Muradzi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Muradzi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 976

Citation: Muradzi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 976
Appeal from: Muradzi v Minister for Immigration [2011] FMCA 342
Parties: TATENDA MURADZI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
File number: VID 642 of 2011
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 26 August 2011
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for visa – application in incorrect form – prescribed method of lodgement not used – legislative intention - decision-maker not permitted to consider  application – application invalid
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 45, 46, 47, 48
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.07, 2.12, Sch 1, item 1229
Cases cited: Fang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245 considered, applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Hayman (1999) 90 FCR 120 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sharma (1999) 90 FCR 513 cited
Onea v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 254 considered, applied
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 considered, applied
Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 cited
Date of hearing: 22 August 2011
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Bonnici
Solicitor for the Appellant: Belleli King and Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr W S Mosley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 642 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

TATENDA MURADZI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 642 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

TATENDA MURADZI
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

26 AUGUST 2011

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This appeal raises issues as to the proper construction of provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) made thereunder.

    THE BACKGROUND FACTS

  2. The relevant facts are not in dispute. The appellant wished to obtain a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) migration visa. The Act and the Regulations had the effect that her application had to be received by the Department of Immigration (“the Department”) no later than 15 March 2010. This was because the only substantive visa which she held expired on that day. The combined effect of s 48(1) of the Act and Regulation 2.12 was that a non-citizen who did not hold a substantive visa could not apply for a Skilled Migration Visa. The Regulations required that the application had to be lodged by means of the…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 976
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Muradzi, appealed against the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court which had dismissed her application for judicial review of the respondent Minister’s refusal to process her application for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) migration visa. The appellant argued that despite her inability to lodge her application using the internet, her application by facsimile transmission should have been considered as valid. The Federal Magistrates Court held that the appellant’s application was invalid because she had not used one of the prescribed methods of lodgement stipulated by the Regulations.

The central legal issue was the proper construction of item 1229(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Migration Regulations 1994, which prescribed the methods of lodgement for visa applications. The appellant contended that the methods of lodgement were not exhaustive and that her application by facsimile transmission should be considered as a reasonable alternative. The court had to determine whether the statutory scheme evinced a legislative intention that an application not made in one of the prescribed ways was to be treated as invalid.

