FANG v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 2612
•8 November 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 2612 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Leave sought to amend application to rely on three new grounds in lieu of the single ground in the originating application – leave granted to file an amended application. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 417 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A, cll.820.211, 820.221, sch.2 |
| Cases cited: Angkawijaya v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 450 ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109 |
| Applicant: | LIHUA FANG |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3100 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Smith |
| Hearing date: | 5 September 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 September 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 8 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr C Guan, Paul Guan & Associates |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr G Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3100 of 2017
| LIHUA FANG |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 13 September 2017. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
The issues in these proceedings require an understanding of the details of the applicant’s immigration history in Australia. That history was sufficiently set out in the decision of the delegate of the Minister and is as follows (without alteration):
●On 27 April 2010, you first arrived in Australia, as the holder of a Tourist (subclass 676) visa with the visa condition 8503 - No Further stay, as part of a planned Tour Group;
●On 05 May 2010, you Tourist (subclass 676) visa ceased and you became an unlawful non-citizen after absconding from the tour;
●From 6 May 2010 until 31 January 2013 you were an unlawful non-citizen for a period of two (2) years, eight (8) months and twenty-six (26) days;
●On 12 June 2012, you lodged a waiver request of your visa condition 8503 - No Further Stay. On 05 July 2012 this request was refused;
●On 01 February 2013, you lodged a Protection visa application and were granted an associated bridging (subclass 030) visa C.
●On 05 August 2013 your Protection visa applicationthis application was refused;
●On 26 August 2013, you lodged a review of the departments’ decision with the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT).
●On 19 December 2013 the RRT affirmed the department’s decision;
●On 16 January 2014, the Bridging (subclass 030) visa C associated with your Protection visa application ceased and you became an unlawful non-citizen;
●From 17 January 2014 until 23 March 2014, you were an unlawful non-citizen for a period of two (2) months and seven (7) days;
●On 28 February 2014 you applied for Ministerial Intervention;
●On 24 March 2014 you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 11 April 2014;
●On 11 April 2014, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 11 July 2014;
●On 11 July 2014, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 10 October 2014;
●On 16 March 2015 the Minister decided not to exercise their power under section 417 of the Act in your case;
●On 10 October 2014, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 14 January 2015;
●On 05 November 2014, you lodged a waiver request of your visa condition 8503 - No Further Stay. On 08 December 2014 this waiver request was refused;
●On 14 January 2015, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 14 April 2015;
●On 16 March 2015 the Minister decided not to exercise their power under section 417 of the Act in your case;
●On 26 March 2015, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 09 April 2015;
●On 09 April 2015, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 27 April 2015;
●On 22 April 2015, you applied for Ministerial Intervention;
●On 27 April 2015 your Bridging (subclass 050) visa E ceased and you became an unlawful non-citizen;
●From 28 April 2015 until 4 May 2015 you were an unlawful non-citizen for a period of seven (7) days;
●On 05 May 2015, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 12 May 2015;
●On 08 May 2015 you lodged a judicial review of the departments’ decision to refuse to waive your visa condition 8503 - No Further Stay;
●On 12 May 2015, you lodged and were granted a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E valid until 13 May 2016;
●On 19 May 2015, the Minister decided not to exercise their power under section 417 of the Act in your case;
●On 11 April 2016 the Minister Withdrew from the judicial review;
●On 09 May 2016 the 8503 - No Further Stay visa condition was waived;
●On 11 May 2016 you lodged a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (Subclass 820) visa and a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (Subclass 801) visa application;
●On 13 May 2016, you were granted an associated Bridging (subclass 050) visa E;
●You currently remain the holder of a Bridging (subclass 050) visa E.
The application by the applicant for partner visas was based upon her marriage to an Australian citizen which had taken place in March 2012. One of the criteria for the grant of the Class UK visa was that the applicant be the spouse or de-facto partner of a person who is an Australian citizen: sub-cl.820.211(2)(a)(i) in sch.2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). That criterion effectively also had to be met at the time of the decision: sub-cl.820.221(1)(a). The definition of spouse for the purposes of the Act and Regulations was provided for by s.5F which provided:
(1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is the spouse of another person if, under subsection (2), the 2 persons are in a married relationship.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), persons are in a married relationship if:
(a) they are married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of this Act; and
(b) they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others; and
(c) the relationship between them is genuine and continuing; and
(d) they:
(i) live together; or
(ii) do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.
