FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Muradzi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 976
Citation: Muradzi v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 976 Appeal from: Muradzi v Minister for Immigration [2011] FMCA 342 Parties: TATENDA MURADZI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP File number: VID 642 of 2011 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 26 August 2011 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for visa – application in incorrect form – prescribed method of lodgement not used – legislative intention - decision-maker not permitted to consider application – application invalid Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 45, 46, 47, 48
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.07, 2.12, Sch 1, item 1229Cases cited: Fang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 245 considered, applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Hayman (1999) 90 FCR 120 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sharma (1999) 90 FCR 513 cited
Onea v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 80 FCR 254 considered, applied
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 considered, applied
Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 citedDate of hearing: 22 August 2011 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Bonnici Solicitor for the Appellant: Belleli King and Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr W S Mosley Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 642 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: TATENDA MURADZI
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
26 AUGUST 2011
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 642 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: TATENDA MURADZI
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE:
26 AUGUST 2011
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This appeal raises issues as to the proper construction of provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) made thereunder.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The appellant wished to obtain a Skilled (Provisional) (Class VC) migration visa. The Act and the Regulations had the effect that her application had to be received by the Department of Immigration (“the Department”) no later than 15 March 2010. This was because the only substantive visa which she held expired on that day. The combined effect of s 48(1) of the Act and Regulation 2.12 was that a non-citizen who did not hold a substantive visa could not apply for a Skilled Migration Visa. The Regulations required that the application had to be lodged by means of the…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 976
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was the proper construction of item 1229(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Migration Regulations 1994, which prescribed the methods of lodgement for visa applications. The appellant contended that the methods of lodgement were not exhaustive and that her application by facsimile transmission should be considered as a reasonable alternative. The court had to determine whether the statutory scheme evinced a legislative intention that an application not made in one of the prescribed ways was to be treated as invalid.
The court found that the statutory provisions required strict compliance with the prescribed methods of lodgement as an essential precondition to the validity of an application and the Minister's power to consider it. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the methods of lodgement were not exhaustive, stating that the legislature had gone to great lengths to make apparent that an application by way of Form 866 was the only way for these matters to come before the Minister. The court held that the prescription of the form was one of substance and not merely procedural, and that there was no room for the concept of a constructive application or substantial compliance with the provisions for a form by conduct falling short of use of the form.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
“Grounds” 1 and 5 merely identify issues. The other grounds each raise for consideration the proper construction of the legislation relating to the making and processing of visa applications and, in particular, the meaning and effect of item 1229(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.CONSIDERATION The appellant acknowledged that her application for a Skilled Migration Visa was not made by one of the methods prescribed by item 1229(3)(a). She submitted that she had adopted an alternative method which was all that she could reasonably be expected to do when she had been frustrated in her attempts to lodge her application using the internet. She contended that the methods of lodgement prescribed by item 1229(3)(a) should not be treated as exhaustive. Both parties accepted that the guiding principle of statutory construction which the Court should apply was that propounded by McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Project Blue Sky (at 390-1). It was that:“… a court, determining the validity of an act done in breach of a statutory provision, may easily focus on the wrong factors if it asked itself whether compliance with the provision is mandatory or directory and, if directory, whether there has been substantial compliance with the provision. A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. … In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute’”. In framing these propositions their Honours adopted views earlier expressed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 at 23-4. The visa application scheme prescribed by the Act and Regulations was analysed by a Full Court of this Court in Fang. RD Nicholson J (with whom Jenkinson J agreed) said (at 278-9) that:“Particular features of ss 45-47 of the Migration Act relevant to a proper construction of them are: s 45(1) asserts that a non-citizen ‘must’ apply for a visa of a particular class. Section 46 introduces the notion of validity as attaching to an application only in certain circumstances, indeed ‘if, and only if’ certain requirements are met. One such condition is that the application is made in the way required by ss 45(2) and (3), that is as provided for in r 207. S47(1) confines the Minister to only considering a valid application for a visa. Section 47(3), ‘to avoid doubt’, enacts that the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application. How much plainer could Parliament have made its intention that an application in the required manner is an essential precondition to the Minister, as the relevant decision-maker, exercising the power to consider and grant a visa? By linking the concept of validity to the use of Form 866, Parliament has spelt out that the use of that Form is of such importance to the general object of the legislation in this respect that it is incapable of partial compliance; to disregard it is to imperil validity of a ministerial act. It will also be noted that none of these provisions relevantly use ‘shall’ or ‘may’ so that the question is properly one of construction of the provisions rather than the characterisation of them as mandatory or directory.Section 25C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that ‘where an Act prescribes a form, then, unless the contrary intention appears, strict compliance with the form is not required and substantial compliance is sufficient’. The statutory provisions requiring an application form as a necessary precondition to validity of an application and Ministerial power to resolve the application are, in my opinion, a manifestation of a relevant contrary intention. The legislature having mandated the use of an application as a precondition to the making of a valid application, if the applicant does not utilise the form the applicant does not commence on the path providing the prerequisite entry to Ministerial consideration of the application.It is the case that the use by a legislature of the words ‘if, and only if’ does not in all circumstances mean those words should be equated with ‘but not otherwise’. Where the former words were used to provide in an Act that a company is to be deemed to have ceased to carry on business or to be unable to pay its debts ‘if, and only if’ certain matters are satisfied, it has been held that it cannot have been intended to create an absolute statutory presumption rather than a rebuttable one: Cooper & Dysart Pty Ltd v Sargon (1991) 5 WAR 472. See also Sydar Pty Ltd v K Simmonds Finance Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 480. In the present context, where the legislature is patently concerned to define the circumstances determining the validity of an application and to relate the concept of validity to the genesis of Ministerial decision-making power, there do not appear to be present any reasons for reading down the effect of the words ‘if, and only if’.It is the case that the form of application is provided for by the regulations. The form, however, is necessarily imported into the provisions of the Act to which reference has been made so that it is not possible to speak of the former being subsidiary to the latter in the sense that there might be substantial compliance with the Act despite non-compliance with the requirement for use of the approved form: cf Hunter Resources Limited v Melville at 250 per Dawson J.In my opinion, a reading of these provisions makes apparent that the only way in which a visa of a particular class can be obtained is for an application to be made for it on Form 866. Short of that there is no valid application and the Minister is enjoined from considering it. This conclusion finds support in the Note which precedes the Schedule (Classes of Visas) to the Migration Regulations which reads in part:‘NOTE: This Schedule sets out the specific ways in which a non-citizen applies for a visa of a particular class. An application that is not made as set out in this Schedule is not valid and will not be considered.’Furthermore, the statutory provisions are such that I do not consider anything short of use being made of a Form 866 could constitute an application. There is no room left by the statute for the concept of a constructive application or substantial compliance with the provisions for a form by conduct falling short of use of the form. The legislature has gone to abundant lengths to make apparent that an application by way of Form 866 is the only way for these matters to come before the Minister and for the Minister's power in relation to it to be validly activated. In my opinion, this requirement has the result that the prescription of the form is one of substance and is not merely procedural.”