcefulness of Dr Mulcahy, and his clear grievance with Ms Williams, suggested that those in his employ would ensure that their work tallied with what Dr Mulcahy sought. I do not suggest by these comments that Dr Mulcahy is anything other than a medical specialist who demands from his staff the exacting standards that he demands of himself. And of course, he should be and is entitled to conduct his obviously busy practice as he deems proper. That said, I had the clear impression that he would brook little opposition to whatever it was that he required or demanded. It is his practice and he conducts it according to his exacting standards.
In this regard, I observe that Ms Williams, too, is a strong personality. It may be that the practice, over time, was not big enough for two strong personalities. What is also curious, is that Ms Williams worked for Dr Mulcahy for a not insignificant period of time, yet it seemed that his allegations only concerned the last weeks or months of her employment with him, with nothing referrable to either (a) any alleged misconduct earlier in time, and or (b) how or why such alleged [mis]-conduct would appear rather more recently. Such matters were never addressed or explained.
Leaving to one side for the moment that Ms Williams formally denied each and all of the allegations made by Dr Mulcahy, and noting the detail of handwritten notes of Ms Williams, made shortly after her dismissal, which were tendered and became Exhibit A, I note the following submissions from the Applicant in relation to each of the allegations. I have earlier noted that the FWO adopted the following submissions.
Theft: In addition to submitting that no allegations of serious misconduct were made at the time of the termination of her employment, in relation to the allegation of theft, Ms Williams submitted as follows:
The respondent alleges that there is an identified discrepancy in the respondent’s accounts of between $2000.00 to $7000.00. No evidence was led on how this discrepancy was identified. Rather, Dr Mulcahy gave evidence that the respondent considered engaging a forensic accountant to conduct an independent investigation into the respondent’s financial affairs but this course of action was not implemented due to the time and expense involved.
Given that the respondent did not conduct any investigation and did not tender any financial information it is difficult to comprehend on what basis Dr Mulcahy is asserting:
(a) that any of the respondent’s funds are actually missing (as opposed to the accounts simply not balancing or being disorderly);
(b) if any funds are missing, that the amount missing is between $2000.00 to $7000.00; and
(c) that I, rather than any of the several other people with cash handling responsibilities, had any involvement in the allegedly missing funds.
Further I submit that an allegation of theft is a criminal allegation which in order to be properly investigated (and defended) should have been referred to the police. Dr Mulcahy has not made any such referral. I submit that no weight should be given to the allegation of theft based on the very limited evidence supplied.
In short, I agree with these submissions. Of telling significance is that (a) there was no or insufficient independent evidence to substantiate the allegations of theft, and (b) the allegations were not referred to the relevant authorities, such as the police. In the absence of relevant evidence to support or sustain such serious allegations, there is no basis for them being used in the current proceeding.
Bullying & Harassment: In relation to these allegations, the Applicant submitted:
(a) failing to proactively tell an employee what time she was required to start work on a particular day, as well as, not being sufficiently approachable so that the employee could feel comfortable asking me her start time;
(b) failing to provide the bookkeeper with some invoices or not providing them in a timely manner; and
(c) expressing an opinion to a colleague that I disliked dealing with a particular person (though it was confirmed that I continued to deal with this person in a professional manner).
I deny committing any action which could reasonably be described as bullying or harassment. The respondent’s evidence in relation to this allegation was largely hearsay and opinion and I submit that even if this evidence was accepted it would not be sufficient to establish that I had committed serious misconduct.
For my part, I note that, as with other matters alleged by Dr Mulcahy, these complaints were not referred to in his correspondence with the Fair Work Inspector in November and December last year. Why they were not then detailed or even referred to was not explained. Failing to raise them with the Inspector in relation to complaints that were then being investigated, and given that in the course of the proceeding the Respondent was legally represented, raises in my mind some questions of procedural fairness as well as unanswered questions (already noted) as to why the serious misconduct now alleged was not raised with the Fair Work Inspector in 2011.
Further, because the evidence, in my view, is substantially conflicted (which is to say that it is a ‘he said – she said’ series of contentions), on this basis, the onus borne by the Respondent to establish ‘serious misconduct’ in each and every of its forms as alleged by the Respondent has not been discharged.
Racism Allegation: In relation to this third allegation against the Applicant, I note Ms Williams’ submissions as follows:
It is alleged that I was motivated by racist tendencies to deliberately withhold a complaint email sent by a patient apparently of Indian ethnicity (Patient). Dr Mulcahy has alleged that the delayed email exposed him to proceedings in the ACT Human Rights Commission. I submit that Exhibit H demonstrates that the nature of the proceedings related to the medical services provided to the Patient by Dr Mulcahy and does not make any reference to the email of 17 January 2011 (or more specifically to any delay in responding to the email of 17 January 2011).
I deny that I committed any acts motivated by racist tendencies, including but not limited to, withholding the Patient’s email. As stated during the hearing on 20 August 2012, I provided Dr Mulcahy with the Patient’s complaint email as soon as I became are of it. I submit that this allegation has not been made out. I further submit that the Court should place significant weight on the fact that none of the three witnesses called by the respondent were able to identify any instance of me treating either colleagues or patients in a differential manner due to race or ethnicity.
I accept the substance of the Applicant’s submissions in this regard, which I take to be to the effect that the evidence adduced by the Respondent did not establish, according to the requisite standard of the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant had engaged in the conduct alleged. Indeed, I accept in particular the submission that none of the witnesses called on behalf of the Respondent was able to identify, and certainly not with any relevant certitude, any instance of the Applicant treating any person (colleague or patient) in a manner that was different to the treatment of others, on the basis of their race or ethnicity.
Other contentions were raised by Dr Mulcahy on behalf of the Respondent, such as that until certain documents (which he alleged were taken by Ms Williams, which she denied) were returned to him, he/the Respondent was entitled to with-hold any further payment to the Applicant. No such entitlement to with-hold payment has been established in accordance with s.324 of the Act.
A final contention raised by Dr Mulcahy concerned an alleged off-set against any entitlement to further payment to the Applicant on the ground that she was paid at an hourly rate above the relevant award during her employment.
However, at least since the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia decision in Logan v Otis Elevator Co Pty Ltd in 1999, Courts have consistently held that an employer cannot use a payment to meet obligation “x” to meet obligation “y.”[5] Thus here: the Respondent cannot claim that a payment of wages at a particular rate can be used against a claim of an altogether different kind, in this case, payment in lieu of notice of termination.
[5] Logan v Otis Elevator Co Pty Ltd (1999) 94 IR 218. See further, Finance Sector Union v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2000) 104 IR 33; Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Givoni Pty Ltd (2002) 121 IR 250.
I note again that the FWO submitted that (a) it supported the Applicant’s submissions, (b) the Respondent had not established any of the allegations against Ms Williams such as to satisfy the requirements of s.123(1)(b), and therefore (c) it followed that the Applicant was entitled, under s.117(3) of the Act, to be paid the amount claimed, of $998.08.
The Court finds that (a) the Respondent has not discharged the onus of proof in establishing “serious misconduct” on the part of the Applicant, and (b) in all the circumstances, and pursuant to s.117(3) of the Act, the Applicant is entitled to be paid by the Respondent the sum of $998.08. That sum is to be paid within 14 days.
The Court so orders.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Neville FM
Date: 16 October 2012
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