(3) The regulations may make provision in relation to the determination of whether one or more of the conditions in paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) exist. The regulations may make different provision in relation to the determination for different purposes whether one or more of those conditions exist.
...
(Emphasis in original)
The Regulations make provision in accordance with s.5F(3) of the Act in reg.1.15A(3) which provides:
(3) The matters for subregulation (2) are:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets; and
(ii) any joint liabilities; and
(iii) the extent of any pooling of financial resources, especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iv) whether one person in the relationship owes any legal obligation in respect of the other; and
(v) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses; and
(b) the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for the care and support of children; and
(ii) the living arrangements of the persons; and
(iii) any sharing of the responsibility for housework; and
(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the persons represent themselves to other people as being married to each other; and
(ii) the opinion of the persons’ friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship; and
(iii) any basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities; and
(d) the nature of the persons ‘ commitment to each other, including:
(i) the duration of the relationship; and
(ii) the length of time during which the persons have lived together; and
(iii) the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other; and
(iv) whether the persons see the relationship as a long-term one.
By letter dated 12 August 2016, an officer of the Department of Immigration wrote to the applicant inviting her to comment on certain information and also inviting her to provide further evidence in respect of her relationship with her partner. In response to that letter, the applicant’s solicitor sent by email on 30 August 2016 a number of documents including joint utilities accounts, rental receipts, a letter from NSW Government Family & Community Services and two statutory declarations completed by a neighbour and church member together with a letter addressed to the Minister sent in connection with an application for the exercise of the Minister’s power under s.417 of the Act.
On 26 October 2016, a delegate of the Minister made a decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Class UK visa on the basis that the information before the delegate was not sufficient to demonstrate that she was the spouse of an Australian citizen and so did not satisfy the criterion in sub-cl.820.211(2)(a).
The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. She and her husband attended a hearing conducted by the Tribunal on 13 September 2017 and the Tribunal made a decision on the same day affirming the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
Tribunal’s decision
The reasons for the Tribunal’s decision are accurately set out in the Minister’s submissions at [6] to [11]:
6. The Tribunal accepted that the parties were validly married. However for reasons it set out from [8]−[26], it was not satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others. Accordingly the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the requirements of cl 820.211, which relevantly required the parties at the time of the application to be in a married relationship as defined in s 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
7. The Tribunal had significant concerns about the applicant’s immigration history. It questioned the applicant about aspects of the history, and was not satisfied with her answers. It found that she had been untruthful in her evidence to the Tribunal, and found that her decision to remain in Australia as an unlawful non-citizen indicated that she was willing to breach immigration laws to achieve a desired migration outcome. This brought into question her motivation for entering the marriage.
8. As part of the applicant’s immigration history, the Tribunal questioned the applicant about the protection visa application that she made, and it found that she had been entirely untruthful in the making of those claims and had falsified the claims in order to stay in Australia. The Tribunal did acknowledge that a desire to remain in Australia is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a genuine relationship, but it was concerned that the applicant had entered into the relationship with the sponsor for the sole purpose of enabling her to remain in Australia. The Tribunal referred to the timing of the relationship and the haste with which it commenced — the couple met in January 2012 and were married in March 2012, meaning the decision to marry must have occurred in February 2012. The Tribunal again noted that the motivation of the applicant in deciding to marry the sponsor did not itself mean that the relationship was not genuine. The Tribunal was not convinced with the applicant’s evidence as to how she formed a bond with the sponsor so quickly. The Tribunal was of the view that the applicant never had, nor did she presently have, a commitment to a shared life with the sponsor, and that the only reason for the present relationship was her aim to obtain permanent residence.
