EOD17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EOD17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 3323
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa application – application for judicial review lodged 8 minutes late – application dismissed for non-appearance – application for reinstatement – relevant principles – reasonable excuse and prejudice conceded by first respondent – legal unreasonableness considered – reasons of IAA considered – IAA’s treatment of question of applicant’s credibility arguable – application for reinstatement allowed.  

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.03C, 16.05

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.476, 477.

Cases cited:

AAI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1110

BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 792

BTR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 892

BXK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 76

CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCA 1344

Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479

House v The King(1936) 55 CLR 499

Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

MZAKQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1392

MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous

Affairs [2005] FCA 1066

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018)

353 ALR 600

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Applicant

S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59

Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA

1167

Applicant: EOD17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: MLG 2178 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge A Kelly
Hearing date: 9 November 2018
Date of Last Submission: 9 November 2018
Delivered at: Melbourne
Orders Pronounced: 9 November 2018
Delivered on: 21 November 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Bergin
Solicitors for the Applicant: Kerdo Legal
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms McInnes
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The Order made on 13 June 2018 dismissing the application is set aside.

  2. The application is listed for hearing on Thursday, 7 February 2019 at 11:30am.

  3. By 4:00pm on Friday, 11 January 2019 the applicant file and serve any further amended application with detailed particulars of each ground of review and any further affidavit on which the applicant proposes to rely. 

  4. By 4:00pm on Friday, 18 January 2019 the applicant file and serve an outline of submissions not exceeding 10 pages addressing the grounds of review.

  5. By 4:00pm on Friday, 25 January 2019 the respondent file and serve any submissions upon the grounds of review not exceeding 10 pages. 

  6. The costs of and incidental to the Application in a Case filed on 24 August 2018 and the Amended Application in a Case filed on 19 October 2018 be reserved.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 2178 of 2017

EOD17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 3323
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, EOD17, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The application for judicial review was lodged eight minutes late, and subsequently dismissed for non-appearance. The applicant then applied for reinstatement of the dismissed application. The matter came before Judge A Kelly in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether to grant the applicant's application for reinstatement of the judicial review proceedings. This required the Court to consider the principles governing the exercise of discretion to reinstate a proceeding, particularly in circumstances where the initial application was dismissed for non-appearance and lodged late. The Court also had to assess whether the grounds of review proposed by the applicant were "arguable" to a sufficient degree to warrant reinstatement.

The Court applied the principles established in cases such as *CAL15* and *MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection*, which hold that an application for reinstatement does not require the Court to be satisfied of the grounds of review to the same level as a final hearing. Instead, the threshold is whether the grounds of review are "arguable," meaning they are not fanciful, illogical, or devoid of merit, but possess a level of rationality and a basis in the material sufficient for the Court to hear full argument. The Court noted that this assessment is evaluative and discretionary, guided by the principles in *House v The King*. The Minister conceded that the applicant had a reasonable excuse for the delay and that there would be no prejudice from reinstatement. The Court considered the applicant's proposed amended grounds of review, which alleged that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) failed in its duty to consider the applicant's claims in accordance with procedural fairness, particularly concerning adverse credibility findings made by the IAA. The Court found that the applicant's proposed grounds of review, particularly regarding the IAA's treatment of the applicant's credibility, were arguable.

The Court allowed the application for reinstatement, ordering that the dismissed application be reinstated.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The exercise of discretion in favour of an order for reinstatement does not require the Court to be satisfied of the grounds of review to the same level as apply at a final hearing of an application for judicial review: CAL15 at [5]. Rather, on an application for reinstatement, the threshold which is applicable to a consideration of the merits of the application is whether the grounds for judicial review are shown to be ‘arguable’: CAL15, [5] citing MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[6] There, Mortimer J stated at [6]:The threshold is whether a ground of review is “arguable”. That means it is not fanciful, illogical, impermissible or devoid of merit, but has a level of rationality and a basis in the material before the Court sufficient for the Court to be satisfied it is appropriate to hear full argument, with the parties having a fair opportunity to prepare for such argument. Thus, at the level of assessing whether a ground is “arguable”, the Court should not expect a ground of judicial review to be fully developed, especially by an unrepresented asylum seeker whose first language is not English. (emphasis added)[6] [2015] FCA 1391, [62] More recently, in Savrimootoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1167 at [47], Mortimer J referred to CAL15 and described the discretion to reinstate a proceeding as a broad one. The assessment upon an application for reinstatement, which requires the Court to consider whether a ground of review is arguable, is evaluative. As Ryan J observed in MZYEZ, it follows from the principles considered above that the “decision whether or not to reinstate a proceeding is essentially discretionary, and so attracts the application of the principles” stated by Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House v The King[7]: cf BAL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[8][7] (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 to 505[8] [2018] FCA 792, [10] (Bromwich J). I apply these principles in the present application. The Minister conceded both the issue of reasonable excuse and prejudice. However, it was submitted that the applicant’s delay of seven weeks in making the application should not be overlooked. I have not done so. The proposed amended application in a case, advanced a claim that the Order dismissing the application for want of appearance was amenable to amendment under the slip rule. This application was not pressed. It is convenient to consider proposed Grounds 1 and 2 together. Proposed amended ground one of the draft application reads:1. The Second Respondent failed in its duty to ‘consider’ the Applicant’s claims in accordance with the codified requirements for procedural fairness that apply to fast track reviewable decisions as set out in Part 7AA and s 473DB:(a) The IAA made extensive adverse credibility findings on which its rejection of the applicant’s claims to protection and to complementary protection were based.(i) The finding that the reason for the Applicant’s detention between 1986 and 1987 was not plausible despite supportive country information (at [10]);(ii) The finding that the Applicant’s claims of torture at the STF camp or later at Boorsa (at [11]) were not credible and were inconsistent (at [14]);(iii) The finding that the Applicant’s claims of being a person of interest to the authorities following his release from prison lacked credibility and were a fabrication and must be rejected (at [12]), [13], [15], [16], [32], [33], [41]);(iv) A finding about a number of credibility concerns regarding the Applicants claims to events that occurred during the period 2002 to 2005 and fear of being followed and intimidation which were not plausible (at [17] – [24]);(v) The finding that the Applicant’s evidence at his SHEV interview was extremely vague and ought to be rejected as an exaggeration (at [21]);(vi) The finding that the Applicant’s claims regarding Qatar and the ransacking of his room in Qatar were inconsistent and a fabrication and not plausible (at [25] – [27]);(vii) The finding that the Applicant’s claims regarding the incidents that occurred on his return to Sri Lanka in 2012 were not credible and were fabricated to boost his claims for protection (at [28]) regarding a phone call (at [29]), armed men looking for him (at [30]) and the Karuna group kicking down his door (at [31]);(vii) The finding on the complementary protection assessment which was wholly based on adverse credibility findings made in assessment of the applicant’s claims to be a refugee (at [53], [54]).(b) The Applicant’s credibility was material to the Second Respondent’s decision.(c) In those particular circumstances, the Second Respondent was required consider a submission, being an oral or written submission or both, made by or on behalf of the Applicant.