FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| GOTT & ORS v TOOGOOD & ORS (No.2) | [2020] FCCA 3545 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Proceedings in connection with sequestration – Petition and sequestration order – Hearing of creditor’s petition and form of sequestration order – Going behind judgment |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss. 52, 153B(1) |
| First Applicant: | JAMES PATRICK CECIL GOTT |
| Second Applicant: | CASSOWARY COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL |
| Third Applicant: | TRACEY TAYLOR |
| Fourth Applicant: | RICKY KENNETH TAYLOR |
| Fifth Applicant: | JOHN KREMASTOS |
| First Respondent: | STEVEN PAUL TOOGOOD |
| Second Respondent: | JULIANNE TOOGOOD |
| File Number: | BRG 337 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Jarrett |
| Hearing date: | 17 January 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 December 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 24 December 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Raeburn |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Connolly Suthers |
| The Respondents appeared in person |
ORDERS
On the application in a case filed on 12 November, 2020:
the applicants have leave to reopen the case and adduce further evidence and in particular, have leave to rely upon the affidavit of Steven Paul Toogood filed on 12 November, 2020;
Costs reserved;
On the application in a case filed on 3 December, 2019:
set aside the order made on 2 December, 2019 pursuant to FCCR 16.05(2)(a);
Costs reserved;
On the application in a case filed on 22 November, 2019:
set aside the order made on 21 November, 2019 pursuant to FCCR 16.05(2)(a);
Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of these orders the parties must confer an attempt to reach agreement on directions to be made by the court for the purposes of resolving the remaining issues in dispute;
In the event the parties are unable to reach agreement about the form of directions to be made by the Court, each party must, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of these orders provide to the Court the directions for which that party contends;
Directions will thereafter be made on the papers;
The creditors’ petition is adjourned for directions to 25 January, 2020 at 9:30 am; and
The creditors’ petition is adjourned for hearing to 8 March, 2020 at 10:00am.
Costs reserved.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 337 of 2019
| JAMES PATRICK CECIL GOTT |
First Applicant
| CASSOWARY COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL |
Second Applicant
| TRACEY TAYLOR |
Third Applicant
| RICKY KENNETH TAYLOR |
Fourth Applicant
| JOHN KREMASTOS |
Fifth Applicant
And
| STEVEN PAUL TOOGOOD |
First Respondent
| JULIANNE TOOGOOD |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before me is…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 3545
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the respondents had engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, in contravention of the relevant legislation. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the representations made about the business's financial performance were factually accurate and whether, if inaccurate, they were made knowingly or recklessly, or without reasonable grounds. The Court also considered the causal link between any misleading conduct and the loss suffered by the applicants.
Judge Jarrett found that the respondents had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. The Court's reasoning focused on the evidence presented, which indicated that the financial statements and representations provided by the respondents did not accurately reflect the true profitability of the business. The Court applied the principles established in cases concerning misleading or deceptive conduct, emphasizing that the test is objective and considers whether the conduct has a tendency to lead a person into error. The Court concluded that the applicants had relied on these representations to their detriment, establishing the necessary causal connection for a claim for damages. The Court ordered that the respondents pay damages to the applicants, the quantum of which was to be determined.
Background
Background to the litigation
The creditors' petition was filed on 5 April 2019, and the respondents filed a notice of opposition and appearance on 7 May 2019. The hearing of the petition was initially adjourned multiple times, with the respondents seeking further adjournments to allow for the finalisation of criminal proceedings and investigations into the alleged illegality of certain resolutions by the petitioning Council. The hearing of the petition was eventually conducted on 21 November 2019, during which the respondents attempted to appear by telephone but failed to connect due to a disconnected number. Consequently, the sequestration order was made against the respondents' estates.
Following this, the respondents filed multiple applications to set aside the sequestration order and to reopen their case to adduce further evidence. The first application, filed on 3 December 2019, sought to set aside the order made on 2 December 2019. The second application, filed on 22 November 2019, sought to set aside the order made on 21 November 2019. The respondents argued that there was no true debt owing by them to the petitioning creditors, and they requested the court to investigate whether the costs orders were obtained by fraud or other deceptive conduct by the petitioning creditors. They also asserted that any costs due were to be paid by the Council, which had received reimbursement from a third party. The respondents sought to present additional evidence to support their claims, including affidavits and newspaper articles.
This case is an application to set aside a sequestration order made against the respondents' estates in bankruptcy and to reopen the case to adduce further evidence. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an interlocutory application to set aside the sequestration order. The case originated from a creditors' petition filed on 5 April 2019 by the applicants seeking a sequestration order against the respondents based on a bankruptcy notice issued on 5 March 2019. The bankruptcy notice was issued in reliance on orders made by the District Court of Queensland on 26 April 2018, which ordered the respondents to pay costs to the applicants. On 21 November 2019, the court made a sequestration order against the respondents' estates. The respondents subsequently filed applications to set aside the sequestration order, which were dismissed. The respondents then sought leave to reopen the case and adduce further evidence, which was granted. The court set aside the sequestration order and directed the parties to confer and agree on directions for resolving the remaining issues in dispute. If the parties could not reach an agreement, they were required to submit their proposed directions for the court to decide. The creditors' petition was adjourned for directions and further hearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the bankruptcy notice properly served on the respondents?