9. The Tribunal took into account various aspects of the relationship as it was required to do under the Regulations. It took into account that the applicant and the sponsor had limited ability to communicate and so was not satisfied they provided each other with comfort and emotional support. It took into account the financial aspects of the relationship, but was not satisfied with the documentary evidence submitted as it could have been provided for any couple, not necessarily a genuine one. The Tribunal did take into account there was some pooling of financial resources. The Tribunal took into account that third parties had attested to the relationship. There was no evidence of any social activities, which the Tribunal attributed to the sponsor’s poor health. The Tribunal took into account that the applicant had an adult child, but that the applicant had been unwilling to introduce her husband to her son. The Tribunal otherwise found very little family support for the relationship. The Tribunal took into account that the applicant and sponsor had been married for five years, but was of the view that the relationship would not last beyond the grant of the visa, due to its findings as to the applicant’s motivation for entering the relationship.
10. The Tribunal took into account the physical care the applicant provided the sponsor, accepting that they lived in the same household and that she attended to domestic chores. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the parties viewed the relationship as a spousal one, as opposed to a carer arrangement.
11. The Tribunal acknowledged that there were some aspects of the relationship that pointed to it being genuine, and other aspects that pointed the other way. Having regard to all of the circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others.
(References omitted)
Consideration
At the hearing of this matter the applicant was granted leave to rely on three new grounds in lieu of the single ground in her application.
Ground 1: “Contrary to the relevant judicial decisions, the second respondent has made a jurisdictional error in finding the applicant’s motivation in entering into her marriage with the sponsor...”
The applicant argued, in essence, that the Tribunal found that the motivation of the applicant to enter into the relationship with her husband was determinative of the question of whether the relationship between them was a genuine and on-going relationship within the meaning of s.5F of the Act. She relied upon the decision of Angkawijaya v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 450, a decision of Judge Driver in this Court as well as the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal from Judge Driver’s decision: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Angkawijaya (2016) 236 FCR 303. On appeal, Allsop CJ said at [3]:
In my respectful view, however, the Tribunal elevated love or tender emotion as a factor in the evaluation that does not find reflection in the Act, regulations or proper evaluative process thereunder. That is not to say that such considerations are not relevant and, especially if found to be present, may not be determinative. To love and be loved is the beauty that founds many, but not all, human relationships in which there is a commitment to live as a couple. The approach of the Tribunal at [103] of its reasons may be seen to posit a false dichotomy: between commitment to an agreement for services to meet needs, and commitment to a relationship, as necessarily exclusive of each other. In searching for the factor that distinguished the two parts of the posited dichotomy it appears (as the reasons of Kenny and Griffiths JJ demonstrate) that love in an emotional or romantic sense rose as the discrimen. A couple may have a commitment to each other to a shared life together as partners in the absence of what one might call emotional or romantic love. That is not to say that a mere agreement for money or material support in exchange for being in someone’s company and for tending to their needs (domestic and personal) is a mutual commitment to a shared life as partners.
The applicant conceded in oral submissions that it was permissible for a Tribunal or other decision-maker to consider the motive of a party to a relationship for entry into the relationship. That concession is well made in light of the decision of the Full Court in Angkawijaya: see in particular at [64].
The difficulty with the applicant’s argument in respect of this ground is that while it is true that the Tribunal did focus to some extent upon the motive of the applicant in entering her marriage to her sponsor, it did not find that that was determinative of the question posed by s.5F of the Act. It said, at [11]:
... The Tribunal acknowledges that a desire to remain in Australia is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a genuine relationship but the Tribunal is concerned that the applicant entered the present relationship for the sole purpose of enabling her stay in Australia.
At [12], the Tribunal said:
... In such circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view that the applicant’s decision to marry the sponsor and form a relationship with him, which was done with considerable haste, is nothing more than a means of establishing an opportunity to apply for a visa. The Tribunal acknowledges that this in itself does not mean the relationship is not genuine but the Tribunal’s concern is that the applicant lacks commitment to this relationship and that the only reason she entered the relationship was to enable her to stay in Australia.
The Tribunal further emphasised its understanding in the following passages:
14. The Tribunal acknowledges that a desire for a particular migration outcome is not inconsistent with the existence of a spousal relationship. The Tribunal also acknowledges that the applicant’s motivations could have changed over time. However, for the reasons set out in this decision, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant ever had a commitment to a shared life as husband and wife, either when she met the sponsor or at present. The Tribunal has formed the view that the applicant is not a person of credibility, that her primary aim is to obtain the Australian residence and that is the only reason for the present relationship.