The court found that the statutory provisions required strict compliance with the prescribed methods of lodgement as an essential precondition to the validity of an application and the Minister's power to consider it. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the methods of lodgement were not exhaustive, stating that the legislature had gone to great lengths to make apparent that an application by way of Form 866 was the only way for these matters to come before the Minister. The court held that the prescription of the form was one of substance and not merely procedural, and that there was no room for the concept of a constructive application or substantial compliance with the provisions for a form by conduct falling short of use of the form.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal raises issues as to the proper construction of provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) made thereunder.THE BACKGROUND FACTS The relevant facts are not in dispute. The appellant wished to obtain a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) migration visa. The Act and the Regulations had the effect that her application had to be received by the Department of Immigration (“the Department”) no later than 15 March 2010. This was because the only substantive visa which she held expired on that day. The combined effect of s 48(1) of the Act and Regulation 2.12 was that a non-citizen who did not hold a substantive visa could not apply for a Skilled Migration Visa. The Regulations required that the application had to be lodged by means of the internet, prepaid post or couriered delivery. At 11:00 am on 15 March 2010 the appellant attended the offices of her migration agent. Her purpose was to complete her application and lodge it through the internet. For some unexplained technical reason she was unable to transmit her application by that means. She then purported to lodge her application by facsimile transmission to an office of the Department in Adelaide. This particular office was chosen because it was the only office in Australia where applications for general skilled migration visas are processed by the Department. It appears that she made two attempts to send the facsimile transmission. The electronic date and time stamp on the first copy received by the Department was recorded at 5:01 pm on 15 March 2010. The second facsimile transmission was recorded as having been received at 5:24 pm on 15 March 2010. These facsimile transmissions do not appear to have come to the attention of an officer of the Department until the following morning. A manual stamp was then applied recording receipt on 16 March 2010. By letter dated 9 April 2010 an officer of the Department advised the appellant that her application was not valid. Two reasons for this conclusion were assigned. They were that:·Her application was received on 16 March 2010 – a day after the last date on which a valid application could be made; and·The application had been made by facsimile transmission – a means not permitted by the Regulations. The officer refused to process the application and returned it to her.PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant sought judicial review of the officer’s decision in the High Court of Australia. She applied for a writ of mandamus to issue to direct the respondent Minister to determine her application for a visa. The High Court remitted her application to the Federal Magistrates Court and then enlarged time for the commencement of the proceeding. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the application with costs: see Muradzi v Minister for Immigration [2011] FMCA 342. This appeal is brought from the Federal Magistrate’s decision.LEGISLATION The provisions of the Act and the Regulations relating to visa applications are highly prescriptive. Relevantly they provide as follows.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The post office box and courier addresses referred to in item 1229(3) have been specified by the Minister pursuant to Instrument IMMI 07/057. The post office box specified for the purpose of subparagraph 1229(3)(a)(ii) of Schedule 1 is: Adelaide Skilled Processing Centre, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, GPO Box 1638 ADELAIDE SA 5001, AUSTRALIA. The address for courier delivery for the purpose of subparagraph 1229(3)(a)(ii) of Schedule 1 is: Adelaide Skilled Processing Centre, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 4th floor, 55 Currie Street, ADELAIDE SA 5000, AUSTRALIA.”THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE’S DECISION Although five separate judicial review grounds were relied on by the appellant in the Federal Magistrates Court, each of those grounds turned directly or indirectly on the construction of item 1229(3) in Schedule 1 to the Regulations. The Federal Magistrate upheld the Minister’s submission that the appellant had not made a valid application and that, as a result, the Minister’s delegate was precluded from considering her purported application. This was because the appellant had not adopted any of the prescribed methods of lodgement stipulated by item 1229(3)(a). Her Honour found that the statutory scheme evinced a legislative intention that an application for a visa which was not made in one of the ways identified in item 1229(3) was to be treated as invalid and was not to be considered by the Minister or his delegate. In coming to this conclusion her Honour had regard to the decision of the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 and to the decisions of this Court in Fang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245 and Onea v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 254.GROUNDS OF APPEAL The appellant’s notice of appeal raises what are said to be five grounds. They are:1.In issue is the correct or preferred construction of sub item 3(a) of Item 1229 in Schedule 1 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations)2. Her Honour erred in law in finding that:The reasoning in Fang v Minister for Immigration (1996) 64 FCR 245 and Onea v Minister for Immigration (1997) 80 FCR 254 applies with equal force to the method of lodgement.3.Her Honour erred in law finding that the intention of the legislature is abundantly clear. It is mandatory that, to be a valid application, the visa application must be lodged by one of the prescribed methods.4.Her Honour erred in law in concluding at paragraph 18 of the Reasons for Judgment that the difficulty experienced by the appellant in her unsuccessful attempt to lodge her Internet application for a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) (The Appellant’s application) was an intended inconvenience.5.In issue is the date of receipt of the appellant’s application at the Adelaide office of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. “Grounds” 1 and 5 merely identify issues. The other grounds each raise for consideration the proper construction of the legislation relating to the making and processing of visa applications and, in particular, the meaning and effect of item 1229(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.CONSIDERATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

