Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd (No 3) - [2025] FedCFamC2G 516

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2G 516

File number(s): BRG 311 of 2021

Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN

Date of judgment: 11 April 2025

Catchwords: FAIR WORK – Whether the first respondent contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 – where first respondent found to have contravened provisions of the Act – whether the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable in respect of the Club’s contraventions – where the second to tenth respondents were found to have been accessorily liable – where the first respondent’s contraventions were serious contraventions – where adverse action found to have been taken against the applicant – Orders accordingly.

Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 144(1)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s. 12, s. 14(1)(a), s. 16(1)(a), s. 44, s. 45, s. 46(1), s. 87, s. 90, s. 90(2), s. 117, s. 340, s. 340(1)(a)(i), s. 340(1)(a)(ii), s. 340(1)(a)(iii), s. 341, s. 341(1)(c)(ii), s. 342(1), s. 361, s. 539, s. 539(2), s. 545, s. 545(5), s. 546(1), s. 546(3)(c), s. 550(1), s. 550(2), s. 550(2)(c), s. 557, s. 557(1), s. 557(2), s. 557A, s. 557A(5A)

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s. 95

Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)

Cases cited:
Atkins Freight Services Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2017] FCA 1134

Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39

Danaratna v Arunatilaka [2024] FCA 918

EZY Accounting 123 Pty Ltd v Fair Work Commission (2018) 282 IR 86

Fair Work Ombudsman v DTF World Square Pty Ltd (in liq) (no. 3) [2023] FCA 201

Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd [2022] FCA 525

Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR1

Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2024) 98 ALJR 1021

Ray v Radano [1967] AR (NSW) 471

Russel v Institution of Engineers Australia T/A Engineers Australia [2013] FCA 1250

Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740

Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg & Ors (2016) 242 FCR 505

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs: 178

Date of last submission/s: 25 March 2025

Date of hearing: 19 – 27 August 2024 and 2 December 2024

Place: Brisbane

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Wood of King’s Counsel with Mr R Haddrick of Counsel, Ms B Nolan of Counsel and Ms I Hogan of Counsel

Solicitor for the Applicant: Yates Beaggi Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A Smith of Counsel with Ms B Mendelson of Counsel

Solicitor for the Respondents: Aitken Legal
ORDERS

BRG 311 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:
KATHRYN HARPER

Applicant

AND:
GOLD COAST PISTOL CLUB LIMITED

First Respondent

PETER ROPER

Second Respondent

STEVEN JOHN FLORI (and others named in the schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE EGAN

DATE OF ORDER:

11 APRIL 2025

IT IS DECLARED THAT:
1.During the period from 26 July 2015 until 7 July 2021 inclusive, the First Respondent contravened the following civil remedy provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA):
(a)section 45 by failing to pay the Applicant the minimum rates of pay (for a Grade 3 Employee) under the Amusement, Events, and Recreation Award [MA000080] 2020 (and its predecessors) (the Amusement Award);
(b)section 45 by failing to pay the Applicant overtime rates as required under the Amusement Award;
(c)section 45 by failing to make superannuation contributions on behalf of the Applicant as required under the Amusement Award; and
(d)sections 44 and 45 by failing to pay the Applicant annual leave entitlements and leave loading as required by sections 87 and 90 of the FWA and under the Amusement Award.

2.The contraventions in declaration 1(a) – (d) inclusive are each individually course of conduct contraventions by the First Respondent.
3.Each of the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (c) were serious contraventions within the meaning of s 557A of the FWA.
4.The Second Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 26 July 2015 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
5.The Third Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 26 July 2015 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
6.The Fourth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 26 July 2015 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA she is taken to have committed the contraventions herself.
7.The Fifth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 15 May 2018 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
8.The Sixth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 8 May 2020 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA she is taken to have committed the contraventions herself.
9.The Seventh Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 8 May 2020 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA she is taken to have committed the contraventions herself.
10.The Eighth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 19 October 2020 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
11.The Ninth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the periods 26 July 2015 until 9 June 2017 and 19 October 2020 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
12.The Tenth Respondent was involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contraventions as set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above during the period 25 January 2021 until 7 July 2021, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA he is taken to have committed the contraventions himself.
13.Each of the Second to Tenth Respondents are liable to have a pecuniary penalty imposed for their involvement in the First Respondent’s contraventions set out in declarations 1(a) – (d) above.
14.The First Respondent has failed to pay the Applicant 15.75/10 of 8.66667 weeks of long service leave as is required by s 95 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (IR Act).
15.The First Respondent contravened ss 117(3) and 44 of the FWA by failing to give the Applicant a minimum of 5 weeks’ notice of her termination of employment on 7 July 2021.
16.The First Respondent contravened section 340 of the FWA by taking adverse action against the Applicant which resulted in the Applicant entering into a new contract of employment in early January 2021.
17.The Second to Ninth Respondents were involved, within the meaning of s 550(2) of the FWA, in the First Respondent’s contravention as set out in declaration 16 above, and by reason of s 550(1) of the FWA they are taken to have committed the contravention themselves.
18.Pursuant to section 546(1) of the FWA, each of the First to Ninth Respondents are liable to have a pecuniary penalty imposed for the contravention set out in declaration 16 above.
AND IT IS ORDERED THAT:
19.The Applicant be entitled to stay in the demountable home located at 85 Edmund Rice Drive, Southport QLD known as “the Cottage” until she attains the age of 80 years on 23 June 2026, provided she continues to pay to the First Respondent the sum of $275.00 per week for her occupation of the Cottage, and she continues to perform the caretaker duties associated with maintaining the Cottage.
20.The applicant’s claims be otherwise allowed to the extent of the findings of the Court.
21.On the question of the making of orders for compensation and the imposition of pecuniary penalties, the further hearing of the proceeding be transferred to the docket of another Judge sitting in Sydney.
22.Each party have liberty to apply to the Judge to whom the proceeding is next docketed, on the giving of two (2) days’ notice, each to the other.
23.The question of costs of and incidental to the trial and of the hearing on 5 June 2025 be reserved.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE EGAN
Introduction

Mrs Harper (Harper) was born on 23 June 1946 and is 78 years old. Harper was known as ‘Kate’. Harper first became a member of the first respondent (the Club) in 1981. She was made a life member of the Club in 2007, but that life membership was terminated on 13 August 2021.
The Club provided competitive shooting facilities for members and guests at premises situated in Ashmore in southern Queensland.
Harper claimed that during the course of her employment with the Club, she had not been paid appropriate award wages, and that she ought to be compensated for that underpayment, and for other alleged contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FWA). She also claimed that she was entitled to continue to occupy a residence situated within the Club’s premises (the Cottage), and to continue to perform the role of caretaker for the Club. The final orders sought in the Third Amended Statement of Claim (SOC) filed on 20 June 2024 were as follows:
106.An order pursuant to s. 545 of the Fair Work Act that the Pistol Club continue to permit the Applicant to occupy the Cottage and perform the role of caretaker in accordance with the terms of the Amended Accommodation Agreement.
107.Alternatively to paragraph 106, an order pursuant to s. 545 of the Fair Work Act that the Respondents pay the applicant compensation for the loss of the value of the Amended Accommodation Agreement.
108. An order pursuant to s. 545(2) of the Fair Work Act that the Respondents pay the Applicant compensation for the loss referred to in paragraphs 59AA, 64.6, 73.6, 68.6, 80.6, 86A.1 and 86C.4.
109.Alternatively to paragraph 108, the Pistol Club pay the Applicant in quantum meruit reasonable renumeration for services rendered.
…
111.An order pursuant to subsection 546(1) of the Fair Work Act that a pecuniary penalty be imposed upon the Respondents in respect of each of the contraventions of the Fair Work Act pleaded above.
112. An order pursuant to subsection 546(3)(c) of the Fair Work Act, that the pecuniary penalties be paid to the applicant.
…
116. An order that the Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs of the Proceedings.
…
120.An order that the Respondents pay the Applicant Long Service Leave in the amount of $15,127.58.
121.An order that the Respondents pay the Applicant annual leave in the amount of $64,617.80.
Matters not in dispute
At all relevant times, the Club was a “constitutional corporation” under s. 12 of the FWA.
The Club was a “national system employer” under s. 14(1)(a) of the FWA. It was also an employer for the purposes of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) (the SGA).
The Club was run by a fourteen (14) person committee elected at its Annual General Meeting (AGM). Membership of the Club was governed by the provisions of a document entitled “Gold Coast Pistol Club Limited – Constitution and Articles of Association”. [1] The club committee was required to meet once every calendar month.
[1] Annexure BES-1 to the affidavit of Robert Schukraft filed on 28 September 2021.
By clause 14(a) of the Constitution, it was provided, under the heading “Functions of the Management Committee”, that the management committee “(i) shall have the general control and management of the administration of the affairs, property and funds of the Club…”.
One of the responsibilities of the Management Committee was to manage the affairs of the Club according to law. So much was trite.
Harper’s contentions
Harper claimed that from November 2005 until 30 June 2006 she was employed by the Club on a part-time basis to undertake bookkeeping and other administrative tasks on its behalf.
Harper claimed that from November 2005 until the commencement of the Registered and Licenced Clubs Award 2010 on 1 January 2010, she was employed by the Club under the Clerical Award – Registered and Licenced Clubs – State 2003 (the State Award).
The Court finds that Harper was appointed as the Club Manager by Geoffrey Hall, the then president of the Club, on or about 1 July 2006. Harper moved into the caretaker’s residence on site at the Club premises in about October 2007. [2] Harper stayed in that residence as part of her remuneration package, paying rent to the Club in the amount of $100 per week, from 2007 until the date of the termination of her employment on 7 July 2021.
[2] Affidavit of Hall filed on 23 December 2022 at paras 104 – 114.
It was Harper’s ongoing occupancy of that Club caretaker’s residence (the Cottage), after the termination of her employment with the Club, which was the subject of an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court from an interlocutory judgment of His Honour Judge Vasta, who refused an application for an interlocutory injunction restraining the Club from interfering with Harper’s quiet use and enjoyment of the residence until the handing down of judgment in this proceeding. On that application for leave to appeal, Logan J in Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd [2022] FCA 525 granted leave to appeal from the interlocutory orders of His Honour Judge Vasta and allowed the appeal. Orders were made by Logan J on 16 February 2022 in the following terms:
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal and the appeal be heard and determined instanter.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3.Orders 1 and 3 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dated 20 October 2020 be set aside.
4. In lieu thereof it be ordered:
Upon the applicant, by her counsel, undertaking in respect of the premises known as the Cottage, 85 Edmund Rice Drive, Ashmore, Queensland 4215 (the Cottage):
a.to keep the Cottage in the manner of a reasonable tenant; and
b.to pay the first respondent rent in respect of the occupancy of the Cottage in the sum of $275 per week;
the respondents be restrained from interfering with the applicant’s quiet use and enjoyment of the Cottage pending final resolution of these proceedings or further earlier order.
From 1 January 2010 until on or about 6 January 2021, Harper claimed that she was an employee under a Modern Award, namely from the time of the commencement of the Registered and Licenced Clubs Award 2010, and thereafter from the time of the commencement of the Registered and Licenced Clubs Award 2020.
The law
The provisions of ss. 340, 341 and 361 of the Fair Work Act (2009) (Cth) (FWA) are respectively as follows:
“Section 340 – Protection
(1) A person must not take adverse action against another person:
(a) because the other person:
(i) has a workplace right; or
(ii) has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
(iii) proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or
(b) to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.
Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
(2) A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person) because a third person has exercised, or proposes or has at any time proposed to exercise, a workplace right for the second person’s benefit, or for the benefit of a class of persons to which the second person belongs.
Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).
…
Section 341 – Meaning of workplace right
(1) A person has a workplace right if the person:
(a) is entitled to the benefit of, or has a role or responsibility under, a workplace law, workplace instrument or order made by an industrial body; or
(b) is able to initiate, or participate in, a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument; or
(c) is able to make a complaint or inquiry:
(i) to a person or body having the capacity under a workplace law to seek compliance with that law or a workplace instrument; or
(ii) if the person is an employee – in relation to his or her employment.
Meaning of process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument
(2) Each of the following is a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument:
(a) a conference conducted or hearing held by the FWC;
(b) court proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument;
(c) protected industrial action;
(d) a protected action ballot;
(e) making, varying or terminating an enterprise agreement;
(f) appointing, or terminating the appointment of, a bargaining representative;
(g) making or terminating an individual flexibility arrangement under a modern award or enterprise agreement;
(h) agreeing to cash out paid annual leave or paid personal/carer’s leave;
(i) making a request under Division 4 of Part 2-2 (which deals with requests for flexible working arrangements);
(j) dispute settlement for which provision is made by, or under, a workplace law or workplace instrument;
(k) any other process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument.
Prospective employees taken to have workplace rights
(3) A prospective employee is taken to have the workplace rights he or she would have if he or she were employed in the prospective employment by the prospective employer.
Note: Among other things, the effect of this subsection would be to prevent a prospective employer making an offer of employment conditional on entering an individual flexibility arrangement.
Exceptions relating to prospective employees
(4) Despite subsection (3), a prospective employer does not contravene subsection 340(1) if the prospective employer makes an offer of employment conditional on the prospective employee accepting a guarantee of annual earning.
(5) Despite paragraph (1)(a), a prospective employer does not contravene subsection 340(1) if the prospective employer refuses to employ a prospective employee because the prospective employee would be entitled to the benefit of Part 2-8 or 6-3A (which deal with transfer of business).
…
Section 361 – Reason for action to be presumed unless proved otherwise
(1) If:
(a) in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and
(b) taking that action for that reason or with that intent would constitute a contravention of this Part;
it is presumed that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to orders for an interim injunction.”

