Hans-Egon Bruno Bernhard Metzner v Jaqueline Rita Metzner

[2021] NSWSC 1336

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

Hans-Egon Bruno Bernhard Metzner & Anor v Jaqueline Rita Metzner [2021] NSWSC 1336

Hearing dates:

15, 16, 17, 18 June and 12 August 2021

Date of orders:

19 October 2021

Decision date:

08 October 2021

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Real Property List

Before:

Rein J

Decision:

See [176]-[177]

Catchwords:

EQUITY — Trusts and trustees — Resulting trusts — Presumption of advancement — Property purchased by parents (the Plaintiffs) in daughter’s (the Defendant) name — Consideration of whether the Plaintiffs intended to gift the whole of the Property to the Defendant or retain the beneficial interest, or a part thereof, for themselves — Consideration of whether the Plaintiffs have rebutted the presumption of advancement — Plea by the Defendant, in the alternative, that if she holds the Property on trust for the Plaintiffs, it is only in respect of a life estate for the Plaintiffs — Held: the Plaintiffs have not discharged their onus of rebutting the presumption of advancement, save to the extent of a life interest — Declaration that the Defendant holds the Property on trust for the Plaintiffs for their lifetimes and then for herself absolutely

EQUITY — Unconscionable conduct — Special disability or disadvantage — No special disability or disadvantage

EVIDENCE — Witness evidence — Competence — Lack of capacity — First Plaintiff deposed to two affidavits — Plaintiffs assert that the First Plaintiff lost capacity on account of his diagnosis of mixed vascular Alzheimer dementia soon after swearing his second affidavit — Consideration of whether the Court should make an order permitting the Plaintiffs to use those affidavits pursuant to r 35.2(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) — Second affidavit sworn so close in time to diagnosis that the First Plaintiff’s cognitive function is likely to have been seriously affected — Plaintiffs only permitted to use the first affidavit, but limited weight given to that affidavit

EVIDENCE — Witness evidence — Cross-examination — Rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 — Submissions involving assertions of fact not put to the Defendant in cross-examination

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)

Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

3WJ Pty Ltd and Anor v Kanj [2008] NSWCA 321 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1

Amit Laundry Pty Ltd v Jain [2017] NSWSC 1495 Anderson v McPherson [No 2] [2012] WASC 19 Binetter v Dunkel (NSWSC unreported 28 May 1993)

Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390

Bridgewater v Leahy (1988) 194 CLR 457

Brown v Brown (1993) 31 NSWLR 582

Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67

Cairns v Cairns [2006] NSWSC 364

Calderone v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited [2008] VSC 373

Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242

Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353

Commissioner of Taxation v Bosanac (No 7) [2021] FCA 249

Condos v Clycut Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 200

Cone v Burch [2010] NSWCA 168

Davis v Council of the City of Wagga [2004] NSWCA 34

Dumper v Dumper (1862) 3 Giff 583

Flourentzou v Spink [2019] NSWCA 315

Fulton v Fulton [2014] NSWSC 619

Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336

Hatzantonis v Lawrence [2003] NSWSC 914

Jain v Amit Laundry Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 20

Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352

Martin v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297

Mason v Demasi [2009] NSWCA 227

Mastronardi v State of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 270

Mekhail v Hana; Mekail v Hana [2019] NSWCA 197 Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 32 ALR 153

Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538

Newnham v Wakefield [2002] NSWSC 1152 Pullicino v Burden's Plumbing (Vic) Pty Ltd [2019] VSCA 88

Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367

Royal Melbourne Hospital v Equity Trustees Ltd (2007) 18 VR 469

Russell Caldar v Public Trustee of NSW (Supreme Court of New South Wales, 27 October 2004, unreported)

Saravinovska v Saravinovski (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 128

Schweitzer v Schweitzer [2010] VSC 543

Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1977) 19 NSWLR 219

Strong v Woolworths Ltd (2012) 246 CLR 182

Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317

Woodley v Woodley [2018] WASC 333

Texts Cited:

Brendan Edgeworth, Butt's Land Law (7th ed, 2017, Thomson Reuters)

J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (looseleaf, LexisNexis)

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Hans-Egon Bruno Bernhard Metzner (First Plaintiff)
Rita Elisabeth Metzner (Second Plaintiff)
Jaqueline Metzner (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Ms M Fraser (Plaintiffs)

Mr A Harding SC and Ms L Johnston (Defendant)

Solicitors:
Alpine Law (Plaintiffs)

WMD Law (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2019/362059

Publication restriction:

Nil

Judgment

1. These proceedings relate to a property in Bowral, NSW (“the Property”). The Property was purchased for $840,000 in May 2017.

2. The purchase price (including the deposit) was paid entirely by the Plaintiffs, Mr Hans-Egon Bruno Bernhard Metzner (“Egon”) and Mrs Rita Elisabeth Metzner (“Rita”), but the purchaser was described as Mrs Jaqueline Rita Metzner (known as “Jackie”) and she became, in July 2017, and remains, the registered owner of the Property.

3. Egon and Rita claim that Jackie, their daughter, holds the Property on trust for them and they seek the transfer of the Property to them.

4. Egon and Rita assert that, notwithstanding they had provided all of the purchase money for the Property and arranged for Jackie to be the purchaser, they agreed with Jackie that Jackie would be registered as the owner of the Property on the basis of:

1. representations made by Jackie that this would prevent Jackie’s sister, Marilyn Barbara Metzner (“Marilyn”), from interfering with Egon’s and Rita’s intention to leave the Property to Jackie when they died, and would avoid payment of stamp duty on the transfer of the Property after their deaths (“the Pleaded Representations”); and

2. Jackie’s promise that she would regard the Plaintiffs as the true owners of the Property if they purchased the Property in her name (“the Pleaded Promise”).

5. The Plaintiffs also assert that they agreed to purchase the Property in Jackie’s name on the basis that they would remain the true owners of it until their deaths and that Jackie would inherit the Plaintiffs’ interest in the Property if it was still owned by them when they died.

6. The Plaintiffs also assert that:

1. Jackie made no contribution to the cost of acquisition of the Property and that they “purchased the [Property] for their own use and benefit and that they did not intend to give the benefit of the [Property] to [Jackie]” (see paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Statement of Claim);

2. Jackie knew or should have known that they relied on her “to act honestly, prudently, and carefully in their interests” (see paragraph 12 of the Statement of Claim);

3. Jackie:

1. knew the Pleaded Representations were untrue or was recklessly indifferent as to the truth or otherwise of the representations;

2. alternatively, was mistaken about the matters the subject of the Pleaded Representations;

4. Jackie has taken unconscionable advantage of the Plaintiffs by:

1. making the Pleaded Representations and Pleaded Promise in the circumstances described in [6(3)] above and by denying their interest in the Property; or

2. “accepting the benefit of legal ownership of the [Property], knowing the basis on which it had been conferred” (see paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim); and

5. Jackie holds her interest in the Property on a resulting or constructive trust.

7. Jackie denies that she made the Pleaded Representations or made the Pleaded Promise and she asserts that:

1. the Plaintiffs purchased the Property in her name, told her that they intended it to be a gift to her and intended, in fact, to make a gift of the Property to her;

2. although she did not make a contribution to the cost of the acquisition of the Property, she has made financial contributions to the Property since its purchase, totalling $12,064.02 (see CB 19). It was not, however, asserted that issues of the kind adverted to in cases such as Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390 were relevant in the present dispute,

and that accordingly, she does not hold the Property on trust for the Plaintiffs.

8. Jackie also advances an alternative defence: see CB 20. That alternative defence is that, should the Court conclude that Jackie holds the Property on trust for the Plaintiffs, she only does so for the remainder of their lives, following which the full beneficial interest in the Property vests in her. By that alternative defence, Jackie asserts that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a transfer of the legal title in the Property, as any such transfer would be inconsistent with the trust. This alternative defence is based upon the words that the Plaintiffs say they used in conversations with Jackie (see the Defendant’s Closing Submissions at paragraph 182); namely:

1. Rita gives evidence that she and Egon said to Jackie in relation to the Property (CB 616, paragraph 61 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021):

“It stays ours. If something happens to us, it will be yours.”

2. Rita gives further evidence that Egon said to Ms Gillian Rendall, a director of The Shire Conveyancer Pty Ltd (“the Shire Conveyancer”) who acted on the conveyance from the vendors of the Property to Jackie (see CB 157, paragraph 47 of Rita’s affidavit of 18 November 2019):

“We decided to put the house in Jackie’s name, but it always stays ours. We will pay all the bills. It stays ours until we die. And that way she doesn’t have to pay any stamp duty.”

3. Egon gives evidence that he said to Jackie (CB 83, paragraph 46 of Egon’s affidavit of 18 November 2019):

“OK, if you want to, you can go on the house in your name. But the house belongs to me and mum while we are alive. You have to wait until I kick the can, after that it is yours.”

9. It is important to note that from 2004 to late 2018, the Plaintiffs and their younger daughter, Marilyn, had almost no contact with each other. The Wills dated 2012 of both Egon and Rita left their entire estates to each other but in the event that the spouse died first, then to Jackie. There was a note appended to their respective Wills in which Egon and Rita explained why they had not left any part of their estates to Marilyn: see Exhibit 2.

10. I shall say more about the reasons for estrangement between the Plaintiffs and Jackie later, but it appears that between 2004 and 2017, Egon and Rita had a close and loving relationship with Jackie. In a card sent in 2016, they described Jackie as the “light” of their life: see Exhibit 1 page 12. The degree of affection held by Rita towards Jackie in more recent years is put in issue by Rita’s evidence and I shall return to that topic. What is not in dispute is that in the second half of 2018 the situation altered dramatically with Jackie completely out of favour and by 2019 Marilyn had become the object of the Plaintiffs’ affection and the person who, under new wills made by Egon and Rita (see Exhibit 2) (“Wills”), would receive the bulk of the estates once Egon and Rita had passed away with Jackie to receive nothing from either estate.

11. On 11 May 2021, Marilyn was appointed as guardian for Egon on account of his admission earlier in the year to, and treatment at, Bega Hospital and then Kenmore Hospital pursuant to the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) and diagnosis of mixed vascular Alzheimer dementia. Egon was not, as a consequence of his condition, able to give evidence at the hearing of these proceedings. Marilyn was appointed tutor for Egon on 27 May 2021 pursuant to an order of Darke J. On 30 March 2021, Egon was provisionally diagnosed with mixed vascular Alzheimer dementia and Dr Zhou, the psychiatric registrar at Kenmore Hospital, advised that Egon did not have capacity: see Exhibit 8. I will address the consequence of Egon’s inability to give evidence at the hearing later in these reasons.

12. Ms M Fraser of Counsel appeared for the Plaintiffs. Mr A Harding SC and Ms L Johnston of Counsel appeared for Jackie. I received detailed written opening submissions from Ms Fraser (“POS”) and from Mr Harding and Ms Johnson (“DOS”). After the conclusion of the hearing in June, I received extensive written closing submissions from Ms Fraser (“PCS”) and from Mr Harding and Ms Johnson (“DCS”). I also received submissions in reply from Ms Fraser (“PCSR”) and oral submissions from Counsel at the hearing on 12 August 2021.

13. What has to be determined is the following:

1. Did Jackie make the Pleaded Representations?

2. If so:

1. Were the Pleaded Representations false?

2. Did the Plaintiffs rely on the Pleaded Representations?

3. Should the Court find a resulting trust in favour of the Plaintiffs because they provided all of the purchase money?

4. Is there to be inferred a presumption of gift (otherwise known as the “presumption of advancement”) because Jackie is the daughter of the Plaintiffs?

5. Can an express intention be discerned from the words and conduct of the Plaintiffs?

6. If Jackie holds the beneficial interest in the Property, is that subject to a life interest in the Property for the parents?

7. If the answer to [13(6)] above is yes, how is that to be dealt with?

8. There are subsidiary questions of fact, namely:

1. What was said by the Plaintiffs to any other person involved in the transaction (in particular, Ms Rendall)?

2. Have the Plaintiffs said or done anything after the purchase of the Property which constitutes an admission adverse to their contentions of fact?

3. Has Jackie said or done anything after the purchase of the Property which constitutes an admission adverse to her contentions of fact?

