Garzo v Liverpool/Campbelltown Christian School

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Garzo v Liverpool / Campbelltown Christian School. [2012] NSWCA 151
Hearing dates:7 March 2012
Decision date: 25 May 2012
Before: Basten JA at 1; Meagher JA at 21; Tobias AJA at 30
Decision:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

TORTS- Negligence - Appellant slipped and fell on painted strip of pedestrian crossing within school grounds - Whether primary judge erred in concluding that the respondents were not negligent - Whether the respondents reasonably ought to have known that the crossing was unduly slippery on the date of the appellant's fall

TORTS - Negligence - Duty of care - Whether respondents breached their respective duties of care in failing to repaint the surface of the pedestrian crossing using a paint which was capable of producing slip resistant results when tested in wet conditions - Whether the legal duty requires precise conformity to a specific standard of slip resistance

TORTS- Negligence - ss 5B and 5C Civil Liability Act 2002 - Whether the respondents failed to take reasonable precautions - Whether the risk of harm to a person slipping on the wet surface of the crossing was foreseeable and not insignificant - Whether primary judge was too narrow in the description of the risk of harm that he adopted - Whether it can be established that professional testing should have been undertaken shortly before the accident and, if done, would have demonstrated that the condition of the crossing was such that a reasonable person should have taken steps to decrease its slipperiness

TORTS - Negligence - Causation - s 5D Civil Liability Act 2002 - Whether the negligence was a necessary condition to the occurrence of the appellant's injury
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak [2009] HCA 48; (2009) 239 CLR 420
Amaca Pty Ltd v Booth [2011] HCA 53; 86 ALJR 172
Amaca Pty Limited v Ellis [2010] HCA 5; (2010) 240 CLR 111
Brady v Girvan Bros Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 241
Garzo v Liverpool/Campbelltown Christian School Limited & Anor [2011] NSWSC 292
Harmer v Hare [2011] NSWCA 229; (2011) 59 MVR 1
Harris v Woolworths Ltd [2010] NSWCA 312
March v Stramare [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506
Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5; 86 ALJR 267
Zanner v Zanner [2010] NSWCA 343
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Antoinette Paula GARZO (appellant)
LIVERPOOL/ CAMPBELLTOWN CHRISTIAN SCHOOL (first respondent)
T & J TURNER BUILDING SERVICES PTY LTD (second respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
S Norton SC/…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a slip and fall incident within school grounds. The appellant, Ms Garzo, alleged negligence against the respondents, Liverpool/Campbelltown Christian School, after slipping on a painted pedestrian crossing. The primary judge had found the respondents not negligent, and Ms Garzo appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the respondents had not breached their duty of care. This involved determining whether the respondents reasonably ought to have known that the painted crossing was unduly slippery on the day of the accident, and whether they failed to take reasonable precautions by not using a paint with better slip-resistant qualities, particularly when tested in wet conditions. The court also considered whether the risk of harm was foreseeable and not insignificant, and whether the primary judge had narrowly defined the risk. Finally, the court examined whether any negligence on the part of the respondents was a necessary condition for the appellant's injury, as per section 5D of the *Civil Liability Act 2002* (NSW).

The Court of Appeal considered the evidence regarding slip resistance standards, including AS/NZS 4586:1999 and HB 197:1999, which provided classifications for pedestrian surfaces based on British Pendulum Numbers (BPN). Expert testing conducted by Mr Stephenson, on behalf of the appellant, yielded an average BPN of 50 for the painted crossing, which was classified as having a "low" contribution to the risk of slipping when wet. While some worn areas showed slightly higher results, the worst results were 45 BPN. Mr Stephenson also conducted a test using the same paint applied to a section of the crossing, which resulted in a BPN of 40, falling within a classification considered to have a moderate risk of slipping. The court noted that the expert evidence did not establish that the respondents had failed to meet any applicable standard or that professional testing shortly before the accident would have revealed a condition requiring immediate remedial action. The primary judge's assessment that the respondents had not breached their duty of care was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Nevertheless AS/NZS 4586:1999, Slip Resistance Classification of New Pedestrian Surface Materials was an interim publication of Standards Australia that was to be withdrawn when that agency published a more comprehensive Slip Resistance Handbook. HB 197:1999 (HB 197) was a publication of Standards Australia entitled "An Introductory Guide to the Slip Resistance of Pedestrian Surface Materials". Under the heading "BACKGROUND" it stated that the guide established a basis for specifying pedestrian surface materials for various locations. Its introductory text said this with respect to AS/NZS 4586: Table 1 to HB 197 was as follows: There then followed Table 2 which adopted the concept known as British Pendulum Numbers (BPN) and which was intended to prevent what was referred to as the "inappropriate evaluation of coefficient of friction results derived using other test methods". In this respect BPN measures the slip resistance of a surface using the wet pendulum test although another slightly different measure of that slip resistance is to determine the coefficient of friction. Table 2 provided as follows: The tests conducted by the experts in the present case used the Four S rubber methodology. The document tendered in evidence as HB 197 was not complete as it also included a Table 3 which relevantly provided as follows: In his report Exhibit D, Mr Stephenson at par 4.1.1 said this: Mr Stephenson's report was tendered on behalf of the appellant, but he was not called to give oral evidence. He attended the site of the appellant's accident on 6 March 2008, a little over four months after it occurred and some seven to eight months after the last occasion upon which the crossing was painted, being July 2007. At paragraph 3.1.3 of his report Mr Stephenson noted that he had carried out tests upon the painted section of the crossing in five different locations and directions in accordance with the methodology required by AS/NZS 4663:2004. The wet test results he obtained averaged a BPN of 50 which represented, he stated, a contribution of the floor surface to the risk of slipping when wet as "low". However, at paragraph 3.1.4 Mr Stephenson noted that the areas tested that were more highly worn obtained slightly higher results (52 BPN) with the worst results obtained being 45 BPN on the "best quality paint". I interpolate that I would infer that Mr Stephenson was referring to the brightest or least worn area/s of paint. He further observed that these figures raised the question of degradation of the painted surface and the differences of slip resistance of that surface over time. In particular, it raised the question of what the slip resistance of the painted surface would have been when the appellant's accident occurred, compared to the slip resistance of the surface when tested some four months later. In order to answer this question Mr Stephenson obtained from Mr Turner a can of Rocol Easyline Paint, which he then applied to a small section (150mm x 150mm) of the crossing which coincided with the location where the appellant had said she had slipped. The Technical Data Sheet stated that on application the paint would be touch dry in ten minutes and suitable for light traffic in 40 minutes. Mr Stephenson left the surface for two hours and then conducted a wet test obtaining a BPN of 40, which would fall in the middle of the range of Class X referred to in Table 2 of HB 197.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established