Hamcor Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd

Case [2013] QCA 262


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Hamcor Pty Ltd & Anor v Marsh Pty Ltd & Anor [2013]
QCA 262
PARTIES:  HAMCOR PTY LTD
ACN 010 141 429
(first appellant)
TERRENCE ARTHUR ARMSTRONG
(second appellant)
v
MARSH PTY LTD
ABN 86 004 651 512
(first respondent)
OTAGO PTY LTD
ABN 90 010 161 501
(second respondent)
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(not a party to the appeal)
FILE NO/S:  Appeal No 1887 of 2013
SC No 5764 of 2011
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  13 September 2013
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  7 August 2013
JUDGES:  Margaret McMurdo P, Muir JA and Atkinson J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the orders made
ORDERS: 
1.  The appeal be allowed, but only to the extent that:
a. paragraph 1 of the order of 20 February 2013 is

varied by deleting therefrom “and/or the ISR

Policy referred to in paragraphs 50(b) and 51(h)”

and “and/or the ISR Policy” and by deleting

“paragraphs 37-43 and 43(d)” and substituting

therefor “paragraphs 37-40 and 43(d)”; and

b. paragraph 2 of such order is varied so that it reads as follows:

“It is declared that the costs incurred by the

Plaintiffs in remediating their own land in

response to statutory notices and court orders, as

and 30 of the Further Amended Statement of

pleaded in paragraphs 29 (and particularised) indemnity under the renewed Primary Policy or the renewed Excess Policy referred to in paragraphs 37-40 and 43(d) of the Further

Amended Statement of Claim.”

2.    The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the

appeal unless the appellants apply for leave to make
submissions as to costs within two days of the delivery
of these reasons.

CATCHWORDS: INSURANCE – THE POLICY – PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTRUCTION – where the appellants were required, by

a notice issued pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and orders made in Planning and Environment Court proceedings, to remediate land contaminated following

the application of water to a fire on the appellants‟ land –

where the appellants contended that, had they been competently advised by the respondents, they would have

been able to secure “the primary policy”, “the excess policy” and “the ISR policy” – where the primary judge held that

even if the appellants had been named in the primary policy, the excess policy or the ISR policy, the costs incurred by the appellants in remediating their own land in response to statutory notices and court orders were not capable of being

the subject of indemnity under those policies – where the

appellants submit that the primary judge erred in holding that, upon the proper construction of the primary policy, the

indemnity for a claim for “liability to pay compensation” for

pollution made against the insured contained an additional requirement that the compensation be paid by the insured to

the claimant – where the appellants contend that, unlike

damages,…

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Hamcor Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 262
Case
[2013] QCA 262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hamcor Pty Ltd v Marsh Pty Ltd, the appellants sought indemnity from the respondents for costs incurred in remediating land contaminated by the application of water to a fire on their property. This remediation was necessitated by notices issued under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and orders made in Planning and Environment Court proceedings. The appellants contended that had they been properly advised by the respondents, they would have secured certain insurance policies. The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation and applicability of clauses in the insurance policies, specifically whether these policies provided indemnity for the remediation costs incurred by the appellants.

The primary judge had ruled that the costs of remediation were not covered under the policies, even if the appellants had been named in them. The appellants contested this decision, arguing that the primary judge had misinterpreted the policy clauses. They submitted that the policy clause concerning "liability to pay compensation" did not necessitate that the compensation be paid to the claimant. Additionally, they argued that an exclusion clause should not apply to pollution liability, and that the term "debris" in the ISR policy could include remediation costs.

The court examined the construction of the insurance policies and the exclusion clauses. It concluded that the primary judge was correct in holding that the remediation costs were not covered. The court found that the phrase "liability to pay compensation" did indeed require that compensation be paid to the claimant, and that the exclusion clause applied to section B of the policy. Furthermore, the court upheld the primary judge's interpretation that the exclusion in clause 8.4 applied to damage to the insured's own property. The court also affirmed that the term "debris" in the ISR policy did not encompass the remediation costs as claimed by the appellants.

In light of these findings, the appeal was allowed in part. The court ordered that the appeal be allowed, but only to the extent that the appellants were to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal unless they applied for and were granted leave to appeal to a higher court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed, but only to the extent that:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondents contended that the ISR policy contemplates the completion of a statement of “limits of liability” and “declared values”. It was argued that where the appellants‟ land, buildings and contents were completely destroyed by fire, “that event would enable a first party property claim by the Appellants under the ISR Policy for indemnity of the full declared value of the property destroyed, pursuant to the Section 1 indemnity”. Paragraph (f), of section 1, is a qualified indemnity and cannot be activated if the insurer has already indemnified the appellant to the limit of liability. It was submitted that, on the facts pleaded, the policy could not respond. This contention provides a further illustration of the problems which an attempt to determine matters such as those under consideration on a partly hypothetical basis can give rise. Conclusion For the above reasons, I would order that the appeal be allowed, but only to the extent that: As the respondents have been substantially successful, I would order that the appellants pay the respondents‟ costs of the appeal unless the appellants apply for ATKINSON J: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Muir JA and the orders proposed by his Honour.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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