14. Unfortunately, the relations between the Plaintiffs and Jackie have become rancorous and that has spread to some of the witnesses called by the parties and is reflected to a degree in the form of some of the submissions. Ms Fraser, for example, in the PCS, referred to Jackie as a “fraudster” (PCS at paragraph 5) who engaged in “perfidy” (see PCS at paragraph 2) and practiced “deceit and manipulation of her parents over a very long period of time” (PCS at paragraph 102), that Jackie was “doing her best to keep Rita in Hospital” (after Rita’s attempted suicide) (see PCS at paragraph 211), attempted “to control her parents and their finances for her own benefit” and “is prepared to milk her parents for every penny she can” (see PCS at paragraph 275). As I shall outline later in these reasons, many of the assertions made by Ms Fraser in her submissions could not be supported and should not, in my opinion, have been made. Significant attacks on the credit of most lay witnesses were launched and I will have to deal with each of these attacks in due course. I will return to that topic after I have provided an outline of the events which lead to the present catastrophe of family warfare played out in the Court room. Ironically, both Ms Fraser and Mr Harding asserted that much of the hearing was spent on matters that are irrelevant: see DCS at paragraph 2 and PCS at paragraphs 1-3.

Factual Background

15. I summarise the factual background to the dispute the subject of these proceedings as follows:

1. Egon and Rita were born in Germany in the late 1930s and early 1940s respectively and emigrated to Australia in the mid-1950s. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Egon undertook an apprenticeship as a mechanical engineer and, upon completing that apprenticeship, he and Rita incorporated Mer Industries Pty Ltd (“Mer Industries”), by which they operated a mechanical engineering business specialising in cranes. Upon her arrival to Australia, Rita commenced work as a dressmaker and continued in that role until she and Egon incorporated Mer Industries, following which she commenced managing the business alongside Egon. Egon and Rita worked in the business until their retirement in 2016.

2. In the mid-1990s, the Plaintiffs purchased a vacant block of land in Jindabyne (“the Jindabyne Property”). In 1999, the Plaintiffs built a house on the Jindabyne Property and, until 2016, used it as a holiday home. In late 2016, the Plaintiffs moved from their previous property in Bonnet Bay (“the Bonnet Bay Property”) into the Jindabyne Property and continue to reside there.

3. In March 1999, Jackie sold a unit in Miranda owned by her (“the Miranda Property”) but to which her parents had contributed a substantial amount and commenced residing at the Jindabyne Property. In September 2000, Jackie returned to Sydney for a short period and, thereafter, resided with the Plaintiffs at the Bonnet Bay Property until October 2014, following which she commenced residing with Mr Kieran Tynan (“Kieran”, whom she later married) at a property in Port Hacking.

4. In June 2002, the Plaintiffs sold a property that they owned in Vincentia NSW (“the Vincentia Property”).

5. In 2012, the Plaintiffs made the Wills to which I have earlier referred.

6. On 16 September 2016, Egon and Rita are said (on Jackie’s case) to have signed a letter (“the Gift Letter”) advising the St George Bank (“the Bank”) that they would provide an irrevocable gift to Jackie of $650,000 towards the purchase of a property. The authenticity of the Gift Letter is called into question by the Plaintiffs and it was a matter to which much attention was paid at the hearing in June 2021. I will return to the significance of the Gift Letter later in these reasons.

7. In October 2016, Egon fell ill with several significant medical problems. Those medical issues required that he frequently attend St Vincent’s Hospital for surgery and other treatment. The Plaintiffs’ permanent residence at the Jindabyne Property soon became impractical. For this reason, the Plaintiffs enlisted Jackie’s assistance to search for a property in and around Bowral, NSW that they could use as a base from which to visit Sydney when Egon needed to see medical practitioners or receive treatment.

8. In April 2017, the Plaintiffs and Jackie attended an inspection at the Property at which time Egon indicated his disapproval of it. The Plaintiffs and Jackie attended inspections for other properties; however, they did not follow up on those inspections.

9. On or about 20 May 2017, the Plaintiffs and Jackie decided to reinspect the Property after having been advised by the real estate agent marketing the Property that the vendor had lowered the sale price. Upon his reinspection of the Property, Egon indicated that it “was more suitable than he initially thought”: see CB 185, paragraph 40 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020). Later that day, Egon and Rita made an offer to purchase the Property, which was accepted the following day.

10. On 22 May 2017, Egon, Rita and Jackie attended at the office of Di Jones Real Estate and on 23 May 2017, Di Jones Real Estate issued a sales advice which recorded “Jacqueline Rita Metzner” as the purchaser.

11. In relation to [15(10)], there is no suggestion that Jackie was the person who gave the real estate agent the instructions reflected in the sales advice.

12. On 25 May 2017, the Shire Conveyancer was engaged to act on the conveyance of the Property. The Shire Conveyancer had acted on the conveyance of several other properties for the Plaintiffs and Jackie prior to and following May 2017. On that day, Egon had a telephone conversation with an employee of the Shire Conveyancer, Ms Denise Robinson, in relation to the purchase of the Property. The file note made by Ms Robinson states:

“Egon Purchasing for his daughter – will pay deposit saturday [sic]”

13. On 26 May 2017, Egon had a conversation with Ms Rendall. Ms Rendall’s file note of that conversation relevantly reads:

“Ppty [sic] to be occupied Egon [sic] & wife

need to move closer to Sydney

Egon had melanoma

Want to buy in Jackie [sic] name as

she will inherit eventually”

14. A cheque for the deposit was drawn by Egon on 26 May 2017 and handed over to the Shire Conveyancer on 27 May 2017.

15. Jackie executed the contract for sale of the Property on 6 June 2017. Completion of the sale of the Property occurred in July 2017. The stamp duty payable was $33,310: see AF 37. Egon and Rita provided all of the funds for the purchase, stamp duty and legal costs.

14. On 16 June 2017, Jackie sent an email to the owner of a storage facility (who, Jackie asserts, is a friend of Kieran’s), in which Jackie relevantly wrote:

“… Mum and Dad have just purchased a house in Bowral.

…

Address of their new residence is 14 Miro Crescent, Bowral”

17. In February 2018, the Plaintiffs decided to sell the Jindabyne Property and purchase a property in Burradoo, NSW.

18. On or about 12 April 2018, the Plaintiffs purchased the property located in Burradoo, NSW (“the Burradoo Property”) for $1,680,000. As the Plaintiffs had not yet sold the Jindabyne Property, they did not have sufficient funds to purchase the Burradoo Property. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs applied for bridging loans from the Bank and also procured a loan from Kieran in the amount of $84,000, which sum was used to pay the deposit. The registered proprietors of the Burradoo Property were the Plaintiffs and Jackie jointly. The Plaintiffs now assert they are unaware of the circumstances in which Jackie became a registered proprietor of the Burradoo Property. Nevertheless, in contrast to her position in respect of the Property, Jackie has accepted that the Plaintiffs:

“were to be the property owners and if something were to happen to both of them, then the Burradoo [P]roperty would pass to [her]. This was a different arrangement to the Bowral property. There was never any suggestion by my parents that the Burradoo [P]roperty was a gift to me”

(see CB 189, paragraph 63 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020). Ms Rendall sent a letter to the Plaintiffs on 23 April 2018 in which she states “[w]e wish to confirm that you are purchasing the property in the names of Hans Egon Metzner and Rita Elisabeth Metzner and Jaqueline Metzner as Joint Tenants”: see page 2 of Exhibit 5. That letter was also emailed to Jackie: see T280.20-22.

19. Between 12 April 2018 and the date of settlement of the Burradoo Property, the Bank indicated its approval of a bridging loan for the amount of $1,300,000, which left the Plaintiffs with a shortfall of at least $400,000, having regard to stamp duty and other expenses related to their purchase of the Burradoo Property. The loan document issued by the Bank included Jackie as a purchaser of the Burradoo Property.

20. On 22 June 2018, the Plaintiffs, Jackie and Kieran attended a meeting at the Property with Mr Robert Simpson of Loan Market to discuss sourcing finance for the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Burradoo Property. Jackie asserts (and the Plaintiffs deny) that she offered to sell the Property to assist with the Plaintiffs’ finance of the Burradoo Property, which offer was rejected by Egon. The Plaintiffs assert, by contrast, that at, or sometime shortly before or after this meeting, they asked Jackie to sell or mortgage the Property to assist with their purchase of the Burradoo Property, which she refused to do. Jackie denies having been asked to sell or mortgage the Property at that point in time.

21. In August 2018, Rita attempted to kill herself. There is a progress note by a Ms Kemp, social worker at the hospital at which Rita was admitted, in which Rita is recorded as having told her that she and Egon (see Exhibit 7):

“have 3 properties in total, a property in Jindabyne and Burradoo they own outright and a home in Bowral they purchased recently… Rita states they put the Bowral home in her daughters name and that her husband has stated this is the daughters property now. Rita’s husband has recently become changeable regarding the sale of properties and wanting to retain the Jindabyne home despite their plan to sell due to no longer being able to upkeep the 5 acre property. Rita believes this has been a contributor to their recent arguments.”

22. Prior to 31 October 2018 (see AF 178), Egon contacted Ms Rendall stating that he wanted to sell the Property. Ms Rendall must have contacted Jackie: see [15(23)] below.

23. On 31 October 2018, Jackie wrote a letter to Egon (“the October Letter”), which contained the following relevant passage:

“On 29^th October, I received an email from Gillian at Shire Conveyancing that you want to sell [the Property]. This property was put in my name by both of you. Dad you repeatedly said to me that this property is not to be sold you made me promise this to you. So why would you go behind my back and try and sell it with no attempt to discuss this with me (I recall that both of you told Uncle John & Aunty Erika when they visited Bowral that the House was purchased for me thus securing my future). …

Selling Bowral has implications:

If you want the title deed in your name, costs associated with this are approximately $500 for new Title Deed; $42,000 in Stamp Duty and then legal fees. Potentially you could also lose your pension for both yourself and Mum as you will then be in receipt of 3 properties. You could explain Jindabyne as Primary and that it is up for sale and that you have purchased Burradoo as your new residential property! I am not a Lawyer, so you will need to double check this.

This could have implications of Capital Gains Tax and Land Tax to what extent I’m not sure.”

24. On 5 November 2018, Jackie wrote a further letter to Egon (“the November Letter”), which contained the following relevant passage:

“Regarding [the Property], please advise me when it is empty and I will put it on the market and take the time to spruce it up for sale. Once it is sold, funds need to be allocated for repayment of out of pocket costs for [the Burradoo Property] and any other out of pocket expenses for [the Property]. The balance of the funds then will need to be discussed.”

25. The Plaintiffs sold the Burradoo Property on 30 November 2018 for $1,480,000, i.e. at a loss.

26. On 17 December 2018, Ms Rendall wrote to Egon and Rita concerning the proposed sale and the need to obtain a new Certificate of Title: see AF 188.

27. On 9 January 2019, Egon wrote to Ms Rendall confirming that the Property was not for sale but requesting a transfer of the Property into his and Rita’s name: see AF 188A. He asserted that he and Rita had nominated Jackie as the “property carer” until their death at the request of Jackie and that since they are still alive, “the goods bought and paid by us are under our control”.

28. Ms Rendall replied to Egon and Rita in a letter dated 16 January 2019, in which she stated:

“You initially verbally requested the property be sold we advised that Jaqueline had to agree as the property is in her name, she has agreed although your recent letter advises you no longer wish to sell.

…

No one has denied you have a claim on the property it is the legalities to change the property into your name that will cost money.

In regards to the current original title deed for the above property which appears to be missing. We provided the original deed to Jaqueline the legal owner who advised she provided it to you.”

(emphasis added)

Reference is made to the need for various documents to apply for a new title deed, including:

“3. Application form and statutory declaration which we can prepare once we have formal clear instructions and payment. Jaqueline has agreed to sign once they are prepared”

16. I have referred to the sale of the Burradoo Property. I think it is clear from the evidence that the purchase of the Property became a source of tension between Egon and Rita. Rita was keen to move to the Burradoo Property (see T83.30-43) and a sale of the Jindabyne Property would have provided the funds to purchase the Burradoo Property. However, although he may have agreed with that course of action initially, Egon, it appears, later refused to sell the Jindabyne Property. He had always intended that he and Rita would move in the Jindabyne Property when he retired: see CB 82, paragraphs 19 and 20 of Egon’s affidavit of 18 November 2019. According to hospital notes that are in evidence, Rita told medical staff that Egon wanted “to see out his remaining days in Jindabyne”: see Exhibit 7 at page 75; see also T337.16-17. In his affidavit, Egon says that “Jindabyne… did not sell”, but see T70.25-T71.8.

17. The tension over the Burradoo Property move escalated to the point where Rita decided that she would leave Egon and return to live in Germany. She then, in August 2018, attempted suicide, which led to her hospitalisation in a psychiatric ward for twelve days.

