JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2005 (WA)
CITATION: AUSCON PTY LTD and TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE [2021] WASAT 116
MEMBER: DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER
MR R POVEY, MEMBER
HEARD: 1 AND 2 JUNE 2021
DELIVERED : 2 SEPTEMBER 2021
PUBLISHED : 2 SEPTEMBER 2021
FILE NO/S: DR 203 of 2020
BETWEEN: AUSCON PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Building - Building permit - Town planning - Development application - Building permit extension - Relevant considerations in considering application to extend building permit - Substantial commencement - Works - Estoppel
Legislation:
Building Act 2011 (WA), Pt 2, s 9, Div 2, s 16, s 20, s 20(1) s 21, s 22, s 22(1), s 22(2), s 22(2)(a), s23, s 24, Div 3, s 25, s 27, s 29, Div 4, s 32, s 32(3), s 76, s 119
Building Regulations 2012 (WA), Pt 3, reg 18(2)(b), reg 23, reg 24, reg 24(1), reg 24(2), reg 25
Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 43(1)
Planning and Development (Local Planning Schemes) Regulations 2015 (WA), Sch 2, cl 1, cl 61(1)(a), cl 61(1)(b), cl 77(2)(b), cl 77(1)(d)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 4, s 4(1)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27, s 91(2)
Town of Cambridge Local Planning Scheme No 1, cl 33(1)(d), cl 42(2)
Result:
Application for review dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | Mr D Stanley |
| Respondent | : | Mr C Slarke |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| Respondent | : | McLeods |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Adams v Executive Director, Fisheries WA [2000] WASC 34
Attorney-General v Mayor of Bournemouth [1902] 2 Ch 714
Auburn Municipal Council v FN Eckold Pty Ltd (1974) LGRA 101
Day v Pinglen Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 23; (1981) 148 CLR 289
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Lebnan [1974] HCA 34; (1974) 131 CLR 350
Enoka v Shire of Northampton (1996) 15 WAR 483
Fazio v City of Fremantle (unreported, WASC, Library No 920584, 16 August 1996)
Gnech Building Co and Town of Claremont [2018] WASAT 77
Green v Kogarah Municipal Council [2001] NSWCA 123; (2001) 115 LGERA 231
Latitude Fisheries Pty Ltd v Australian Fisheries Management Authority [2002] FCA 416; (2002) 68 ALD 365
London County Council v Marks and Spencer Ltd [1952] 1 Ch 549
Miller and City of Melville [2012] WASAT 156
Milson Gardens Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1964] NSWR 926; (1963) 9 LGRA 308
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries and Hulkin (unreported, Court of Appeal, 1948)
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries v Matthews [1950] 1 KB 148
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193
North Sydney Municipal Council v Middle Harbour Investments Pty Ltd (1963) 10 LGRA 41
Smith v Wyong Shire Council (No 3) (1984) 53 LGRA 170
Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 416
Waverley Municipal Council v Ladec Holdings Pty Ltd (1978) 36 LGRA 188
REASONS FOR DECISION…
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- Case
- [2021] WASAT 116
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around whether the respondent, the TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE, could be estopped from enforcing the requirement for substantial commencement of works within the specified timeframe of the building permit. The court had to determine whether estoppel could prevent the exercise of a statutory discretion and if the range of considerations for extending a building permit was limited to those specified in the Building Regulations. The court also needed to address whether the Building Regulations could limit the operation of the Building Act.
The court concluded that estoppel by representation could not prevent the performance of a statutory duty or the exercise of a statutory discretion. This principle was derived from the English case Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd and applied in Western Australia in Enoka v Shire of Northampton. The court held that the respondent could consider the matters identified in s 20(1) of the Building Act when reviewing an application for an extension of a building permit. The court further found that the Building Regulations could not limit the operation of the Building Act and that the requirements set out in s 20(1) of the Building Act must be considered each time an application to extend a building permit is made.
The court's decision was that the TOWN OF CAMBRIDGE was entitled to consider the statutory requirements for granting a building permit extension, and the applicant could not rely on estoppel to prevent enforcement of the statutory deadlines. The court's reasoning was grounded in the statutory framework and the principle that estoppel cannot extend statutory powers beyond the law that creates them.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In any event, the accepted position appears to be that estoppel by representation cannot prevent the performance of a statutory duty or the exercise of a statutory discretion. That principle arises from the English case Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 416. That principle was applied in Western Australia in Enoka v Shire of Northampton (1996) 15 WAR 483 (Enoka). Both of these cases are referred to Adams v Executive Director, Fisheries WA [2000] WASC 34 (Adams) where McKechnie J states (at [67]):[E]stoppel will not operate to extend the power of an administrative body beyond the regulations of law which creates the power. The respondent submits that the present case provides an example whereby estoppel would extend the operation of the law beyond the instrument which establishes the power. That is to say, if the respondent estopped from asserting the failure of substantial commencement, the result would be, it would have to issue a building permit extension in circumstances where it otherwise would be prohibited from doing that, at least on the respondent's case. We generally accept the respondent's submissions on Issue 1. That is, for the following six reasons, we accept that the respondent is entitled to consider the matters identified in s 20(1) of the Building Act in relation to an application made under reg 23 of the Building Regulations. Firstly, this matter arises in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. Our task is to hear the matter de novo and to make the correct and preferable decision: s 27 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). On review, it is the Tribunal which must be satisfied that there is a lawful basis to grant an extension to the building permit under reg 25 of the Building Regulations. In large part, the history of this matter and the applicant's complaints thereon, are not relevant to the Tribunal. While the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the respondent, we still must satisfy ourselves that a further extension to the building permit is capable of being lawfully issued. Secondly, there is nothing in the text of the statute which begins and ends the inquiry of statutory construction that would suggest the range of requirements set out in s 20(1) of the Building Act are somehow excluded by the operation of Pt 3 of the Building Regulations, including reg 23 to reg 25. There is nothing in the language of the Building Regulations which would lend weight to a submission that the range of considerations is narrowed to those identified in reg 24(1) of the Building Regulations. Implicit within the considerations set out in reg 24(1) is that the building permit extension can otherwise lawfully be granted. That being the case, the requirements set out in s 20(1) of the Building Act must be enlivened each and every occasion an application to extend a building permit is made. Thirdly, and in a related sense, the Building Regulations are subsidiary legislation. As subsidiary legislation they cannot be inconsistent with the Building Act: s 43(1) of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). Unless expressly provided for, the Building Regulations cannot operate so as to limit the operation of the Building Act. The two instruments are to be read together but the Building Act prevails.