Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2G 516   

File number(s): BRG 311 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN
Date of judgment: 11 April 2025
Catchwords: FAIR WORK – Whether the first respondent contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 – where first respondent found to have contravened provisions of the Act – whether the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable in respect of the Club’s contraventions – where the second to tenth respondents were found to have been accessorily liable – where the first respondent’s contraventions were serious contraventions – where adverse action found to have been taken against the applicant – Orders accordingly.
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s. 144(1)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s. 12, s. 14(1)(a), s. 16(1)(a), s. 44, s. 45, s. 46(1), s. 87, s. 90, s. 90(2), s. 117, s. 340, s. 340(1)(a)(i), s. 340(1)(a)(ii), s. 340(1)(a)(iii), s. 341, s. 341(1)(c)(ii), s. 342(1), s. 361, s. 539, s. 539(2), s. 545, s. 545(5), s. 546(1), s. 546(3)(c), s. 550(1), s. 550(2), s. 550(2)(c), s. 557, s. 557(1), s. 557(2), s. 557A, s. 557A(5A)

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s. 95

Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Atkins Freight Services Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman [2017] FCA 1134

Automatic Fire Sprinklers Pty Ltd v Watson (1946) 72 CLR 435

Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39

Danaratna v Arunatilaka [2024] FCA 918

EZY Accounting 123 Pty Ltd v Fair Work Commission (2018) 282 IR 86

Fair Work Ombudsman v DTF World Square Pty Ltd (in liq) (no. 3) [2023] FCA 201

Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd [2022] FCA 525

Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 63 ALJR1

Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2024) 98 ALJR 1021

Ray v Radano [1967] AR (NSW) 471

Russel v Institution of Engineers Australia T/A Engineers Australia [2013] FCA 1250

Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740

Westpac Banking Corporation v Wittenberg & Ors (2016) 242 FCR 505

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 178
Date of last submission/s: 25 March 2025
Date of hearing: 19 – 27 August 2024 and 2 December 2024
Place: Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Wood of King’s Counsel with Mr R Haddrick of Counsel, Ms B Nolan of Counsel and Ms I Hogan of Counsel
Solicitor for the Applicant: Yates Beaggi Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A Smith of Counsel with Ms B Mendelson of Counsel
Solicitor for the Respondents: Aitken Legal

ORDERS

BRG 311 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

KATHRYN HARPER

Applicant

AND:

GOLD COAST PISTOL CLUB LIMITED

First Respondent

PETER ROPER

Second Respondent

STEVEN JOHN FLORI (and others named in the schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE EGAN

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 516
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Harper v Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd (No 3), the dispute involved the applicant, Harper, against multiple respondents including Gold Coast Pistol Club Ltd and several individuals. Harper alleged that the respondents contravened provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009, particularly in relation to serious contraventions and accessorial liability for the Club's actions. The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the first respondent had indeed contravened the provisions of the Act, and if so, whether the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable for these contraventions. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the first respondent took adverse action against Harper and if such action was related to proscribed reasons under the Act.

The court examined the evidence provided by the respondents, particularly focusing on the testimonies of the decision-makers and those involved in the recommendation process. The reasoning of the court highlighted the necessity of direct and reliable evidence from the decision-makers to satisfy the onus on the employer, as mere declarations of innocent intent might not suffice if contrary inferences could be drawn from the facts. The court found that the first respondent had contravened the Act, and the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable due to their involvement in the decision-making process and the recommendations that led to the contraventions. The adverse action taken against Harper was also found to be related to proscribed reasons.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favour of Harper on the grounds that the first respondent contravened the provisions of the Act and that the second to tenth respondents were accessorily liable for these actions. The court's decision was grounded in the necessity for direct and reliable evidence from those involved in the decision-making process, ensuring that the onus on the employer was properly discharged. The court's final orders would reflect the findings of liability and the need for appropriate remedies and penalties for the contraventions identified.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