18. In relation to some of these items, the following explanations were given by witnesses in their affidavits or oral evidence:

1. In relation to [15(28)] above, in her affidavit of 1 June 2021 (at paragraph 23), Ms Rendall explains her statement that “[n]o one has denied you have a claim on the property it is the legalities to change the property into your name that will cost money” by deposing to the following (see CB 464):

“[That sentence] is inconsistent with my clear recollection of my impression at the time I undertook the conveyance of the Property, namely that Hans-Egon and Rita intended the Property to be Jackie’s.”

She also said that her comment was not made on the basis of instructions from Jackie: see T273.8-15.

2. In relation to [15(16)] above, Jackie claims that her parents told her that she should not tell Kieran about the purchase of the Property and she asserts that she “worded the email in this way to ensure it was not disclosed to Kieran that the Bowral property was purchased for [her]”: see CB 202, paragraph 122(52) of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020. Rita asserts, in contrast, that neither she, nor Egon, asked:

“Jackie not to tell Kiernan [sic] that the house was purchased in her name. Jackie asked us not to tell Kieran”

(see CB 615, paragraph 52 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021).

3. In relation to [15(24)] above, in her affidavit of 18 February 2021 (at paragraph 46: see CB 427-428), Jackie seeks to explain the final sentence of this extract, and undermine its importance, by deposing to the following:

“I was suffering from an emotional breakdown at the time of writing the letter as I could not understand why my parents stopped talking to me, why my mother wanted to take her life or why my parents were regularly arguing. I met with a Psychologist around the time I wrote the letter as my parents’ behaviour resulted in me feeling overwhelmed. I wrote the words “the balance of the funds will then need to be discussed” in the hope that these words would prompt them to talk to me or provide me with some information that would explain their actions.”

The Key Disputed Conversations

19. The Plaintiffs and Jackie respectively assert that several key conversations took place around the time of the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property. The conversations relied upon by the Plaintiffs are as follows:

1. Egon deposes to the following conversations which he says took place at the real estate agent’s office at the time of his and Rita’s purchase of the Property (see CB 83, paragraphs 41-42 and 44-46 of the affidavit of Hans-Egon Bruno Bernhard Metzner sworn on 18 November 2019):

“41. … I said to Jacqueline, “Thank you for helping us.”

42. I said to Rita, “Jackie has helped us so much that she will get it when we die if we still have it.”

…

44. Jackie said, “That’s very nice Dad. But I am worried that Marilyn will interfere in whatever you put in your wills. I don’t want any arguments with Marilyn and her husband.”

45. … [Jackie] said, “Can’t I put my name on the property now. Otherwise after you die, I will have to pay money again. It will cost me $19,000 to put it in my name.”

46. I said, “OK, if you want to, you can go on the house in your name. But the house belongs to me and mum while we are alive. You will have to wait until I kick the can, after that it is yours.””

(emphasis in original)

2. Rita deposes that the following conversations took place:

1. Whilst at a meeting with Egon, Jackie and Ms Rendall at the offices of the Shire Conveyancer (see CB 157, paragraphs 47-48 of Rita’s affidavit of 18 November 2019):

“47. Egan [sic] said to [Ms Rendall], “We decided to put the house in Jackie’s name, but it is always [sic] stays ours. We will pay all the bills. It stays ours until we die. And that way she doesn’t have to pay any stamp duty.”

48. Jackie said, “Don’t worry, I will never do anything to hurt you. It will always stay yours.” She also said, “Don’t tell Kieran. I don’t want him to know.””

She also deposes that Jackie said the following at that meeting (see CB 615, paragraph 59 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021):

“Then I don’t have to pay the stamp duty and Marilyn can’t get her hands on it.”

2. Following the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property, she said to Jackie and Egon (see CB 615, paragraph 54 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021):

“We finally have a place where we can get easily to the doctors.”

3. Also following the Plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property (see CB 615, paragraph 56 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021), Rita said the following to Jackie:

“We are not renovating. This is just a place to stay over. This is not our final house.”

4. At an unspecified time (see CB 616, paragraph 61 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021), Rita said to Jackie:

“It stays ours. If something happens to us, it will be yours.”

5. In the conversations with Ms Rendall, Rita asserted (at T96.45-T97.17) that Egon added the words “[i]f its still there when we die”.

20. Jackie denies that the conversations asserted by Rita and Egon occurred. The conversations asserted by Jackie are as follows:

1. On about 19 April 2017, Jackie and Egon inspected several properties in Bowral. Jackie deposes that she had the following conversation with Egon when they were driving between two inspections (see CB 184, paragraph 36 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020):

“[Egon]: “Jackie whatever house we buy in Bowral will be put in your name as I want to ensure that you have an asset and to thank you for all the years you have helped your Mother and me, helping with Jindabyne and Bonnet Bay properties”.

[Jackie]: “Really, I can’t believe it. Is this what Mum wants too?”

[Egon]: Yes, I’ve already discussed this with your Mother and we both want to ensure that you don’t have any problems with Marilyn and Ross in the future.”

[Jackie]: “Oh my goodness, thankyou!”

[Egon] “We just ask that you do not tell Kieran”

[Jackie]: “Okay””

2. On about 20 May 2017, at the Plaintiffs’ second inspection of the Property, Jackie indicated that she disliked the apricot coloured walls in 5 of the rooms. After indicating her dissatisfaction with the colour of the walls, Jackie deposes to having the following conversation with Rita (see CB 185, paragraph 40 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020):

“[Jackie]: “What colour would you like the walls to be painted?”

[Rita]: “You can pick whatever colour you like, this is your house.””

3. Following the Plaintiffs’ second inspection of the Property, Jackie and the Plaintiffs had the following conversation (see CB 185, paragraph 43 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020):

“[Rita]: “We are excited about the property. Do you like it?”

[Jackie]: “Yes.”

[Egon]: “If we purchase it we are going to put it in your name to ensure that you have an asset and to thank you for being so helpful and supportive to us both for many years. We will be paying for the house and expenses relating to the property because we want to use it to attend medical appointments and for visits to Sydney.”

[Rita]: “If we sell Jindabyne later on and buy another property here, you can always rent the Bowral property out and have an income.””

4. On 22 May 2017, at a third inspection of the Property, Jackie and Rita had the following conversation (see CB 186, paragraph 45 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020):

“[Rita]: “Are you excited?”

[Jackie]: “Of course I am excited. This property needs a good clean up and the Metzner touch to it”

[Rita]: “Well it is your house and you can do whatever you want to it”.

[Jackie]: “One day I would like to redo the powder room and ensuite and I think granite bench tops would look good in the kitchen”.

[Rita]: “Yes that would be nice, but the kitchen looks pretty good”.

[Jackie]: “I agree”.”

5. Jackie claims that on 22 May 2017, at the office of the real estate agent, her mother confirmed that “it is your house and you can do whatever you want to it” and that Egon said that she should put the utilities for the house in her name: see CB 186.

6. On 25 May 2017, Jackie and Egon had the following conversation (see CB 187, paragraph 54 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020):

“[Egon]: “We will pay the council and water rates and utilities while we are using the property to attend medical appointments.”

[Jackie]: “Thank you. Dad as you know I am on income protection and have a lot of medical bills at present.””

7. Jackie asserts (see CB 187, paragraph 50 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020) that at the meeting with Ms Rendall, her parents explained to Ms Rendall “that they put the property in my name to thank me for all my help and that they wanted to ensure Marilyn and her husband would not be able to inherit the property”.

8. Jackie asserts (see CB 187, paragraph 52 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020) that her parents said to her:

“Our intention is to purchase this property in your name. We want you to have an asset in your name. It is our way of thanking you for your help over the years.”

21. I have referred at [15(13)] to Ms Rendall’s file note. Ms Rendall deposes to the conversation that she had with Egon and Rita at that conference on 26 May 2017 (see CB 463, paragraph 10 of Ms Rendall’s affidavit of 1 June 2021):

“[Egon]: “We intend to buy this property in Miro Crescent, Bowral. It will be purchased in Jackie’s name as she will inherit it eventually anyway.

Rita and I can use the property if we need to be closer to Sydney because I’ve got some health issues, I’ve had a melanoma.””

22. Jackie calls in her case evidence from several witnesses as to statements made by Egon and Rita that undermines their assertions:

1. Kieran deposes to several conversations between him, Jackie, Egon and Rita. The critical conversations to which he deposes are the following:

1. On the morning of 23 August 2018, Jackie and Egon had the following conversation in Kieran’s presence (see CB 403, paragraph 16 of Kieran’s affidavit of 1 July 2021):

“[Egon]: “Jackie I cannot thank you enough. Promise me that you will not sell the house in Bowral. It is yours”.

[Jackie]: “I promise that I will not sell it”.

[Egon]: “I know you will look after me”

[Jackie]: “Of course I will. We have always been so close”.

[Egon]: “Yes, that will never change.”

[Egon]: “Kieran, thank you for everything. You are like the son I never had.””

2. On 22 June 2018, at the meeting with Mr Simpson, Kieran had the following conversation with Rita and Egon (see CB 404, paragraph 23 of Kieran’s affidavit of 1 July 2021):

“[Egon]: “This property is in Jackie’s name. It is a gift from us”

[Kieran]: “Okay then.”

[Rita]: “Yes, we wanted Jackie to have an asset in her name and we wanted to thank her for everything she has done for us.””

3. On 28 June 2018, at a second meeting with Mr Simpson, Jackie and Egon had the following conversation in Kieran’s presence (see CB 405, paragraph 24 of Kieran’s affidavit of 1 July 2021):

“[Jackie]: “I could sell the Bowral property or I could put it up as security.”

[Egon]: “No Jackie. This is your house. We do not want you to sell it. We will work something out.””

2. Mr John Metzner (“John”), Egon’s brother, deposes to the following key conversations:

1. On 14 December 2017, whilst attending the Property to celebrate Egon’s 80^th birthday, John had the following conversation with Egon and Rita (see CB 173, paragraph 16 of John’s affidavit of 2 June 2020):

“[Egon]: “We have purchased this property for Jackie because she has looked after us. This property is hers.”

[John]: “That is very nice of you. You are doing a good thing for Jackie. However, it is no concern of ours. We don’t need to know about this. This is between your family. We do not need to get involved.”

[Rita]: “I know. Please do not mention this to Kieran. We do not want him to know.”

[John]: “Okay.””

2. Also on 14 December 2017, in response to a question about the arrangements regarding the Plaintiffs’ use of the Property and payment of utilities, Egon said (see CB 173, paragraph 18 of John’s affidavit of 2 June 2020):

“We are not going to use it full time, we will only use it when we need to. The property is Jackie’s. It is nice to have the option to be closer to Jackie and Kieran, it will also allow us to be closer to you.”

3. Mrs Erika Metzner (“Erika”), John’s wife, deposes to the following key conversations:

1. In December 2017, when visiting the Plaintiffs at the Property for Egon’s 80^th birthday, Egon said the following (see CB 165, paragraph 7 of Erika’s affidavit of 2 June 2020):

“We bought this house for Jackie. This property is hers. Jindabyne will be hers too when we pass away. She looked after the business and the property. Marilyn has not done anything. She will not inherit anything from us.”

2. At an unspecified time, Jackie said the following to Erika (see CB 166, paragraph 10 of Erika’s affidavit of 2 June 2020):

“[My parents] can use [the Property] whenever they want, I do not need to use it now. When I can, I will water the gardens and put essential items in the fridge.”

4. Mrs Sigrid Niemeyer, who first met the Plaintiffs in 1966 and had sporadically remained friends with them since that time (which included a period from the mid-1970s to approximately 2013 in which she did not speak with the Plaintiffs), deposes to the following conversation that she had with Rita at the Property shortly following its purchase (see CB 459, paragraph 7 of Mrs Niemeyer’s affidavit of 29 May 2021):

“[Mrs Niemeyer]: “You’ve got two houses?”

[Rita]: “No. We put this house in Jackie’s name as part of her inheritance.””

Credibility of Lay Witnesses other than Egon

Rita

23. Mr Harding submitted that Rita was not a credible witness and that I should not accept her evidence unless it was an admission against interest, the reasons for which are expounded in the DCS at paragraphs 8-24. Ms Fraser responded to the many points without concession as to any of them.

24. Some of the matters on which Rita was cross-examined were, in and of themselves, of minor importance, but they demonstrate her unreliability. I will give six examples:

1. Egon was hospitalised on 28 October 2016 for a reoccurrence of his back melanoma. Rita was stopped by police and issued with a speeding infringement notice on 3 November 2016 on her way to the hospital, having said that she had to wait for the removalists in Jindabyne before she could head to Sydney. At first, she agreed that she had not travelled to Sydney immediately (see T54.44-48) but by T57.45 she was asserting that the wrong date had been included on the infringement notice.