...
25. ... However, the Tribunal has formed the view that the applicant’s sole motivation for entering and maintaining this marriage was to enable her to obtain the Australian visa and the Tribunal is not satisfied that this has changed over the five years of marriage. ... The Tribunal is not satisfied that if granted the visa, the applicant will remain in the present relationship.
In short, the Tribunal did not fall into the error alleged by the applicant and the ground is rejected.
Ground 2: “The second respondent made a jurisdictional error by making contradictory findings”
This ground essentially relies upon the findings in [25] of the Tribunal’s reasons that, on the one hand there were some aspects of the relationship that point to its genuine nature, but on the other, the Tribunal had formed the view that the applicant’s sole motivation for entering the marriage was to obtain an Australian visa.
The applicant argues that those two findings cannot sit together and that that establishes that the Tribunal did not properly exercise its jurisdiction.
The findings made by the Tribunal at [25] are not contradictory. What the Tribunal was doing in that paragraph, as it had done throughout its reasoning up to that point, was to assess each of the circumstances required to be analysed by s.5F read together with reg.1.15A(3) and then to make an evaluative judgment of the whole of the relationship on the basis of those matters. The fact that some of the circumstances of the relationship pointed in one direction did not dictate that the character of the entire relationship was dictated by those circumstances. Clearly enough, there were other circumstances which pointed in the other direction. For example, against the background of her migration history, the applicant claimed to have decided on the very day that she met her husband that she should marry him. That haste, as the Tribunal put it, logically supported the inference that the relationship was not, at the outset at least, a genuine one but only one intended to enable the applicant to remain in Australia. Given the evaluative nature of the task required by the criterion in cll.820.211(2) and 820.221(2) understood in light of s.5F and reg.1.15A, it is be expected that the Tribunal analyses the very indicia of the relationship and considers their effect on the whole of the character of the relationship. This ground is rejected.
Ground 3: The second respondent “had acted unreasonably because its decision lacks in intelligible or evident justification and could also be described as being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, irrational and beyond ‘the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power’.”
In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the plurality explained that the question of whether a decision is affected by legal unreasonableness is whether, having regard to the “terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power”, the decision had the quality of being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, irrational or lacking in evident or intelligible justification. More recently, in Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 92 ALJR 713, the plurality explained that a decision made in the exercise of a statutory power is unreasonable in a legal sense when it lacks an evident and intelligible justification and that that may be so where a decision is one where no reasonable person could have arrived at, although an inference of unreasonableness is not to be drawn only where a decision appears to be irrational: [10]. The plurality went onto explain, as was noted by Gageler J in Li, that the test for unreasonableness is necessarily stringent because the courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion.
It is to be recalled that the decision in Li concerned the failure to exercise a discretionary power, a matter qualitatively different to the consideration of whether the Tribunal’s lack of satisfaction as to whether criteria are met is affected by jurisdictional error. That is not to say, however, that legal unreasonableness cannot apply in circumstances such as the present.
In Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, Justices Crennan and Bell explained at [131] that it was insufficient that different minds might reach different conclusions on the state of satisfaction required by the criteria and that the test for illogicality or irrationality:
… must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
In ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109, the Full Court of the Federal Court said, after referring to SZMDS:
[47] Subsequent authorities have established that, for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reason, “extreme” illogicality or irrationality must be shown “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions and against the framework of the inquiry being as to whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal”. Illogicality or irrationality in that extreme sense may be considered not only in relation to the end result, but also extends to fact finding which leads to the end result, albeit that, as Robertson J emphasised in SZRKT at [151], the overarching question is whether the decision was affected by jurisdictional error...
(References to authorities omitted)
The applicant attacked a number of the findings made by the Tribunal in support of this ground.
First, she argued that many years of the interdependent relationship between herself and her husband were interpreted by the Tribunal as merely a way to secure a migration outcome and that it would stop in the event that a migration visa had been granted. The applicant argued that there was no intelligible justification for that conclusion. That is not so. I have already noted that one aspect of the relevant factual background considered by the Tribunal was the haste with which the applicant came to be married to her husband and the immigration context in which that marriage took place. It will be recalled that at the time of the marriage the applicant was an unlawful non-citizen in Australia and had been for a period of some years. In addition to that fact, the evidence of the applicant was that she and her husband only communicated about basic things about what to buy and where to go, bills and other documents were put into their joint names only to support the visa application and the applicant had no contact with her husband’s family and kept her husband from any contact with her son.
