Toogood & Anor v Cassowary Coast Regional Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Toogood & Anor v Cassowary Coast Regional Council  [2019] QSC 60

PARTIES:

STEVEN PAUL TOOGOOD

(first applicant)

JULIANNE TOOGOOD

(second applicant)

v
CASSOWARY COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL

(first respondent)

JAMES PATRICK CECIL GOTT
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 2012 of 19

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

19 March 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

JUDGE:

Ryan J

ORDER:

1. The application for leave to file an application under rule 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS –GENERALLY – Where undertaking given to the court not to file further proceedings without leave – Application for leave to file application under rule 667 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999.

Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2009) 209 CLR 478

COUNSEL:

Mr Toogood prepared the written submissions on behalf of the applicants

SOLICITORS:

(N/A)

  1. On Wednesday 13 March 2019, at 9.15 am, I delivered by reasons in the matter of Toogood and Anor v Cassowary Coast Regional Council and Anor (file number 2012/19).

  2. I dismissed the application by the Toogoods to vary the undertaking given by them not to file further proceedings without leave.  I also dismissed three applications by the Toogoods for leave to file further proceedings (namely, applications for leave to appeal/leave to appeal out of time).  They did not pursue two applications for leave to apply for a stay of proceedings.

  3. On Friday 8 March 2019, at 4.54 pm, the applicants attempted to file, by e-mail, this present application.  The registry does not accept documents for filing by e-mail and the Toogoods were so informed.  The present application was not received by the court in paper form until 18 March 2019, when it was filed.

  4. Before dealing with the application, I observe that it is reasonable to assume that the applicants are very desirous of obtaining a grant of leave from this court to allow them to pursue an application for leave to appeal from the interlocutory decisions made in the course of the defamation proceedings and that they are making every attempt to persuade this court to grant that leave, including by way of this present application. 

  5. I also observe that the applicants may not be aware that a party may challenge the correctness of a final judgment on the ground that some interlocutory decision, which was relevant to the final result, was wrong, even if there has been no appeal from the interlocutory decision: see Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2009) 209 CLR 478 [5] – [6] and [49].

  6. The present application is for leave to file proceedings under rule 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 in relation to the order I made on 13 March 2019.

  7. I treated this application as akin to one brought under section 11 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (VPA).  

  8. I intended…

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Details
Case
[2019] QSC 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties involved in Toogood & Anor v Cassowary Coast Regional Council were the plaintiffs, Toogood and another, and the defendant, Cassowary Coast Regional Council. The plaintiffs sought leave from the court to file an application under rule 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, which governs the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiffs' application followed an earlier proceeding where they had made an undertaking to the court not to file further proceedings without the court's leave. The legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under rule 667, given their prior undertaking, and whether the court had the inherent jurisdiction to grant such relief.

The court found that the plaintiffs were bound by their earlier undertaking, which precluded them from filing further proceedings without leave. The court also held that rule 667 does not provide a basis for setting aside an undertaking given to the court. Furthermore, the court noted that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant the grant of leave to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' attempt to circumvent the terms of the earlier undertaking was unsuccessful, and the court dismissed their application for leave to file further proceedings. The court's decision was grounded in the principles of adherence to court undertakings and the maintenance of procedural fairness.

As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiffs' application for leave to file an application under rule 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 was dismissed. The court's ruling underscores the importance of respecting undertakings given to the court and the limitations of the inherent jurisdiction in such contexts. The plaintiffs are bound by their earlier undertaking, and any further proceedings must comply with the terms of that agreement. The decision serves as a reminder of the need for parties to carefully consider the implications of their commitments to the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to file an application under rule 667 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established