For Harper’s adverse action claims to be proven, she must have asserted, and established, that:
•she exercised a workplace right or rights as pleaded in her SOC;
•the conduct complained of in fact occurred; and
•the conduct constituted adverse action pursuant to the provisions of s. 342(1) of the FWA.
If it was established by Harper that the impugned conduct was conduct which contravened provisions of the FWA, it was for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that it was not motivated by an impermissible reason in respect of the threatened termination of her employment.
As to the proper approach to be adopted by a court when considering whether impermissible adverse action has been established or not, the Court respectfully adopts the principles as set out in the decision of the High Court in Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at [5] per French CJ and Crennan J; at [104] and [129] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; and at [140] and [141] per Heydon J where it was respectively said:
“[5] The task of a court in a proceeding alleging a contravention of s 346 is to determine, on the balance of probabilities, why the employer took adverse action against the employee, and to ask whether it was for a prohibited reason or reasons which included a prohibited reason. This appeal was concerned with identifying the correct approach to that task.” – at [5] per French CJ and Crennan J
“[104] In light of the legislative history of s 346 and the intention of Parliament outlined above, the reasoning of Mason J in Bowling is to be applied to s 346. An employer contravenes s 346 if it can be said that engagement by the employee in an industrial activity comprised “a substantial and operative” reason, or reasons including the reason, for the employer’s action and that this action constitutes an “adverse action” within the meaning of s 342.” – at [104] per Gummow and Hayne JJ
“… The test is whether adverse action has been taken because of a proscribed reason.” – at [129] per Gummow and Hayne JJ;
“… Examining whether a particular reason was an operative or immediate reason for an action calls for an inquiry into the mental processes of the person responsible for that action.” – at [140] per Heydon J;
“… The assessment of a witness’s mental processes is an assessment of that witness’s state of mind. It is pre-eminently a matter in which a trial judge has a considerable advantage over an appellant court…” – at [141] per Heydon J.
A causal link must be established between the adverse action the subject of complaint, and the matters referred to in s. 340(1)(a)(i) – (iii) inclusive of the FWA, due to the use of the word “because” in s. 340(1)(a) of the FWA. That issue was dealt with by Foster J in Russel v Institution of Engineers Australia T/A Engineers Australia [2013] FCA 1250 at [60] and [63] where His Honour said:
“[60] The provisions particularly relied upon by the applicant (ss 44, 97, 340, 341, 351 and 352 of the FWA) all use the expression “because” or “because of” as describing the necessary causal link between the adverse action and the relevant prohibited reason for that action.
...
[63] It is not necessary for an applicant to establish that the only reason or the dominant reason that adverse action was taken was a prohibited reason. It is sufficient if the prohibited reason is one of several reasons for the taking of the action although it may be that the prohibited reason must have operated as a substantial and operative factor in the taking of the adverse action.”
On the issue of what evidence was needed to be canvassed in relation to the impugned action taken by an employer, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [41], [44] and [45] as follows:
“[41] The question of why an employer took adverse action against an employee is a question of fact arising from the operation of interdependent provisions of the Fair Work Act. These provisions must be construed together in accordance with the principles of statutory construction established by this Court, which must begin with a consideration of the text of the relevant provisions and may require consideration of the context including the general purpose and policy of the provisions.
…
[44] There is no warrant to be derived from the text of the relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act for treating the statutory expression “because” in s 346, or the statutory presumption in s 361, as requiring only an objective inquiry into a defendant employer’s reason, including any unconscious reason, for taking adverse action. The imposition of the statutory presumption in s 361, and the correlative onus on employers, naturally and ordinarily mean that direct evidence of a decision-maker as to state of mind, intent or purpose will bear upon the question of why adverse action was taken, although the central question remains “why was the adverse action taken?”
[45] This question is one of fact, which must be answered in the light of all the facts established in the proceeding. Generally, it will be extremely difficult to displace the statutory presumption in s 361 if no direct testimony is given by the decision-maker acting on behalf of the employer. Direct evidence of the reason why a decision-maker took adverse action, which may include positive evidence that the action was not taken for a prohibited reason, may be unreliable because of other contradictory evidence given by the decision-maker or because other objective facts are proven which contradict the decision-maker’s evidence. However, direct testimony from the decision-maker which is accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the burden upon an employer even though an employee may be an officer or member of an industrial association and engage in industrial activity.”
(Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added)
On the question of onus, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [50] as follows:
“[50] The following description of a legislative predecessor to s 361 given by Mason J in General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling remains pertinent: “the plain purpose of the provision [is to throw] on to the defendant the onus of proving that which lies peculiarly within his own knowledge.”
(Footnotes omitted)
An employer’s onus may not be satisfied by a mere statement that the action taken by the employer was not for a proscribed reason. As was said by French CJ and Crennan J at [54] of Barclay:
“[54] … a question arose as to whether the director’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the onus cast upon the employer. In deciding that the director’s evidence was sufficient, the majority in Pearce recognised that mere declarations of an innocent reason or intent in taking adverse action may not satisfy the onus on an employer if contrary inferences are available on the facts.”
(Emphasis added)
When deciding, for the purposes of s. 361 of the FWA, who the relevant decision-maker was, or upon whose advice or recommendation the decision-maker relevantly acted upon when taking any adverse action, White J in Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740 at [121] – [127] inclusive said:
[121] My conclusion that the applicant’s exercise of his workplace rights played no part in the decision of Mr De Angelis and the recommendation of Mr Kerswell is not conclusive of the applicant’s case with respect to the termination of his employment. Regard should also be had to the basis for the underlying recommendation on which they acted. If those making the recommendation to Mr De Angelis did so because of the making of the applicant’s First Complaint, Transfield would not discharge the s 361 onus. This is evidenced by the authorities.
[122] In Voigtsberger v Council of the Shire of Pine Rivers (No 2) (1981) 58 FLR 239, the finance committee of the respondent Council had recommended that the applicant’s position be abolished. The report of the finance committee was adopted later that same day by the full Council. Evatt J held at 256 that the decision of the finance committee was the critical decision in the case because the full Council had merely rubber stamped its recommendation. Accordingly, it was essential that the Court have evidence from the members of the finance committee so that it could determine whether a proscribed reason had been a substantial and operative factor influencing the decision of any individual councillor.
[123] Smithers J addressed the question of principle involved in Wood (on behalf of the Industrial Relations Bureau) v Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1979) 41 FLR 1 at 19 in a context analogous to the present:
[19] In the task of ascertaining the mind of the defendant corporation, with respect to the standing down of Mr Kane, that mind may be located in the mind of one authorised officer or of more than one person exercising the executive power of the corporation. It is a pure question of fact where in particular circumstances that corporate mind may be located. In a case where two officers are concerned in the solution of an administrative problem and are working jointly to solve it and decide what the corporation is to do and are working in harmony and in full confidence, the one with the other, the mind of the corporation is to be found in the course of conduct agreed upon between them and the reasons which in the end are the operating reasons for the policy agreed upon.
However, as Smithers J went on to acknowledge, that does not preclude the possibility that one of the participants may have as his or her motive an undisclosed proscribed reason for joining in the decision.
[124] Gray J also noted the issue in Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, 21 December 1987) at 84‑5 when he said:
[T]here is still a difficult question of the extent to which the improper purpose of one person may be a substantial operative factor in the decision of another. Clearly, if the actual decision maker simply “rubber stamps” a decision in fact made by another, the purpose of that other will be a substantial operative factor. At the other extreme, if the actual decision maker truly believes the false and innocent reasons advised by the other person, the mind of the decision maker will not be tainted by the improper purpose of the other person. The problem assumes greater complexity when the decision is made by more than one person, as might be the case with the board of directors of a company, and as is often the case when the decision is made by a local government authority.
[125] Gray J reviewed and applied these authorities in National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2013] FCA 451 at [25]‑[29].
[126] Counsel for the applicant referred to Rowland v Alfred Health [2014] FCA 2. The decision in that case confirms that it is appropriate to have regard to the reasons actuating the members of a selection committee making a recommendation, and not just to the reasons of the ultimate decision maker.
[127] Accordingly, it is appropriate in the present case to have close regard to the reasons of those who made the recommendations to Mr De Angelis and Mr Kerswell. This includes their reasons for recommending the restructure which Transfield adopted as well as their reasons for selecting the applicant as a person to be made redundant in consequence of that restructure. The evidence of Mr Rynja and Mr Hall is particularly significant in this respect. Mr Handy did not contribute to the recommendation to Mr De Angelis, and Mr Vigus had only a limited role.”
It will always be a question of fact as to whether the proscribed reasons, as pleaded in a statement of claim as constituting the reason/reasons or motive for the taking of the adverse action, have been rebutted. Motive is a relevant consideration for the Court to have regard to when assessing the evidence before it, in that regard.
Whether or not a complaint or inquiry has been made by an employee in relation to his or her employment for the purposes of s. 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FWA is factual and is to be considered objectively.
In this proceeding, the respondent conceded that the termination of the applicant’s employment on 7 July 2021 constituted adverse action under s. 342 of the FWA.
As later canvassed in these reasons, the Court finds that the exercise by Harper of her workplace rights was in respect of her employment as governed by the provisions of s. 341(1)(c)(ii) of the FWA.
The capacity in which Harper worked at the Club
At trial, the lawyers for Harper called 21 witnesses, and the lawyers for the respondents called 6 witnesses. All the witnesses did their best to recall what work they saw Harper performing on the occasions that they each were in attendance at the Club’s premises. When viewed as a whole, the weight of the evidence favoured Harper’s version as to the extent of work performed by her. [3]
[3] See the affidavits of Robert Craig filed on 12 March 2023; Robert Giles filed on 18 November 2022;
John Illingworth filed on 20 December 2022 and 12 March 2023; Lawrence Hinton filed on 8 December
2022; Barry Hollingsworth filed on 21 November 2022; Mark Ruddell filed on 22 November 2022;
Heathcote filed on 28 September 2021 and 18 November 2022; and the Transcript evidence of David
Chalk at pp. 338 – 343 on 22 August 2024; and Amanda Goldsworthy at pp. 373 – 377 on 23 August
2024; Colin Moore at pp. 378 – 382 on 23 August 2024; Diane Terakes at pp. 409 – 412 on 23 August 2024; Rhonda Hough at pp. 417 – 420 on 23 August 2024; Daniel Repacholi at pp. 4222 – 425 on 23 August 2024; Lee Kernaghan at pp. 426 – 434 on 23 August 2024; Sharee Betts at pp. 463 – 472 on 26 August 2024; Damion Emannuel at pp. 491 – 495 of 26 August 2024.
Inconsistencies between the evidence of those witnesses called on behalf of Harper as compared with those witnesses called on behalf of the respondents were because of their memory having suffered due to the passage of time, and in some respects because their friendship with Harper had been fractured over time due to her dispute with the Club.
The Court finds that Harper was employed in the capacity of Club Manager, and that the work she performed, over time, and as particularised in her affidavit filed on 5 February 2023, was as follows:
a.Paragraphs 78 – 81 – work performed as and from 1 July 2006 until 2007.
b.Paragraphs 88 – 131 – work performed from 2007 until 2009.
c.Paragraphs 132 – 177 – work performed from 2009 until 2010.
d.Paragraphs 178 – 210 – work performed during 2011.
e.Paragraphs 211 – 225 – work performed during 2012.
f.Paragraphs 226 – 292 – work performed from 2013 until 2016.
g.Paragraphs 296 – 359 – work performed from 2017 until 2019.
h.Paragraphs 360 – 417 – work performed from 2020 until 25 June 2021.
The Court found Harper to be a forthright and honest witness. Harper was plausible and accurate in most of her evidence, though the Court did find that in some respects she was inaccurate in her memory and reconstruction of past events. Although sometimes appearing nervous, she did not prevaricate or otherwise give conflicting evidence of significance. The small number of errors in her evidence, some significant, can be attributed to memory lapses because of the passage of time.
Harper was best placed to record exactly what work she performed during the period of her employment by the Club, and the capacity in which she performed such work. Her relevant affidavit evidence about her ongoing work performance was as set out in [48] – [425] of the Harper Affidavit filed on 5 February 2023. In particular, the Court accepted that Harper performed the work as set out in [81] of her affidavit filed on 5 February 2023, which provided as follows:
81. I accepted the full-time role and from in or around July 2006, I undertook the following type of work for the Club:
81.1 continual and daily updating of the financial accounts for the Club. The Club operated on an accounting package called Quickbooks, however when I started it changed over to use MYOB,
81.2 ongoing, daily, processing of memberships. I was signing up maybe 2-3 new memberships a week at this stage,
81.3 preparing week to week payment requisitions and obtaining signatures from Committee Members for those payments. I'd prepare the requisition, cheque, and remittance advice, obtain the signatures, and then I'd post the payments in the mail. The Club was operating on hand-written cheque books / payments and letters by post at that stage,
81.4 entering on a daily or weekly basis the data for the monthly Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet, reconciliation of the accounts, and producing a report for the end of month for the Treasurer to present to the Committee Members at the monthly Committee Meetings of the Club,
81.5 at the end of month printing out a list of payments already made over the course of the month by the Club Treasurer to be ratified at the monthly Committee Meeting,
81.6 attending, on daily basis, upon prospective members, answering their inquiries, taking their application, completing the necessary documentation/ references for their application, and preparing the application for approval of the Committee at Committee Meeting,
81.7 daily processing of payments for the Club from the new members or renewals, and posting letters of renewal to members,
81.8 issuing, on daily basis, the new members with a swipe card and participation book, and discussing with them how the Club operated, how to maintain their participation book, requirements of their licensing, when they were able to acquire firearms, storage of firearms, likely costs of firearms and ammunition, Club events, and any other type of inquiry or direction,
81.9 following up, on daily basis, members after making their application for their information, records, and paperwork to process, or dealing with after application inquiries, including attending upon the Weapons Licensing Branch with respect to those applications and or permits to acquire firearms,
81.10 conducting a daily stocktake of ammunition, alcohol, stationary, and placing orders for them from local suppliers. At that stage the Club did not have a significant retailing business,
81.11 managing, on daily basis, volunteers to conduct work around the Club including what work was required by each of them. Rostering of volunteers to complete the work required in and around the Club. Bruce Brown (Moses) undertook the cleaning for the Club at that stage, and Graham Jeremy (Graham) undertook the maintenance. They were both paid a wage for doing that work. The Club engaged many volunteers, year to year. Many of the volunteers were paid cash by the Club to not affect their government pensions,
81.12 attending, on daily basis, to the post office to post or pick up Club mail, the bank to carry out the Club's banking, or various locations to pick up supplies,
81.13 attending to, daily or weekly, general maintenance issues around the Club. would occasionally, through the course of any week, walk around the Club and see if anything needed attending to, or would have it reported to me by members attending the range. I'd then arrange any work that was required,
81.14 physically, on daily basis, attending on members for the retailing of limited volumes of ammunition, safes, shirts, caps, firearms accessories, food, and beverage, and maintaining the cash register. Most members paid for items by EFTPOS or credit-card at that stage, however some still paid with cash. The Club used manual credit card machines with carbon paper receipts at that stage,
81.15 attending, on daily basis, upon the Weapons Licensing Branch with respect to licensing, membership renewals, new members, compliance, or permits to acquire,
81.16 in anticipation of upcoming Committee Meetings making sure all the bank reconciliations and records of transactions were up to date and printed for the Treasurer. I would work on the accounts wherever I could find time over the course of the week. It was an ongoing attendance. The minutes of prior meetings were typed by the Secretary, who was Laurie Hinton at that stage,
81.17 giving each Committee Member upon arrival a copy of the minutes of prior meeting and agenda for meeting, and discussing the Club with them prior to the start of the Committee Meetings,
81.18 attending each month's Committee Meeting over the course of 3 to 4 hours and taking notes of what was required of me by way of Club Management arising from that Committee Meeting. The Committee would discuss the business of the Club for the month. The meetings were conducted in a certain order. We'd start with apologies for those who could not attend. That was addressed by the Secretary. Then we'd cover the incoming and outgoing correspondence. That was also addressed by the Secretary. Then we'd have the Treasurer's report. That was addressed by the Treasurer. The Treasurer would go through the profit and loss, balance sheet, funds held at bank and then distribute the accounts to all the Committee Members for review. The financial records presented by the Treasurer were those which I had maintained, prepared, and provided to the Treasurer. Then we'd go through new memberships. Then we'd move to business from the last meeting. That was addressed by the President. Then to current business, which was also addressed by the President. Each of the matters raised would be addressed with or without much discussion by the Committee. If anyone wanted to say something about an issue they would speak and discuss it. I would speak and contribute to the discussion when I felt any comments were necessary. A lot of matters would be raised by Committee Members at the Committee Meeting that were not on the agenda. That is, if matters came to mind during the meeting, they would raise them, and we'd discuss them. A lot of the matters raised would revert to me for comment because I was the only person present full-time at the Club over the course of the month and would have either observed it, heard about it, or experienced it. Most times I was responsible for sending out the letters or emails that are referred to within the Minutes of the Committee Meeting. Even where there is no identification in the Minutes about who is to undertake a task that task was usually undertaken by me. On my next day of work, I would start to action the items given to me from the Committee Meeting. If I couldn't attend a Committee Meeting the President would adjourn it to a later date so that I could be present for it. That was the case with each President ie Geoff, Bob Schukraft (Bob), Barry Dixon, and later Steven Flori (Steve),
81.19 I maintained the accounts for the Club on a week to week and then month to month basis,
81.20 completing, on the daily basis, application forms for permits to acquire a firearm for members,
81.21 attending, on the daily basis, upon suppliers / creditors of the Club to manage accounts payable. When I started the Club had a poor reputation because the former Treasurer, Tim Davis, hadn't paid creditors of the Club. No one wanted to deal with the Club because of its bad credit. It took me quite a while to mend relationships. When people noticed that I was working at the Club, some having dealt with me in my former firearms dealership, and that payments were being managed and made, they were happy to deal with the Club again,
81.22 dealing with the external accountant through the course of the year. I'd provide John Amos with the figures for quarterly lodgements, in the lead up to the AGM, and for the end of financial year. The Treasurer would supervise what records I was providing to John Amos,
81.23 working with or supervising the work that Moses and Graham did in and around the Club,
81.24 training of junior members, aged 11 to 18, on a weekly basis. There was generally 5 or 6 of them at any given time. I also undertook any administration / paperwork for them with their parents,
81.25 each year going through a register received from the Police and checking member attendance / participation records, firearms ownership, reconciling that register against our records, and reporting back to the Weapons Licensing Branch. I would complete this task over a period of approximately 8 weeks,
81.26 attending, month to month, to promotional activities for the Club including stalls at shows, like the Gold Coast Show. I would speak with interested parties at shows or any public event and try to attract memberships to the Club. We had a TV ad running in those early years. In later years I attended on radio broadcasts promoting the Club,
81.27 attending any events or functions of the Club where alcohol was served because I was the responsible person for the Liquor License and the only person who held a certificate for the responsible service of alcohol. At a later stage another member also obtained a certificate and would assist me in the service of alcohol,
81.28 on a weekly basis obtaining quotes, estimates, and tenders for work needed around the Club and reviewing them and providing them with my recommendations to the Committee Members for their consideration and or acceptance,
81.29 reviewing the financial records of the Club, on daily and weekly basis, as I entered the data and identifying any irregularity. If found or where the accounts didn't balance, then finding out why and resolving the irregularity,
81 .30 sending by mail invoices every month for any receivables including for membership renewals,
81.31 on daily and weekly basis, preparing for, processing, and attending to the accounts payable,
81.32 on daily and weekly basis, preparing for, processing, and managing the accounts receivable,
81.33 on daily basis, manually entering all transaction undertaken by the Club into MYOB,
81.34 attending upon representatives of third parties for inspections or matters of compliance. For instance, I negotiated the changes to the operating hours of the Club for licensing purposes, I attended to inspections of the Club premises with Christian Moore of the Weapons Licensing Branch, I attended to inspections of the Club premises / ranges with Sergeant Gerry O'Conner, I attended to inspections of the Club premises with Trevor Jenkins from SSAA for insurance purposes,
81.35 preparing policies and procedures for the Club. I would prepare them and provide or dictate them to Noel Willis who would enter them into the computer in the correct format,
81.36 on daily basis taking all phone inquiries for the Club and attending to all tasks that arose from those calls, and
81.37 on daily and weekly basis preparing lists and registers for work that needed to be done in and around the Club.