2. She denied at T56.7 that Jackie had written a letter for her to State Debt Recovery even asserting that Egon had done so, but later admitted that Jackie had prepared the letter for her at T56.50: see also T57.1-7.

3. She denied that she and Egon had received as a present from Jackie a massage at the Golden Door Spa Centre on the Gold Coast (see T50.46-48) but then asserted it was a Christmas present (see T51.5), then denied receiving the Christmas present: T51.7-17.

4. She denied that Erika and John had come to the Property around the time of Egon’s birthday (see CB 622) and cross-examination revealed that they had done so: T107.45-46. She asserted that prior to Egon’s birthday, she had not seen John and Erika for many years (see T108.10-11), but she had, as a matter of fact, seen them in more recent times: see T108.18-35 and see T109.11-T110.26, which also demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining clear answers from Rita about matters in respect of which she had given evidence.

5. She and Egon had, on the occasion of Jackie’s 50^th birthday, described Jackie as “the light of our life” (see Exhibit 1, page 12), but she described that as being years earlier (it was in 2016): see T66.20-32.

6. She says she was not aware that Jackie spelt her name without a “c” (i.e. Jaqueline) and asserted in her affidavit that the correct spelling of her daughter’s name was with a “c”, notwithstanding that she was aware that Jackie’s birth certificate names Jackie without a “c”: T100.9-30.

25. In my view, Rita was not a reliable witness and for the following reasons:

1. The matters referred to in [24] above.

2. On many occasions, she gave non-responsive answers to the questions asked of her: for example, see T41.24-6, T42.38-43, T44.10, T45.50-T46.1, T50.9-11 and T50.17-18.

3. On several occasions, she gave non-responsive answers which involved an attack on Jackie or Kieran: see T54.2-7, T55.23-24, T59.49, T61.4-10 and T67.13-T68.20.

4. She asserted that Erika had told her that she (Erika) had been diagnosed with dementia; an assertion denied by Erika. There was no evidence that Erika had been diagnosed with dementia and nothing in Erika’s demeanour or the evidence that she gave to suggest that there was any truth in that allegation.

5. At T66.2-9, T77.5-T78.38, T92.23-31, T103.10-43 and T109-T110, she gave responses to questions without first having heard the whole question or a necessary part of it by which she could have adequately comprehended what was being asked of her.

6. Rita asserted that the estrangement between Marilyn and the Plaintiffs was as a result of what Jackie had told them: see CB 613, T38.22-42, T43.7-41. The addendum to the Plaintiffs’ Wills contradicts the assertion that it was Jackie who caused the estrangement and that Rita had no direct discussion with Marilyn. The addendum includes the assertion that Marilyn had “divorced herself personnally [sic] by word in 2004 and confirmed from thereon by her actions”: see Exhibit 2 page NTP 14. At T45.50-T46.11 Rita denied informing her family, including Marilyn, that she and Egon had sold the Vincentia Property notwithstanding that, by the letter annexed to her 2012 Will, she cited as one of her reasons for intentionally omitting Marilyn from that Will the fact that Marilyn was, after being informed of the Plaintiffs’ sale of the Vincentia Property, “extreme [sic] furious and accused us that we sold her home”: see Exhibit 2 page NTP 14. In cross-examination, Rita also later resiled from her earlier assertion that she did not inform Marilyn that she and Egon had sold the Vincentia Property: see T46.43-45.

7. At T49.15-16, Rita agreed that she had made only one Will in 2012. That was inconsistent with paragraphs 36 and 37 of her affidavit sworn on 28 January 2021 and a statement from which she sought to resile later in her cross-examination: see T76.41-T77.41.

8. There were inconsistencies in her evidence concerning the other 2012 Will (see T79-T81), which Will, she asserted, did not contain an addendum. Her evidence concerning the creation of another Will in 2012 was unconvincing and inconsistent and there is no corroborative evidence of any such other Will.

9. Rita asserted that the decision to purchase the Property in Jackie’s name was only made at the meeting in Ms Rendall’s office, an assertion not supported by Egon’s affidavit. The documentary evidence, in my view, establishes that the decision to purchase in Jackie’s name was communicated to the real estate agent on 22 May 2017 and was confirmed to Ms Robinson of the Shire Conveyancer, i.e. before the meeting with Ms Rendall on 26 May 2017.

10. I have referred (at [19(2)(e)] above) to Rita’s evidence at T96.46-49 (and see T97.5-11) by which Rita adds words to the conversation with Ms Rendall she says Egon used that were not in her earlier affidavit (and see also similarly the conversation set out at CB 615 at paragraph 59 of her affidavit in comparison to the earlier version).

11. In connection with Jackie’s assertion that whilst she was residing at the Bonnet Bay Property, she had carried out cleaning of the property, Rita denied that was so and said that the Plaintiffs had the service of a cleaning lady, Mrs Walsh: see paragraph 14 of Rita’s affidavit of 28 January 2021. The fact is that Mrs Walsh had died in 1996 (see Exhibit 1, page 24) and Rita, when cross-examined about the date of Mrs Walsh’s death, could offer no date, even an approximate basis: see T67.25-40.

12. Rita professed to have a clear recollection of the conversations that she advanced to support her case but was unable to recall specifics of other events or conversations at the same time. For instance, she said she could not recall what occurred at the meeting with the real estate agent (at which the agent was undoubtedly informed that Jackie would be the purchaser), but claimed to have a good recall of what she said at the meeting with Ms Rendall. Regard should be had to the whole of the transcript from T89.50-T94.44, not as the PCSR seeks to do (at paragraph 17) to just one part of it.

13. There were several exchanges in cross-examination where Rita gave evidence that appeared evasive: see, eg, T78.30-T80.12, T89.10-25 and T107.33-110.34.

14. Rita was forced to admit that her evidence about the visit of Erika and John was false: T112.31-43.

15. At T112.47-T113.3, Rita denied that the Burradoo Property was purchased in the names of herself, Egon and Jackie, notwithstanding that that was undisputed and evidenced by the contract for the sale of that property (see CB 310) and the fact that a letter was sent by Shire Conveyancer confirming that fact: see Exhibit 5; and see also the letters from the Bank dated 12 July 2018 in Exhibit 1 and the documents attached to Egon’s affidavit of 18 November 2019 at CB 132-133.

16. Rita sought to blame Jackie for her admission to, and detention at, a psychiatric hospital following Rita’s attempt at suicide. The admission clearly was a result of Rita’s attempted suicide and Rita’s complaint that Jackie should not have called an ambulance and had her taken to hospital is groundless.

17. Further to the matter in [25(16)], I set out the cross-examination in relation to Rita’s mother at T73.35-T75.30:

“Q. You mentioned a minute ago that one of the reasons that you were involuntarily detained at Campbelltown Hospital was because Jackie falsely told the medical staff that your mother had psychiatric problems.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember giving that evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Your mother did have a psychiatric illness, didn’t she?

A. No, she had a heart problem.

Q. You told the doctors, didn’t you, that your mother had experienced a psychotic illness post menopause?

A. Because we - we escaped from the Russians, and that was normal. We escaped across the border, but she didn’t have a psychiatric illness, no.

Q. I'm sorry, I just asked you, do you agree or do you not agree?

A. I do not agree that my mother had a mental illness, no.

Q. I'm not asking you that. I'm asking whether you agree that you told the medical staff at Campbelltown Hospital that your mother had experienced a psychotic illness post menopause.

A. No.

Q. Do you or do you not agree that you told the hospital staff that your mother suffered from depression?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you realise that’s a medical illness?

A. No.

Q. Do you or do you not agree that you told hospital staff that your mother was treated with electroconvulsive therapy?

A. No.

Q. E-C-T.

A. No.

Q. Jackie wanted to visit you in hospital on multiple occasions, but you refused to see her. Isn't that right?

A. She only came once and she came three times with her father.

Q. And you refused to see her.

A. Yes, I want to see Egon by myself.

Q. And you told her in German, didn’t you

A. Yes.

Q. that you would never forgive her.

A. Yes.

HIS HONOUR

Q. What did you mean when you said that? Forgive her for what?

A. Because the way she treated me for some time before. I had lots of issues with her.

HARDING

Q. She left the hospital on one occasion in tears, didn’t she?

A. I wouldn’t know.

HIS HONOUR

Q. Were you angry at her because you had gone into hospital, into the psychiatric hospital?

A. No, I got angry with her because she always lied to me.

Q. No, I'm just asking you, were you angry with her because you had thought she had put you into the hospital?

A. Partly, yes.

HARDING

Q. I think I asked you before whether you agreed that depression was a medical illness. I meant to say, a mental illness. Do you agree that depression is a mental illness?

A. No.

Q. After you were discharged from hospital, you reconciled with Egon, didn't you? You got back together with Egon.

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And you told Egon, didn't you, that one of the reasons you were detained against your will at Campbelltown Hospital was because of Rita?

HIS HONOUR: Rita?

HARDING: I'm sorry. I withdraw that. I'll start again.

Q. You told Egon, didn’t you, that one of the reasons you had been detained against your will at Campbelltown was because of Jackie?

A. Yes.

Q. And thereafter, you cut Jackie out of your life, didn’t you?

A. Not only - not only - before already.”

18. I have referred to the note taken of what Rita informed the hospital staff member: see [15(21)]. Rita denied not only that she had told the hospital that Egon wanted to remain in Jindabyne, but also that he had expressed the view that the Property was Jackie’s: see T71.10-12.

19. She asserted in her affidavit of 28 January 2021 at paragraph 50 (see CB 615) that Egon never intended that the Property would be bought in Jackie’s name. She admitted at T87.23 that she did know that the Property would be purchased in Jackie’s name but asserted that she first learnt that the Property would be purchased in Jackie’s name at Ms Rendall’s office: T87.25-36.

20. She said at T89.14-25 that she remembers having seen the real estate sales advice but then said she could not remember it. It is clear that that decision to purchase the Property in Jackie’s name had been made prior to 27 May 2017 and whilst it is possible that Egon did not reveal his intentions to her before that, this is unlikely, particularly since they attended the real estate office together. In this connection, Rita admitted she was at the meeting with the real estate agent (see T91.27-35) but at T90.7-8 she said she was sitting in the waiting room.

26. I have difficulty accepting Rita’s evidence as truthful and do not propose to do so unless it involves an admission against her interests or corroborated by an independent witness.

Jackie

27. Ms Fraser in the PCSR made the following points concerning Jackie’s credibility:

1. Jackie had not mentioned her gambling addiction in her affidavit.

2. Jackie had extensive involvement in her parents’ affairs: see PCSR paragraph 28.

3. Jackie was evasive about what she did with the proceeds of sale of the Miranda Property: see PCSR paragraph 29.

4. Jackie must have taken documents from the Plaintiffs’ safe and put them into evidence (without the permission of the Plaintiffs).

5. Jackie claimed in applications for credit cards to own the matrimonial home when, in fact, she did not.

6. Jackie claimed that she had written the October Letter whilst in an emotional state.

7. PCSR paragraph 32 states:

“It is not simply by having Rita discharged to another psychiatric hospital that Jackie sought to keep Rita in hospital. An extended admission was clearly what Jackie was seeking to achieve, by reporting that Rita’s mother had required ECT, and by exaggerating Rita’s behaviours and their effects on Jackie. Jackie described Rita as “cruel and savage” and became teary in an interview with a social worker. And, according to Rita, she brought in enough clothes for a 6-month admission. Rita refused to speak to Jackie, and staff quickly noted her improvement on the ward. Jackie contined to contact the hospital asking for updates on Rita’s mental state. Staff noted that Jackie, and later Kieran, were “allowed to ventilate” i.e., express their dissatisfaction to no real effect.”

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original)

28. I deal with these seriatim:

1. I do not think that Jackie was required to reveal her gambling addiction in her affidavit. It is the Plaintiffs, through the PCSR, who assert that it is relevant because it is said to be unlikely that they would have put the Property in Jackie’s name if they had known. The Plaintiffs do not assert that they did not know of Jackie’s gambling problem and do not say that had they known they would not have put the Property in her name.

2. Ms Fraser did not put to Jackie that she had extensive involvement in the Plaintiffs’ affairs.

3. I do not think Jackie was evasive about what she did with the proceeds of sale of the Miranda Property. In any event, it does not seem to have any relevance.

4. Jackie’s evidence is that she had a number of documents of her parents stored on her computer but, in any event, I do not think this contention is relevant to her credit in the context of this case.

