GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd
[2001] FCA 1761

TRADE PRACTICES - CORPORATIONS – s 12DA Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 – s 995 Corporations Law – s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 – misleading and deceptive conduct by company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange - non-disclosure – where company made announcements to market omitting disclosure of certain known issues relevant to share price of company – information reported to the board by actuaries not disclosed to market – causation – where investor listed investment company

TRADE PRACTICES – CORPORATIONS – meaning of unconscionability under s 12CA Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 and s 51AA Trade Practices Act 1974 – where company resiled from publicly announced position to enter into scheme to purchase shares

WORDS AND PHRASES – “misleading or deceptive”,  “unconscionable conduct”

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51AA, 51AB, 52
Corporations Law ss 995(2), 1001A
Australian Securities & Investments Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 12CA, 12CB, 12DA

Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 452 applied
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Lyndel Nominees Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 475 applied
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 cited
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 cited
Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 cited
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 cited
Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 182 ALR 138 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) 96 FCR 491 not followed in part
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-778 cited
CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2001) ATPR 41-826 referred to
Cortis Exhaust Systems Pty Ltd v Kitten Software Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1189 cited
Pritchard v Racecage Pty Ltd (1997) 142 ALR 527 cited
Olex Focas Pty Ltd v Skodaexport Co Ltd [1998] 3 VR 380 cited
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253 cited
Monroe Topple & Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia [2001] FCA 1056 cited
Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 cited

Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 cited
Henville v Walker (2001) 75 ALJR 1410, 182 ALR 37 applied
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101 cited

GPG (AUSTRALIA TRADING) PTY LIMITED ACN 054 400 761 v GIO AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS LIMITED ACN 054 573 401 and AMP LIMITED ACN 079 354 519
N 213 OF 2000

GYLES J
SYDNEY
11 DECEMBER 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 213 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

GPG (AUSTRALIA TRADING) PTY LIMITED
ACN 054 400 761
APPLICANT

AND:

GIO AUSTRALIA HOLDINGS LIMITED
ACN 054 573 401
FIRST RESPONDENT

AMP LIMITED
ACN 079 354 519
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 DECEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1761
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd initiated legal proceedings against GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, primarily contending that GIO's public announcements were misleading and deceptive, and that GPG suffered financial loss as a result. The case was heard and determined in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue in the case was whether GIO's public announcements were misleading or deceptive, thereby contravening the Corporations Law. The court was required to assess the accuracy of GIO's public statements and determine whether they warranted a finding of misleading or deceptive conduct. Additionally, the court had to consider whether GPG's losses were directly attributable to the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct.

The court meticulously examined the evidence provided by GIO's directors, as well as the public announcements made by GIO. It found that certain aspects of GIO's announcements were misleading or deceptive, particularly regarding the capital position and the prospects of the company. The court concluded that GIO's statements, while not intentionally deceptive, failed to accurately reflect the true financial situation and future prospects of the company, thus breaching the statutory provisions. The court held that GPG's decision to invest in GIO was influenced by these misleading statements, leading to financial loss when the takeover bid by AMP fell through. Consequently, the court ruled in favour of GPG, finding that GIO's conduct was indeed misleading or deceptive and that GPG's losses were a direct result of this conduct.

In light of the findings, the court ordered the proceeding to be stood over to allow the parties to bring in short minutes reflecting the reasons for the judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be stood over to enable the parties to bring in short minutes to give effect to these reasons.