Harper was adamant that the work that she performed after 1 July 2006 was that of a full-time club manager. That claim was supported, in abundance, by documentation generated by the Club itself. In relation to the Club’s acknowledgment of the extent of work carried out by Harper on behalf of the Club after 1 July 2006, and as to the capacity in which Harper carried out such work, the Court has read, and having done so, adopts as accurate, those references in Schedule E to the applicant’s submissions filed on 5 November 2024, to Exhibit 9, and to the transcript as respectively particularised in footnotes 41 – 44 inclusive of the applicant’s submissions filed on 5 November 2024. Those references evidence Harper being acknowledged as Club manager, as well as the performance by her of work in that capacity.
An example of the latter was Harper being referred to as “Club Manager” on the Club’s website as early as 17 November 2007. [4] The ongoing reference by the Club to Harper being the Club Manager was further evident from an emailed Club Information Book prepared in 2012 which identified Harper as being an integral part of the Club’s operations. Harper was specifically referred to as being the point of contact by reference to those headings in the Information Book relating to Range Operations, Club Management, Weapons Safety Attainment Certificate (Weapons Act Safety Course), Weapons Licencing and Firearm Acquisition. Under the heading “Range Operations”, reference was made to Harper being the Club Manager as follows: [5]
The Club Manager is Kate Harper. Kate is the person you will most likely have the most to do with on a day to day basis. Her duties include: opening the club grounds and facilities for members, giving potential new members tours of the club and taking bookings for and providing weapons safety courses, and coaching sessions. Kate is responsible for the collection of range fees from non-member shooters, which currently is $15 per person per day. She also reports to the management committee on matters of range operation and most importantly from your perspective, range availability for members use.
Kate is directly responsible to the committee through the Vice President. If there are matters that require attention and they cannot be resolved by Kate she will bring the matter to the attention of the appropriate committee member on your behalf. If you need something and don’t know who to ask, Kate is a good starting point.
The club manager is on duty on Saturdays and Sundays. On the weekends the responsibility for range operations is exercised by the range officers for the particular disciplines on the shooting calendar.
If you are an unlicenced shooter at this point in time you will need to complete a QLD Government Weapons Safety Course. Kate will help you out with this requirement. What you need to remember you cannot get a weapons licence until you have completed this course.
[4] See website at Ex. 9 at pp. 10 – 23, especially at p. 14.
[5] See ex. 9 at pp. 369 – 386, especially at 372 – 373.
The Court largely accepts the evidence of Harper in her affidavit. First, at [156], [176], [209], [243], [263], [280], [294], [355], [361], [372] and [373] of her said affidavit, Harper deposed that she had, from as early as 2010, raised the underpayment of her wages with, respectively, Robert Craig, Bob Schukraft, John Illingworth and, via Craig, with Steve Flori. Each of Craig, Schukraft, Flori and Dixon were members of the Club committee at the relevant time that Harper raised the underpayment of her wages with them. The Court accepts that Harper raised the issue of underpayment of wages by the Club with Craig as early as 2009 – 2010, with Barry Dixon in about 2010 [6], and that Craig raised the issue with other committee members over time up until his resignation in 2021.
[6] See transcript of 21 August 2024 at p. 229.28 – .31
For Harper, the evidence concerning work performed by her was as follows:

Witness Affidavit Transcript

Robert Giles Affidavit filed on 18.11.2022
para 6 – 11.36 Transcript of 20.08.2024 at p. 133.11 – 140.47

Robert Peter Craig n/a Transcript of 20.08.2024 at
p. 148.18 – 153.13 and
Transcript of 21.08.2024 at p. 185.45 – 196.45.

