HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
. Barwick C.J., Menzies, Owen, Walsh and Gibbs JJ.
PARRAMATTA CITY COUNCIL v. BRICKWORKS LTD.
14 March 1972
Town Planning (N.S.W.)
Town Planning (N.S.W.)—Planning Scheme—Residential district proclamation—Suspension of Planning Scheme—Varying scheme—Formal requirements—Right to continue existing use of land—Right to extend existing work—"Use"—"Work"—Local Government Act, 1919 (N.S.W.), ss. 309 (1) (2)*, 342L, Pt XIIA, div. 7, s. 648—County of Cumberland Planning Scheme Ordinance, cll. 32, 33, 57. * Sub-section (2) of s. 309 of the Local Government Act, 1919 (N.S.W.), as amended provides: "Nothing in this section shall preclude the continuance of the use of any building for any purpose for which the same was used immediately before the date of the proclamation aforesaid, or the alteration, enlargement, rebuilding, or extension of any building used for any such purpose whether or not such alteration, enlargement, rebuilding or extension involve the use of adjoining land which immediately before the date of the proclamation was in the same ownership or for such other purpose as the Council thinks reasonable in the circumstances."
Decisions
1972, March 14.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared in this appeal by my brother Gibbs. I entirely agree with them and have nothing to add. In my opinion for those reasons the appeal should be dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed. (at p3)
MENZIES J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Gibbs J. with which I entirely agree subject to one reservation of small importance. (at p3)
2. I am inclined to regard the quarrying that is now the matter of contention as but the continuation of an existing use of the land as a whole authorized by cl. 32 of the Planning Scheme Ordinance, rather than an existing work on the land the extension of which is authorized by cl. 33 of the Ordinance. In consequence I place no reliance upon cl. 33 in reaching the conclusion that the Ordinance authorizes what the Council seeks to stop. (at p3)
OWEN J. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed and the cross-appeal allowed. I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my brother Gibbs and I agree with it. (at p4)
WALSH J. The judgments given in this suit in the Supreme Court of New South Wales at first instance (1970) 18 LGRA 395 and on appeal (1970) 22 LGRA 200; 92 WN (NSW) 701 demonstrate the difficulties created by the legislation and by the instruments promulgated under statutory authority, which the Court was required to consider. It was no easy task to ascertain whether the respondent was entitled to carry on the activities which the appellant sought to restrain or was prohibited absolutely from doing so or required consent of the appellant to do so. Hardie J. considered that the Residential District Proclamation made in March 1932, by which the use of the land to which the suit related for…
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- Case
- [1972] HCA 21
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether Brickworks' operations constituted a nuisance at common law, and if so, whether the Council had standing to seek an injunction on behalf of its residents. Specifically, the court considered the nature of the nuisance alleged, the extent to which statutory authority might provide a defence, and the principles governing the grant of injunctive relief in such circumstances.
The High Court, in a majority decision, held that while Brickworks' operations did cause a nuisance, the Council lacked the necessary standing to seek an injunction. The court reasoned that the right to sue for nuisance at common law rests with the individual whose property rights are interfered with, or who suffers damage to their person or property. While the Council had a general responsibility for the welfare of its residents, this did not extend to bringing common law actions for nuisance on their behalf. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a public authority might have statutory power to act in the public interest, finding that no such power was applicable here.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the Council's appeal, upholding the decision of the lower court that the injunction should not be granted.
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