[2012] AATA 895
Division VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION File Number
2011/2510
Re
Graham Abbott
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President DG Jarvis and
Lt Col B Ormston (Retd)Date 19 December 2012 Place Adelaide The decision under review is affirmed.
......................[Sgd]..................................................
Deputy President DG Jarvis
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS - Disability pension - rate of pension payable - special rate - held that applicant not prevented from continuing to undertake past remunerative work by his war-caused conditions alone - decision under review affirmed.
LEGISLATION
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth), s 24(1)(c)
CASES
Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988) 9 AAR 534
Chambers v Repatriation Commission (1995) 55 FCR 9
Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 48 ALD 1
Forbes v Repatriation Commission (2000) 101 FCR 50
Jackman v Repatriation Commission [1997] FCA 564
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 358
Re Banovich and Repatriation Commission (1986) 9 ALN N223
Repatriation Commission v Braund (1991) 23 ALD 591
Repatriation Commission v Butcher [2006] FCA 811
Repatriation Commission v Butcher (2007) 94 ALD 364
Repatriation Commission v Connell (2011) 197 FCR 228
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Repatriation Commission v Van Heteran (2003) 75 ALD 703Starcevich v Repatriation Commission (1987) 18 FCR 221
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President DG Jarvis and
Lt Col B Ormston (Retd)19 December 2012
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Graham Abbott, served in the Australian Army between March 1957 and April 1987. He had operational service in Vietnam from 18 February 1969 to 4 February 1970. He has a number of disabilities that have been accepted as service related.
On 2 July 2007, he lodged an application for an increase in pension. His application referred to two disabilities, namely pain in both knees and lower back pain, and the supporting details completed by a general practitioner referred to diagnoses of osteoarthritis in both knees and the lower back.[1] We deduce from the documents before us that a delegate of the Commission decided in March 2008 that L5/S1 spondylolisthesis from which Mr Abbott suffers was not related to service, but that his pension should be increased to 100% of the general rate with effect from 2 April 2007. Following an appeal to the Veterans’ Review Board (VRB), the VRB decided in June 2009 to affirm the Commission’s decision that the L5/S1 spondylolisthesis was not related to service, to vary its decision by amending the diagnosis of L5/S1 spondylolisthesis to include lumbar spondylosis, and to set aside the Commission’s decision in relation to lumbar spondylosis and substitute a decision that that condition was war-caused. The VRB then remitted the matter to the Commission for assessment of the rate of pension to be paid.
[1] Exhibit R2, T3, page 13.
It further appears that in September 2009 the Commission decided to maintain its assessment of the rate of pension at 100% of the general rate. That decision was affirmed by the VRB in May…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The tribunal examined the evidence presented by Mr Abbott and the medical reports to determine the extent of his injuries and their impact on his ability to work. The tribunal found that Mr Abbott had not made a genuine effort to find new employment after his previous job ended, as he had only looked for work in a limited area and did not consider the possibility of working outside that area. Additionally, the tribunal concluded that Mr Abbott's decision not to seek further employment was influenced by factors unrelated to his war-caused injuries, such as age and lack of transportation. The tribunal also noted that Mr Abbott's primary issue was disc degeneration, which was secondary to his service-related injury but not solely attributable to it.
Based on the evidence and the tribunal's analysis, it was determined that Mr Abbott did not meet the criteria for a pension under s 24(1)(c) of the VE Act. The tribunal found that Mr Abbott had not been genuinely seeking remunerative work and that his decision to stop working was influenced by factors unrelated to his war-caused injuries. The tribunal affirmed the decision under review, concluding that Mr Abbott was not entitled to a pension under the VE Act.
No further orders were made by the tribunal in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
If s 24(1) of the VE Act applies Mr Abbott is entitled under s 24(4) to a pension at the special rate therein provided. Sections 24(1)(c) and 24(2)(a) and (b) of the VE Act provide as follows:24(1) This section applies to a veteran if:...(c)the veteran is, by reason of incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, alone, prevented from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking and is, by reason thereof, suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, that the veteran would not be suffering if the veteran were free of that incapacity; and...(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(c):(a)a veteran who is incapacitated from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, shall not be taken to be suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, by reason of that incapacity if:(i) the veteran has ceased to engage in remunerative work for reasons other than his or her incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both; or(ii) the veteran is incapacitated, or prevented, from engaging in remunerative work for some other reason; and(b)where a veteran, not being a veteran who has attained the age of 65 years, who has not been engaged in remunerative work satisfies the Commission that he or she has been genuinely seeking to engage in remunerative work, that he or she would, but for that incapacity, be continuing so to seek to engage in remunerative work and that that incapacity is the substantial cause of his or her inability to obtain remunerative work in which to engage, the veteran shall be treated as having been prevented by reason of that incapacity from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking.CONSIDERATION In considering the application of s 24(1)(c) of the VE Act, we refer first to the analysis of Branson J, with whom the other members of the Full Court of the Federal Court agreed, in Flentjar v Repatriation Commission.[10] Her Honour said that a proper consideration of s 24(1)(c) required responses to the following four questions:1.What was the relevant “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking” within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act?2.Is the veteran, by reason of war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, prevented from continuing to undertake that work?3.If the answer to question 2 is yes, is the war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, the only factor or factors preventing the veteran from continuing to undertake that work?4.If the answers to questions 2 and 3 are, in each case, yes, is the veteran by reason of being prevented from continuing to undertake that work, suffering a loss of salary, wages or earnings on his own account that he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?[10] (1997) 48 ALD 1 at 4-5. A determination of the responses to these questions entails an examination of the facts relevant to each question. Under s 120(4) of the VE Act, the tribunal must decide these issues to its reasonable satisfaction, a standard which equates with proof on the balance of probabilities.[11] Neither party has an onus of proof (s 120(6) of the VE Act), and the tribunal must act according to substantial justice, and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to legal form and technicalities.[12] We also bear in mind that it nevertheless remains necessary for a party asserting facts to adduce evidence which would support a finding by the tribunal that those facts exist, since as a matter of common sense, if there is no such evidence, the finding cannot be made.[13][11] Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327.[12] s 119(1)(g) of the VE Act.[13] McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 at 358.