Kathryn Harper Affidavit filed on 5.2.2023
para – 69 – 430 Transcript of 21.08.2024 at p. 208.34 – 267.30 and Transcript of 22.08.2024 at p. 292.5 – 316.45

David Chalk n/a Transcript of 22.08.2024 at p. 340.38 – 343.5

Amanda Jane Goldsworthy n/a Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 374.45 – 377.45

Colin John Moore n/a Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 380.4 – 381.45

Diane Joyce Terakes n/a Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 410.10 – 412.25

Rhonda Joyce Hough Affidavit filed on 5.12.2022
para 4 – 12 Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 418.40 – 420.10

Daniel Peter Repacholi Affidavit filed on 12.2.2023
para 4 – 13 Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 422.45 – 425.40

Lee Raymond Kernaghan Affidavit filed on 12.3.2023
para 5 – 14 Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 426.30 – 427.40

Jay Ruben John Cleaver n/a Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 430.30 – 434.30

Howard Stephen Day n/a Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 438.1 to 442.15

John Murray Illingworth Affidavit filed on 20.12.2022
para 7 – 19 Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 451.15 – 462.15

Sharee Betts n/a Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 466.5 – 472.35

Lawrence Edward Hinton Affidavit filed on 2.12.2022
para 9 – 13 Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 479.1 – .45

Barry Alan Hollingsworth Affidavit filed on 21.11.2022
para 7 – 15 Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 481.35 – 485.25

Damien Emmanuel n/a Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 491.5 – 494.30

Mark William Riddell Affidavit filed on 22.11.2022
para 5 – 13 Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 498.5 – 501.30

James Victor Heard Affidavit filed on 22.11.2022
para – 5 – 9 Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 503.15 – 504.25

Bruce Anthony Brown Affidavit filed on 29.9.21
para 5 – 13 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 512.5 – 515.10

David Heathcote Affidavit filed on 18.11.2022
para 7 – 14 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 516.45 – 518.25

For the respondents, the evidence concerning work performed by Harper was as follows:

Witness Affidavit Transcript

Geoffrey James Hall Affidavit 1.3.23
para 2 – 21 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 544.30 – 569.40

Mikailah Reeves Affidavit 23.12.2022
para 53 – 79 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 572.40 – 576.20

Diane Margaret McNiven Affidavit 23.12.2022
para 24 – 55 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 577.10 – 578.45

Peter Arthur Goldstone Affidavit 23.12.2022
para 9 – 13 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 581.29 – 584.45

Gaye Goldstone Affidavit 23.12.2022
para 7 – 55 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 585.45 – 594.10

Victor Jonathan Clough Affidavit 23.12.2022
para 5 – 39 Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 594.12 – 600.45

The applicant called one Robert Craig as a witness in her case. Craig was an important witness because he had not only been a member of the Club from about 2004 until he resigned from the Club in 2021, but he had also served as a director and committee member of the Club between 12 November 2007 – 16 June 2008, and between 10 November 2008 – 22 January 2021. Craig had also served as treasurer of the Club between 2009 and 2021.
At [38] of his affidavit filed on 12 March 2023, Craig deposed, and the Court finds, that Harper had performed work at the Club as follows:
38. Over the period of my membership, as Director, Committee Member, or Treasurer, I observed during my attendance at the Club, from my personal undertaking of work with Kate, the Club's records, or reports made to me by other members / Committee Members, that Kate undertook the following work for the Club
38.1 day to day general management task.
38.2 sourcing and ordering of any plant, machinery, or equipment required for use the Club
38.3purchasing, firearms' related equipment, and ammunitions for the Club and its members
38.4ordering food and beverage for the Club and maintaining stocktake.
38.5 membership inquiries, new memberships, membership licensing, and renewals.
38.6sourcing, recruitment, training rostering, and management of volunteer staff.
38.7attending upon third parties and government agencies concerning the Club and its affairs. For instance, in relation to licencing, employment, or workplace issues, legal and accounting matters, third party certifications (such as the police training)
38.8preparing reports and recommendations to the Committee as to procedures, business, or administration of the Club and assisting the Committee on decision making
38.9administration, maintaining, and processing of financial records for the Club and preparing its records for statutory periodic lodgements ie for business activity statements or annual returns.
38.10assisting / arranging, authorising, and overseeing maintenance or replacement of Club property. For instance, the security cameras or IT equipment.
38.11 attending monthly Committee meetings and annual meetings. She discussed the issues that were relevant to that months’ business and administration of the Club.
38.12 overseeing the computer system and making recommendations to the Committee to upgrade the computer system.
38.13 representing the Club at various external meetings or events.
38.14 resolving any disputes with third parties, the public, government agencies
38. 15 directly supervised the work of other volunteers.
38.16 completing tasks that required a level of skill and intelligence.
38.17 completing any training or education she required to advance the administration or business of the Club.
38.18 supervising staff in one or more sections of the club, including allocation of duties, preparation of rosters, counselling, discipline, and performance.
38.19 undertaking or supervising clerical work, maintaining records including the use of computers.
38.20 assisting in stock control and stocktaking.
38.21 contributing ideas for long term planning, including the areas of new equipment, maintenance, human resources, marketing.
38.22 checking and supervising quality of services, hygiene, and safety arrangements.
38.23 checking equipment and facilities for maintenance, replacement, and upgrading.
38.24 checking, organising, and implementing security procedures.
38.25 placing supply orders and authorised payments within set procedures.
38.26 assisting in establishing stock control levels, checking accuracy of stocktaking, evaluating suppliers, negotiated pricing and / or terms.
38.27 implementing and checking emergency procedures.
38.28 collecting statistics, analysing income, and making recommendations for improvement of trade.
38.29 assessing tenders and quotations, inspecting works done at the Club, liaising with outside businesses.
38.30 analysing income and expenditure for a number of the Club's operations, calculating costs and / or value of stock and sales.
38.31 Investigating and identifying financial irregularities.
38.32 Implementing and maintaining marketing programs and activities including the Club's website.
38.33supervising financial reports and calculation of finances, reporting to the Club's accountant, establishing stocktaking procedures, and identifying financial risks.
38.34 preparing agendas and proposals for consideration by the Committee.
38.35 assisting/ establishing procedures that apply to the whole Club.
38.36 preparing financial reports, co-ordinating reporting with the Club's external accountant.
38.37 representing the Club at third party venues, events, speaking engagements, including annual meetings / Club meetings.
38.38maintaining a firearms register.
38.39attending with me upon suppliers of firearms to negotiate and purchase stock for the Club.
38.40 attending with me to the quarterly firearms dealership meetings including when the Weapons Licensing Branch of the Queensland Police was present.
38.41 inquiring about, pursuing, and obtaining government grants for the Club.
38.42operating for the benefit of the Club’s services and membership a registered training organisation.
The Court further finds that from 26 July 2015 until 7 July 2021, Harper was either required or expressly or impliedly authorised to perform the work which was carried out by her on behalf of the Club.
Hours worked by Harper
Harper had been residing at the Club’s premises since late 2007 until the present time. She was for most of that time the person who was responsible for the opening and closing of the gates to the Club premises. She had unrestricted access to the office, and she otherwise was able to access all parts of the Club, at her own discretion, as and when she desired. Due to the close proximity of the Cottage to the areas where most members congregated when attending at the Club’s premises, Harper was in regular contact with such Club members. Much of the evidence given by witnesses called on behalf of Harper relating to her hours of work was based upon such witnesses having seen Harper in and about the Club when they had been at the Club. The fact that Harper always appeared to be present when such witnesses were at the Club does not necessarily support the proposition advanced on behalf of Harper that she was working up to 60 – 70 hours per week. Nor does it support the proposition that Harper was always working when such witnesses so observed her.
It was not surprising that Harper would have found it difficult to distinguish between times worked by her, and times claimed to have been worked by her. Mere banter with club members, which the Court finds Harper extensively engaged in, did not constitute work on most such occasions. During cross-examination, Harper conceded that socialising was not part of her job description as follows: [7]
[7] Transcript of 21 August 2024 at p. 205.5 – .36.
But you weren’t always in the office, were you?---Not always in the office, no.
No. Sometimes you’re out shooting and enjoying shooting, weren’t you?---I would be socialising with the visitors and the members, yes.
Yes. And socialising with the visitors and members wasn’t part of your work, was it?---As the manager, yes, it was.
You weren’t employed by anyone to socialise, were you?---I was employed to be a club representative, and to me that was to make visitors and members feel at home and be happy.
No one ever instructed you that your job was to socialise with people, did they?---Part of a member’s – excuse me – manager’s duty is to socialise with people and make ---
I’m asking what you think part of a manager’s duty is, no one ever instructed you as part of your employment duties to socialise with anybody, did they?---I would say they did.
Well, you haven’t mentioned it in your affidavit?---Well, then, no.
No. So you accept that no one ever told you to do it?---I accept that.
Okay. And the practical reality is you had been at the club a very long time, you accept that?---Yes.
And that a large part of your social circle was centred around the club and its members?---Not a large part, but probably half of it.
Half of it. And you accept, don’t you, that you enjoy spending time with your friends at the club?---I love spending time with my friends at the club.
Relevantly, there were no time sheets required to be kept by Harper, or anyone else in authority at the Club, relating to Harper’s hours of work. [8] In the absence of the accurate recording of the times when Harper was engaged in work on behalf of the Club, the Court is required to make a holistic assessment on such issue based upon the entirety of the evidence before it, including the nature and extent of the duties which the Court has found Harper performed during her employment. In the absence of documentation which reflected actual times worked, such assessment was necessarily impressionistic. Having considered all relevant evidence on that issue, the Court finds that for most of the time between 1 July 2006 and 6 January 2021, Harper worked a 38-hour week. The Court accepted the submission made on behalf of the respondents that Harper often sought the company of friends who were Club members, and that she mingled with them, because she found it difficult to concentrate watching television or relaxing in the Cottage due to the noise generated by range gunfire. The Court also finds that Harper was a gregarious individual who enjoyed mixing with Club members socially.
[8] Transcript of 21 August 2024 at p. 242.7.
Further, the Court finds that Harper spent a considerable period during her working week dealing with issues arising out of the running by her of a business under the corporate name of Queensland Training Centre Pty Ltd (QTC). QTC was a business incorporated on 24 October 2011 which ran weapons training courses. Harper deposed that she relevantly had the skills and knowledge to run weapons safety training courses. [9] She benefited financially from the operation of such business in her capacity as a beneficiary of the Queensland Training Centre Trust (QTCT).
[9] Harper affidavit filed on 29 September 2021 at [6] – [9].
Harper’s evidence during cross-examination about QTC was relevantly as follows: [10]
[10] Transcript of 22 August 2024 at p. 294.3 – 298.33.
Now, you ran your own business, QTC, from the club’s premises, didn’t you?---Correct.
And you used the club computer to run the business?---Yes, I got permission from Bob Schukraft when I got QTC, and he said to use the club’s computer, so I did.
And you were regularly doing QTC work from 2010 onwards during hours you claimed to have been working for the club?---QTC work from 2010 was very minimal and all I ever did was email certificates. And it didn’t take much time at all, and I believe one to two hours a week would have been the total time I took on QTC.
QTC had a website, didn’t they?---It did.
And you have to prepare the information for that website to be put up?---The only thing I had to change on the website was the date of the courses, and I had somebody do that.
But when the website was originally created, for example, there was information that was required to be given to a web designer?---Yes, I did that.
You did that?---But that didn’t come from the club, I did that - - -
And you did that at the club, didn’t you?---No, I did not.
You did it during work hours on the club computer?---No, I did not.
And on that website, the QTC website, there was a phone number?---Yes.
To ring you, wasn’t there?---Yes.
And that was a number which went to your phone, that the club phone was diverted to as well?---Correct.
So to the extent you were taking calls, you weren’t only taking them for the club, you were taking QTC calls as well, weren’t you?---Yes, I was, but there wasn’t a lot of QTC calls.
All right. Now, you used the club computer, you’ve accepted, and used to print out certificates for the attendees at the courses?---No, they were emailed.
You would print out some of them, wouldn’t you?---Some of them. The ones Thursday nights, ones for Ross, I used to print out.
And you would print those out - - -?---And some – yes.
You would print those out at the club on hours you claimed to have been working?---Most of the Ross ones I did at 9.30 at night, after he finished his course.
And there were also packs that you gave to the attendees, weren’t there, with information in them?---Correct.
Booklets, and those sorts of things?---Correct.
And you printed those booklets out from the club computer as well, didn’t you?---I printed some of them – most of them were printed by a man that I knew that worked at Xerox, and he printed me out a bulk lot which I had at home.
Now, during the entirety of its operation period, QTC had 7894 different attendees – sorry, I will withdraw that. I will start that question again. There were 7894 attendances at QTC training during its period; do you accept that?
HIS HONOUR: Which period?
MR SMITH: During the entirety of QTCs operation, your Honour.
THE WITNESS: What that’s - - -
HIS HONOUR: Well, up until when?
MR SMITH: Well, up until - - -
HIS HONOUR: About.
MR SMITH: - - - mid 2021?---So – probably that would be correct.
All right. And each of those attendees had to contact you, didn’t they?---No, they didn’t.
Well, you organised the training sessions; you accept that?---The training sessions – I organised the dates, yes.
And the way that you were contacted by those people was either by them ringing you on your telephone; that was one way they contacted you, wasn’t it?---Everybody didn’t contact me. Most of them – if they came from the webpage then they would – the information that they needed was on the webpage. If they came from the club, the information that they needed was on the new members form that I used to send out to each welcome letter to every member.
But they still had to register to do the course?---No, they didn’t. They would just turn up. They did not have to register.
How would you know if anyone was going to turn up to a course, Ms Harper?---We didn’t.
Now, QTC didn’t only operate the Gold Coast Pistol Club, did it?---No, it didn’t.
You had trainers scattered all throughout Queensland, didn’t you?---I did.
About 23 of them, I think. Does that sound about right?---I think – at the last six years I’ve had seven.
All right. But over time you’ve had a number of different trainers?---Yes, but some of them did, like, a year. They weren’t big trainers.
No, but I’m asking about the number of trainers?---Yes, I probably had up to 16 trainers, yes.
All right. And you had to identify people with the right qualifications and ability to train the courses, didn’t you?---Yes, I did.
And that was something that you did during business hours, wasn’t it?---No, it wasn’t. It was something that I did at home. That was done on my computer.
And you had to liaise with the other ranges that were used, didn’t you?---No, I didn’t. That was up to the trainer.
You spent, can I suggest to you, a significant amount of time each week administering business at QTC from the club; do you accept that?---I accept I did about one to two hours, yes.
Can I suggest to you that it was more like five to 10 hours a week?---No, that is not correct.
All right. You would accept, though, that you sent a significant number of emails from the Gold Coast Pistol Club address that were QTC emails?---I did, but probably most of them were on my days off. Some weren’t.
So to the extent that there are emails, that are before the court, which are from the Gold Coast Pistol Club address that relate to QTC - - -?---Yes.
- - - you accept you would have sent those?---I would, yes.
All right. And there were – not all of those emails that you sent during that time would have been about straightforward matters, would they?---They were just certificates, and they would take, probably, one minute to do.
Well, you would have also sent emails to your accountant about financial matters; do you accept that?---Not from the club, no.
Not from the club. Excuse me, your Honour.
THE WITNESS: I met with John Illingworth in person.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Smith.
MR SMITH: Yes. Excuse me, your Honour. I am just trying to find a particular email that’s relevant to the question I just asked.
HIS HONOUR: Do you think you will finish with Ms Harper before 1?
MR SMITH: Not before 1, but I would expect to finish with Ms Harper today.
HIS HONOUR: Right. Well, I am going to adjourn at about 10 to 1.
MR SMITH: Thank you, your Honour.
Would you have, then, sent emails to your accountant from your - - -?---Private email - - -
- - - kateharper2 email?---Yes.
And you would accept if that showed you were in club hours, you sent it during club hours – it would show that on the email?---If it’s stated on the email, I would accept it was during club hours, yes.
All right. The reality is that you were running a reasonably complex business operation with QTC, weren’t you?---I wouldn’t call it complex.
Well, you had to maintain real training and assessing certification, didn’t you?---No, I didn’t do that. The trainers did that, and the paperwork was done by people that I employed.
Well, you did it while you were training, didn’t you?---What’s that?
While you were training people for QTC you had to have a trainer and assessor certification - - -?---I did, yes.
- - - and you had to do that and maintain it?---I did.
And you had to do checks on your trainers to ensure that they had the right certification, didn’t you?---That was done originally when they became trainers, yes.
And the business had a licence as a registered training organisation; is that right?---It did. And you had to apply for that licence, didn’t you?---I did.
And you had to maintain that licence, didn’t you?---It was audited every 10 years. It was up for an audit now.
Yes. So there were audits that you had to respond to?---Correct.
And there was financial information that you had to prepare for the accountant?---But that was not done at the club. I did everything - - -
I am not asking where it was done?---Okay.
I am just asking about the tasks?---Yes – yes. There was financial things that had to be done for the accountant, yes.
Yes. And there were payments that had to be made to the trainers?---Yes.
And there were telephone inquiries that you had to deal with?---Yes.
And all of those things you did while at the club during your hours of work, didn’t you?---No, I did not. A lot of it I did at home, and a lot of it I did on my days off.
So is your evidence to his Honour that from 2011 onwards, in addition to working 60 to 70 hours a week, plus working two hours a night as a caretaker, you’re also running this business on your own time? Is that your evidence?---I had – yes. I had one trainer up till two thousand and seven – 2015. One additional trainer is all I had.
I didn’t ask how many additional trainers you had. I asked you whether in addition to, you say, working between 60 and 70 hours a week, plus another 10 hours of caretaker-time, you were then, on top of that, running this business in your own time?---Yes. I was running it in my own time.
That’s just a flat-out lie, isn’t it?---No, it’s not.

