Ferguson v State of South Australia (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

FERGUSON v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ANOR (No 2)

[2019] SASC 10

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

8 February 2019

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - COSTS

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - GENERALLY - POWER OF COURT TO EXTEND LIMITATION PERIOD

This Court allowed the plaintiff’s appeal against the orders of a Magistrate dismissing his defamation action against the first and second defendants and refusing his application for an extension of time. Rather than remitting the matter to the Magistrates Court, the Court determined to exercise its discretion as to the length of the extension of time to be granted. The parties put further evidence before it relevant to the application. The Court also heard argument in relation to the costs of the appeal.

Held:

1.  The time within which to issue proceedings in respect of the action for defamation for the publication of the email of 4 June 2014 be extended to 25 May 2017.

2.  The plaintiff have 80 per cent of his costs of the appeal and of the application for the extension of time to be paid by the first defendant on a party/party basis.

3.  There be no order as to the costs of the cross-appeal by the first and second defendants.

Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 37; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 56A, referred to.
Barrett v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 304, applied.
York v Morgan [2015] NSWDC 109, distinguished.
Noonan v MacLennan (2010) Qd R 537, not followed.
Ferguson v South Australia [2018] SASC 90; Barrett v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 304; Pingel v Toowoomba Newspapers Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 175; Casley v ABC (2013) 39 VR 526; State of Queensland v O’Keefe [2016] QCA 135; Houda v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWSC 1036; Rasch Nominees & Anor v Bartholomaeus & Ors [2013] SASCFC 105, considered.

FERGUSON v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ANOR (No 2)
[2019] SASC 10

STANLEY J.

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from an order for the summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s action in defamation against the first and second defendant.

  2. For reasons published by me on 26 June 2018[1] I allowed the plaintiff’s appeal against the order made for summary judgment dismissing the defamation action against the first and second defendant.  However, the action for defamation is out of time.  The magistrate refused an application for an extension of time.  I set aside that order and listed the matter for further hearing on the application for an extension of time, and in relation to the costs of the appeal. 

  3. The exercise of the magistrate’s discretion in deciding the application for an extension of time miscarried.  In his reasons the magistrate declined to extend the time on the basis that the…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ferguson v State of South Australia (No 2) involved a dispute over the extension of a limitation period in a defamation claim brought by the plaintiff against the defendants. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, with the plaintiff seeking an extension of the limitation period to allow them to bring their defamation claim against the defendants. The defendants opposed the application for an extension, arguing that the plaintiff had ample time to bring their claim within the original limitation period and had not acted promptly once they became aware of the publication in question.

The court was required to decide whether the plaintiff's delay in bringing the claim was justified and whether an extension of the limitation period should be granted. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the publication to plead their claim in November 2015 and that they did not act promptly in bringing their claim until June 2016, which was only just within the three-year limitation period. They submitted that even on a generous view, three months after having received the publication was a reasonable and sufficient time within which to commence proceedings, justifying an extension of time to about 14 February 2016 but no longer period.

The court rejected the defendants' submission and found that the discretion to extend the limitation period should not be fettered by the time when the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the publication to plead their cause of action. While the promptness with which a plaintiff commences proceedings is a relevant consideration, it is only one of many factors to be considered in exercising the discretion judicially. The court held that the rationales for the existence of the limitation period in respect of proceedings for defamation require a careful consideration of any likely defences and an assessment of the merits of those defences. The court granted the plaintiff an extension of time to bring their defamation claim against the defendants.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

STANLEY J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STANLEY J

The defendants submit that in deciding the length of the extension to be granted the Court should weigh two considerations. First, at what point the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the publication to plead his claim. Second, whether the plaintiff acted promptly after becoming aware of the publication. The defendants submit that the plaintiff had sufficient particularity to plead his claim in defamation on 13 November 2015 when he obtained a copy of the email of 4 June 2014. He did not issue proceedings for a further 18 months. This was only just within the three-year limitation period. Further, the plaintiff knew from June 2016 that the defendants denied liability and were not prepared to make any offer of amends. In these circumstances the defendants submit the plaintiff failed to act promptly. They submit that even on a generous view, three months after having received the publication was a reasonable and sufficient time within which to commence proceedings. That would justify an extension of time to about 14 February 2016 but no longer period. Accordingly, the Court should not grant an extension of time to 25 May 2017. Consideration I do not accept the defendants’ submission. To adopt that submission would be to fetter impermissibly what is an unfettered discretion. That is not to suggest that in the exercise of that unfettered discretion the promptness with which a plaintiff commences proceedings is not a relevant consideration. However, that is merely one of a myriad of factors to be considered by the Court in the exercise of the discretion which must be exercised judicially. The requirement that the discretion be exercised judicially requires the discretion be exercised by reference to the rationales for the existence of the limitation period prescribed. In that context, I do not accept that the time when the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the publication to plead his cause of action is a decisive consideration in the exercise of the discretion. In Houda v State of New South Wales[13] McCallum J held that what is reasonable in deciding whether to issue proceedings for defamation requires consideration of more than just the known existence of the elements of the cause of action. Her Honour said:[14]A publication is actionable if it conveys meanings defamatory of a person. However, that says little about the wisdom of pursuing such an action, which requires careful consideration of any likely defences. [13] [2012] NSWSC 1036.[14] [2012] NSWSC 1036 at [29]. While that observation was made in the context of deciding whether the not reasonable test was satisfied in that case, I consider the judge’s reasons are equally applicable to the rationale for the existence of the limitation period in respect of proceedings for defamation. The prudently self-funded potential plaintiff in an action for defamation would be ill advised to issue proceedings without assessing his or her prospects of success in the litigation. That requires more than the identification of the elements of the cause of action. It requires an assessment of the defences that might be raised and the merits of those defences.