Turner v York Motors Pty Ltd

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85 CLR 55

TURNER AND OTHERS

APPELLANTS; DEFENDANTS,

YORK MOTORS PROPRIETARY LIMITED. RESPONDENT.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Landlord and Tenant-Tenancy agreement-No formal document-Occupation of

land by tenant-Rent paid and accepted monthly-Nature of tenancy-At will or from month to month-Yearly tenancy-Implication-Notice to quit- Validity-Ejectment proceedings in the Supreme Court-" Prescribed premises " - " Bare " land Protected person "-Conveyancing Act 1919-1943 (N.S.W.) (No. 6 of 1919-No. 15 of 1943), S. 127 (1)-Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1948-1949 (N.S.W.) (No. 25 of 1948-No. 22 of 1949), SS. 8, 69-Defence (Transitional Provisions) Act 1946-1950 (No. 77 of 1946-No. 78 of 1950), 3. 6 (2)-National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations, regs. 28A,

About 9th October 1946, the defendants went into possession of about 11 acres of land, after a telephone conversation had taken place between T., one of the defendants, and S. the registered proprietor of the land. S. had told T. that he was willing to lease the 11 acres to the defendants at a rental of £6 per week and that they could take possession immediately. This they did, and thereafter paid S. rent, at first £6 every week and later £26 every month. The defendants extended their occupation on to the balance of the land owned by S. which had a total area of about five acres. Upon the land there had been erected a number of temporary buildings but these were to be removed or were in course of removal. Late in 1947 or early in 1948, after S. had made unsuccessful efforts to confine the defendants to the 11 acres, the defendants increased their payments to £52 per month, and S. accepted these payments as rent for the whole area. S. sold the land to the plaintiff in October 1948, and for a short period thereafter the plaintiff accepted rent from the defendants at the rate of £52 per month for the whole

85 CLR 56

area. No formal lease was ever executed. S. deposed that he had expressly stipulated that a lease would have to be drawn up by a solicitor and signed by the defendants. T. denied that there was any mention of a formal lease. There was also conflict as to whether it had been agreed that the letting should be for two years, or, as affirmed by T., for two years and to continue thereafter until determined by six months' notice if the land should be resumed and three months' notice otherwise. On 23rd March 1949, the plaintiff gave the defendants a notice in writing dated 21st March 1949, requiring them on 25th April 1949, to quit the land and deliver up possession thereof to the plaintiff. It stated that the plaintiff was owner and that the defendants held the land from the plaintiff as tenants at will. The notice not having been complied with a writ in ejectment was issued on 2nd May 1949. The defendants claimed (i) to have become lessees of the land and denied…

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Details
Case
[1951] HCA 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Turner v York Motors Pty Ltd* involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellants, the defendants, had occupied land owned by the respondent, York Motors Pty Ltd, and the dispute centred on the nature of their tenancy and the validity of a notice to quit. The defendants had entered into possession of the land following an oral agreement with the previous owner, Mr. Sears, and had paid rent, initially weekly and later monthly, without a formal lease ever being executed. The plaintiff, York Motors, had purchased the land and subsequently issued a notice to quit, asserting the defendants were tenants at will. The defendants contested this, arguing they were lessees, that the notice was invalid, and that the land constituted "prescribed premises" under relevant legislation, with some defendants also claiming protected person status under war service moratorium regulations.

The High Court was required to determine the character of the tenancy between the defendants and the previous owner, Mr. Sears, and subsequently the plaintiff. Specifically, the court had to ascertain whether the defendants were tenants at will, tenants from month to month, or held under some other form of tenancy that would render the notice to quit invalid. Further issues included whether the land qualified as "prescribed premises" under the *Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 1948-1949* (N.S.W.) and the validity and applicability of the *National Security (War Service Moratorium) Regulations*.

The majority of the High Court, comprising Dixon, Webb, and Kitto JJ., held that the appeal should be allowed. Their reasoning was that the regular payment and acceptance of rent on a monthly basis, particularly after the defendants occupied the entire area at an increased monthly rent, indicated a tenancy from month to month, rather than a tenancy at will. They found that the circumstances did not support the conclusion that the defendants were merely tenants at will, pending the execution of a formal lease. The court also determined that section 127(1) of the *Conveyancing Act 1919-1943* (N.S.W.) did not apply to imply a tenancy at will, as the rent was fixed on a monthly basis, and at common law, this would not give rise to a yearly tenancy. Consequently, the notice to quit, which purported to terminate a tenancy at will, was deemed bad and ineffectual. Dixon and Williams JJ. also separately held that "bare" land did not constitute "prescribed premises" and that the relevant moratorium regulations were void.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Supreme Court. The court concluded that the notice to quit was invalid because the tenancy was from month to month, not at will, and therefore the notice was insufficient to bring the tenancy to an end.

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