Green v Kogarah Municipal Council

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:     Green v Kogarah Municipal Council [2001]  NSWCA 123

FILE NUMBER(S):
41010/99

HEARING DATE(S): 3 April 2001

JUDGMENT DATE:    02/05/2001

PARTIES:
Ross Winston Green - Appellant
Kogarah Municipal Council - Respondent

JUDGMENT OF:        Mason P Giles JA Ipp AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:    Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):             LEC 40047/99

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:        Cowdroy J

COUNSEL:
T Hale SC & E White - Appellant
J Ayling - Respondent

SOLICITORS:
Brock Partners - Appellant
Abbott Tout - Respondent

CATCHWORDS:
DEVELOPMENT CONSENT - lapse - whether building, engineering or construction work relating to the building or subdivision physically commenced on the land - activities relied on in breach of condition of development consent - activities relied on themselves carrying out development without consent - could not be physical commencement - development consent had lapsed..  D.

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA  41010/99

LEC  40047.99

MASON P

GILES JA

IPP AJA

Wednesday 2 May 2001

GREEN v KOGARAH MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

JUDGMENT

  1. MASON P:  I agree with Giles JA.

  2. GILES JA:  The respondent granted the appellant development consent for a dual occupancy development on his land.  The issue in this appeal is whether the development consent has lapsed.  Dual occupancy development on the appellant’s land is no longer permitted under the relevant planning instrument, and if the development consent has lapsed it can not be granted anew. 

    The development consent

  3. The appellant owns the land known as 40 Algernon Street, Oatley, a long, narrow block running from Algernon Street down to the Georges River.  Erected on the land is a brick dwelling with a swimming pool.

  4. In early 1995 the appellant caused to be prepared plans for a dual occupancy development on the land. 

  5. One plan was a plan of subdivision of the land.  It is apparent from condition 18 of the development consent, to which I will shortly refer, that there was such a plan, but it was not in evidence.  It must have been similar to a plan of subdivision prepared in August 1998, which was in evidence, under which the front portion of the land containing the existing dwelling was one lot and the rear portion was another lot served by a right of carriageway over the first lot.  The 1998 plan of subdivision provided for a drainage easement one metre wide from the rear of the first lot by an irregular path across the second lot to the Georges River.  The 1995 plan did not provide for the drainage easement. 

  6. The other plan was an architectural plan for the erection of a dwelling on the second lot.  Taking account of an elevated ramp for car access and a deck, the second dwelling almost filled the width of the block between the side boundaries of the land.  The architectural plan indicated three trees in or close to the footprint of the building, and that two of them were…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWCA 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Mr. Green, sought declarations and orders from the Land and Environment Court, arguing that his development consent had not lapsed. He contended that his activities in February-March 1999 constituted the physical commencement of building, engineering, or construction work on the land, thereby satisfying section 95(4) of the relevant Act. The respondent was Kogarah Municipal Council.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the activities undertaken by the appellant qualified as "building, engineering or construction work relating to the building" for the purposes of section 95(4) of the Act, which dictates when a development consent lapses. This question hinged on whether such work could be lawfully undertaken in the absence of a building approval, which was a condition of the development consent.

The court, upholding the decision at first instance, reasoned that the activities could not constitute physical commencement under section 95(4) because they were undertaken in breach of the development consent's conditions. Specifically, the consent was expressly conditional upon the submission of a building application and council approval before any building work commenced. Therefore, any work carried out without this prior approval could not be considered lawful work relating to the development. The court relied on the principle established in *Iron Gates Developments Pty Ltd v Richmond-Evans Environmental Society Inc*, which held that work undertaken in the absence of necessary council approval could not be regarded as building, engineering, or construction work relating to the development.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Act (1999) largely took over regulation of building approvals and subdivision approvals. It enabled combined application for development consent and other approvals (s 78A(3)), so that separate application for the approvals was not required. It is not necessary to go into the Act (1999) in this respect, or into underlying amendments in relation to building applications and subdivision approvals. By cll 5 and 36 of the 1998 regulation applications for subdivision approval and for building approval respectively could be made until 1 July 1999 as if the rump of the Local Government Act 1919 had not been repealed and the Act (1995) had not been amended. The common ground in the appeal included that the references to building approval and subdivision approval in the appellant’s development consent remained meaningful as at March 1999. The decision at first instance The appellant brought class 4 proceedings in the Land and Environment Court, seeking declarations and orders founded on the development consent still being in force because s 95(4) of the Act (1999) was satisfied by his activities in February-March 1999 (“the activities”) and the development consent had not lapsed. In a judgment delivered on 6 December 1999 Cowdroy J ordered that the proceedings be dismissed with costs. His Honour gave two grounds for his decision, and contemplated a third ground. The first ground rested upon the decision of this Court in Iron Gates Developments Pty Ltd v Richmond-Evans Environmental Society Inc (1992) 81 LGERA 123. Cowdroy J considered that in the absence of building approval the activities, said by the appellant to be building, engineering or construction work, could not qualify as such because the work could not be carried out without building approval. His Honour said -“The difficulty in the applicant’s submission lies in the fact that there was no ‘building’ to which any work relied upon could be referable as required by s 95(4) of the Act. The terms of that subsection are predicated upon building or engineering or construction work being undertaken in relation to a building which can be constructed lawfully. The consent was made expressly conditional upon the submission of a building application for the work comprising the development. The conditions as set out above make it clear that council’s approval was required before the commencement of any building work.In these circumstances any work that was undertaken on the site could not be work to which the provisions of s 95(4) apply. In Irongates [sic] Developments Pty Ltd v Richmond-Evans Environmental Society Inc (1992) 81 LGERA 132 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that work of an engineering nature undertaken by a developer in the absence of approval by the council of engineering plans could not be regarded as building, engineering or construction work relating to the development. Handley JA said at 135 -‘In my opinion the work in question was not work “relating to that development” for the purpose of s 99(2)(a) because it was prohibited by the consent, and was therefore not “the subject of that consent” within s 99(1)(a).’Section 99 of the unamended Act is the equivalent of s 95 of the Act. Work in that case was ‘prohibited’ because it was carried out contrary to the requirements of the consent. Similarly in the present case any work undertaken could not be work “relating to” the proposed dwelling for the reasons stated by Handley JA.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.