Background

Background to the litigation

The witnesses called by GIO were the Chief Executive and director, Peter Corrigan (“Corrigan”), the non-executive Chairman, Paul Keith Mazoudier (“Mazoudier”) and non-executive directors John Patrick Ducker (“Ducker”), Bruce Malcolm Robertson (“Robertson”) and Peter John Lamble (“Lamble”). This comprised all of the directors who participated in the decisions relating to the announcements by GIO which are in issue. The chief financial officer, Geoffrey Arthur Thompson (“Geoffrey Thompson”) was also called. Much of the matrix of facts is undisputed. There are, however, a number of issues of fact and law as to which I have had the benefit of comprehensive written and oral submissions. I will not attempt to deal with all the matters in dispute. I will trace the salient facts which were in the public domain, then proceed to look at the decision-making by GPG, then return to deal with relevant matters which were not in the public domain before considering the causes of action.FACTS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN GIO was the successor to the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales, which, to use current parlance, had been privatised and floated in 1992. Part of its business was writing reinsurance business, that is, accepting premiums in return for taking a share of risks undertaken by other insurers. This involved potential liability in relation to various kinds of catastrophes around the world. Due to the period for which claims that might arise can take to be notified and quantified it is necessary for the reinsurer to make provision for settlement of those claims. The calculation of the appropriate provision is a complex and specialised task in which the advice of actuaries is necessary. Regulators also take an interest in the topic. It is important to appreciate that this provision is made for events which have occurred (whether or not claims have yet been notified). New events (whether catastrophes or not) are not covered by such provisions. In 1998 AMP made a takeover bid for all of the shares in GIO at an ultimate price of $5.35 per share. AMP had been a mutual life insurance company for many years and was the largest such business in Australia. It also had a general insurance division. The demutualisation of AMP had been completed fairly recently at the time of the bid for GIO. The Board of GIO opposed the offer and the Part B Statement included an independent expert’s valuation of GIO shares, with a mid-point acquisition value of $6.19 which supported the Board’s recommendation that the bid be rejected. In an announcement to the market dated 10 December 1998 GIO estimated that the reinsurance and corporate finance businesses would contribute $69 million to the company’s operating profit, before abnormal items and tax, for the 1998/1999 financial year. Furthermore, in late 1998, GIO’s directors declared a distribution to shareholders of 50c cash per share, consisting of a special payment of 38c per share, being a return of excess capital and a fully-franked 1998/1999 interim dividend of 12c per share. The notification to the ASX included the following:“The GIO Board’s decision to declare a special payment of 38 cents per share follows a detailed review of GIO’s capital position and its short to medium term capital requirements. This lengthy review was referred to in the Part B Statement and has just been completed.The value that a number of leading stockbroking analysts have recently placed on a GIO share, if AMP went away, is greater than the value that many shareholders will receive after capital gains tax if they accept AMP’s bid.GIO’s businesses are performing strongly and our prospects have never looked brighter.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
On 16 December 1999 the shareholders (other than AMP) approved the revised scheme of arrangement, which became effective on 20 December 1999.GPG DECISION-MAKING In 1999 the Sydney office of GPG had responsibility for making investment and divestment decisions in its own right. Those decisions were made by the Committee, which consisted of Brierley, Weiss, Loomes and Cureton. The Committee operated informally, relying upon reports in relation to a particular company or opportunity by a member of the group or one of the analysts employed by GPG, followed by discussion at meetings of the Committee which took place on an ad hoc basis. Although members of the Committee did not have clearly defined areas of responsibility, each member tended to have an in-depth knowledge of particular industries or industry sectors. Loomes’ area of interest was the banking and insurance industries. He had initiated investments by GPG in various insurance companies, and had been a director of a life insurer and an insurance broker and underwriter. He had had a professional interest in GIO since 1996, including the purchase and sale of shares by GPG on his recommendation, and he continued to monitor the company for potential reinvestment. He did this by reading public announcements and brokers’ reports and by undertaking financial analyses. Loomes saw and studied the announcements by GIO and AMP on 24 September 1999 and prepared an investment report, dated 27 September 1999, recommending that GPG invest in GIO. In the course of preparation of the report, he reviewed all public announcements made by GIO to the ASX during the past year. That report needs to be considered as a whole and in context, but is too long to be reproduced in full. Some of the more important parts of it were as follows:“The company has been trying to sell its reinsurance division via Credit Suisse First Boston but without success (not surprising). The group is now faced with running off the tail, hopefully from a strongly reserved position. This reality has brought to a head the need to address the capital shortage in GIO – various reports have put the new capital necessary at $350-400 million.…Ahead of the announcement, GIO was selling at about $2.60 per share. The consideration offered per share comprises –·One $3.05 perpetual debt note, carrying interest at 90 day bank bill plus 1.3%, and redeemable at AMP’s option after five years, to be listed·An unlisted “contingent instrument” entitling holders to two cash instalments·$0.22 less share of GIO Re losses over 1999/2000·A residual payment reflecting GIO Re’s profits over years ended June 2001 and 2002 less interest on capital subscribed by AMP to GIO Re to meet regulatory requirements.”The take-over is to be effected by a scheme of arrangement requiring approval by 75% of shares (excluding those held by AMP) and 50% of shareholders. A meeting is scheduled for mid December. There is a “drop-dead date” of 31 December 1999, and AMP has provided itself with plenty of escape clauses.In the wake of the announcement, GIO shares are selling for about $2.90 ps, a discount that possibly reflects a number of considerations –(1)AMP may have a great deal of trouble getting the scheme across the line in the face of outraged shareholders.(2)Valuation of the debt note may be at some discount from face value – but I do not agree with such a proposition given the success of the National Bank’s recent issue of a similar instrument at 90 days bank bill plus 1.25% pa. See attached newspaper article.(3)The contingent instrument payments are probably totally discounted as GIO Re suffers further disasters and as profit outcomes will be in the hands of AMP itself.I find it hard to believe that there is not a lot of money to be made out of GIO now that AMP has committed itself to this “mop-up” course of action. The consideration being offered is dubious in nature and uncertain; it is grossly inadequate relative to the value to AMP of 100% ownership of GIO; the entire situation surely provides opportunities for an entrepreneurial investor.To offer investors in equities consideration consisting of debt notes and contingent payments deferred for some years is to invite trouble. No wonder the rush for the exits at $2.90. You would have thought AMP would have put in place a cash alternative underwritten by some enterprising broker – maybe the notes aren’t worth $3.05 after all!!!…All of this assumes nil contingent payments, and the outcome on this front is dependent on the performance of GIO Reinsurance. It is not possible to forecast the profitability of this business, but the following points can be made –(1)Liabilities at 30 June 1999 were extensively reviewed and an increase to $225 million in prudential margins was put in place [net of tax, prudential margins are worth $0.25 per GIO share].(2)GIO Reinsurance has stopped writing business, but(3)There is exposure to unearned premiums, and there have been plenty of natural disasters in the present six months – earthquakes in Turkey, Greece, Taiwan; windstorms etc in Hong Kong, US east coast, Bermuda(4)Ahead of the proposed GIO meeting, shareholders will be updated on the position of GIO Re.If we were to purchase say 5% of GIO (cost $91 million at $2.90 ps), GPG would have lots of options and could possibly be king-maker in the AMP proposal these would include –·Do nothing (or indeed publicly endorse the scheme), accept the offer, sell the notes at face value, book $4.7 million profit (15% pa return) and ride the contingent instrument at nil cost (maybe buy more contingent instruments on a secondary market). Seek a seat on GIO Re board to represent contingent instrument holders.·Agitate for higher consideration or reconstructed consideration – remember AMP is making $1134 million on this deal and a clean offer of say $3.50 per GIO share would not make a big hole in this. The contingent instruments are only extending the aggravation.·Negotiate a role in running off the reinsurance tail on a confrontationist, litigious plane, maximising value for operator and shareholders.The downside is that the scheme is voted down or otherwise fails; we are left with $91 million of GIO with a fundamental valuation of $71 million and facing a need to put up another $20 million into GIO in an equity raising. We would have a $111 million problem but then AMP has already has a $1900 million problem and will then have a $2128 million problem. It is very difficult to believe a solution will not be found, especially given the attractive post merger value of GIO to AMP.” (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