Harper transacted business on behalf of QTC, as and when required, when approached at the Club by people who wanted to undertake firearm training and safety courses under the auspices of QTC. She also took telephone calls concerning QTC courses during the day when she was otherwise performing her usual work duties for and on behalf of the Club.
Again, the Court has been required to adopt a holistic approach to the question as to how much time Harper spent on QTC related activities. Having considered the nature of work undertaken by Harper on behalf of QTC as deposed to by her, as well as the fact that most of such work was undertaken by her at the Club’s premises, the Court finds that Harper probably spent about 5 hours per week involved in QTC business. That 5 hours would have fallen outside of the 38-hour working week performed by Harper on behalf of the Club, such that her entitlement to payment by the Club for the performance of a 38-hour working week was not diminished thereby.
Under which award should Harper have been paid
In the present matter, Harper was paid on a part-time basis until 30 June 2006 as a bookkeeper, but after 1 July 2006 she was employed on a full-time basis as Club Manager. Such change of role was of no moment. It has long been acknowledged that the facts of each particular case determine whether a change in the employment relationship between an employer and an employee has, or has not, occurred.
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg & Ors (2016) 242 FCR 505 at [257] – [262], Buchanan J held as follows:
257.The search, accordingly, in a case where it is said that a contract of employment has been replaced in an ongoing relationship of employment (or even that its terms have been varied), is for an imputed mutual intention that such a change in the contractual landscape has occurred.
258.In Easling v Mahoney Insurance Brokers (2001) 78 SASR 489 (“Easling”), Doyle CJ said:
8           To my mind, a court should not too readily assume that a change in working arrangements, or in the duties of an employee, involves either a variation to an existing contract, or the making of a new contract. In my respectful opinion Murray CJ stated the matter too widely when he said in Federated Mutual Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Sabine [1920] SALR 284 at 292:
“The true view, I think, is that unless the original agreement gave the employer the right to the services of the employee in any capacity he chose to direct from time to time there would be a new employment whenever a change was made in the duties to be performed, and it would be a question of fact in each case what the terms of the new employment were.”
9            In my respectful opinion the issue is whether the original agreement gives the employer the right to make the changes that have been made, and if it does, then neither a varied contract nor a new contract arises.
10         The application of the relevant principles to the facts of a particular case will often be difficult. In some fields of employment changes in the working arrangements and tasks performed will occur gradually. The application of the relevant principles of law may be difficult in such a case.
259.In the same case, Bleby J found that there had been no unilateral change of duties and hence no repudiation of the contract to support a claim for damages. His Honour said:
157         It cannot be said, in the light of the correspondence and of the appellant’s oral evidence, that as at 12 February 1999, when the appellant terminated the contract, there had been any enforced change of duties against the appellant’s will, such as to amount to a repudiation of his contract of employment. The respondent had expressed a repeated willingness to discuss such changes with the appellant, and indeed to seek his advice as to how the restructuring could best be effected. He himself had expressed a willingness to undertake a different range of duties, and had frankly acknowledged in evidence that the prospect of some further change was not a major concern to him.
260.Even with changes to duties being made at the instigation or direction of an employer, there may be no basis for complaint about imposed changes. In Spartalis v BMD Constructions Pty Ltd (2014) 120 SASR 575, a Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia referred to the observation of Doyle CJ in Easling, and to Quinn, and said:
26         A court should not too readily find that a change in working arrangements or in the duties of an employee entails either a variation to an existing contract or the making of a new contract. If the original agreement gives the employer the right to make the changes that have occurred, there will be neither a variation of contract nor a new contract.
(Footnotes omitted.)
261. Whether changes occur incrementally and slowly, or more rapidly pursuant to an intended program of development and expansion, unless it can be said that an employer has breached a contract by an unjustified and unlawful attempt to impose change (in which case the employee has the normal remedies for breach or repudiation) it would not be readily inferred, in my view, that the entire contract of employment has been replaced by a new one. In the case of a comprehensive written contract dealing with a range of important matters, including but by no means confined to, methods and occasions for termination of the contract, that could have drastic and potentially damaging results for both parties. Such an intention should not lightly be imputed to them in a continuing relationship.
262. A suggestion of consensual variation raises different issues. The variation suggested must arise directly from the altered circumstances and respond to them in a way which can be objectively attributed and imputed to both parties. The test for implication of the term, or the implied abandonment of an existing term, leaving a void to be filled, is not supplied by the view of a court that the change would itself be reasonable. Unless it can be said that abandonment of a term represents a common intention it may not be assumed in my respectful view.  A fortiori, the altered circumstances are consensual; so must be the contractual variation, if any.
Further, it has long been a well-established principle that employers and employees cannot contract out of minimum entitlements as contained in awards. As was held by White J in Atkins Freight Services Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2017] FCA 1134 at [49]:
49. The FWO’s first contention on the appeal concerning the Deeds was that no effect should be given to them because it is not possible for employers and employees to contract out of the minimum entitlements established by awards. That principle is well established: Josephson v Walker (1914) 18 CLR 691 at 700; Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Givoni Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1406 at [23]‑[35]; Metropolitan Health Service Board v Australian Nursing Federation [2000] FCA 784, (2000) 99 FCR 95 at [17]‑[25]. The FWO accepted that this general principle does not preclude parties from compromising bona fide current and contemplated litigation. So much was confirmed by the Full Court in Kowalski at [17]:
17. In these circumstances to view the Heads of Agreement as simply involving some diminution of the appellant’s statutory rights is to misunderstand the agreement reached. Plainly the appellant and the second respondent had litigation outstanding. Plainly enough each party was putting a particular position in that litigation. There were risks to each. True it is that statutory public rights cannot be waived or compromised. However, this does not prevent the parties from compromising litigation on foot and in contemplation, having regard to the various risks to the parties in that litigation.
The Court finds that from at least 2010 until 7 July 2021, Harper was either required by the Club, or was expressly or impliedly authorized by the Club, to perform the work which she did, and that Harper worked a 38-hour week.
It was submitted on behalf of Harper that the applicable awards governing Harper’s employment were the Registered and Licenced Clubs Award [MA000058] 2010 and 2020 (the Clubs Award).
It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the applicable awards were the Amusement Events and Recreation Award [MA000080] 2020 (and its predecessors) (the Amusement Award).
Clause 4 of the Clubs Award relevantly provided as follows:
4. Coverage
[Varied by PR994478]
4.1This award covers employers of employees engaged in the performance of all or any work in or in connection with or for clubs registered or recognised under State, Territory or Commonwealth legislation and their employees in the classifications within Schedule C-Classification Definitions, to the exclusion of any other modern award.
4.2To avoid doubt, this award covers the work of bar attendants or stewards employed in a club situated on a football ground, cricket ground or sports ground and persons engaged as greenkeepers, ground attendants, gardeners, propagators, lawn mower and motor roller drivers and general labourers in the construction and maintenance of bowling greens and golf courses, but does not cover:
(a)       persons employed by a student union of a university;
(b)       employees of municipal, shire or county councils;
(c)       landscape gardeners and master gardeners;
(d) employees employed by an employer other than the club, where the employer operates a golf pro shop, driving range or other golfing facility, or provides golf coaching or other similar services, which are accessible to the general public;
(e)thoroughbred, harness, trotting and greyhound racing clubs and their employees in relation to operations covered by the Racing Clubs Events Award 2010; or
(f)       club honorary secretaries.
4.3This award does not apply to employees of employers who are covered by the following awards:
(a)       Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010;
(b)       Cleaning Services Award 2010;
(c)       Racing Industry Ground Maintenance Award 2010; or
(d)       Security Services Industry Award 2010.
4.4The award does not cover an employee exdude0 from award coverage by the Act.
4.5The award does not cover employees who are covered by a modern enterprise award, or an enterprise instrument (within the meaning of the Fair Work (TransitionalProvisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth)), or employers in relation to those employees.
[New 4.6 inserted by PR994478 from 01Jan10]
4.6 The award does not cover employees who are covered by a State reference public sector modern award, or a State reference public sector transitional award (within the meaning of the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments)Act 2009 (Cth)), or employers in relation to those employees.
[New 4.7 inserted by PR994478 from 01Jan10]
4.7This award covers any employer which supplies labour on an on-hire basis in the industry set out in clause 4.1 in respect of on-hire employees in classifications covered by this award, and those on-hire employees, while engaged in the performance of work for a business in that industry. This subclause operates subject to the exclusions from coverage in this award.
[New 4.8 inserted by PR994478 from 01Jan10]
4.8 This award covers employers which provide group training services for apprentices and/or trainees engaged in the industry and/or parts of industry set out at clause 4.1 and those apprentices and/or trainees engaged by a group training service hosted by a company to perform work at a location where the activities described herein are being performed. This subclause operates subject to the exclusions from coverage in this award.
[New 4.9 inserted by PR994478 from 01Jan10]
4.9 Where an employer is covered by more than one award, an employee of that employer is covered by the award classification which is most appropriate to the work performed by the employee and to the environment in which the employee normally performs the work.
NOTE: Where there is no classification for a particular employee in this award it is possible that the employer and that employee are covered by an award with     occupational coverage.
Clause 4 of the Amusement Award relevantly provided as follows:
4.   Coverage
[Varied by PR994516, PR500482, PR718585]
4.1 This industry award covers employers throughout Australia in the amusement, events and recreation industry and their employees in the classifications set out in this award to the exclusion of any other modern award.
4.2      Definition of amusement, events and recreation industry
[4.2(a) substituted by PR718585 ppc 01Jun20]
(a)       Amusement, events and recreation industry means the operation of:
(i)        leisure and recreation facilities and centres;
(ii)       sporting, exhibition, convention and amusement complexes;
(iii)      theme parks;
(iv)      heritage, tourism and cultural centres;
(v)       museums and galleries;
(vi)      zoos, animal parks and aquariums;
(vii)      agricultural and horticultural shows;
(viii)     carnivals and amusement parks;
(ix)      ten pin bowling venues;
(x)       go-kart racing venues;
(xi) amusement arcades, including video game and pinball parlours; and
(xii) golf facilities including but not limited to golf clubs, on-course and off course golf shops and driving ranges.
(b) For the purposes of this clause, theme parks means locations or enterprises operating attractions or amusements (whether indoor or outdoor) open to the public through either paid or free admission.
(c) For the purpose of this clause, the amusement, events and recreation industry also includes employers engaged in the supply, preparation, marking out, fabrication, installation, erection or dismantling of exhibition stands or associated componentry for the trades and public promotions industry.
[4.2(d) inserted by PR500482 from 18Aug10]
(d) For the purposes of this clause, the amusements, events and recreation industry also includes the provision of services within the primary venue such as photographic services, the sale of food, beverages and merchandising, and also activities undertaken by an employer covered by this Award which are ancillary to the conduct of the primary venue, such as road or water transport at, to or from, or away from, the primary venue, sightseeing tours, travel arrangements, and wildlife research, conservation and collection conducted away from the primary venue.
[4.2(e) inserted by PR718585 ppc 01Jun20]
(e) For the purpose of this clause, the amusements, events and recreation industry also includes golf facilities including but not limited to golf clubs, on-course and off-course golf shops and driving ranges.
4.3 Exclusions
(a) This award does not cover employees of employers where the major and substantial activity is the provision of health and fitness services and classes.
(b) The award does not cover an employee excluded from award coverage by the Act.
(c)       The award does not cover an employer bound by the:
(i)        Building and Construction General On-site Award 2010;
(ii) Electrical, Electronic and Communications Contracting Award   2010;
(iii)      Joinery and Building Trades Award 2010;
[4.2(c)(iv) inserted by PR718585 ppc 01Jun20]
(iv)      Registered and Licensed Clubs 2010;
[4.3(c)(iv) renumbered as 4.3(c)(v) by PR718585 ppc01Jan10]
(v)       Travelling Shows Award 2010; or
[4.3(c)(v) inserted by PR994516 from 0lJanl0; 4.3(c)(v) renumbered as 4.3(c)(vi) by PR718585 ppc 01Jan10]
(vi) Fitness Industry Award 2010.
(d) The award does not cover employees who are covered by a modern enterprise award, or an enterprise instrument (within the meaning of the Fair Work(Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth)), or employers in relation to those employees.
[4.3(e) substituted by PR994516 from 01Jan10]
(e) The award does not cover employees who are covered by a State reference public sector modern award, or a State reference public sector transitional award (within the meaning of the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth)), or employers in relation to those employees.
[4.4 inserted by PR994516 from 01Jan10]
4.4This award covers any employer which supplies labour on an on-hire basis in the industry set out in clause 4.1 in respect of on-hire employees in classifications covered by this award, and those on-hire employees, while engaged in the performance of work for a business in that industry. This subclause operates subject to the exclusions from coverage in this award.
[4.5 inserted by PR.994516 from 0lJanl0]
4.5This award covers employers which provide group training services for apprentices and trainees engaged in the industry and/or parts of industry set out at clause 4.1 and those apprentices and trainees engaged by a group training service hosted by a company to perform work at a location where the activities described herein are being performed. This subclause operates subject to the exclusions from coverage in this award.
[4.3(e) renumbered as 4.6 by PR994516 from 0lJanl0J
4.6Where an employer is covered by more than one award, an employee of that employer is covered by the award classification which is most appropriate to the work performed by the employee and to the environment in which the employee normally performs the work.
NOTE: Where there is no classification for a particular employee in this award it is possible that the employer and that employee are covered by an award with occupational coverage.
The Court finds that the provisions of Clause 4 of the Amusement Award were more applicable to the work performed by Harper in relation to the recreational and commercial activities that were carried on by the Club, than were the provisions of Clause 4 of the Clubs Award. The Clubs Award was more directed to bar staff and those employees involved in activities associated with maintenance of existing infrastructure. It could not be said that Harper’s main activities fell into the management of such activities. Her responsibilities were more diverse and varied, as would have been expected of the manager of a recreational pistol shooting club. Clause 4.9 of the Clubs Award does not assist Harper.
Clause 13 of the Amusement Award provided that employees covered by the Award must be classified according to the structure and definitions as set out in Schedule B – Classification Structure.
It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that under the Amusement Award, Harper ought to be classified as a Grade 3 employee. The Court accepts that submission. The Grade 3 criteria were more applicable to the tasks performed by Harper than those as set out in the Grade 4 criteria. The respective criteria for Grades 3 and 4 were as follows:
Amusement, Events and Recreation Award 2010
…
B.4 Grade 3
B.4.1 An employee at this level is an employee who has completed an appropriate level of training so as to enable the employee to perform work within the scope of this level.
B.4.2 An employee at this level performs work above and beyond the skills of a Grade 2 employee to the level of their skills, competence and training.
B.4.3 An employee at this level includes Supervisors and Operators (where four or more are employed).
B.4.4 Such an employee will possess the following skills and may be required to perform the following duties:
(a)Works from complex instructions and procedures.
(b) Assists in the provision of on-the-job training.
(c) Can perform a greater variety of tasks competently in accordance with the established procedures within their work classification.
(d) Can provide assistance for problem solving and work direction.
(e) Is trained in and can apply a higher level of quality control and customer service.
(f) Performs work which is the subject of final checking only.
(g)       Has good health and safety knowledge.
(h) Works individually under general supervision while having the ability to co-ordinate work within a small team environment.
(i) Communicates effectively with other workers in their work section.
(g) Rigs steel or timber components and/or erects or dismantles same on any site or location either as a temporary or permanent structure and includes the preparation, painting and greasing or otherwise lubricating any structural part either fixed or moving either in the employer's workshops or on the site where the stand or fixture or structure is to be erected, dismantled and/or operated.
(k) Operates a passenger vehicle, handles animals, grades garments, maintenance, pattern making, animal health management, basic stable/animal compound management, operate games/amusement rides, specialised animal care, assistance with animal training, preparation of animal feed and animal care, animal management, maintenance of enclosures and gardens including pruning and irrigation, tour guide duties and presentations to the public, international host required to speak a second language, cocktail or specialised waiter, nontrade cooking, operate a food outlet, bookings and reservations, ordering stock and stock control, basic lifeguarding, security officer monitoring and operating CCTV systems.
B.5 Grade 4
B.5.1 An employee at this level is an employee who has completed appropriate training or has acquired equivalent competency so as to perform work within the scope of this level. Work performed at this level will be trade level or equivalent.
B.5.2    An employee at this level includes:
(a) An employee who holds a trade certificate or tradespersons rights certificate as an:
•Engineering tradesperson (electrical/electronic)-Level I;
•Engineering tradesperson (mechanical)-Level I;
•Engineering tradesperson (fabrication)-Level I, or equivalent;
(b)       Technical/ Trade Qualified maintenance person;
(c)       Craftsperson;
(d)       Exhibition technician; and
(e)Interpreter.
B.5.3 Such an employee will possess the following skills and may be required to perform the following duties:
(a) Is able to exercise the skills and knowledge of the engineering trade so as to enable the employee to perform work within the scope of this level or possesses the skills, experience, knowledge, responsibility, expertise and competency to perform work at the trade level.
(b)       Understands and applies quality control techniques.
(c)       Exercises good interpersonal and communications skills.
(d)       Exercises higher level keyboard skills.
(e)       Exercises discretion within the scope of this classification level.
(f) Performs work under limited supervision either individually or in a team environment.
(g)       Performs non-trade tasks incidental to their work.
(h) Performs work that while primarily involving the skills of the employee's trade is incidental or peripheral to the primary task and facilitates the completion of the whole task. Such incidental or peripheral work would not require additional formal technical training.
(i) A person qualified b a trade required by the employer engaged in or in connection with in-house preparation, loading or unloading, marking out, carpet laying, fabrication, installation, erection or dismantling.
(j) Works from complex instructions and procedures and has a thorough understanding of the employer's internal policies and procedures relating to their department.
(k)Is able to provide training for other employees within their specific area of responsibility for skill development.
(l) Is able to co-ordinate work in a team environment or work individually under general supervision.
(m)      Is accountable for their own work at trade level or equivalent.
(n) Has a thorough knowledge of the health and safety procedures relating to work within their department.
(o) Is able to exercise good interpersonal and communication skills in dealing with other workers.
(p) Performs lower-level tasks incidental to their work or which facilitate the completion of the whole task. Such incidental or peripheral work would not require additional formal technical training.
(q) Has worked or studied in a relevant field for a significant time to ensure competence to undertake and advise on a full range of normal requirements for the work and has the ability to perform a variety of activities involving special or unusual features of the work.
(r) Trade qualified cooking, food production, senior security officer, trade qualified maintenance (i.e. plumbing, spray painting, construction work) designs costumes and production, liaise with agencies, staff recruitment, menu planning, animal training, medication of animals, plantation management, animal education duties, management of a food outlet, cleaning operators, projectionist, bar supervisor, maitre d', greenkeeping, specialised performers and advanced lifeguarding.