“Grounds” 1 and 5 merely identify issues. The other grounds each raise for consideration the proper construction of the legislation relating to the making and processing of visa applications and, in particular, the meaning and effect of item 1229(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.CONSIDERATION The appellant acknowledged that her application for a Skilled Migration Visa was not made by one of the methods prescribed by item 1229(3)(a). She submitted that she had adopted an alternative method which was all that she could reasonably be expected to do when she had been frustrated in her attempts to lodge her application using the internet. She contended that the methods of lodgement prescribed by item 1229(3)(a) should not be treated as exhaustive. Both parties accepted that the guiding principle of statutory construction which the Court should apply was that propounded by McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Project Blue Sky (at 390-1). It was that:“… a court, determining the validity of an act done in breach of a statutory provision, may easily focus on the wrong factors if it asked itself whether compliance with the provision is mandatory or directory and, if directory, whether there has been substantial compliance with the provision. A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. … In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute’”. In framing these propositions their Honours adopted views earlier expressed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 at 23-4. The visa application scheme prescribed by the Act and Regulations was analysed by a Full Court of this Court in Fang. RD Nicholson J (with whom Jenkinson J agreed) said (at 278-9) that:“Particular features of ss 45-47 of the Migration Act relevant to a proper construction of them are: s 45(1) asserts that a non-citizen ‘must’ apply for a visa of a particular class. Section 46 introduces the notion of validity as attaching to an application only in certain circumstances, indeed ‘if, and only if’ certain requirements are met. One such condition is that the application is made in the way required by ss 45(2) and (3), that is as provided for in r 207. S47(1) confines the Minister to only considering a valid application for a visa. Section 47(3), ‘to avoid doubt’, enacts that the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application. How much plainer could Parliament have made its intention that an application in the required manner is an essential precondition to the Minister, as the relevant decision-maker, exercising the power to consider and grant a visa? By linking the concept of validity to the use of Form 866, Parliament has spelt out that the use of that Form is of such importance to the general object of the legislation in this respect that it is incapable of partial compliance; to disregard it is to imperil validity of a ministerial act. It will also be noted that none of these provisions relevantly use ‘shall’ or ‘may’ so that the question is properly one of construction of the provisions rather than the characterisation of them as mandatory or directory.Section 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that ‘where an Act prescribes a form, then, unless the contrary intention appears, strict compliance with the form is not required and substantial compliance is sufficient’. The statutory provisions requiring an application form as a necessary precondition to validity of an application and Ministerial power to resolve the application are, in my opinion, a manifestation of a relevant contrary intention. The legislature having mandated the use of an application as a precondition to the making of a valid application, if the applicant does not utilise the form the applicant does not commence on the path providing the prerequisite entry to Ministerial consideration of the application.It is the case that the use by a legislature of the words ‘if, and only if’ does not in all circumstances mean those words should be equated with ‘but not otherwise’. Where the former words were used to provide in an Act that a company is to be deemed to have ceased to carry on business or to be unable to pay its debts ‘if, and only if’ certain matters are satisfied, it has been held that it cannot have been intended to create an absolute statutory presumption rather than a rebuttable one: Cooper & Dysart Pty Ltd v Sargon (1991) 5 WAR 472. See also Sydar Pty Ltd v K Simmonds Finance Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 480. In the present context, where the legislature is patently concerned to define the circumstances determining the validity of an application and to relate the concept of validity to the genesis of Ministerial decision-making power, there do not appear to be present any reasons for reading down the effect of the words ‘if, and only if’.It is the case that the form of application is provided for by the regulations. The form, however, is necessarily imported into the provisions of the Act to which reference has been made so that it is not possible to speak of the former being subsidiary to the latter in the sense that there might be substantial compliance with the Act despite non-compliance with the requirement for use of the approved form: cf Hunter Resources Limited v Melville at 250 per Dawson J.In my opinion, a reading of these provisions makes apparent that the only way in which a visa of a particular class can be obtained is for an application to be made for it on Form 866. Short of that there is no valid application and the Minister is enjoined from considering it. This conclusion finds support in the Note which precedes the Schedule (Classes of Visas) to the Migration Regulations which reads in part:‘NOTE: This Schedule sets out the specific ways in which a non-citizen applies for a visa of a particular class. An application that is not made as set out in this Schedule is not valid and will not be considered.’Furthermore, the statutory provisions are such that I do not consider anything short of use being made of a Form 866 could constitute an application. There is no room left by the statute for the concept of a constructive application or substantial compliance with the provisions for a form by conduct falling short of use of the form. The legislature has gone to abundant lengths to make apparent that an application by way of Form 866 is the only way for these matters to come before the Minister and for the Minister's power in relation to it to be validly activated. In my opinion, this requirement has the result that the prescription of the form is one of substance and is not merely procedural.”