Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Casair Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   HAWKER PACIFIC PTY LTD -v- CASAIR PTY LTD [2011] WASC 152

CORAM:   JENKINS J

HEARD:   15 OCTOBER & 25 NOVEMBER 2010, 14 FEBRUARY 2011

DELIVERED          :   22 JUNE 2011

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1903 of 2009

BETWEEN:   HAWKER PACIFIC PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

CASAIR PTY LTD t/as COMPLETE AVIATION SERVICES
Defendant

Catchwords:

Landlord and tenant - Duration of term of lease - Construction of written terms of lease - Ascertainment of oral terms of lease

Landlord and tenant - Tenant holding over after lease terminated - Measure of damages

Procedure - Plaintiff's application to discontinue claim for damages - Application made after evidence concluded - Relevant principles

Legislation:

Airports (Transitional) Act 1996 (Cth)
Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s 72(1)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 1 r 4A, O 1 r 4B, O 23 r 2(3)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 24(7)

Result:

Judgment for the plaintiff
Plaintiff's application to withdraw claim for damages dismissed
Assessment of damages reserved for further submissions

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr A P Hershowitz

Defendant:     Mr M J McCusker QC

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     SRB Legal

Defendant:     Wilson & Atkinson

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Amad v Grant [1947] HCA 9; (1947) 74 CLR 327

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd [1973] HCA 36; (1973) 129 CLR 99

Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] 53 NSWLR 153

Fox v Star Newspaper Co Ltd [1898] 1 QB 636

Heartlink Ltd v Jones (2007) 35 WAR 190

Rock Bottom Fashion Market Pty Ltd (in liq) v HR & CE Griffiths Pty Ltd [1998] QCA 33

Stahlschmidt v Walford (1879) 4 QBD 217

The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165

Turner v York Motors Pty Ltd [1951] HCA 52; (1951) 85 CLR 55

JENKINS J: 

Introduction

  1. Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd (Hawker Pacific) is the lessee of hangar 223 and the adjacent car park and customer lounge at the Perth Airport.  In 2006 Hawker Pacific negotiated a sub‑lease of part of hangar 223 and associated areas (the premises) to Casair Pty Ltd trading as Complete Aviation Services (Casair).  In 2009 Hawker Pacific gave Casair notice to quit the premises.  Casair refused to vacate the premises and claimed that its sub‑lease was only terminable if the head lease to Hawker Pacific was terminated or the premises were required for redevelopment (the trigger events).  Hawker Pacific seeks an order for possession of the premises and related orders.

Summary of the central issue

  1. The issue for the court is whether the sub‑lease was terminable by Hawker Pacific on one month's notice, without cause, or whether, as Casair contends, it was only terminable if either of the trigger event occurred.

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Details
Case
[2011] WASC 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd brought an action against Casair Pty Ltd in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking to determine the duration of a lease and associated damages. The dispute centred on the interpretation of both written and oral terms of the lease, as well as the conduct of the parties post-contract. The central legal issues revolved around whether post-contractual conduct could be considered in determining the existence and terms of a partly oral, partly written contract, and the appropriate measure of damages for a tenant holding over after the lease's termination.

The court examined the principles established in various authorities, including the Codelfa doctrine which restricts the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret written contracts. However, the court found that post-contractual conduct could be relevant in determining whether a contract with specific terms was made, as articulated by Young J in Peddie v Stein and Stephenson LJ in Mears v Safecar Security Ltd. The court rejected the view that post-contractual conduct is entirely inadmissible for this purpose, aligning with the reasoning in Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd and Peddie v Stein. The court concluded that post-contractual conduct can be considered to ascertain whether a contract existed and what its terms were, provided the evidence is sufficiently detailed and certain.

The court found that the lease had been extended for a term of two years, and that Casair had held over for approximately six months after the lease term expired. The measure of damages was assessed based on the reasonable rental value during the period of holding over. The court also considered the plaintiff's application to discontinue the claim for damages, which was made after evidence had concluded. The court ruled that the application was not appropriate in the circumstances, as the plaintiff had not acted promptly, and the application was made after the close of evidence.

