Gaughan v Causevic (No. 2)

Case [2016] FCCA 1693


FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAUGHAN v CAUSEVIC (No. 2) [2016] FCCA 1693
Catchwords:
CONTROL ORDER – Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) – application for confirmation of Interim Control Order – preventing terrorist act – obligations, prohibitions and restrictions – reasonably appropriated and adapted – confirmation of Interim Control Order made – variation of Interim Control Order by removal of one or more obligations, prohibitions and restrictions.
Legislation:
Control of Weapons Act 1990 (Vic), s.5AA
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss.11.5(1), 101.6(1), 102.1(1), 104.4, 104.4(1)(c), 104.4(1)(c)(i), 104.4(1)(d)(i), 104.4(2), 104.5(3), 104.12, 104.12A, 104.14(7), 104.32
Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation-Islamic State) Regulation 2014 (Cth)
Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s.233BAB(5)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.66A, 79, 140, 191
Federal Court Practice Note CM7
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr.23.12, 23.13
Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (Vic), s.13E

Cases cited:

Amotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137

Henderson v Queensland (2014) 255 CLR 1

Jabbour v Hicks [2008] FMCA 178
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204
Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11
Palmer v Dolman [2005] NSWCA 361
Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844

Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 234 FCR

549

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307

Applicant: NEIL GAUGHAN
Respondent: HARUN CAUSEVIC
File Number: MLG 2056 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Hartnett
Hearing dates: 20 June 2016, 21 June 2016, 22 June 2016, 23 June 2016, 27 June 2016, 28 June 2016 and 1 July 2016
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 8 July 2016

REPRESENTATION

Queen’s Counsel for the Applicant: Dr Donaghue
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Tran
Solicitors for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Senior Counsel for the Respondent:

Dr Neal

Counsel for the Respondent: Dr Boas
Solicitors for the Respondent: Stary Norton Halphen Solicitors

ORDER

  1. Pursuant to section 104.14 of the Criminal Code the Interim Control Order made on 10 September 2015 is confirmed and varied in relation to HARUN CAUSEVIC in the terms of Attachment 1.

Attachment 1

MLG2056 of 2015

Criminal Code (Cth), sections 104.14 and 104.16

Name of Controlled Person:        Harun Causevic

  1. Pursuant to section 104.4 of the Criminal Code, contained at Schedule 1 to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Criminal Code’), the Interim Control Order made in relation to you on 10 September 2015 is confirmed.

  2. This confirmed Control Order has been varied from the form of the Interim Control Order by the removal of Control 2, Control 3, Control 4(iii), Control 4(iv) and Control 4(vi).

  3. The Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that confirming the Interim Control Order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act.

  4. The Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on you by this confirmed Control Order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate…

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AGLC
Gaughan v Causevic (No. 2) [2016] FCCA 1693
Case
[2016] FCCA 1693
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Gaughan v Causevic (No. 2)*, Hartnett J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales considered a dispute concerning the enforceability of an alleged oral agreement for the sale of a business. The plaintiff, Mr Gaughan, sought to enforce the agreement against the defendant, Mr Causevic, who denied that a binding contract had been formed.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the parties had reached a concluded agreement for the sale of the business, and if so, whether that agreement was sufficiently certain to be enforceable. This involved determining if the essential terms of the proposed contract, such as the price and the subject matter, had been agreed upon with the necessary clarity.

Hartnett J found that the parties had not reached a concluded agreement. His Honour reasoned that while there had been extensive negotiations, a crucial element, namely the price, had not been definitively settled. The Court applied the principle that for an oral contract to be binding, there must be a clear and unequivocal agreement on all essential terms. In this instance, the lack of certainty regarding the price meant that no legally binding contract had come into existence.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for specific performance of the alleged agreement.

Orders

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