Ferguson v State of South Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

FERGUSON v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ORS

[2018] SASC 90

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

26 June 2018

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

DEFAMATION - ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION

DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - REBUTTAL OF PRIVILEGE BY MALICE

TORTS - MISCELLANEOUS TORTS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - GENERALLY

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES - DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS - DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS - APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR FURTHER AND BETTER DISCOVERY

Appeal and cross-appeals from interlocutory orders made by a magistrate.

The plaintiff has brought a claim against the first and second defendants in defamation. This claim is out of time.  The plaintiff seeks an extension of time within which to bring the action.  He also has brought a claim against all defendants for injurious falsehood.  In addition, the plaintiff brought applications for further and better discovery of a bundle of Freedom of Information (FOI) documents in respect of which the first defendant claimed public interest immunity (PII).  The plaintiff also brought an application for better particulars. 

The magistrate upheld the claim for PII after examining the documents.  He dismissed the claims for further and better discovery and particulars. The magistrate granted the application for summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim in defamation.  The magistrate refused the defendants’ applications to strike out the plaintiff’s pleadings and for summary judgment in respect of the plaintiff’s claim for injurious falsehood.  The defendants have cross-appealed those orders. 

Held:

1.  The plaintiff’s appeal against the order for summary dismissal of the defamation actions against the first and second defendants is allowed.   The order dismissing the plaintiff’s action in defamation is set aside.

2.  The plaintiff’s appeal against the refusal to order the provision of better particulars is dismissed.

3.  The plaintiff’s appeal against the refusal to order further discovery is allowed. Those orders are set aside.

4.  The first defendant is ordered to provide particulars of the identity of the persons who made allegations to the second defendant relied upon by her in publishing the email of 4 June 2014 and particulars of the extent of the publication of that email.

5.  The first defendant is ordered to produce the bundle of FOI documents in respect of which the magistrate allowed a claim for PII.

6.  The cross-appeal from the refusal to order the strike out of the plaintiff’s pleadings is dismissed.

7.  The cross appeal from the refusal to order summary judgment in the action for injurious falsehood is allowed.  That order is set aside.

8.  The plaintiff’s claims against the defendants for injurious falsehood are dismissed.

9.  Judgment is entered for the third defendant against the plaintiff.

10.  The appeal against the refusal of the application for an extension of time is allowed. That order is set aside.

11.  The matter…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 90
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal against interlocutory orders made by a magistrate in a defamation case involving the plaintiff, a teacher employed by the Department for Education and Child Development (DECD), and the defendants, including the DECD. The plaintiff alleged that he was defamed by the defendants in two separate publications, with the defendants asserting a defence of qualified privilege and claiming the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred. The plaintiff countered that the defendants acted with malice.

The court addressed several issues, including whether the magistrate erred in granting summary judgment on the defamation claim, whether the claim for injurious falsehood could proceed, and whether the magistrate correctly refused the plaintiff's application for further discovery of documents claimed to be protected by public interest immunity.

The court found that the magistrate erred in granting summary judgment on the defamation claim, as the determination of whether the publication was reasonable and whether it was actuated by malice required factual findings that could only be made after hearing all relevant evidence. The court also noted that the plaintiff's claim for injurious falsehood could proceed, as there was no conclusive evidence that the claim could not succeed. Regarding the discovery of documents, the court held that the magistrate erred in upholding the claim of public interest immunity for the bundle of FOI documents, determining that the plaintiff was entitled to further discovery.