On 9 September 1999 Geoffrey Thompson sent an email to Trevor Thompson headed “Private and Confidential” as follows:“Please find attached a capital management update – reflecting further analysis, including incorporation of our latest business forecasts.It addresses part of your information request under item 1.2 of the list provided to me by Phil Simmons.I would like to discuss this with you before you circulate it further.(See attached file: PC Capital memo Update 9 Sept.doc)Please note that this information is to be treated in accordance with your confidentiality undertaking, dated 6 August 1999. Also, in the event that discussions between GIO and AMP on capital matters are concluded we reserve the right to require all documents to be returned to me or destroyed.”Enclosed was a copy of a memorandum from Geoffrey Thompson to Corrigan of 9 September 1999, providing details of changes in agreed capital requirements and the regulatory position since 13 August 1999 BFIC paper “Capital Update to the Board Finance and Investment Committee” was presented. The following is included in this memorandum:“The allocation of funds from the capital raising proposed is intended to address:·Capitalisation of GIO at $380m which meets the regulatory requirements after taking into account $27m in excluded assets. There is no buffer for further deterioration and it will be important to assess the updated net outstanding claims position for experience since 30 June to determine whether this allocation continues to be adequate. Greg Schneider is preparing this analysis.…” (emphasis added) On the same date, Schneider wrote to Mr Verne Baker of Tillinghast (“Baker”) as follows:“I write to confirm our meeting at 2:00pm today, and to confirm the purpose and scope of the matters to be discussed at that meeting.Tillinghast has been retained by AMP Limited (AMP) to advise it on actuarial issues in connection with the possible sub-underwriting for a capital raising by GIO Australia Holdings Limited (the Issue). I am prepared to discuss issues relating to GIO Re’s 30 June 1999 result and current issues facing GIO Re within my area of expertise on the basis that:a)information disclosed by me is kept confidential by Tillinghast, until such time as that information comes into the public domain as a result of disclosure by a person lawfully entitled to make that disclosure.b)Tillinghast applies that information only for the purpose of advising AMP on the Issue, and for no other purpose; andc)a record of the meeting is prepared by Tillinghast, its contents are agreed with me, and the revised record is provided to AMP and treated in the same way as other documents released by GIO to AMP under existing confidentiality arrangements entered into in connection with the Issue.GIO is conducting its own due diligence exercise in connection with the Issue. Accordingly, I have invited a representative of Allens (who are acting on the Issue) to attend, so that the interview is captured as part of the broader prospectus due diligence exercise.”