Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   FORREST & FORREST PTY LTD -v- MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS [2024] WASCA 96

CORAM:   BUSS P

MITCHELL JA

VAUGHAN JA

HEARD:   5 & 6 MARCH 2024

DELIVERED          :   9 AUGUST 2024

FILE NO/S:   CACV 53 of 2023

BETWEEN:   FORREST & FORREST PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

BUURABALAYJI THALANYJI ABORIGINAL CORPORATION

Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Coram:   PRESIDENT PRITCHARD

DR S WILLEY, SENIOR MEMBER

MS C BARTON, MEMBER

Citation: FORREST AND FORREST PTY LTD and MINISTER FOR ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS [2023] WASAT 28

File Number            :   DR 82 of 2019


Catchwords:

Administrative law - Judicial review - Where Minister declined to consent to the use of land under Aboriginal heritage legislation - Where appellant sought review of the Minister's decision in the State Administrative Tribunal - Where Tribunal affirmed decision under review - Whether the Tribunal erred in law in regarding the Minister's decision as probative of its own correctness - Terms on which the matter should be sent back to the Tribunal for reconsideration

Legislation:

Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA), s 17, s 18, s 39
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 18, s 27, s 29, s 105

Result:

Leave to appeal granted on ground 1
Leave to appeal refused on grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
Appeal allowed
Tribunal's orders set aside
Matter sent back to the Tribunal, to be constituted by different members, for reconsideration in a fresh hearing de novo

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : K M Pettit SC & A J Papamatheos
First Respondent : G J Ranson SC & J M Misso
Second Respondent : S J Wright SC & V E Long-Droppert

Solicitors:

Appellant : Green Legal
First Respondent : State Solicitor's Office
Second Respondent : Castledine Gregory

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Aloi Holdings Pty Ltd v John Nominees Pty Ltd [2019] WASC 270 (S)

Aung v Minister for Immigration [2000] FCA 1562

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

Broken Hill Cobalt Project Pty Ltd v Lord [2022] NSWCA 271; (2022) 254 LGERA 274

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76

Coastal Waters Alliance of Western Australia Inc v Environmental Protection Authority (1996) 90 LGERA 136

Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407

Commissioner for Consumer Protection v Carey [2014] WASCA 7

Commissioner for Consumer Protection v Murphy [2013] WASCA 89

Commissioner of Police v Thayli Pty Ltd [2020] WASC 43

Development Consent Authority v Phelps [2010] NTCA 3; (2010) 27 NTLR 174

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Field Deployment Solutions Pty Ltd v SC Projects Australia Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 60

Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2024] WASCA 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, the appellant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision under the Aboriginal heritage legislation to decline to consent to the use of land. The appellant's application for review was heard and dismissed by the State Administrative Tribunal, which affirmed the Minister's decision. The appellant appealed to the court, contending that the Tribunal erred in law by regarding the Minister's decision as probative of its correctness. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's approach to the Minister's decision was legally sound and whether the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.

The court examined the principles established in Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, where the Full Court of the Federal Court held that the decision of a primary decision-maker, in this case the Minister, did not have any further probative significance in determining whether the decision was correct or preferable. The court found that the Tribunal had erred in treating the Minister's decision as having independent probative value. Instead, the Tribunal should have formed its own view on the merits of the case, giving appropriate weight to the reasons provided by the Minister where they were persuasive or based on established facts.

The court concluded that the Tribunal had indeed erred in law by giving undue weight to the Minister's decision. It held that the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration, with the direction that the Tribunal should form its own view on the merits of the case, taking into account the reasons provided by the Minister where appropriate, but not treating the Minister's decision as probative of its correctness.

The court ordered that the matter be remitted to the State Administrative Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the court's reasons. The Tribunal was directed to form its own view on the merits of the case, considering the reasons provided by the Minister where they were persuasive or based on established facts, but not treating the Minister's decision as probative of its correctness.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 1 October 1981, a Full Court of the Federal Court (Fox, Deane and Morling JJ) delivered judgment and published their reasons in Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.[5] The hearing of the appeal occurred on 20 July 1981.[5] Collins v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 58 FLR 407. In Collins, the AAT affirmed a decision of the Minister to exercise his discretion under s 13(a) of the Migration Act 1973 (Cth) to deport the applicant. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the applicant's appeal because it was unclear whether the Deputy President of the AAT who heard and determined the applicant's application for review had placed weight on the Minister's decision to deport the applicant as distinct from the Minister's reasons for deciding to deport him. The applicant made the application to the AAT for review of the Minister's deportation order after it was served on him. The Minister lodged a statement with the AAT in accordance with s 37 of the AAT Act, which set out the Minister's findings on material questions of fact and gave the reasons for his decision to issue the deportation order. The statement also referred to a relevant statement of government policy. The Deputy President said in his reasons that, ultimately, 'it has to be decided what is in the best interests of the Australian community, a decision which will weigh up all relevant aspects with which this review has been concerned, and in arriving at a decision some weight is to be given to the Minister's decision … There may be cases where that decision should receive great weight or perhaps no weight … Here I consider the decision should have, and I do give it, some weight' (411). Fox, Deane and Morling JJ observed that the Minister's decision, as set out in the deportation order, gave no reasons and was merely a statement to the effect that the Minister had exercised the power conferred upon him by the Migration Act (412). Their Honours said that the relevance of the deportation order was that it gave rise to a right to invoke the AAT's jurisdiction (412). However, the Minister's decision as embodied in the deportation order '[did] not have any further probative significance in the determination of the question whether, on the material before the [AAT], the decision was the correct or preferable one' (412). Their Honours elaborated (412):The [AAT] must … act in accordance with law and this requires it to form its own view on the merits of the case. Moreover, we do not doubt that, in an appropriate case, the expressed reasons of the Minister may carry weight with the [AAT] because of the fact that the [AAT] is impressed by, or finds itself in agreement with, a line of reasoning or an analysis of established fact which those reasons contain. In such circumstances, the [AAT] may give weight to the Minister's reasons in the same way as it gives weight to the oral argument of the legal or other representatives of the parties appearing before it. There is, however, no presumption that the Minister's decision is correct and the [AAT] is neither required nor entitled to place weight, in the ultimate weighing process, upon the fact that the Minister has decided the issue before him, on the material before him, in a particular way. Putting to one side the position where the decision maker is a person or Tribunal having special expertise where the position may conceivably be different, the actual decision does not, in itself, carry any weight.Unfortunately, the language used by his Honour in the present case leaves us in doubt as to whether, when referring to 'the Minister's decision', he was meaning to refer to the deportation order itself or to the process of reasoning adopted by the Minister in his s 37 statement (which incorporated the reference to government policy). As we have already indicated, the former approach would, in our opinion, manifest an error of law: the latter would not.