As to Flori’s involvement in both the ongoing underpayment of Harper and the taking of adverse action against her, the Court has had regard to Flori’s shameful involvement in the purposeful mischaracterization, in the 16 November 2020 committee minutes, that it had only “recently” come to the committee’s attention that Harper had been underpaid. The relevant part of those 16 November 2020 committee minutes relating to Harper were as follows: [41]
Wages
Following Kate's representations to the Club's Treasurer, and on the advice of the Club's Accountant, it was recently revealed that the Committee is obliged by law to pay Kate a wage. This being the case, a package has been developed that is demonstrably fair, in line with the National Employment Standard, and aligns with the Manager's role at the Gold Coast Pistol Club. Although Kate had proposed she be employed under the Licensed Clubs Award, this award was not relevant to this Club or to Kate's qualifications. An Employee Performance Sub-Committee, comprising LS, RM and VM, has been formed to manage the transition from the current arrangements to a contract. After some discussion by the remaining Committee members (JM and RC had left the meeting by this time), it was agreed that, with Kate's duties and qualifications, she should be entitled to the hourly rate of $24.39 with additional percentages and multiples for work hours on Saturdays and Sundays. Any contract agreed upon will include compulsory participation in a Performance Appraisal and Review process, in line with modern Human Resources practices. The Manager's current accommodation has been assessed by PRO Real Estate at a weekly rental of between $225 and $250 per week, which does not include utilities and Wi-Fi related accesses. A Letter of Offer is to be prepared and presented to Kate by the Sub-Committee on Saturday 21 November. This will outline that weekly rent is to be $275 a week including electricity/gas and water charges ($20), Wi-Fi including Foxtel ($20), and private use of telephone ($10). All other payments, incentives, allowances, concessions and considerations are to cease as of 1 January or sooner as the contract to be offered to Kate takes effect.
(Bold Inserted)
[41] See annexure VJC 47 to the affidavit of Clough filed on 23 December 2022 at pp. 4735 – 4742, especially
at p. 4741.
Flori signed off on the November minutes as being accurate, as he did in respect of the committee meeting minutes for December 2020. [42] The relevant discussion relating to Harper’s underpayment of wages as recorded in the December 2020 committee meeting minutes was as follows:
[42] See annexure VJC 47 at pp. 4749 – 4755.
General business
Wages
At the November meeting the Committee agreed on an amount for a wages package to be offered the Manager. This offer was put to Kate Harper on 21 November by the Employee Review Sub-Committee (RM, LS and VM) and a letter of offer signed by Kate which she subsequently withdrew on 26 November. Kate maintains that she should be engaged under the Registered Clubs Award, however SF said this award was not applicable to the Gold Coast Pistol Club, which does not meet the definition of a licensed club, or to Kate who does not meet the criteria of a club manager, nor have the requisite qualifications of a manager, under the award. SF raised the issue of Kate lobbying four Committee members for support and telling members that she is in charge of the Club and not the Committee. It was proposed that, before Kate commences working under a new contract, she be paid out for her current leave entitlements. As records were destroyed in the 2012 flood, there are no wage records or leave records. However, it was felt that $10,000 would be a generous amount to acquit her current leave entitlements and a motion to this effect was proposed. Moved: SF. Seconded: RM. Carried. A final employment offer is to be provided to Kate on 17 December and this offer will expire at 5pm on 23 December.
(Bold Inserted)
The Court accepts the affidavit evidence of Illingworth that he had had numerous conversations with Craig from as early as 2009, and later Steve Flori, concerning Kate’s wages falling short of what was required to be paid to her under the relevant award. [43] The Court further accepts that by an email sent by Robert Craig to Steve Flori at 15.53 pm on 15 December 2016, Craig explicitly raised the issue of the underpayment of Harper’s wages with him as follows: [44]
[43]          See para 2 of affidavit of Illingworth filed on 12 March 2023.
[44]          CB pp. 576 – 578 being annexure KH-2 at pp. 285 – 287 of Harper affidavit filed on 5 February 2023.
“Hi Steve
Kate raised the question of her wage at the club. She has come up with some figures as a starting point. See attachment.
I pointed out that expecting the club to pay what she currently receives plus tax payable, rent and what she is receiving from the pension is double dipping.
Based on Fair Work Ombudsman level 4 Club manager income under $500,00 and over 21 the award is $854.60 per week $44,439 a year. (There are many awards that Kate may qualify for).
Kate indicated she would accept this but we would need to work out rent payable.
Holiday pay, super etc. would be as per award.
We also pay dog insurance and food, plus cash for promotional shoots.
Kate’s goal is to receive the highest wages from the club, but still qualify for a Health Care Card.
Current Wages Approx. $33,000 not including extras
Award  $44,439
Wants   $62,400
In theory, we are giving Kate an $11,439 pay rise rather than $29,400 she is looking for.
I feel this is fair for all parties if we go with Contract based wage package for several reasons.
1.Who else will do the job for the same price considering the number of hours to a similar standard?
2.The Club is currently legally exposed
3.Kate’s bonus will increase with firearms sales.
The downside of this is
1.Other people working at the Club may feel they should be paid more?
2.With bonus removed, Kat may not feel she needs to work as hard
If we do go ahead start date 1^st January 2018. We can back date paperwork after January committee meeting if necessary. Damien from APS (Auditors) will oversee to ensure the club is not exposed.
Looking for your thoughts.
Robert”
(Bold and Underlining Inserted)
Steve Flori replied to Craig’s email at 4.14 pm (16.14 pm) on the same day, asking Craig to keep the contents of their respective correspondence confidential. The email was as follows:
“From: Steve Flori <[email protected]>
Date: 15 December 2016 at 4:14:37 pm AEST
To: Robert Craig – Gold Coast Pistol Club <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Kates Wages
My initial thoughts are putting Kate on wages will reduce incentive as she gets older to perform in areas where she currently receives commission. We will be replacing her ‘commissions’ with a wage at least in part.
Can we keep this confidential, ie do not discuss this further with Kate, at the time until I can sit down with you in person and work through it
Cheers
Sent from my iPad”
(Bold Inserted)
By reason of the ongoing failure on the part of the Club to properly pay Harper what was duly payable to her at law after 15 September 2017, the Court finds that such conduct evidenced a systematic pattern of poor behaviour which constituted a serious contravention of the provisions of s. 557A of the FWA. Such conduct continued for the whole of the period from 15 September 2017 until 7 July 2021. The Club’s contravention was at the more serious end of the scale.
Harper’s acquiescence
During her cross-examination concerning whether she had raised the issue of her wages as early as 2006 with any of the directors / members of the Club committee, Harper’s evidence was as follows: [45]
But you didn’t ask to get paid, did you?---No, I didn’t.
So you were there as a volunteer.
HIS HONOUR: I’m sorry, when you say, no, you didn’t, what do you mean by that?---I thought they would pay me. I – I was given the job as the administrator, and I was told it was for full time. At that time I was still getting the $250. I thought once I had been given the administrator role, it was noted in publications that I was the new administrator; it was full time, and full-time employment to me is you get paid, but I didn’t know how to broach the subject to – to get the wage. So I kept hoping that, yes, it would happen. In 2008, when Robert Craig became the treasurer, he discussed it with Bob Schukraft and they said, yes, they would look into it, and they would fix it. So I was quite happy to keep going like I was going, because they were going to fix it. And then in 2009, John Illingworth talked to Bob Schukraft again about my wages, and again, “Yes, we will fix it.” And – so I just kept going, knowing that I had known these people for a long time and they were going to fix it. I think in 2013, even Rick Flori was asked to look at my wages. Robert - - -
[45] Transcript of 21 August 2024 at p. 244.27 – .43.
The Court finds that from 2009 – 2010 onwards, Harper knew that she had an enforceable right to bring a claim against the Club for not being paid under an Award. After that time, she was regularly raising the issue of the underpayment of her wages with committee members, most notably Craig. The Court finds, however, that Harper took no step to enforce any of her rights until the commencement by her of the current proceeding. She sat on her heels.
The Court finds that in circumstances where Harper knew that she had a legal entitlement to enforce her rights concerning underpayment for work performed by her on behalf of the Club, and where she took no steps to enforce those rights, she had acquiesced in the wrong which she claimed had been committed against her, thereby extinguishing her right to claim that the acts of the Club in failing to pay her appropriately were unconscionable.
The Cottage
Annexure VJC 51 to the affidavit of Mr Clough at pp. 4805 – 4808 filed on 23 December 2022 was a copy of the minutes of the management committee meeting of the Club held on 17 December 2018. Present at that meeting were Steve Flori (President), Lisa Stubbs (Secretary), Robert Craig (Treasurer) and Committee Members Peter Roper, Barry Hollingsworth and Bruce Brown.
As was the case in relation to other minutes of management committee meetings disclosed by the Club pursuant to orders of the Court requiring such disclosure, annexure VJC 51 set out the Club’s then financial position under the heading “Treasurer’s Report”.
Under the heading “General Business”, the question of Harper’s ongoing occupation of the Club Cottage after her retirement was relevantly recorded in the minutes as follows:
“Kate’s retirement residence
This discussion of arrangements for Kate’s retirement and the possibility of her remaining at the Club as an on-site caretaker and during the transition of a new Manager followed on from previous Committee meetings. It was proposed that, upon retirement, the Club Manager be retained as the on-site premises caretaker and be provided with on-site accommodation at a rate to be determined based on market assessment and the determination of the Committee. Moved: RC. Seconded: PR. Carried.”
The Court accepts as truthful Harper’s pleaded case, at [18] – [21] of the SOC, namely that in or about 2007 it was agreed that in consideration of Harper assuming the additional duties as caretaker, she would be provided accommodation at the Club’s premises, at a cost of $100 per week. So much was not in dispute at trial.
In December 2018 the accommodation agreement was varied in the terms as expressed in the minutes of the December 2018 committee meeting last referred to. The Court accepts as truthful that evidence of Harper as set out at [48] – [58] of her affidavit filed on 4 August 2021. [46] Such evidence was as follows:
[46] Affidavit of Harper filed on 4 August 2021 in support of an interlocutory application for an injunction
seeking orders that the respondents be restrained from interfering with Harper’s quiet enjoyment and
occupation of the Cottage pending the final determination of the subject proceeding. That application
was heard before His Honour Judge Vasta on 20 October 2021.
Purported variation of the Right to Live in the Cottage for Life
48. On about 17 December 2020, some ten years after being granted the right to live in the Cottage for my life and paying $100 a week for that right, the Pistol Club, through the Third Respondent, Fourth Respondent and Ninth Respondent, handed to me an 'offer of employment contract' which included the following clause:
Accommodation and amenities:
The Club offers your ongoing periodic residential tenancy as part of your contract if you decide to remain in residence on the Club's premises:
Rental weekly inclusive of utilities: $275 per week.
49. The offer of employment contract is referred to in paragraph [8] of this affidavit.
50. I was aware that in around early December 2020, the Pistol Club had engaged a real estate agent from PRO Realty who attended the Cottage to undertake a rent assessment. The realter who attended said to me during that attendance words to the effect that the dwelling "was worth $200 per week all up”.
51. I did not appreciate the words "periodic tenancy" stated that the employment contract sought to vary my right to live in the Cottage for my life that was agreed to with me in 2010, and I thought that the only change to my occupation of the Cottage was an increase in the weekly rent and utilities.
52. I was not provided with a residential tenancy agreement or any written document besides the 'offer of employment contract'.
53. At the time that the 'offer of employment' was provided to me I was informed by the Third Respondent that the offer was the final offer that would be made to me. A copy of the email from the Third Respondent to me that stated the offer to be a final offer is at pages [3] to [4] of Exhibit "KH-1 ".
54. I understood the reference to final offer to mean that if I did not accept the offer, I would be immediately terminated.
55. Later on or around 6 January 2021 I executed the 'offer of employment'.
Notice to Leave
56. On 25 June 2021 and when the Pistol Club terminated my longstanding employment, the Pistol Club also provided to me a Notice to Leave (Form 12). A copy of the letter dated 25 June 2021 and the Notice to Leave (Form 12) is located at pages (5) to [7] of Exhibit "KH-1 ".
57. The Notice to Leave stated that my tenancy was terminated because my employment with the Pistol Club was terminated and that I was required to vacate the Cottage by 4 August 2021.
58. I was surprised when I received the Notice to Leave as I believed my occupation of the Cottage was not dependant on my continued employment with the Pistol Club and as I have never signed any agreement to periodically reside at the Cottage.
…
The Court finds that Harper has made out her case in relation to the “New Contract” as pleaded at [41] – [41A] of the SOC. Paragraphs [41] – [41A] of the SOC were as follows:
41. On around 2 January 2021, the Applicant and the Pistol Club entered into a new contract of employment (the New Contract).
41A The New Contract relevantly contained terms to the following effect:
41A.1 The Applicant’s job title would be “Club manager and caretaker”;
41A.2 The Applicant would be paid an hourly wage of $24.39 and additional percentages and multiples for work hours on Saturdays and Sundays as set out in the New Contract.
41A.3 The Applicant’s normal hours of work would be 38 hours per week being 7:30 am to 5:00 pm on Wednesday, 7:30 am to 4:00 pm on Thursday and Friday, 7:30 am to 3:00 pm on Saturday and 8:00 am to 2:30 pm on Sunday.
41A.4 The commencement date of the contract would be 6 January 2021.
41A.5 The termination date of the contract would be 6 months after the commencement date.
41A.6 The Applicant’s occupation of the Cottage would be an ongoing periodic residential tenancy at the rate of $275 per week.
(Strikethroughs omitted)
The Court finds that the Committee’s action which resulted in Harper signing the written contract of employment in early January 2021 was a calculated prelude to her ultimately having her employment terminated, as it was, on 7 July 2021. It was also part of that calculated plan of action that the termination of Harper’s employment would necessarily result in her contemporaneous eviction from the Cottage on the basis that her role as the Club’s caretaker was also terminated.
The Court is not satisfied that Harper was granted any proprietorial interest, either at law or in equity, in the nature of a life tenancy entitling her to occupy the Cottage until she died. The Court finds that the enforceable agreement between Harper and the Club relating to her occupation of the Cottage was that in the nature of a licence entitling her to occupy the Cottage as long as she performed the duties of the Club’s caretaker. The agreement was as pleaded in [21] of the SOC, namely:
21. In around December 2018, the Pistol Club and Applicant amended the Accommodation Agreement (Amended Accommodation Agreement) by adding the following terms:
21.1AWhen the Applicant is no longer employed as Club Manager, she will continue to perform the role of caretaker of the Pistol Club for as long as she wishes or is able to for the rest of her life.
21.1. The Applicant would be entitled to live at the Cottage for as long as the Applicant is performing the role of caretaker for the Pistol Club.
21.2. Upon no longer being employed as Club Manager and performing only the role of caretaker, the Applicant would pay rent to the Pistol Club at a rate to be determined by the Committee of the Pistol Club based on market assessment.
Harper is presently aged 78 years, turning 79 years on 23 June 2025. The Court finds that had the Club not taken adverse action against Harper by requiring her to enter into the written contract, Harper most likely would have ceased to act as caretaker on behalf of the Club when she attained the age of 80 years. The $250.00 rental payable under the written contract only slightly exceeded the $200.00 amount which Harper alleged was the amount which an agent told her was the “going rate” for weekly rental of the cottage as at early January 2021. It was likely that the Club would have sought to engage the services of a younger on-site caretaker when Harper attained the age of 80 years, based upon safety and security considerations alone. The Court finds that Harper is entitled to stay in the Cottage until she attains the age of 80 years, provided that she continues to pay to the Club the sum of $275.00 per week for her occupation of the Cottage, and provided that she continues to perform the duties which she had previously performed as caretaker on behalf of the Club over many years.
Conclusion
The Court finds that Harper is entitled to relief under the FWA pursuant to the provisions of s. 545 of the FWA.
The Court has found that the Club failed to pay Harper amounts to which she was entitled under, relevantly, the 2010 Amusement Award, and later under the 2020 Amusement Award, for the period from 26 July 2015 to 7 July 2021. By reason of such failure, the Club contravened the provisions of ss. 44 and 45 of the FWA. The contraventions were ongoing over a long period of time in circumstances where committee members of the Club would have well known and well appreciated that Harper was being underpaid. The Club’s contraventions were serious contraventions under the then provisions of s. 557A of the FWA.
Further, by requiring Harper to enter a new contract, threatening to dismiss her from her employment, and threatening to evict her from her accommodation if she did not enter the new contract, the Club contravened the provisions of s. 340 of the FWA. Section 340 was relevantly a civil penalty provision under s. 539 of the FWA. The Club contravened the provisions of s. 340 of the FWA because Harper exercised a workplace right to complain about not having been paid her entitlements under the Award. Harper has made out her claim as pleaded at [81] – [86A] inclusive of the SOC.