5. I accept that this is a matter of relevance to Jackie’s credit and I take it into account below. I should point out, however, that the point made at PCS paragraph 47 that Jackie did not show herself as owner of the Property whilst technically correct ignores the fact that that document is one from 2016, long before the Property was purchased: see CB 779-781 and 791-795.

6. Jackie’s claim that she was in an emotional state when she wrote the letter has not been shown to be untruthful or refuted by any alternative evidence. If anything, the letter supports that contention.

7. The allegation that Jackie deliberately and inappropriately ensured that Rita remained in a psychiatric hospital after Rita’s suicide attempt was denied by Jackie (see T215.31-33) and I am not satisfied that the allegation is supported by any credible evidence. I have, at [25(17)] set out the portion of the cross-examination of Rita relevant to this.

29. I agree with the DCS submissions that Jackie answered questions directly and without volunteering material that was not responsive. She also was willing to make admissions against her interest and overall presented as far more credible than Rita.

30. There are, however, a number of matters of concern relating more generally to Jackie’s credit and reliability:

1. She admitted that she had falsely described her assets to her bank on several occasions: CB 780, T195-T196 and T197.15.

2. She admitted that she had told her father that she was not in receipt of much income when this was untrue: T224.31-33.

3. She admitted, at T189, that she had a gambling problem but said that it was under control by the time of Rita’s admission to Campbelltown Hospital (T194.30) but at T215.6-21, she was forced to admit that she had a significant problem when she briefly took on a role under a power of attorney for her father and as his guardian in August 2018.

4. Her evidence as to her dealings with the Bank in 2016, 2017 and 2018 was very confused; her claim that she had applied for a loan in connection with the purchase of a property in 2016 was not supported by any documentation produced by the bank. She said that the application was made online (see T194.39) but says she gave a copy of the Gift Letter to the bank in person (see T205.2). The bank did produce a copy of the Gift Letter although there seems to be a contest about who provided that copy to the Bank. Jackie did say in her affidavit of 18 February 2021 that she could not recall what she did with the original Gift Letter (see paragraph 13, CB 423) but in cross-examination, she said she had given the original to her father at the time she photocopied it: see T205.37-38. I found her evidence relating to her attempt to obtain a loan that would enable her to assist her parents complete the Burradoo Property purchase confusing.

5. She gave a false address in the contract for the purchase of the Property and a purchaser declaration to the Office of State Revenue: T176.27-49. Her claim that her parents told her to do this (see T177.1-3) was unconvincing.

6. She asserts (see CB 187, paragraph 50) that the Plaintiffs told Ms Rendall that they put the Property in her name to thank her and because they wanted to ensure that Marilyn and her husband would not be able to inherit the Property. Ms Rendall gave no account of such in her evidence and she also states that she did not know that Jackie had a sibling. If Jackie’s version was accurate, Ms Rendall would very likely have enquired as to who Marilyn was and been informed. This, by the way, is the mirror image of one of Rita’s credibility problems.

1. Jackie’s evidence concerning the Gift Letter and its genesis was confusing: T202-T203.

2. Jackie claims that she handed the Certificate of Title for the Property to her parents to put in their safe. There is no doubt that Egon and Rita could not find the Certificate of Title in October 2018 and the absence of the Certificate of Title does not support the Plaintiffs’ case, so I am inclined to accept that it was not in the safe (see T211-T212) and that the Plaintiffs did not have it in October 2018.

3. Jackie’s explanation for why she mentioned her husband’s wealth to the hospital did not make any sense (see T186.36-47), although it does not appear to have any significance.

4. Her evidence as to how she came to be included as a joint tenant in the Burradoo Property purchase was unclear, although I accept that her involvement was confirmed by letter from the Shire Conveyancer to Egon and Rita: see Exhibit 5; and see T266-T267. One explanation for the Plaintiffs wanting to include Jackie as one of the owners of the Burradoo Property is that which Jackie says Rita gave her; namely, to ensure that Jackie automatically became the owner of the Burradoo Property on their death which would “prevent your sister from having a claim to it”: see paragraph 62 of Jackie’s affidavit of 11 June 2020. That reason is consistent with what Jackie says Egon said concerning the Property and with the addendum to the 2012 Wills.

5. In one of the finance applications she prepared for her parents, she recorded them as the owners of the Property: see Exhibit E. On her case, that was untrue. In another application prepared by her, her parents are not recorded as the owners of the Property: see Exhibit 5 and AF 137-144.

6. Jackie asserted that she had told her solicitor about pressure exerted upon her by a friend of the Plaintiffs, Mr Alphonso Bo (see T231.2-34), but no notes were produced when called for. It is possible that she did inform her solicitor of the “pressure”, but it is unlikely that he would not have made a note or at least given evidence that she did inform him, but that he did not make notes. I should say that I am not questioning Jackie’s assertion that Mr Bo did call her trying to encourage her to hand over the Property. Mr Bo was in Court throughout most, if not all, of the hearing and was not called to contradict Jackie’s evidence.

7. It was Jackie’s evidence that her parents asked her not to tell Kieran about the purchase. It was Egon and Rita’s evidence that Jackie asked them not to tell Kieran. I find it difficult to accept that Egon and Rita had any reason not to want Jackie to tell Kieran about the purchase in Jackie’s name – particularly since Kieran claims that Egon told him he regarded Kieran as the son he never had: see paragraph 16 of Kieran’s affidavit of 1 July 2020.

31. Jackie gave evidence that she provided assistance to her parents both whilst she lived with them (i.e. until October 2014) and from January 2016 to August 2018 during which time she was living with Kieran, notwithstanding that from 2015 and 2016 she had suffered not insignificant injuries to her back and elbows respectively and that she admitted (see T163.33) that from 2017, she could not “do anything that required any heavy lifting and carrying”: see T163.32. On Jackie’s evidence, that assistance included cleaning her parents’ house, mowing the lawns, maintaining the gardens and conducting other general housekeeping duties. It was Rita’s evidence that Jackie exaggerated the assistance she provided to both her and Egon. It is not an easy matter to determine the extent of Jackie’s contribution but it is not strictly necessary to do so because Egon, on his own evidence in relation to the decision to buy the Property in Jackie’s name, said (see paragraph 42 of Egon’s affidavit referred to in [19(1)] above):

“Jackie has helped us so much that she will get it when we die if we still have it”

32. At paragraph 233 of the PCS, Ms Fraser contends that it can be inferred from the limited number of bank transactions on the St George freedom account that Jackie was not present in Bowral more than 7 out of 60 weekends between January 2017 and January 2019. This contention is based on the assumption (not proven) that Jackie always used that particular account whenever she was in Bowral. A similar problem emerges in relation to the attack on Jackie’s credit because she asserted that she had a lot of medical bills: see paragraph 237-8 of the PCS. This assumes that Jackie only used that one account to pay bills – a matter not proven by the Plaintiffs.

Kieran

33. Kieran’s evidence was directed mainly to an account of two conversations with Egon in which Egon told him he had made (or referred to) a gift of the Property to Jackie, but he also gave evidence as to the Plaintiffs’ relationship with Marilyn, Jackie’s payment of expenses for the Property, his loan to the Plaintiffs for the Burradoo Property and the assistance which Jackie gave to her parents.

34. He readily admitted to not recalling particular conversations and events (albeit those were few) and was not shown to have given inconsistent evidence. At times, however, he appeared to be evasive (see, eg, T306.32-34). He denied having told the hospital that Jackie had arranged for Rita’s transfer to a private psychiatric hospital, but the hospital notes show that he did do so: p.52 of Exhibit J. He also gave evidence concerning the loan of $84,000 to Egon and Rita and said that Egon had offered to pay interest. Kieran, however, had not pressed any claim for interest when the money was repaid. There was a further aspect of his evidence that became an issue at the hearing in June. The relevant part of the cross-examination to which I am referring is the following (T306.32-T307.9):

“Q. Mr Tynan, has any of the transcript of the proceedings so far been made available to you?

A. Can you expand upon what you call transcripts, please?

Q. Well, transcript of the court hearings.

A. Yes.

Q. And have you had an opportunity to read those?

A. No.

Q. So you say you haven’t read them?

A. Correct.

Q. Just before court commenced at 10.30 this morning, were you standing out - just outside here, speaking with Mr Groundwater?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you see the young gentleman at the back of the room, Mr Ryan Metzner, did you see him arrive?

A. Arrive? No.

Q. Did you notice that he walked past you?

A. Yes.

Q. And at the time he was walking past, was Mr Groundwater saying to you, “Have you read the transcript for yesterday?” Did Mr Groundwater say that to you?

A. I don’t believe so.

Q. And you responded, “Yes.” Is that right?

A. No.”

35. Consequent upon Kieran giving this evidence, Mr Dean Groundwater (the solicitor for Jackie) and Mr Ryan Metzner (“Ryan”) (Marilyn’s son) were called and gave evidence.

36. Mr Groundwater’s evidence was as follows (T390.16-30):

“Q. And yesterday before court commenced, did you have a conversation with Mr. Kieran Tynan?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Outside court?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what was the effect of that conversation, please?

A. Well, I asked him if he read the transcript of the proceedings from the day before and he said “no, I haven’t read the transcript”.

Q. Had you, in fact, sent him the transcript of the proceedings?

A. Yes, I inadvertently did send him the transcript, but realised that probably wasn’t a prudent thing to have done and that’s why I asked him if he’d read the transcript.”

37. In cross-examination, Mr Groundwater gave the following additional evidence (at T391.6-14):

“Q. Right, and can I put to you that what you said, is as you said, “have you read the transcript for yesterday?”, that’s right? And Mr Tynan replied, “yes, it makes me nervous about today”?

A. He did not say that. He said, “no, he hadn't read the transcript.” Had he said yes, I would've taken different action than - than I had taken.

Q. What action would you have taken?

A. Well, I would've informed counsel, and I suspect that counsel would've informed his Honour. But he said no, and I was satisfied by that.”

38. Ryan’s evidence was (at T419.17-50):

“Q. Now, can I take you to yesterday? What time did you arrive at court?

A. Roughly around 10.30.

Q. And what did you do when you arrived here?

A. I exited the elevator, and began to proceed into the court room.

Q. And did you see any persons?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were they?

A. Keiran [sic] Tynan - Mr Tynan, speaking to his lawyer, who I believe is Mr Groundwater.

Q. And where did you see them?

A. Approximately in the entryway to the court room.

Q. And did you pass them on your way to court?

A. Yes.

Q. And how close were you to them?

A. I was within a metre.

Q. And did you hear some conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you hear?

A. I heard Mr Groundwater asking Mr Tynan if he had received and read transcripts for the previous day.

Q. And what was Mr Tynan’s answer?

A. Yes. And that I was nervous about today. Using - in italics.

Q. That you were nervous about today?

A. No, that Mr Tynan’s mentioned, “Yes, I am nervous about today.””

(emphasis added)

39. Thus, on Ryan’s account, Mr Groundwater asked Kieran if he has received and read the transcript to which he replied “yes” and we have Mr Groundwater’s account that he asks Kieran whether he has read the transcript and Kieran says “no” and we have Kieran who does not think that Mr Groundwater asked him whether he had read the transcript.

40. Mr Groundwater explains that he sent the transcript to Kieran in error treating him as a client rather than a witness (T391.25-31) and not only accepts that he should not have done so, but has apologised to the Court: see T493.43-45. That Kieran told Mr Groundwater that he had not read the transcript was not corroborated by Kieran. Kieran did, in cross-examination, assert that he had not read the transcript (see T306.39-43) and he was not challenged on that but it was put to him that Mr Groundwater had asked him if he had read it and that he had told Mr Groundwater that he had done so: see T307.6-12. There was an attempt in the DCS at paragraphs 71 and 72 to cast doubt on the accuracy of Ryan’s evidence because he is partisan (which he clearly is) and because he was walking past and not a party to the conversation. I take into account both matters but there is no dispute that Mr Groundwater did ask the question that Ryan says he heard, and I accept Ryan’s evidence that Kieran replied that he had.

41. The Court goes to some lengths to ensure that witnesses do not talk to others about their evidence. Mr Groundwater by sending a copy of the transcript to Kieran undermined those efforts and that was entirely inappropriate.

42. I do not know whether Kieran did or did not read the transcript of his wife’s cross-examination. I find it surprising that he did not do so having had the opportunity and his statement (on Ryan’s evidence) that he was nervous about the day does seem to flow logically from such a reading, but this was not explored with him in cross-examination.