An employer’s onus may not be satisfied by a mere statement that the action taken by the employer was not for a proscribed reason. As was said by French CJ and Crennan J at [54] of Barclay:“[54] … a question arose as to whether the director’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the onus cast upon the employer. In deciding that the director’s evidence was sufficient, the majority in Pearce recognised that mere declarations of an innocent reason or intent in taking adverse action may not satisfy the onus on an employer if contrary inferences are available on the facts.”(Emphasis added) When deciding, for the purposes of s. 361 of the FWA, who the relevant decision-maker was, or upon whose advice or recommendation the decision-maker relevantly acted upon when taking any adverse action, White J in Tsilibanks v Transfield Services (Australia) Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 740 at [121] – [127] inclusive said:[121] My conclusion that the applicant’s exercise of his workplace rights played no part in the decision of Mr De Angelis and the recommendation of Mr Kerswell is not conclusive of the applicant’s case with respect to the termination of his employment. Regard should also be had to the basis for the underlying recommendation on which they acted. If those making the recommendation to Mr De Angelis did so because of the making of the applicant’s First Complaint, Transfield would not discharge the s 361 onus. This is evidenced by the authorities.[122] In Voigtsberger v Council of the Shire of Pine Rivers (No 2) (1981) 58 FLR 239, the finance committee of the respondent Council had recommended that the applicant’s position be abolished. The report of the finance committee was adopted later that same day by the full Council. Evatt J held at 256 that the decision of the finance committee was the critical decision in the case because the full Council had merely rubber stamped its recommendation. Accordingly, it was essential that the Court have evidence from the members of the finance committee so that it could determine whether a proscribed reason had been a substantial and operative factor influencing the decision of any individual councillor.[123] Smithers J addressed the question of principle involved in Wood (on behalf of the Industrial Relations Bureau) v Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1979) 41 FLR 1 at 19 in a context analogous to the present:[19] In the task of ascertaining the mind of the defendant corporation, with respect to the standing down of Mr Kane, that mind may be located in the mind of one authorised officer or of more than one person exercising the executive power of the corporation. It is a pure question of fact where in particular circumstances that corporate mind may be located. In a case where two officers are concerned in the solution of an administrative problem and are working jointly to solve it and decide what the corporation is to do and are working in harmony and in full confidence, the one with the other, the mind of the corporation is to be found in the course of conduct agreed upon between them and the reasons which in the end are the operating reasons for the policy agreed upon. However, as Smithers J went on to acknowledge, that does not preclude the possibility that one of the participants may have as his or her motive an undisclosed proscribed reason for joining in the decision.[124] Gray J also noted the issue in Gibbs v Palmerston Town Council (unreported, 21 December 1987) at 84‑5 when he said:[T]here is still a difficult question of the extent to which the improper purpose of one person may be a substantial operative factor in the decision of another. Clearly, if the actual decision maker simply “rubber stamps” a decision in fact made by another, the purpose of that other will be a substantial operative factor. At the other extreme, if the actual decision maker truly believes the false and innocent reasons advised by the other person, the mind of the decision maker will not be tainted by the improper purpose of the other person. The problem assumes greater complexity when the decision is made by more than one person, as might be the case with the board of directors of a company, and as is often the case when the decision is made by a local government authority.[125] Gray J reviewed and applied these authorities in National Tertiary Education Union v Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [2013] FCA 451 at [25]‑[29].[126] Counsel for the applicant referred to Rowland v Alfred Health [2014] FCA 2. The decision in that case confirms that it is appropriate to have regard to the reasons actuating the members of a selection committee making a recommendation, and not just to the reasons of the ultimate decision maker.[127] Accordingly, it is appropriate in the present case to have close regard to the reasons of those who made the recommendations to Mr De Angelis and Mr Kerswell. This includes their reasons for recommending the restructure which Transfield adopted as well as their reasons for selecting the applicant as a person to be made redundant in consequence of that restructure. The evidence of Mr Rynja and Mr Hall is particularly significant in this respect. Mr Handy did not contribute to the recommendation to Mr De Angelis, and Mr Vigus had only a limited role.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the issue of what evidence was needed to be canvassed in relation to the impugned action taken by an employer, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [41], [44] and [45] as follows:“[41] The question of why an employer took adverse action against an employee is a question of fact arising from the operation of interdependent provisions of the Fair Work Act. These provisions must be construed together in accordance with the principles of statutory construction established by this Court, which must begin with a consideration of the text of the relevant provisions and may require consideration of the context including the general purpose and policy of the provisions.…[44] There is no warrant to be derived from the text of the relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act for treating the statutory expression “because” in s 346, or the statutory presumption in s 361, as requiring only an objective inquiry into a defendant employer’s reason, including any unconscious reason, for taking adverse action. The imposition of the statutory presumption in s 361, and the correlative onus on employers, naturally and ordinarily mean that direct evidence of a decision-maker as to state of mind, intent or purpose will bear upon the question of why adverse action was taken, although the central question remains “why was the adverse action taken?”[45] This question is one of fact, which must be answered in the light of all the facts established in the proceeding. Generally, it will be extremely difficult to displace the statutory presumption in s 361 if no direct testimony is given by the decision-maker acting on behalf of the employer. Direct evidence of the reason why a decision-maker took adverse action, which may include positive evidence that the action was not taken for a prohibited reason, may be unreliable because of other contradictory evidence given by the decision-maker or because other objective facts are proven which contradict the decision-maker’s evidence. However, direct testimony from the decision-maker which is accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the burden upon an employer even though an employee may be an officer or member of an industrial association and engage in industrial activity.”(Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added) On the question of onus, it was said by French CJ and Crennan J in Barclay at [50] as follows:“[50] The following description of a legislative predecessor to s 361 given by Mason J in General Motors-Holden’s Pty Ltd v Bowling remains pertinent: “the plain purpose of the provision [is to throw] on to the defendant the onus of proving that which lies peculiarly within his own knowledge.”(Footnotes omitted) An employer’s onus may not be satisfied by a mere statement that the action taken by the employer was not for a proscribed reason. As was said by French CJ and Crennan J at [54] of Barclay:“[54] … a question arose as to whether the director’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the onus cast upon the employer. In deciding that the director’s evidence was sufficient, the majority in Pearce recognised that mere declarations of an innocent reason or intent in taking adverse action may not satisfy the onus on an employer if contrary inferences are available on the facts.”(Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established