The court allowed the plaintiff's appeal against the orders for summary judgment in the defamation action and for further discovery, and dismissed the cross-appeals from the orders concerning the injurious falsehood claim and the public interest immunity claim. The court did not make final orders but remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The magistrate granted the application for summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim in defamation. The magistrate refused the defendants’ applications to strike out the plaintiff’s pleadings and for summary judgment in respect of the plaintiff’s claim for injurious falsehood. The defendants have cross-appealed those orders. Background The plaintiff was a teacher employed by Department for Education and Child Development (DECD) in the APY Lands. He claims to have been defamed by the first and second defendants in separate publications made, first, in or about July and August 2013 and, second, on 4 June 2014. The basis of the claims in defamation concerns allegations of serious misconduct made by the third defendant to the second defendant, who was the principal of the school at which the plaintiff was employed, who in turn published those allegations in an email to three officers of DECD. The first and second defendants plead a defence of qualified privilege and plead that the claim is statute barred. By his reply, the plaintiff pleads that the publication was actuated by malice. The magistrate granted the application for summary judgment in the defamation action. The plaintiff’s claim for injurious falsehood relies upon the same publications. The magistrate declined to order summary judgment on the ground that he could not be satisfied that the plaintiff’s claim could not succeed on any possible view of the facts or the law. He did so on the basis that there was an issue as to whether the tort is wide enough to accommodate any falsehood which does not directly relate to a person’s business but rather affects their standing in a business or professional community. Appeal from order refusing application for further discovery The plaintiff made an application for further discovery of a bundle of FOI documents in respect of which the first defendant made a claim for public interest immunity. The magistrate dismissed the application. The first and second defendants submit that the magistrate was correct to do so on two bases. First, that there is a public interest in protecting exempt documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) (the FOI Act) from being disclosed. Second, that there is a public interest in protecting the confidential nature of the particular disclosures made in the circumstances of this case. The principles applicable to consideration of whether documents are entitled to public interest immunity was discussed by the Full Court in Milisits v South Australia.[1]Those principles are:[2][1] [2014] SASCFC 67, (2014) 119 SASR 538.[2] [2014] SASCFC 67 at [23], (2014) 119 SASR 538 at 545-547.(1) The general rule is that a court will not order the production of a document, although relevant and otherwise admissible, if it would be injurious to the public interest to disclose it: Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 38.(2) However, the court recognises that there are two aspects to the public interest which may conflict. They were described by Lord Reid in Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 9l0 at 940 in these terms:'There is the public interest that harm shall not be done to the nation or the public service by disclosure of certain documents, and there is the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by the withholding of documents which must be produced if justice is to be done.' Those observations were adopted by Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam at 38. Stephen J expressed the competition between these two aspects of the public interest in these terms in Sankey v Whitlam at 48-49: 'These principles, stated in their broadest form, each reflect different aspects of the public weal. Because disclosure to the world at large of some information concerning sensitive areas of government and administration may prejudice the national interest there exists a public interest in preventing the curial process from being made the means of any such disclosure. At the same time the proper administration of justice, of prime importance in the national interest, requires that evidence necessary if justice is to be done should be freely available to those who litigate in our courts.'(3) It is the duty of the court, not the privilege of the executive, to determine whether a document will be produced or may be withheld: Sankey v Whitlam at 38, 58-59, 95-96. As Stephen J said in Sankey v Whitlam at 58, a claim to Crown privilege has no automatic operation; it always remains a function of the court to determine that claim.(4) The court determines whether a document should be produced or withheld by deciding whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced outweighs the public interest that a court in performing its functions should not be denied access to relevant evidence: Sankey v Whitlam at 38-39. In Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 616 the court approved the following observations of Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam at 43.'I consider that although there is a class of documents whose members are entitled to protection from disclosure irrespective of their contents, the protection is not absolute, and it does not endure for ever. The fundamental and governing principle is that documents in the class may be withheld from production only when this is necessary in the public interest. In a particular case the court must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should not be disclosed against the need to produce them in the interest of justice. The court will of course examine the question with especial care, giving full weight to the reasons for preserving the secrecy of documents of this class, but it will not treat all such documents as entitled to the same measure of protection - the extent of protection required will depend to some extent on the general subject matter with which the documents are concerned. If a strong case has been made out for the production of the documents, and the court concludes that their disclosure would not really be detrimental to the public interest, an order for production will be made.'See also Sankey v Whitlam per Stephen J at 63-64 and per Mason J at 98-99.(5) When carrying out this balancing task, the court will give weight to the Minister's opinion that the documents should not be produced but will form its own opinion whether the public interest will be the better served by production or non-production: Sankey v Whitlam at 44-45, 96.(6) Those who urge privilege on the ground of public interest immunity for classes of documents, regardless of particular contents, carry a heavy burden: Sankey v Whitlam per Stephen J at 62; see also Lord Reid in Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 at 400. Speaking generally, a claim of public interest immunity for a class of documents will be upheld only if it is really necessary in the public interest or for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold the documents from production: Sankey v Whitlam at 39.(7) ... [T]here can be no single rule of thumb by which to determine whether a document should be produced for inspection... The fundamental principle is that documents may be withheld from production only if, and to the extent that, the public interest renders it necessary.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would allow the plaintiff’s appeal against the orders made by the magistrate upholding the claim of public interest immunity in respect of the bundle of FOI documents and refusing the application for further discovery. Appeal against order for summary judgment in the defamation action The test for ordering summary judgment in favour of a defendant is whether it is established, assuming the plaintiff’s allegations of fact will be proved, that there is no reasonable basis for the claim against the defendant.[3] It is a necessarily stringent test. The application for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit of the second defendant setting out the circumstances in which she came to publish the email of 4 June 2014. The purpose of affidavit was to establish an evidentiary foundation for the defence of qualified privilege. The magistrate granted the application for summary judgment on the basis that he found that the defence of qualified privilege was made out. He found the second defendant published the email addressing serious concerns relating to the conduct of an employee, namely, the plaintiff. He found that publication in those circumstances was reasonable. [3] Proude v Visic(No 4) (2013) 117 SASR 560. Pursuant to s 28 of the Defamation Act 2005 (SA) a defendant pleading qualified privilege must prove, inter alia, that the publication was reasonable in all the circumstances. In determining whether publication is reasonable, the Court may have regard to various specified matters in s 28(3). It provides:28—Defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information...(3)In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the defendant in publishing matter about a person is reasonable in the circumstances, a court may take into account—(a) the extent to which the matter published is of public interest; and(b) the extent to which the matter published relates to the performance of the public functions or activities of the person; and(c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published; and(d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts; and(e) whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances for the matter published to be published expeditiously; and(f) the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates; and(g) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources; and(h) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s side of the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a response from the person; and(i) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published; and(j) any other circumstances that the court considers relevant. The plaintiff submits that the factors prescribed in placita (a), (c), (d) and (h) are relevant to the determination of whether the publication was reasonable in this case. In his reply, the plaintiff also pleads that the defendants were actuated by an improper purpose in publishing the email of 4 June 2014. The questions of reasonableness of publication and whether the publication was actuated by malice depend upon findings of fact that can only be made after all relevant evidence has been heard. It was not open to the magistrate to find the offence of qualified privilege established in the absence of hearing all the evidence relevant to the defence. The peremptory remedy of summary judgment cannot be applied in these circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established