43. Whilst I am not able to positively conclude that Kieran did read the transcript, I shall have to approach his evidence with a degree of caution because of the possibility that he did so. I need also to take into account that he has a very close connection with Jackie and hence in the outcome of the proceedings. I also have regard to the fact that Egon, because of his condition, is not able to contradict Kieran’s evidence concerning the alleged admissions.

John

44. John was an assertive and forthright witness who, at times, appeared to be evasive (see, eg, T342.14-15 and T344.42-T345.12) and at other times confused (see, eg, T345.14-T346.31).

45. There were also occasions where John’s recollection of events was poor. By way of example, on 17 November 2019, John sent the following text message to Egon (see CB 606):

“Advice I know you won’t heed, be careful what you will do or you just might end up being bankrupted, your father made bad choices as you no doubt remember. Simply free advice”

46. John’s explanation of the reason for him sending this text message, in cross-examination, was that the Plaintiffs purchased the Burradoo Property and had difficulty raising finance to proceed with the purchase of that property: T345.18-20. This is so notwithstanding that the Plaintiffs purchased and sold the Burradoo Property long before John sent this text message in November 2019 and that John asserted that he last spoke with Egon and Rita prior to Rita’s release from hospital in August 2018: see T345.29-31. It was then put to him by Ms Fraser that the actual reason for him sending the text message was the fact that he became aware that the Property was in dispute (i.e. that the Plaintiffs had commenced these proceedings against Jackie) (see T347.14-15), which he denied in a roundabout way.

47. The reason proffered by John for him sending the text message (i.e. that the Plaintiffs purchased the Burradoo Property) is difficult to accept, particularly in circumstances where he also asserts (which does not appear to be denied) that he did not speak with either Egon or Rita after August 2018. Also of relevance is the fact that these proceedings were commenced on 18 November 2019 (i.e. one day after John’s text message). I am unable to accept John’s explanation for his reason in sending this text message.

48. John also demonstrated a general dislike of both Egon and Rita for several reasons, the most significant of which was, he explained, that Egon and Rita had refused to take Jackie to hospital after she suffered an injury (the details of which were not before the Court): see T341.42-T342.22. Soon after he first became aware of Egon and Rita’s failure to take Jackie to hospital (which event actually occurred many years prior), John sent the following text message to Egon on 1 August 2019 (see CB 607):

“As of this moment the both of you are no longer considered family. We are not even sure if you belong to the human race”

49. Once again, the timing of the text message seems to be closely connected to the developing dispute concerning the Property rather than an incident many years earlier and I am unable to accept John’s explanation for sending this text message.

50. John denied that he had had any help in preparing his affidavit (T352.47-48), an assertion that seems inconsistent with the clear indication that it was prepared by Jackie’s solicitor.

51. Ms Fraser submitted that Erika and John could not be treated as reliable witnesses because they had colluded in their evidence. This contention is based upon the fact that they had prepared identical statutory declarations in April 2019. These were marked for identification (MFI-4); the issue of whether they could be tendered on a limited basis being deferred: T416. Mr Fraser in the PCS (see paragraphs 293-296) submitted, relying on s 60 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (“Evidence Act”), that they can be admitted on a limited basis. There was no submission in the DCS contesting that and in any event, I think Ms Fraser is correct. I have had MFI-4 marked as Exhibit R. It is true that Ms Fraser did not put to John or Erika that they had colluded, but insofar as the statutory declarations are concerned, they were not produced to the Court until after John and Erika had been cross-examined.

52. I note the statutory declarations dated 3 April 2019 are identical in form and content. The reason that they say the Property was given to Jackie was, in the statutory declarations, “to provide a secure future for [her]”, which is different to the reason articulated in their affidavits (see CB 165 and 173); i.e. because “[s]he looked after the business and the property” (see CB 165) and “because she [had] looked after [the Plaintiffs]” (see CB 173). The reason articulated in the statutory declaration is, however, consistent with what is contained in the October Letter: see [15(23)] above.

53. I gained the impression that John was very antagonistic to the Plaintiffs, partisan in his support of Jackie and not a reliable witness. I also think that the form of the statutory declarations induces a real need for the exercise of caution in relation to his subsequent affidavit.

Erika

54. Erika appeared to be truthful in her answers in cross-examination. I reject the inappropriate submission made by Ms Fraser that Erika displayed any indication of dementia in the witness box. I am, however, concerned as to the veracity of her account having regard to the content of the statutory declarations and the difference between the account in the statutory declarations and the affidavit. I note too that Erika, in cross-examination, gave evidence of a conversation to which she had not previously deposed (see T395.20-25) and asserted that Jackie was present. Jackie does not, in her affidavits, assert that she was present at their meeting at the Property. John does not assert Jackie was present.

55. A further point is made in the PCS and PCSR concerning that fact that Erika’s signature apparently appears at the foot of John’s affidavit: see, eg, CB 171. No questions were asked by Ms Fraser about why she has done so, and I do not think any adverse inference can be drawn from the presence of that signature.

Mrs Niemeyer

56. Mrs Niemeyer was a forthright witness who, however, admitted that she could not recall the details of particular conversations or events (see, eg, T136.35-T137.2, and see T144.25-36).

57. At T136.35, Mrs Niemeyer denied having said “I’ve always been on good terms with Jackie”, but that is what she deposed to in paragraph 11 of her affidavit: CB 460. She said in her affidavit that she had been speaking with Jackie on the phone once a week “for some years” but this became for the past 6 months in cross-examination: see T138.34-41. Mrs Niemeyer agreed that Jackie had told her about the case but could not recall the number of times that they had discussed the case: T139.14-37. She also denied telling Jackie that the Plaintiffs were speaking to Marilyn again (T142.14-16) but Jackie’s evidence was that Mrs Niemeyer had told her that: T167.10-13.

58. There was the following exchange in cross-examination (at T144.24-36):

“Q. What I want to suggest to you, Ms Niemeyer, is that you're very much on Jackie’s side I [sic] this dispute.

A. Well, I can’t be on both sides, can I?

Q. No. And, you really don’t have any genuine memory of a discussion that occurred four or five years ago?

A. No, I don’t.

Q. And you can’t be sure - you can’t be confident - that Rita did say to you that we put this house in Jackie’s name.

A. That’s what she told me. I recall her own words, in Bowral.

Q. Yes, being the only words of a two-hour

A. That's correct.

Q. encounter that - thank you, nothing further.”

59. I gained the impression that Mrs Niemeyer was partisan in her support for Jackie and the matters to which I have referred and the admission that she did not have any genuine memory of a discussion four or five years ago is cause for concern as to the accuracy of her recollection. However, Rita did not dispute that Mrs Niemeyer had asked “You have two houses?”: see T114.40-45. Rita denies that she replied as Mrs Niemeyer attests, but Rita gave no evidence as to what her answer was to that question.

60. I should note that Mr Harding pointed out that Erika, John and Mrs Niemeyer are witnesses who gain nothing from the outcome in this case. I take that into account, but they are nevertheless friends and supporters of Jackie.

Ms Rendall

61. Ms Rendall appeared to be an essentially honest witness and I have no reason to doubt her testimony. As the only truly impartial lay witness in the case, and the only person with notes of the meeting which she attended, her testimony is critical in my view.

62. Ms Fraser at PCS paragraphs 245-253 sought to impugn Ms Rendall’s evidence in a number of ways:

1. She drew attention to the fact that Ms Rendall had expressed an impression from what had been said by Egon and Rita that the Property was “a gift to Jackie as an early inheritance”.

2. At T262.11-12, Ms Rendall repeated that she had been told that her instructions were to put the Property in Jackie’s name.

7. The matters identified in [14] above which are, in effect, rolled up assertions of misconduct for which no basis has been adequately articulated.

132. Ms Fraser in the PCS sought to deflect criticism of her failure to squarely confront witnesses with accusations of lies and dishonesty: see PCS paragraphs 214-220. Whilst it may sometimes be unnecessary to positively put to a witness that he or she is lying because it is so obvious from the overall tenor of the cross-examination, Counsel cannot, in my view, fail to put the detail of alleged lies, dishonesty or wrongdoing and then make submissions based on the matters not put to the witness. “Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike” was Alexander Pope’s phrase referred to by Wells J in Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 374 in explaining the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67. In Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 16, Hunt J (as his Honour then was) formulated the rule as:

“It has in my experience always been a rule of professional practice that, unless notice has already clearly been given of the cross-examiner's intention to rely upon such matters, it is necessary to put to an opponent's witness in cross-examination the nature of the case upon which it is proposed to rely in contradiction of his evidence, particularly where that case relies upon inferences to be drawn from other evidence in the proceedings. Such a rule of practice is necessary both to give the witness the opportunity to deal with that other evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from it, and to allow the other party the opportunity to call evidence either to corroborate that explanation or to contradict the inference sought to be drawn. That rule of practice follows from what I have always believed to be rules of conduct which are essential to fair play at the trial and which are generally regarded as being established by the decision of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67.”

133. In J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Looseleaf Edition, LexisNexis), the learned author discussed the consequences of a failure to adhere to the rule noting at [17460] that what follows “leaves aside ethical sanctions” and after considering various scenarios, the closest of which to the present circumstance is at 17,164, refers to Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 at 225 and 237 (“Seymour”). In Seymour, Glass JA (with whom Reynolds JA concurred) said at 225B-C:

“Since the rule is designed to prohibit the unfair conduct of trials, it is obvious that breaches of it may occur in many different circumstances and no uniform sanction can be laid down. Depending on the nature of the infraction, the remedy is essentially a matter in the discretion of the trial judge. In extreme cases, he may feel that it is proper to discharge the jury. More often than not, however, he will conclude that the abuse is adequately dealt with, as on this occasion, by instructing the jury that the offending counsel had engaged in unfair tactics and by authorising his opponent to turn this to his forensic advantage. On appeal, as happened in Browne v Dunn, the Court will be inclinded [sic] to disregard a submission on the evidence which was not tested by putting questions to the party best able to deal with it: Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir (1975) 132 CLR 362 at 370.”

134. In my view, none of the matters identified at [131(1)]-[131(8)] or elsewhere in these reasons, including at [112(2)] and [112(10)], as matters that were not put to Jackie should be taken into account. Consideration may need to be given as to whether there should be any further consequence.

135. I have outlined the difficulties in accepting the Plaintiffs’ case. There are also potential obstacles in accepting Jackie’s version of events which need to be considered as well. In addition to the credit points to which I have earlier referred, the PCS draws attention to the following:

1. Jackie’s email to the storage company (see AF 41);

2. the October Letter (see AF 174-179);

3. the November Letter (see AF 180-181);

4. Ms Rendall’s letter of 16 January 2019, which was not sent on Jackie’s instructions, but which Jackie did nothing to correct (see AF 189-190) and

5. that she had, in a document in 2018, included the Property as an asset of her parents.

136. In relation to item [135(1)], there was no obvious need for Jackie to explain to the storage depot that her parents had purchased the Property for their own use but for Jackie’s long-term benefit.

137. Turning to the October Letter (see item [135(2)]), it is by no means limited to the issue of the Property, indeed, I think it does reflect Jackie’s feelings of concern at what had become a most serious turn of events in her relationship with her parents. The portion dealing with the Property is found at AF 178. By her letter, Jackie seems willing to sell the Property, but I think that it cannot be taken as an admission that the Property was not purchased as a gift because she states:

“This property was put in my name by both of you. Dad you repeatedly said to me that this property is not to be sold you made me promise to you. So why would you go behind my back and try to sell it with no attempt to discuss this with me (I recall that both of you told Uncle John & Aunty Erika when they visited Bowral that the House was purchased for me thus securing my future).”

138. I should also note in fairness to Jackie that in my questions to her at T222.47-T223.20 I asked if Burradoo had been sold by that stage; a proposition with which she agreed (see T233.6) but the October Letter seems to have been written with the understanding that the Plaintiffs still owned the Burradoo Property and it is only in the November Letter that Jackie indicates that she had become aware of the sale of the Burradoo Property. With that in mind, her concession at T223.4-20 concerning the letter is of little, if any, significance. Jackie could well have thought that sale of the Property would permit the purchase of the Burradoo Property to be completed and it is her evidence (disputed by her parents) that she was willing to assist them by selling the Property.

139. Jackie’s willingness to agree in October 2018 to a sale of the Property is not of itself evidence that the Property had not been intended as a gift in May 2017.

140. In the November Letter (see [135(3)] above), whilst Jackie does not assert that the Property was a gift, she does implicitly assert an entitlement to some portion of the proceeds of sale.

141. In her letter to Egon (see [135(4)] above), Ms Rendall wrote:

“No one has denied you have a claim on the property it is the legalities to change the property into your name that will cost money.”