All of those matters supported the Tribunal’s conclusion that, in spite of there being some circumstances supporting the existence of a genuine relationship, the relationship was in fact only one of convenience and a short term one at that: see [25] of its reasons. The fact that the applicant disagrees with that conclusion has no legal impact upon the Tribunal’s decision. It is, according to the authorities, insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error, whether that be described as legal unreasonableness or otherwise.
The applicant also attacks the Tribunal’s consideration, (at [10]), of the applicant’s application for a protection visa. She argues that as it was not the Tribunal who was making a decision in respect of the protection visa application, it was not open to the Tribunal to attack her character by applying its own value judgement as to the claims made by her. It is difficult to understand this particular argument.
In [10] of its reasons, the Tribunal assessed the applicant’s own evidence that, for example, she had wanted to apply for a different visa but had instead made an application for a protection visa and the fact that she did not make any substantive claim in her protection visa but used it as a means of approaching the Minister (presumably for the exercise of his power under s.417 of the Act). The inference drawn by the Tribunal from that was that the applicant had no intention of seeking a protection visa. That was an obvious inference to draw being entirely consistent with the applicant’s evidence.
Further, in light of that evidence it was open to the Tribunal to conclude as it did at [11] that the “applicant had been entirely untruthful in her protection visa application” and had “falsified her claims in order to extend her stay in Australia”. That is indeed the effect of what her evidence was. This particular argument is rejected.
The applicant also attacks the Tribunal’s statement at the last sentence of [16] that “[g]iven their limited ability to communicate other than at a basic level”, the Tribunal was not satisfied that “they are able to maintain a mutually committed relationship”.
At first glance that statement, read alone, does not make much sense. It appears to suggest that the mere fact that the applicant and her husband were unable to communicate other than at a basic level, led to the conclusion that they could not maintain a mutually committed relationship, as opposed to that they were not in a mutually committed relationship. It is difficult to understand the logical basis for such a finding if that is the correct understanding of the Tribunal’s reasons. However, I accept the Minister’s submission that that is not the proper understanding of that sentence. Rather, read in context of the whole of [16], the final sentence is intended to be a summary of the different elements of the communication between the parties considered by the Tribunal in that paragraph. Part of that, was the applicant’s own evidence that she had not told her husband about her involvement in Falun Gong. The Tribunal formed the view that the couple had few conversations about their daily activities. Another aspect was the fact that the husband’s main language is English and while he speaks a little Mandarin this is very basic and not much.
Bearing in mind the approach to the written reasons of the Tribunal required in light of the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, the context of the consideration of the communication between the parties in the whole of [16] indicates to me that the Tribunal was not drawing the inference that no people who have a limited ability of verbal communication, other than at a basic level, are able to form a mutually committed relationship. For that reason, on a proper understanding of the Tribunal’s reasons, there is no illogicality evident in that aspect of the Tribunal’s reasons.
The applicant finally attacked the Tribunal’s conclusion that no weight would be given to the joint account and various bills relied upon by the applicant as they had been changed to joint names in order to meet the perceived requirements of immigration: see [17]. The applicant argues that it would be possible to give that another interpretation on the basis of the fact that they had been given advice in preparing the visa application when they sought professional advice. There is some force in the applicant’s argument in this respect however, ultimately it does not support the conclusion that there is any legal unreasonableness involved in the Tribunal’s decision. That is because the highest that argument goes is that the Tribunal ought to have accorded more weight to these documents because the applicant and her husband had simply acted on the basis of legal advice. In light of the authorities set out above that is insufficient to establish legal unreasonableness.
Overall, and in particular in her oral submissions, the applicant’s complaint is that the Tribunal ought to have come to a different conclusion on the facts before it. That is not an argument sufficient to warrant the conclusion that there is jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The ground is rejected.
Conclusion
There is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision and the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Smith
Date: 8 November 2018
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