State of Queensland v O'Keefe

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

State of Queensland v O’Keefe [2016] QCA 135

PARTIES:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(applicant/appellant)
v
CHRISTOPHER LAURENCE O’KEEFE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 9321 of 2015
DC No 3153 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 20 August 2015

DELIVERED ON:

31 May 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13 April 2016

JUDGES:

Philip McMurdo JA and Mullins and Douglas JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal dismissed.

3.   The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS – where a police officer in the internal investigations branch published a briefing note to a superior officer alleging misconduct by the respondent in connection with the investigation of a traffic accident – where the respondent was stood down from duty on the same date the briefing note was published and about 10 months later was charged with the criminal offence of misconduct and suspended from duty without remuneration – where the respondent become aware of the briefing note when suspended from duty and about 11 months later received notice from the prosecution that an indictment would not be presented – where the respondent applied to extend the limitation period for commencing a defamation proceeding in respect of the briefing note – where during the limitation period of one year the respondent was addressing the criminal proceeding related to the alleged misconduct and his suspension without remuneration – where an extension of time to commence proceedings for defamation was granted – whether the primary judge erred in considering circumstances arising after the limitation period’s expiration in deciding whether the test under s 32AA Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) was satisfied – whether it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the respondent to have commenced the action within one year of publication

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10AA, s 32A

Houda v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWSC 1036, considered
Jamiesonv Chiropractic Board of Australia[2011] QCA 56, considered
Noonan v MacLennan [2010] 2 Qd R 537; [2010] QCA 50, followed
Pingel v Toowoomba Newspapers Pty Ltd[2010] QCA 175, considered

COUNSEL:

P J Favell for the applicant/appellant
K A Barlow QC, with A D Scott, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

G R Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the applicant/appellant
QPU Legal Group for the respondent

  1. PHILIP McMURDO JA:  I agree with Mullins J.

  2. MULLINS J:  Mr O'Keefe was successful in obtaining an order from the learned District Court judge on 20 August 2015 extending the time to 3 September 2015 for him to bring a claim for defamation against the applicant.  The parties’ costs of the application were ordered to…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of State of Queensland v O'Keefe, the primary issue was whether the primary judge had erred in considering circumstances that arose after the expiration of the limitation period in determining whether the test under section 32AA of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) was satisfied for an extension of the limitation period for commencing a defamation proceeding. The respondent, a police officer, had been stood down from duty following a briefing note published by another police officer alleging misconduct in connection with an investigation into a traffic accident. About 11 months after the publication of the briefing note, the respondent received notice that an indictment would not be presented. The respondent then applied to extend the limitation period for commencing a defamation proceeding in respect of the briefing note. The Court of Appeal considered whether the primary judge had correctly applied the law in determining the reasonableness of the respondent's delay in commencing the action.

The court examined the primary judge's reasoning and found that the primary judge had considered the appropriate factors in determining whether it was not reasonable for the respondent to have commenced the action within one year of the publication. The primary judge had found that it was not until the full brief of evidence was provided and the conclusions in the briefing note could be tested that an assessment could properly be made as to the likelihood of a defence pursuant to s 30 of the Defamation Act being successful. The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had applied the correct test and had not erred in considering circumstances that arose after the expiration of the limitation period in determining whether the test under section 32AA was satisfied. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal dismissed.

3. The applicant must pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 32A of the Act provides:“(1) A person claiming to have a cause of action for defamation may apply to the court for an order extending the limitation period for the cause of action.(2)A court must, if satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within 1 year from the date of the publication, extend the limitation period mentioned in section 10AA to a period of up to 3 years from the date of the publication.(3)A court may not order the extension of the limitation period for a cause of action for defamation other than in the circumstances specified in subsection (2).(4)An order for the extension of a limitation period, and an application for an order for the extension of a limitation period, may be made under this section even though the limitation period has already ended.”The primary judge’s decision The reasons for the primary judge’s decision are encapsulated in the following paragraphs from his judgment given ex tempore:“I am of the view that the applicant’s solicitor acted professionally and appropriately in having regard to the potential defence of qualified privilege pursuant to s 30 of the Defamation Act in not advising the applicant to commence an action for defamation when he became aware of the contents of the briefing note. I am of the view that it was not until the full brief of evidence was provided and the conclusions in the briefing note could be tested that an assessment could properly be made as to the likelihood of a defence pursuant to s 30 being successful.I am satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the applicant to have commenced an action in relation to the alleged defamatory matter in the briefing note within one year of the date of the publication because it was not until the 28th of August 2014 that the prospective action could be viewed in a manner which took into account not only the allegedly defamatory material in the briefing note but also the basis for the assertions which were made, in the full brief of evidence.”Grounds of appeal The applicant relies on the alleged errors of law made by the primary judge and the question of law raised in Mr O'Keefe’s alternative ground in the notice of contention as warranting the grant of leave. The errors of law alleged by the applicant can be summarised as:(a)failing to find Mr O'Keefe had not shown that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for him to have commenced an action for defamation in respect of the publication of the briefing note within one year of the date of publication;(b)considering circumstances that arose after the expiration of the limitation period as determining whether it was not reasonable for Mr O’Keefe to have commenced an action for defamation within the limitation period and, in particular, the circumstance where Mr O'Keefe’s lawyer formed a view about the defamation claim during the limitation period, but revised that view on receiving further evidence after the limitation period expired.Did the primary judge apply the wrong test?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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