2. Was there a reasonable explanation for the respondents' absence at the hearing on 21 November, 2019?
3. Is there material evidence that might reasonably lead to the making of an order different to that sought to be set aside on 21 November, 2019?
4. Is there any prejudice to the petitioning creditors that is not able to be adequately addressed by the Court?
5. Was the bankruptcy notice obtained by fraud or other deceptive conduct?
6. Has the debt claimed by the petitioning creditors been satisfied by a third party?
7. Is there a right of subrogation between the third party payer and the petitioning creditors?
8. Are the interests of justice better served by allowing or rejecting the application to reopen the case and lead further evidence?
9. Should the Court go behind the costs orders to determine whether there is a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors?
Held
1. The bankruptcy notice was properly served on the respondents.
2. There was a reasonable explanation for the respondents' absence at the hearing on 21 November, 2019, as they were unaware that their telephone line had been disconnected.
3. There is material evidence that might reasonably lead to the making of an order different to that sought to be set aside on 21 November, 2019, as it is likely that a court would exercise its discretion to go behind the costs orders and determine whether there is a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors.
4. There is no prejudice to the petitioning creditors that is not able to be adequately addressed by the Court.
5. The bankruptcy notice was not obtained by fraud or other deceptive conduct.
6. The debt claimed by the petitioning creditors has been satisfied by a third party, which is the Council's insurer.
7. There is no right of subrogation between the third party payer and the petitioning creditors.
8. The interests of justice are better served by allowing the application to reopen the case and lead further evidence.
9. The Court should go behind the costs orders to determine whether there is a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether sequestration orders made against the respondents' estates should be set aside and if the case should be reopened to allow further evidence. The primary issue was whether a court, upon hearing the creditors' petition afresh, would make different orders than those made on 21 November, 2019. The court found that it was likely that different orders would be made, primarily because the evidence suggested that there may not be a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors.
First, the court addressed the issue of whether the bankruptcy notice was properly served on the respondents. The bankruptcy notice was issued on 5 March, 2019, and was based on orders made by the District Court of Queensland on 26 April, 2018. The court found no fault in the service of the bankruptcy notice, as the respondents did not challenge the validity of the notice itself.
Second, the court considered whether there was a reasonable explanation for the respondents' absence at the hearing on 21 November, 2019. The respondents had sought to appear by telephone, but the number provided was disconnected. The court found that the respondents had a reasonable explanation for their absence, as they were unaware that their telephone number had been disconnected.
Third, the court examined whether there was material evidence that might reasonably lead to the making of an order different to that sought to be set aside on 21 November, 2019. The respondents argued that the costs orders in the District Court were obtained by fraud or other deceptive conduct and that the debt claimed by the petitioning creditors had been satisfied by a third party. The court found that the respondents had material arguments that might reasonably lead to the making of a different order.
Fourth, the court assessed whether there was any prejudice to the petitioning creditors that could not be adequately addressed by the court. The court found that there was no prejudice to the petitioning creditors if the orders were set aside.
Fifth, the court considered whether the bankruptcy notice was obtained by fraud or other deceptive conduct. The court found that the conduct of the petitioning creditors concerning the disclosure of a telephone recording did not affect the determination of the underlying applications in which the costs orders were made. Therefore, there was no basis for the court to go behind the relevant costs orders.
Sixth, the court examined whether the debt claimed by the petitioning creditors had been satisfied by a third party. The court found that there was substantial evidence that the Council had reimbursed the other petitioning creditors for their legal costs, and the circumstances of the payment did not give rise to a right of subrogation. Therefore, there may not be a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors.
Seventh, the court considered whether there was a right of subrogation between the third party payer and the petitioning creditors. The court found that the nature of the payment made to the Council did not attract the description of an indemnity pursuant to a policy of insurance, and there was no evidence of a subrogated right to enforce the costs orders.
Eighth, the court assessed whether the interests of justice were better served by allowing or rejecting the application to reopen the case and lead further evidence. The court found that the interests of justice were better served by allowing the application and receiving further evidence.
Finally, the court decided whether it should go behind the costs orders to determine whether there was a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors. The court concluded that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion to go behind the costs order and determine whether there was a debt truly owed by the respondents.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has the discretion to set aside sequestration orders and reopen a case to allow further evidence if there is a reasonable explanation for the respondent's absence, material arguments that might reasonably lead to a different order, no prejudice to the petitioning creditors, and the interests of justice are better served by allowing the application. The court also has the discretion to go behind a costs order to determine whether there is a debt truly owed by the respondents to the petitioning creditors.