The Court finds that Harper is entitled to be paid compensation for the loss that the Court has found that she has suffered by reason of the contraventions of the FWA. The Court further finds that Harper is entitled to be paid for outstanding long service leave and outstanding annual leave.
Harper shall be entitled to remain in occupation of the Cottage until she attains the age of 80 years, provided that she continues to pay weekly rental to the Club in the amount $275.00, and provided that she continues to perform duties as a caretaker of the Club.
Harper is entitled to be paid interest on all of the claims which the Court has found ought to have been paid to her.
By reason of the contraventions committed by the Club, and the accessorial liability on the part of the second – tenth respondents as found by the Court, the respondents are each liable to pay pecuniary penalties pursuant to the provisions of s. 546(1) of the FWA.
Any amount of pecuniary penalty ordered to be paid in respect of the contraventions of the FWA ought to be paid directly to Harper pursuant to the provisions of s. 546(3)(c) of the FWA.
In the event that the parties are unable to reach agreement as to the quantum of amounts to be paid to Harper by way of compensation and pecuniary penalty, the Court will hear the parties as to what appropriate steps might be taken to facilitate the quantification of such claims and the final disposition of the proceeding.
The lawyers for the parties are directed to confer with a view to providing to the Court, within 7 days, draft declarations and orders which are consonant with the findings of the Court as set out in these reasons.
The Court shall reserve the question of costs pending the handing down of judgment and the publication of final orders in the proceeding.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-eight (178) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Egan.
Associate:
Dated: 11 April 2025
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES

