Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hamcor Pty Ltd & Anor v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 183

PARTIES:

HAMCOR PTY LIMITED
ACN 010 141 429
(first appellant)
DONALD CHARLES HAYWARD & JAMES PETER COLLINS AS EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF TERRENCE ARTHUR ARMSTRONG (DECEASED)
(second appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10135 of 2014
SC No 5764 of 2011

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2014] QSC 224

DELIVERED ON:

2 October 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

25 May 2015

JUDGES:

Gotterson JA and Atkinson and Mullins JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   Appellants to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

3.   No order as to costs with respect to the Notice of Contention.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – NEW TRIAL – IN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR GROUNDS – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT – OTHER MATTERS – where property was destroyed by fire – where the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (“QFRS”) had been called to the fire – where in the course of combating the fire, QFRS personnel applied massive quantities of water on and around the fire – where the water mixed with factory chemicals, producing a large volume of contaminated fluid known as “fire-water” – where much of the fire-water flowed onto adjacent bushland or into a local creek via stormwater drains – where however, some of the fire-water remained on the property where it soaked into soil and large concrete construction slabs, or ran into storage dams – where as a result, part of the property was classified as Contaminated Land pursuant to Chapter 7 Part 8 of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (“EP Act”) – where proceedings were commenced against the State of Queensland for alleged breaches of duty of care in negligence on the part of the QFRS in fighting the fire – where the loss occasioned by the breaches was one that, it was claimed, arose from a statutory liability imposed by s 391 of the EP Act to remediate the Contaminated Land – where the cost of remediation was accepted to be more than $9 million, many times the value of the freehold land prior to the fire – where the State of Queensland succeeded in its reliance upon s 129(1) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) (“FRS Act”) – where the learned primary judge held that what the QFRS had done in applying water to the fire was expressly authorised by s 53(1) of the FRS Act – where it was therefore something done pursuant to that Act and hence was protected by the immunity conferred by the first limb to s 129(1) – where the appellants contend that the learned primary judge erred in holding that, in the circumstances in which…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hamcor Pty Ltd v State of Queensland, the respondents sought compensation from the appellants, the State of Queensland, for damages caused by fire-fighting activities undertaken by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) personnel. The fire-fighting efforts resulted in substantial environmental contamination of the respondents' property, leading to a claim for negligence and statutory liability under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld). The respondents sought damages amounting to $12,384,000, including interest, and the appellants’ costs of trial and appeal. The primary issue for determination by the court was whether the QFRS was acting pursuant to the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) (FRS Act) when applying water to the fire, thereby attracting immunity under s 129(1) of that Act. The respondents argued that the QFRS was not entitled to immunity because it acted negligently and in bad faith.

The court found that the QFRS personnel had indeed acted pursuant to the FRS Act when applying water to the fire, which was authorised by s 53(1) of the FRS Act. This action was considered to be within the scope of their statutory powers, and therefore, they were protected by the immunity conferred by the first limb of s 129(1). The court held that the immunity applied irrespective of whether the QFRS acted negligently, as long as they were exercising their statutory powers. The court rejected the respondents' argument that the immunity was conditional upon the QFRS acting without negligence or in good faith. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal on the standard basis. No order was made as to costs regarding the Notice of Contention.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Appellants to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on the standard basis.

3. No order as to costs with respect to the Notice of Contention.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The defence put in issue the existence of a common law duty of care, breach of duty, causation and quantification of loss. It raised a plea of contributory negligence. In addition, the defence pleaded that, in the event that a duty of care as alleged was owed by it, s 36 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) (“CL Act”) applied so as to modify the standard of care applicable;[9] and that, in any event, the conduct of QFRS attracted the statutory immunity from liability conferred by s 129(1) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) (“FRS Act”).[10][9]AB2244-2269; Amended Defence of First Defendant paragraph 28A.[10]Ibid paragraphs 34-36.The decision at first instance The learned primary judge resolved the issue of the existence of a common law duty of care in favour of the plaintiffs. She reached the following conclusion on the issue:“In my view once the QFRS attended the plaintiffs’ land and began exercising its statutory powers to protect against fire and hazardous materials emergency there was sufficient closeness and directness in the relationship between it and the plaintiffs, as owners of the property which was on fire and which was the source of, and vulnerable to, the hazardous materials in question, to establish a common law duty owed by the QFRS to the plaintiffs to take reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs’ property in exercising its powers to combat the fire and emergency.”[11][11]At [174]. At [131], her Honour found that the contaminated fire-water was hazardous material as defined in the FRS Act and that its release during the events of 25 August 2005 and in the subsequent days was a hazardous materials emergency as there defined. This finding is not challenged on appeal. The plaintiffs also succeeded on the issue of breach of duty. Her Honour’s conclusions on it are evident from the following two paragraphs in her reasons:“In my view the QFRS breached its duty to the plaintiffs in applying large amounts of water to areas of the plaintiffs’ land other than the LPG cylinders and solvent tank, and other than the firewall and drums under, and in front of, the awning.”[12]…It may be that the QFRS’s applying water may have cooled parts of the fire, but there was no evidence that it was strategically applied to do so, nor that this was a reasonable fire-fighting objective. Not only was there no reason to apply water, except to the four identified areas (above), it was reasonably foreseeable that applying volumes of water to the plaintiffs’ land would create commensurate volumes of contaminated fire-water. At all material times the QFRS understood that this fire-water posed an environmental hazard. There was a reasonable fire-fighting strategy available: to let the fire burn itself out while applying water to the four identified areas where that application could serve a logical purpose. There is no evidence that these relevant facts were considered as they ought to have been during the course of the fire. For these reasons it seems to me that it was not reasonable for the QFRS to apply water to the site other than to the four areas I have identified, and that it was only reasonable for it to apply water to them during the time at which they were at risk.”[13][12]At [182].[13]At [189].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.