JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: ADAMS & ANOR -v- EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FISHERIES WA [2000] WASC 34
CORAM: McKECHNIE J
HEARD: 12 AUGUST 1999
DELIVERED : 21 FEBRUARY 2000
FILE NO/S: CIV 1423 of 1999
BETWEEN: TERRENCE JOHN ADAMS
FLORENCE MERILYN ADAMS
ObjectorsAND
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FISHERIES WA
Respondent
Catchwords:
Fisheries - Administrative law - Estoppel - Extent to which estoppel operates in public law - Discretion to grant authorisation - Whether discretion controlled or conditioned - Whether management plan inconsistent with Act and ultra vires - Delegation of power - Extent to which public servant can bind statutory office holder
Legislation:
Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Objectors: Mr J A Thomson
Respondent: Mr G I Macnish
Solicitors:
Objectors: Cocks Macnish
Respondent: State Crown Solicitor
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394
Enoka v Shire of Northampton (1996) 15 WAR 483
Formosa v Department of Social Security (1988) 46 FCR 117
Joint Property Ownership v City of Subiaco (1998) 97 LGERA 269
Metropolitan Transit Authority v Waverley Transit Pty Ltd (1991) 1 VR 181
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193
Minister of Fisheries v Matthews [1956] 1 KB 148
Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168
Re Nicoletta Ciffolilli; Ex Parte Peter Phillip Rogers, Executive Director of the Fisheries Department of Western Australia [1999] WASCA 205
Southend‑on‑Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 416
Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507
Western Fish Products v Penwith District Council (1981) 2 All ER 204
Case(s) also cited:
Ansett Transport and Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Cudgen Rutile (No 2) v Chalk [1975] AC 520
Harrington v Lowe (1996) 136 ALR 42
In re Exchange Securities & Commodities Ltd (in liq) [1988] 1 Ch 46
Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] 1 QB 643
Lambidis v Commissioner of Police (1995) 37 NSWLR 320
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Petrovski (1997) 73 FCR 303
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Polat (1995) 57 FCR 98
Moses (alias Moss) v Parker & Ors; Ex parte Moses [1896] AC 245
Parramatta City Council v Palmyra Freeholds Pty Ltd & Anor [1974] 2 NSWLR 83
Peacock v Newtown Marrickville and General Co-operative Building Society No 4 Limited (1943) 67 CLR 25
Project Blue Sky Incorporated & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 153 ALR 490
Qantas Airways v Gibbon & Ors (1992) 28 NSWLR 26
R v Adams; Ex parte Barbeler (1981) 46 LGRA 227
R v Joske & Ors; Ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association & Ors (1976) 10 ALR 385
Robe River Iron Associates v Association of Draughting, Supervisory and Technical Employees of Western Australia (1987) 68 WAIG 11
Roberts v Repatriation Commission (1992) FCR 39 FCR 420
Rubrico v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 208
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- Case
- [2000] WASC 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether estoppel could prevent the Executive Director from enforcing statutory criteria when issuing a permit. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the Executive Director's discretion was controlled or conditioned by the statutory criteria outlined in the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (WA). Additionally, the court examined whether the Interim Management Plan was inconsistent with the Act and thus ultra vires. Another significant issue was whether the public servant could bind the statutory office holder through delegation of power.
The court found that estoppel could not prevent the Executive Director from enforcing statutory criteria when exercising discretion. The court held that estoppel would deny the Executive Director the discretion entrusted by Parliament, which is essential for the proper administration of the Act. The court drew on precedents such as Southend-on-Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd and Joint Property Ownership v City of Subiaco to support its reasoning. It was concluded that the public interest in the enforcement of the statute outweighed any private detriment suffered by the plaintiff. The Interim Management Plan was found to be consistent with the Act, and the Executive Director's discretion was not improperly influenced by the public servant.
The court ordered that the decision of the Executive Director be upheld, and the permit application be denied. The plaintiff's claim for estoppel was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
An example of the second principle is Southend‑on‑Sea Corporation v Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd [1962] 1 QB 416, a case with similarities to the present case. In that case a building inspector made a factual representation as to the prior use of premises and a statement that planning permission was unnecessary. Subsequently, the council decided the factual basis was incorrect and planning permission was required. At a hearing the council sought to introduce facts showing the true factual basis but was estopped from so doing. On appeal Lord Parker CJ stated at 424:"… in a case of discretion there is a duty under the statute to exercise a free and unhindered discretion … estoppel cannot be raised to prevent or hinder the exercise of the discretion." In that case the council had issued an enforcement notice. As Lord Parker said at 425:"… it seems to me quite idle to say that a local authority has in fact been able to exercise its discretion and issue an enforcement notice if by reason of estoppel it is prevented from proving and showing it is a valid enforcement notice in that amongst other things planning permission was required." To adapt the principle of that case to the present, the Executive Director, having refused an authorisation because the objectors cannot comply with the catch history for LFB B42 the Christine Nerelle, it is idle to say the Executive Director should be estopped from asserting the true position. To hold there was an operative estoppel would deny the Executive Director the discretion which Parliament has entrusted to him. Another example is provided in Joint Property Ownership v City of Subiaco (1998) 97 LGERA 269. One of the issues in that case was directed to the question whether estoppel could operate by way of a defence to a statutory defence. In an examination of principles, with which I respectfully agree, Parker J considered this question at 285‑286. After quoting from Commonwealth v Verwayen per Mason J at 483, Parker J continued at 286:"The notions of unconscionability and proportionality of remedy to detriment are relevant and adapted to civil proceedings in which the conduct of, and the competing interests of, the opposing parties may be weighed and compared so that justice may be done between them. In a statutory prosecution the court is not concerned to be dealing with the private interests of the opposing parties. At issue is the public interest in the enforcement of the statute". Adapting this principle to the present case, the grant of an authorisation by the Executive Director pursuant to FRMA s 66 is a matter of public interest where Parliament has empowered the Minister to proclaim an Interim Management Plan and that plan specifies criteria to be met by an applicant. A further example is supplied by Enoka v Shire of Northampton (1996) 15 WAR 483 where Steytler J neatly categorised the issues at 493:"This kind of contention raises difficult questions concerning conflicting interests. There is, on the one hand, much to be said for the proposition that a good citizen who has no knowledge of the complexities of town planning matters and who takes the trouble to ensure that a proposed development, upon which he or she proposes to make a substantial expenditure, is authorised, should be entitled to rely upon an assurance given accordingly on behalf of the public body with authority to oversee such developments. There is, on the other hand, an obvious public interest in ensuring that the public authority concerned does not, by its conduct, render nugatory schemes which have been gazetted in the interest of an entire community and which are required to be approved of by the Minister."