The court ordered that the lease was extended for two years, and that Casair pay Hawker Pacific damages for the period it held over, calculated on the reasonable rental value. The application to discontinue the claim for damages was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Casair submits that where a contract is partly oral and partly written (as in this case) a court is not prevented from looking at post‑contractual conduct to assist in the construction of the contract. In this respect, Casair relies on the dicta of Owen J in TheBell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239 where his Honour said:It is important to draw a distinction between two exercises: on the one hand, deciding whether a contract exists at all (and if it does, what are its terms) and on the other hand, construing or interpreting the terms of a contract known or admitted to be in existence. The question is relatively easy to answer in relation to the construction or interpretation of the terms of a contract. Certainly in the case of a written contract there are severe limits on the admissibility of evidence that is not contained within the four corners of the contractual instrument. This is an application of the Codelfa doctrine: parol evidence of what parties did, or how they have interpreted or applied their contract is inadmissible to subtract from, add to, vary or contradict the language of the written instrument. While it is not easy to reconcile all of the relevant authorities, I think the better view is that post-contractual conduct is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the terms of a contract: FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 343, 350; Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 217, (1999) 21 WAR 350, [50].But what of the other exercise to which I have referred, namely, the task of deciding whether or not a contract with a particular term or terms came into existence at all? There is authority supporting the view that post‑contractual conduct can be taken into account in such an exercise. In Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54, 77, Stephenson LJ said:'I have already expressed my view that this agreement was oral, but even if it was partly in writing, we are concerned with the search for a term that was not written down, and there is nothing in those authorities which prevents the courts from looking at the way the parties acted for the purpose of ascertaining what that term was. Common sense suggests that their subsequent conduct is the best evidence of what they had agreed orally but not reduced to writing, though it is not evidence of what any written terms mean.'A similar question was dealt with by Young J in Peddie v Stein (unreported, SCNSW, BC8701481, 26 March 1987). Having said that evidence of subsequent acts or conversations is not admissible for the purpose of construing a contract, his Honour expressed the view that subsequent communications between the parties may legitimately be referred to and be taken into consideration to determine whether a contract has been made. Young J continued, at 20: 'However not only is it legitimate to look at subsequent conduct for the purpose of determining whether a contract is made, it is also legitimate to refer to such evidence to work out what were the terms of the contract which was partly oral and partly written.'His Honour cited the dicta of Stephenson LJ in Mears in support of that proposition. He also referred to Film Bars Pty Ltd v Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd (1979) 1 BPR 9251 where McLelland J collected the authorities on this question. In Film Bars, a case concerning an informal contract, McClelland J said, at 9255:'Where a question arises whether communications between the parties have given rise to a binding contract at a particular time, subsequent communications may be legitimately referred to and taken into consideration … However … the probative value of such communications must be found in the light they throw on the proper interpretation of the earlier communications alleged to constitute the contract.'I have found one authority that appears to take the opposite view. In Mildura Office Equipment & Supplies Pty Ltd v Canon Finance Australia Ltd [2006] VSC 42; (2006) Aust Contract R 90 ‑ 238, [185], Dodds‑Streeton J said: 'Post‑contractual conduct and communications are not admissible in order to establish the existence of a contract'. Her Honour did not cite or discuss authority for that proposition. Earlier in the reasons there was discussion of (and adoption of) the principles discussed in FAI Traders Insurance, which relate to construction of contractual terms rather than whether or not a contract has been formed. It was not a necessary part of the reasoning process because her Honour went on to say that in any event the evidence of post‑contractual conduct lacked the precision, level of detail and certainty requisite for a contract. And later in the reasons, (at [191] in the course of discussing Vroon BV), her Honour said that 'the evidence of the parties [post‑contractual] conduct and communications … does not establish that they were acting on the basis that a contract existed'.I think I should adopt the approach taken in Mears, Peddie and Film Bars. It seems to me, therefore, that the law does permit access to extrinsic evidence of the conduct of the parties for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether a contract, with the terms contended for, existed [2665] ‑ [2672].