BRG 311 of 2021

Fourth Respondent LISA-JANE STUBBS

Fifth Respondent

JONATHAN MOORE

Sixth Respondent

VICKI GAYE MCKENNA

Seventh Respondent

DOROTHY LESLEY JAMES

Eighth Respondent

OWEN MORRIE MCKENNA

Ninth Respondent

ROSS MCNIVEN

Tenth Respondent

SAMUEL ROBERT REYNOLDS

Arunatilaka [2024] FCA 918 at [47].

File number(s):	BRG 311 of 2021
Judgment of:	JUDGE EGAN
Date of judgment:	11 April 2025
Catchwords:	FAIR WORK – Whether the first respondent contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 – where first respondent found to have contravened provisions of the Act – whether the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable in respect of the Club’s contraventions – where the second to tenth respondents were found to have been accessorily liable – where the first respondent’s contraventions were serious contraventions – where adverse action found to have been taken against the applicant – Orders accordingly.
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 144(1) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s. 12, s. 14(1)(a), s. 16(1)(a), s. 44, s. 45, s. 46(1), s. 87, s. 90, s. 90(2), s. 117, s. 340, s. 340(1)(a)(i), s. 340(1)(a)(ii), s. 340(1)(a)(iii), s. 341, s. 341(1)(c)(ii), s. 342(1), s. 361, s. 539, s. 539(2), s. 545, s. 545(5), s. 546(1), s. 546(3)(c), s. 550(1), s. 550(2), s. 550(2)(c), s. 557, s. 557(1), s. 557(2), s. 557A, s. 557A(5A) Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s. 95 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)
Cases cited:	Atkins Freight Services Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2017] FCA 1134 Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435 Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39 Danaratna v Arunatilaka [2024] FCA 918 EZY Accounting 123 Pty Ltd v Fair Work Commission (2018) 282 IR 86 Fair Work Ombudsman v DTF World Square Pty Ltd (in liq) (no. 3) [2023] FCA 201 Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd [2022] FCA 525 Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR1 Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2024) 98 ALJR 1021 Ray v Radano [1967] AR (NSW) 471 Russel v Institution of Engineers Australia T/A Engineers Australia [2013] FCA 1250 Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740 Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg & Ors (2016) 242 FCR 505
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	178
Date of last submission/s:	25 March 2025
Date of hearing:	19 – 27 August 2024 and 2 December 2024
Place:	Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr S Wood of King’s Counsel with Mr R Haddrick of Counsel, Ms B Nolan of Counsel and Ms I Hogan of Counsel
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Yates Beaggi Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents:	Mr A Smith of Counsel with Ms B Mendelson of Counsel
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Aitken Legal

BRG 311 of 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:	KATHRYN HARPER Applicant
AND:	GOLD COAST PISTOL CLUB LIMITED First Respondent PETER ROPER Second Respondent STEVEN JOHN FLORI (and others named in the schedule) Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE EGAN
DATE OF ORDER:	11 APRIL 2025

Witness	Affidavit	Transcript
Robert Giles	Affidavit filed on 18.11.2022 para 6 – 11.36	Transcript of 20.08.2024 at p. 133.11 – 140.47
Robert Peter Craig	n/a	Transcript of 20.08.2024 at p. 148.18 – 153.13 and Transcript of 21.08.2024 at p. 185.45 – 196.45.
Kathryn Harper	Affidavit filed on 5.2.2023 para – 69 – 430	Transcript of 21.08.2024 at p. 208.34 – 267.30 and Transcript of 22.08.2024 at p. 292.5 – 316.45
David Chalk	n/a	Transcript of 22.08.2024 at p. 340.38 – 343.5
Amanda Jane Goldsworthy	n/a	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 374.45 – 377.45
Colin John Moore	n/a	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 380.4 – 381.45
Diane Joyce Terakes	n/a	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 410.10 – 412.25
Rhonda Joyce Hough	Affidavit filed on 5.12.2022 para 4 – 12	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 418.40 – 420.10
Daniel Peter Repacholi	Affidavit filed on 12.2.2023 para 4 – 13	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 422.45 – 425.40
Lee Raymond Kernaghan	Affidavit filed on 12.3.2023 para 5 – 14	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 426.30 – 427.40
Jay Ruben John Cleaver	n/a	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 430.30 – 434.30
Howard Stephen Day	n/a	Transcript of 23.08.2024 at p. 438.1 to 442.15
John Murray Illingworth	Affidavit filed on 20.12.2022 para 7 – 19	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 451.15 – 462.15
Sharee Betts	n/a	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 466.5 – 472.35
Lawrence Edward Hinton	Affidavit filed on 2.12.2022 para 9 – 13	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 479.1 – .45
Barry Alan Hollingsworth	Affidavit filed on 21.11.2022 para 7 – 15	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 481.35 – 485.25
Damien Emmanuel	n/a	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 491.5 – 494.30
Mark William Riddell	Affidavit filed on 22.11.2022 para 5 – 13	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 498.5 – 501.30
James Victor Heard	Affidavit filed on 22.11.2022 para – 5 – 9	Transcript of 26.08.2024 at p. 503.15 – 504.25
Bruce Anthony Brown	Affidavit filed on 29.9.21 para 5 – 13	Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 512.5 – 515.10
David Heathcote	Affidavit filed on 18.11.2022 para 7 – 14	Transcript of 27.08.2024 at p. 516.45 – 518.25

BRG 311 of 2021
Fourth Respondent	LISA-JANE STUBBS
Fifth Respondent	JONATHAN MOORE
Sixth Respondent	VICKI GAYE MCKENNA
Seventh Respondent	DOROTHY LESLEY JAMES
Eighth Respondent	OWEN MORRIE MCKENNA
Ninth Respondent	ROSS MCNIVEN
Tenth Respondent	SAMUEL ROBERT REYNOLDS