Ms Rendall says she does not now recall why she wrote those words, but I note that she had taken instructions from Jackie prior to sending the letter (but not as to the contents of the letter) and says that she sent Jackie a copy of the letter as sent to Egon: see paragraph 25 of Ms Rendall’s affidavit of 1 June 2021. There is no evidence that Jackie, after receipt of a copy, contacted Ms Rendall about the content of the letter either in writing or orally. I do not accept the submission in paragraph 36(d) of the DCS that the letter could be seen as acknowledging only that the Plaintiffs were making a claim. The difficulty however is that Jackie has always accepted that her parents had rights in relation to the Property, so acceptance that they had a claim in the letter is not inconsistent with her position.

142. Whilst Jackie did, in 2018, include the Property as an asset of her parents in one document, in another document, the only real estate of the parents recorded is Jindabyne.

143. If the Gift Letter is genuine, it provides corroboration of a willingness to assist Jackie in 2016 in connection with the purchase by Jackie of a property should she find such a property and wish to proceed. It is not, however, proof of an intention eight months later to gift the Property to Jackie. I proceed on the basis that the Plaintiffs did sign the original of that letter, but there is doubt as to the real purpose of the letter and I accordingly prefer not to base my conclusions on it.

144. In relation to what was paid by the Plaintiffs and what was paid by Jackie, it is clear that the great bulk of the expenses were paid by the Plaintiffs. Whilst this might have significance in another situation, here, it was clear that it was the parents who would be using the Property so it is not surprising that they would be paying those bills.

145. To summarise the position in relation to the key factual allegations:

1. I accept that the Plaintiffs assert that they did not intend to make a gift of the funds used to purchase the Property, but Egon is unavailable for cross-examination and his evidence could not, therefore, be tested. His assertions are not only contested by Jackie, but his version of events is inconsistent in some respects with Rita’s version;

2. Rita is, in my view, not a reliable witness;

3. There are issues of credit in respect of Jackie as well;

4. There are questions concerning the veracity of the evidence of each of Kieran, John, Erika and Mrs Niemeyer, all of whom gave evidence of what would, if the evidence is accepted, constitute admissions against interest by Egon and Rita made well after the purchase of the Property;

5. There is one lay witness, Ms Rendall, whose evidence I accept and who made a short contemporaneous note of the meeting held with Egon and Rita (and possibly Jackie) concerning the purchase of the Property.

146. I proceed on the basis of accepting Ms Rendall’s evidence as to what occurred on 26 May 2017 and rejecting both Rita and Jackie’s version. Whilst Egon gives no evidence concerning the meeting with Rita, he does give evidence as to a prior discussion with Rita and Jackie. Taking all matters into account, including the significant fact of the absence of cross-examination of Egon and noting the absence of any corroboration by Rita in respect of a conversation occurring before the meeting with Ms Rendall, I am not persuaded that the conversation occurred in the terms he deposes. I accept, however, that he did make clear to Jackie prior to the meeting with Ms Rendall that he and Rita intended the Property to be available for their use whenever they wanted.

147. The factual findings which I make are as follows:

1. Egon and Rita provided all of the purchase money for the Property.

2. Egon and Rita told the real estate agent that Jackie would be the purchaser.

3. Egon told Ms Robinson of Shire Conveyancer on 25 May 2017 that he would be purchasing the Property for Jackie (see AF 31). The decision by the Plaintiffs to buy the Property in Jackie’s name had been made by that date.

4. Egon, on 26 May 2017, told Ms Rendall in the presence of Rita and Jackie:

“We intend to buy this property in Miro Crescent, Bowral. It will be purchased in Jackie’s name as she will inherit it eventually anyway.

Rita and I can use the property if we need to be closer to Sydney because I’ve got some health issues, I’ve had a melanoma.”

5. Neither Egon, nor Rita, told Ms Rendall that Jackie would be holding the Property on trust for them or that they intended that it would only become Jackie’s when they died, and nor am I persuaded that they expressed any such qualification to Jackie.

6. Neither Egon, Rita nor Jackie said anything about Marilyn or stamp duty at the meeting with Ms Rendall.

7. By 2012, the Plaintiffs had long ceased to have any connection with Marilyn and concluded that Marilyn wished to have nothing further to do with them. That was the position in 2017 and it has not been demonstrated to have been caused or even contributed to by Jackie.

8. The Plaintiffs, as at 2017, regarded Jackie as their only daughter and had a close, loving relationship with her. Jackie assisted them in connection with their purchasing of properties and, at least, when asked in connection with other matters such as helping them move houses and typing long letters which required use of a computer (and here, I leave aside the contentious matters referred to in [31] above).

9. By late 2018, Marilyn had found favour and Jackie was decidedly out of favour to the point where, by March 2019, Jackie was no longer included as a beneficiary in the Plaintiffs’ Wills and Marilyn was included as a beneficiary as were Marilyn’s children.

10. I am not persuaded that:

1. Jackie asked her parents to put the Property in her name either because of Marilyn or stamp duty concerns; or

2. Jackie promised Egon and Rita “on or about 27^th May” (or at any relevant time) that she would regard them as the true owners of the Property. The decision to purchase the Property in Jackie’s name was made before the meeting with Ms Rendall and no mention was made to Ms Rendall of any such restriction.

11. It was Egon and Rita’s intention and understanding that they would be able to utilise the Property whenever and for whatever period they wanted, and Jackie understood and accepted that was their intention. Jackie also accepted that she was not free to sell the Property whilst either of the Plaintiffs were alive.

The Pleaded Representations

148. The Plaintiffs have not established, on the balance of probabilities, that Jackie made the alleged representations, but I should note my view that:

1. if Jackie did express a concern about stamp duty implications, she could not reasonably be understood to be expressing a view based on legal advice; and

2. if Jackie did express a view as to reducing the assets in respect of what any future claim by Marilyn would relate, a gift of the Property to Jackie would have removed from the estates an asset and it has not been demonstrated that it was a view she was not entitled to hold or convey.

Resulting Trust

149. I now turn to the principal question to be determined; whether a resulting trust applies in favour of the Plaintiffs. If the Court finds that a resulting trust or some form of interest in the Property applies in favour of the Plaintiffs, then ancillary relief will also need to be considered, including whether legal ownership in the Property should be transferred to the Plaintiffs.

Applicable Principles

150. The principles applicable to the present dispute were helpfully summarised by Tottle J in Woodley (at [63]):

“(a) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a registered proprietor of real estate is presumed to own the equitable interest in it. The equitable estate follows the legal estate and is said to be ‘at home’ with the legal title.

(b) Where, however, a person purchases property in the name of another, or jointly with another, the legal title holder who has not provided the purchase money will only obtain a beneficial interest in the property where that is the intention of the purchaser. This principle was stated by Aickin J (with whom Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ agreed) in Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) as follows:

The law with respect to resulting trusts is not in doubt. Where property is transferred by one person into the name of another without consideration, and where a purchaser pays the vendor and directs him to transfer the property into the name of another person without consideration passing from that person, there is a presumption that the transferee holds the property upon trust for the transferor or the purchaser as the case may be. This proposition is subject to the exception that in the case of transfers to a wife or a child (including someone with respect to whom the transferor or purchaser stands in loco parentis) there is a presumption of advancement so that the beneficial as well as the legal interest will pass. Each of the presumptions may be rebutted by evidence. (citations omitted)

(c) The court is concerned to ascertain the objective, manifest intention of the purchaser not an unexpressed subjective intention.

(d) In ascertaining the true intention of the purchaser the court may admit evidence of the relationship between the parties and their acts and declarations before or at the time of the purchase, or so immediately after it that those acts or declarations constitute a part of the transaction — evidence of subsequent acts and declarations relating to a purchaser’s intention is only admissible as admissions against the donor’s interest. In Glynn v Cmr of Stamp Duties Reynolds JA summarised this limitation on the evidence that is admissible as follows:

The law is clear that the only admissible and relevant evidence (apart from admissions to which I will later refer) comprises the acts and declarations of the parties before or at the time of the purchase, or so immediately thereafter as to constitute a part of the transaction. ‘If that evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption the beneficial gift, absolute or subject only to qualifications imposed upon it at the time, is complete and no subsequent changes of mind or dealings with the property inconsistent with the trust by the donor can as between himself and the donees alter the beneficial interest.’ (citations omitted)

(e) If the relationship between the purchaser and the person to whom the legal title of property is transferred is one which the law recognises as attracting the ‘presumption of advancement’ then there is no resulting trust in favour of the purchaser. One such relationship is the relationship between parents and a child including an adult child.”

(citations omitted)

151. The presumptions can be rebutted by evidence of the actual intention of the purchaser (see Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 251 per Gibbs CJ (“Calverley v Green”)) but the presumption of advancement negates the presumption that normally flows from the provision of the purchase monies. The DCS point out that the time at which the intention must be established is the time of purchase or immediately thereafter: see Calverley v Green at 251 and 262 (per Mason and Brennan JJ); and see Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353 at 365 (“Charles Marshall”). I shall say more concerning [63(c)] of Woodley below.

152. Judgments in the High Court and elsewhere have pointed out that what has been described as the presumption of advancement is not really a presumption but rather, that there are relationships in which equity infers that any benefit provided to another has been provided for advancement. The provision of funds by a parent to a child for the purchase of a property falls within that class of relationships: see Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 at 547-9 per Deane and Gummow JJ and 574 per Dawson J (“Nelson v Nelson”); Anderson v McPherson [No 2] [2012] WASC 19 at [128]-[141] per Edelman J (“Anderson v McPherson”); and see Flourentzou v Spink [2019] NSWCA 315 at [17]. As was remarked by the High Court in Nelson v Nelson (at 548), and noted by Edelman J in Anderson v McPherson (at [115]), many disputes have been resolved and transactions effected on the foundation of the presumption.

153. The presumption of a resulting trust can be rebutted by evidence of the actual intention of the party/parties who provided the funds for the purchase of the property in question. In Amit Laundry Pty Ltd v Jain [2017] NSWSC 1495, which was upheld on appeal (see Jain v Amit Laundry Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 20), Ward CJ in Eq explained the search for the actual intention of the parties providing the funds for the purchase of the property in question in the following terms (at [165]):

“The search for the intention of the relevant party (or parties) intention is as to proof of a “definite” not “nebulous” intention (Weige v Cupton Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 414 at [46]; referring to Drever v Drever [1936] ALR 446 at 450 (Dixon J)); the “objective, or manifest, intention ... it is not a subjective, uncommunicated intention but it is to be inferred from what the parties do or say” (Anderson v McPherson (No 2) [2012] WASC 19 at [156] (Edelman J, citing Calverley at 261 (Mason and Brennan JJ))). The relevant intention is to be found as at the date of purchase (or immediately thereafter) (Calverley at 251(Gibbs CJ); and at 262 (Mason and Brennan JJ)), although evidence of later acts and declarations are admissible (as admissions against interest) against the party who made them (Black Uhlans at [138] (Campbell J, as his Honour then was)).”

and see Napier v Public Trustee (Western Australia) (1980) 32 ALR 153 at 154 per Gibbs ACJ (as his Honour then was) (“Napier”).

154. In Charles Marshall, the Court said of the presumption of advancement that it (at 365):

“can be rebutted or qualified by evidence which manifests an intention to the contrary. Apart from admissions the only evidence that is relevant and admissible comprises the acts and declarations of the parties before or at the time of the purchase (in this case before or at the time of the acquisition of the shares by allotment) or so immediately thereafter as to constitute a part of the transaction. If that evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption the beneficial gift, absolute or subject only to qualifications imposed upon it at the time, is complete and no subsequent changes of mind or dealings with the property inconsistent with the trust by the donor can as between himself and the donees alter the beneficial interest.”

I have already cited what was said in Woodley at [63] and see also Anderson v McPherson at [97]-[98].

155. These cases point to the absence of relevance of the subjective intention of the donors. There are, however, authoritative statements which support the admissibility of such evidence at least where there is a single donor: see Martin v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297 at 303-5 (“Martin v Martin”), although at 304, the Court made reference to the need for caution because of the witness’s clear interest and such evidence being “liable to observations which tend to diminish its weight”: Dumper v Dumper (1862) 3 Giff 583 at 590 per Stuart VC, quoted in Martin v Martin at 304. In Calverley v Green, Mason and Brennan JJ said (at 261):

“It may be that evidence of a sole purchaser's own state of mind at the time of the purchase can be received from him when the court is seeking to ascertain his intention (Martin v Martin) but in the search for the common intention of two or more purchasers at that time, light will rarely be shed by evidence of their uncommunicated states of mind.”

