FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FON17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 2173 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority acted unreasonably by not considering whether to exercise or by not exercising the power under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to obtain new information. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.473DC |
| Applicant: | FON17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 3929 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 17 March 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 7 August 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Hochroth |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Norton Rose Fulbright Australia |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the Immigration Assessment Authority decision made on 17 November 2017 into this court for the purpose of quashing it.
A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Immigration…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 2173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA's failure to refer to any consideration of its power under section 473DC to obtain new information, and its subsequent failure to obtain such information, constituted jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant argued that the IAA's powers to "consider" and "get" new information must be exercised within the bounds of reasonableness, and that an unreasonable failure to do so could invalidate its review decision.
Judge Barnes considered the provisions of section 473DC, which grants the IAA the power to obtain new information not before the Minister, but clarifies that the IAA has no duty to obtain, request, or accept such information. The court noted the applicant's submission that the IAA's failure to mention any consideration of this power in its reasons suggested it had not considered exercising it. While acknowledging that a mere failure to consider or exercise the power is not automatically jurisdictional error, the court was required to evaluate whether, in the specific circumstances of this case, the IAA's failure to consider obtaining documents from departmental files relating to the applicant's protection visa application had the character of legal unreasonableness. This involved examining the terms, scope, and purpose of the statutory power and assessing whether the failure lacked a rational foundation, evident justification, or was otherwise arbitrary or unjust.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 473DC of the Act provides:Getting new information (1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information ) that: (a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and (b) the Authority considers may be relevant. (2) The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances. The Applicant submitted that the Authority’s powers to “consider” whether to exercise its power to get new information under s.473DC and (if it engaged in such consideration) to “get” such information had to be exercised within the bounds of reasonableness (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18). Reliance was placed on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210 at [82]; DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 134; [2019] FCAFC 43 at [45]; BJK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCAFC 171 at [44] and [49]. It was submitted that an unreasonable failure to exercise either such power could render invalid a purported performance by the Authority of the duty imposed on it by s.473CC of the Act to conduct a review (see Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16 at [21], [49] and [71]). The Applicant pointed out that there was no reference in the Authority’s reasons to any consideration of whether to exercise its power under s.473DC to get any new information. It was contended that in the circumstances of this case it could be inferred that the Authority did not consider exercising that power (see CRY16 at [75]). The Applicant acknowledged that a mere failure by the Authority to consider exercising or to exercise its power would not, in itself, establish jurisdictional error (DPI17 at [39]). However it was submitted that in the particular circumstances of this case the Authority had acted unreasonably in failing to consider getting, or getting, documents in Department of Immigration files relating to A’s protection visa application. The Applicant acknowledged that to establish legal unreasonableness it was necessary to identify the asserted failure with precision; to examine the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory power which the decision-maker was said to have failed to consider; and to evaluate the failure to determine whether it had the character of being legally unreasonable, for example in lacking a rational foundation or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in common sense (see CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641 at [51] and DPI17 at [38]).