(citation omitted)

156. In Cone v Burch [2010] NSWCA 168, Giles JA, with whom Beazley JA (as her Excellency then was) and Macfarlan JA agreed, commented (at [30]) that:

“The admissibility and relevance of the uncommunicated intention of the plaintiff is not clear: see Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353 at 364–6; Martin v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297 at 303–5; Calverley v Green at 261–2 (Mason and Brennan JJ); 269–70 (Deane J). It need not be investigated”

but I think that the Court of Appeal in Sze Tu v Lowe (2014) 89 NSWLR 317 at 351 per Gleeson JA, with whom Meagher and Barrett JJA concurred, has resolved the issue, his Honour stating at [181]:

“It needs to be emphasised that it is “the actual intention of the purchaser at the time of the purchase” which is relevant: Calverley v Green at 251 (Gibbs CJ). The true intention of the person who has paid the purchase price may be ascertained from direct evidence from that person as to their intention: Martin v Martin (1959) 110 CLR 297 at 304–305, or from evidence of the circumstances surrounding the transfer such as the relationship of the parties and statements made by them: Charles Marshall Pty Ltd v Grimsley (1956) 95 CLR 353 at 364–365.”

157. At paragraph 43 of Egon’s affidavit (which was objected to and rejected at the hearing in June 2021), he deposed, with reference to paragraph 42 of his affidavit (see [19(1)] above) to the following:

“I meant I would leave the property to Jackie in my will, if we still owned it.”

An explanation of what he meant by the words he used before (on his evidence) Jackie asked him to purchase the Property in her name is not strictly evidence of his subjective intention in making the gift but if it were to be so taken, on the basis of the approach of Mason and Brennan JJ in Calverley v Green, there being two donors, evidence of Egon’s subjective, uncommunicated intention is of very little weight and insufficient to rebut the presumption of advancement.

158. I do not accept Ms Fraser’s submission at paragraph 25 of the PCS that there is no need to objectively ascertain the Plaintiffs’ intention because there is no dispute between the two of them or her assertion at paragraph 26 of the PCS that evidence of actual intention can even displace what was said to third parties at the relevant time if, by that, she means that subjective intention can displace what was said to the donnee or a third party at the relevant time.

159. In this case, the Plaintiffs deny that they intended to make a gift of the Property to Jackie. Egon and Rita say they put the Property in Jackie’s name so that she would not have to pay stamp duty when she inherited the asset under the Plaintiffs’ Wills and also that they agreed to put it in Jackie’s name because Jackie said she wanted to avoid problems with Marilyn. The pleaded case relies on both the stamp duty rationale and the Marilyn rationale.

160. In Martin v Martin, Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Windeyer JJ in their joint judgment said in assessing the findings of the trial judge (at 307):

“In the circumstances perhaps the presumption of equity might have formed a safer guide than Martin's [the husband’s] evidence”

and Kirby P’s (as his Honour then was) comment in his dissenting judgment in Brown v Brown (at 601) that:

“The search for the actual intention of the late Mrs Brown could not be concluded by the evidence of the sons. But equally it could not be satisfactorily concluded from the untested affidavit of Mrs Brown. Thus his Honour was truly in the realm of the operation of reason, assisted by any presumptions which the law provides”

is to the same effect and made even more pertinent in this case because of the untested affidavit of Egon. For the reasons I have already articulated, I find the recourse to a “safer guide” attractive in this case.

161. A further submission made by Ms Fraser was based on what had been said by Leeming JA in Mekhail v Hana; Mekail v Hana [2019] NSWCA 197 in respect of presumptions. His Honour was there dealing with presumptions in relation to Wills and I do not see those comments as having any relevance to the presumptions with which the Court is presently concerned.

162. If the presumption of a resulting trust has not been rebutted, or the presumption of advancement has been rebutted by evidence of the actual intention of the party/parties who provided the funds for the purchase of the property in question, then the terms of the trust will conform to the expressed intentions of the settlor(s), where that intention is discernible from the evidence: see Woodley at [64(a)].

163. If the presumption of a resulting trust has been rebutted (by either the actual intention of the transferor(s) or the operation of the “presumption of advancement”), then the equitable interest in the property will “remain at home with the title and the legal status quo is left undisturbed”: Commissioner of Taxation v Bosanac (No 7) [2021] FCA 249 at [85] per McKerracher J; see also Nelson v Nelson at 547 per Deane and Gummow JJ; Brown v Brown at 589 and 591 per Gleeson CJ, 598-599 and 601 per Kirby P (as his Honour then was); Anderson v McPherson at [123]-[132] per Edelman J.

164. The words that Egon used, on Ms Rendall’s evidence (see [21] above), have a degree of ambiguity and could be interpreted as, in effect:

1. amounting to a present gift of the funds with no retention of beneficial interest in the Property;

2. bestowing the Property to Jackie with a retention of a right to reside and utilise the Property whenever the Plaintiffs wanted;

3. bestowing the beneficial interest in the Property to Jackie subject to a life estate in the Plaintiffs; or

4. retaining the full beneficial interest in the Property but with an expectation that the Property would pass to Jackie on the demise of both Plaintiffs.

165. It will be observed that the words “trust” or “in trust” are not recorded in the notes or in the conversations, nor are they asserted to have been used by the Plaintiffs. The word “gift” is not recorded in any of the notes either and nor does Jackie use that word in her letters to her father. Whilst the word “gift” is not used in the communications relied on by Jackie and set out at [20(1)] and [20(8)] above, the words to which she deposes are clearly indicative of a gift. If [164(4)] was what was intended, there was no need to purchase the Property in Jackie’s name because she was, pursuant to their 2012 Wills, the sole beneficiary of their estates.

166. Accepting that the words used by Egon in the presence of Ms Rendall, Rita and Jackie are those set out at [147(4)] above, and that there is a degree of ambiguity about them, those words are not inconsistent with an intention to provide a gift to Jackie and do not rebut the presumption of advancement save that I think the reference to the Plaintiffs’ occupation of the Property, Jackie’s admission that she understood that the Property could be used by her parents whenever they wanted, her promise not to sell the Property whilst they were alive and her implicit acceptance that her parents had a claim to the Property (as referred to in Mr Rendall’s letter of 16 January 2019) must be given due recognition. Those words are consistent with what Egon told Ms Robinson on 25 May 2017; namely, that he was purchasing the Property for his daughter: see [15(12)] above.

167. The onus of rebutting the presumption of advancement rests on the parents and they have not succeeded in doing so.

168. I conclude, therefore, that the presumption of resulting trust is rebutted by the presumption of advancement.

169. I should note that were I to accept Jackie’s evidence as reflecting, on the balance of probabilities, what actually occurred, the result would be the same. If the Plaintiffs, as at May 2017, wanted to prevent the Property from being an asset of theirs and one that would be included in their estates and hence available for consideration in any claim made by Marilyn (whether that was their own idea or that of Jackie), I am inclined to think that that would also lead to the conclusion that there was no resulting trust. Finally, acceptance that the words said by Egon and Rita to have been used by them, and set out in [8(1)]-[8(3)] above, were spoken, leads to the same conclusion that the Plaintiffs intended that the beneficial interest in the Property would pass to Jackie on their death.

The Life Estate

170. The courts have recognised that a resulting trust need not necessarily relate to the entire interest in the property. In Napier, the High Court said (at 158-9):

“It is also clear that a resulting trust need not necessarily relate to the entire interest in the property. The presumption may be rebutted as to a life interest, but still operate in respect of the interest in remainder (see per Jordan CJ in Re Kerrigan; Ex parte Jones (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 76 at 82–3, where after reviewing the authorities he said):—

It was also urged that when property is bought by one person and put into the name of another three are only two possible alternatives, either the property wholly results to the buyer or is wholly an advancement; there is no middle course. Certain authorities have been cited which appear so to decide, but, to the extent to which they do, I am of opinion that they are wrong and should not be followed.

…

In my opinion in every case of the present type, where there are facts which, unaided by evidence of actual intention, would give rise either to a presumption of resulting trust or such a presumption in collision with a presumption of advancement, the question how far either trust prevails, and to what extent, depends upon the intention of the parties as gathered from all available relevant facts, due consideration being given to the relative weight of the two presumptions when they collide.”

171. That the Plaintiffs had a common intention that they would reside at the Property whenever they wished is not, however, evidence of their intention to vest within themselves a life estate; there being a difference between a life estate and a mere personal right to reside on a property for life or other period. The distinction between a life estate and a mere personal right of residence was considered by Beach J (as his Honour then was) in Calderone v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited [2008] VSC 373; and see also Royal Melbourne Hospital v Equity Trustees Ltd (2007) 18 VR 469 at 514 per Bell AJA; see also Binetter v Dunkel (NSWSC unreported 28 May 1993); and see the observations of Bryson J in Hatzantonis v Lawrence [2003] NSWSC 914.

172. However, given the fact that Jackie has pleaded in her alternative defence only what is, in effect, a life estate (see paragraph 22(a) of her Amended Defence), I do not need to determine whether the rights which the Plaintiffs retained are more appropriately viewed as a life estate or a right to reside.

173. The issue of pleadings has a further significance. The plea of a life interest is that of Jackie in her defence. It has not been pleaded as an alternative “claim” by the Plaintiffs. No relief of any kind is sought by the Plaintiffs in their Statement of Claim in connection with the life estate. Thus, it is not open to the Plaintiffs to seek to propound a case, for example, that the Property should be sold or that the life estate should be sold or bought out by Jackie as they do through the PCS. Mr Harding opposed the tender of any evidence directed towards a new unpleaded case that was not before the Court, by which the Plaintiffs seek to establish the “value” of their life interest. I accept Mr Harding’s submissions that the “claims” to which that evidence is directed are not before the Court and accordingly no regard should be had to Exhibits O, P and Q, which were admitted on a provisional basis.

174. A life estate gives the beneficiary of that estate limited rights with no power to jeopardise the interests of those with rights to the fee simple after the death of the “life”: see Brendan Edgeworth, Butt's Land Law (7th ed, 2017, Thomson Reuters) at [3.130]. I think that a declaration to the effect that Jackie holds the Property on trust for her parents for their lifetime and then for herself absolutely, similar to that made in Schweitzer v Schweitzer [2010] VSC 543, is the appropriate remedy. I will provide the parties with an opportunity to consider the precise form of wording and I will also be willing to consider whether a new caveat reflecting the declaratory relief and protecting the Plaintiffs should be permitted.

Unconscionability

175. The Plaintiffs’ unconscionability case is that (see T294.8-44, paragraph 5 of the POS and paragraphs 88-97 of the PCS) Jackie took advantage of the Plaintiffs to advance her own interests by:

1. alienating their affections for Marilyn;

2. forging the Gift Letter;

3. persuading them to purchase the Property in her name;

4. adding herself as a purchaser of the Burradoo Property without their knowledge or consent;

5. arranging for Egon to execute a power of attorney and enduring guardianship and accepting appointments as Egon’s attorney and guardian; and

6. taking unconscionable advantage of the Plaintiffs by “accepting the benefit of legal ownership knowing the basis on which it was conferred”.

176. [175(1)], [175(2)], [175(3)] and [175(4)] above have not been established. [175(5)] is established but occurred in late 2018 cannot support the conclusion sought. Nor, in respect of [175(6)], has it been established that Jackie told her parents at the time of the purchase that she regarded them as the true owners of the Property. I accept that Jackie says that she later promised her father that she would not sell the Property, but that is not a promise relied on by the Plaintiffs. No special disadvantage or vulnerability on the part of the Plaintiffs was pleaded or particularised and the principles espoused in Bridgewater v Leahy (1988) 194 CLR 457 at 474, 477-9 per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ and at 470-1 per Gleeson CJ and Callinan J (in dissent) have no application to the present dispute.

Conclusion

177. The Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in establishing that Jackie holds the entire Property on trust for them, but I have found, as pleaded in Jackie’s alternative defence, that the Plaintiffs have a life interest in the Property and, to that extent, Jackie’s beneficial ownership of the Property is not absolute.

178. The Plaintiffs should prepare a proposed form of orders reflecting the conclusions reached by the Court. If the parties are unable to agree on a proposed form of orders, then I will hear them on those matters. I will also hear the parties on the issue of costs. The matter will be listed at 10:00am on 19 October 2021 so that the orders can be made and, if needed, a date can be fixed for any argument as to costs.

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Amendments

02 December 2021 - "contends" in paragraph 141 amended to "contents"

file number amended to correct typographical error

Decision last updated: 02 December 2021