EKN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EKN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1135

Appeal from: EKN17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3589
File number: NSD 2204 of 2018
Judge: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 25 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to take into account the possibility it was wrong – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision involved illogical reasoning – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority conducted the “review” contemplated by s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – failure to conduct the “review” contemplated – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority erred in equating a “low risk” with a “remote chance” of harm – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider the reasonably foreseeable future – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pts 7 and 7AA, ss 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CC, 473DB(1), 473DC
Cases cited:

AIE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  [2018] FCA 610

AKR17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1684

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

CDW18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 270

Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQKB (2012) 133 ALD 495

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220

MZXSA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 123

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 CLR 600

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 152

SZGHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 16 May 2019
Date of last submissions: 12 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 106
Counsel for the Appellant (hearing): The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Appellant (written submissions): Mr B Zipser
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms A Carr
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 2204 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EKN17

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In EKN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant challenged the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to dismiss his application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant, a failed asylum seeker, sought to remain in Australia on the basis of fear of persecution if returned to Iraq. The IAA had found that the appellant would not be of interest to the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) militia, which had previously threatened him, and that he was therefore not at risk of persecution if returned to Iraq.

The court considered several legal issues, including whether the IAA failed to take into account the possibility it was wrong, whether the IAA’s decision involved illogical reasoning, and whether the IAA conducted the "review" contemplated by s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court found that the IAA had erred in equating a "low risk" with a "remote chance" of harm, and that the IAA had failed to conduct the "review" contemplated by s 473CC. The court found that the IAA had fallen into jurisdictional error in failing to consider the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found that the IAA had not considered whether the appellant would be of interest to the AAH in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that this was a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the IAA had failed to take into account the possibility it was wrong in relation to the appellant’s credibility, and that this was a jurisdictional error. The court found that the IAA had failed to consider whether the appellant had previously stated that his parents had kept the August 2013 letter, and that this was a jurisdictional error. The court found that the IAA had failed to consider whether the appellant’s evidence was inherently implausible, and that this was a jurisdictional error. The court found that the IAA had failed to consider whether there were any explanations for why the appellant’s parents did not keep the August 2013 letter, and that this was a jurisdictional error. The court found that the IAA had failed to consider whether the appellant would be of interest to the AAH in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that this was a jurisdictional error.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, and ordered that a writ of certiorari be directed to the second respondent to quash the decision of 1 September 2017, and that a writ of mandamus be directed to the second respondent to exercise the power under s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law. The court ordered that the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside, and in lieu thereof there issue absolute in the first instance:

(a) a writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent to quash the decision of 1 September 2017; and

(b) a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent to exercise the power under s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

4. Any application with respect to costs of the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court be made within 7 days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The 8 September 2014 letter stated:This warning is directed at [the appellant].Our Islamic Resistance men investigated you and they received information that you have travelled abroad.The information we have is that you have fled Iraq to an unknown destination. This is the case with all cowards and collaborators and spies.Therefore we urge all members of our Islamic Resistance to search more and more for the traitor [the appellant]. He who may found out his whereabouts, anytime, anywhere, should murder him without mercy and apply the punishment of Allah and the league of the Righteous ones by killing him.Victory is for the Islamic Resistance.Islamic Resistance in Iraq (Asaeb Ahl Al-Haq)Holy Najaf08/09/2014The Delegate’s Decision The delegate did not accept that either of these letters, or the letter of August 2013 referred to in the statutory declaration, had been received. She reached this adverse conclusion pointing out, amongst other things, that there was a “lack of security features” in the threat letters alleged to have been sent by the militia, which made it difficult to verify their authenticity. The delegate:(1)stated: “it seems illogical that [the AAH] would send him letters after not acting on the threats they issued over the phone, when they apparently knew his home address”; and(2)referred to: “the illogicality of the AAH sending letters to the applicant rather than harming him when they had an opportunity to do so and when they knew of his whereabouts”. The delegate was not concerned by the fact that the letters dated 22 February 2013 and 8 September 2014 had not been mentioned in the appellant’s statutory declaration. The delegate expressed what she accepted in the following way:•[The appellant] was born in [Town A].•He is a Shia Muslim.•In 2013, he was working as a taxi driver. He was driving three passengers to [Town A] city centre. One passenger initiated a conversation about the leaders of militant groups operating in southern Iraq.•He insulted Moqtada Al-Sadr (leader of the Mahdi Army). The passengers agreed with his assessment of Al-Sadr. They asked him what he thought of Qais Al-Khazali (leader of Shia militia Asa’ib al-Haq/AAH). The applicant insulted him. The passenger threatened to cut his tongue off, and produced a gun from underneath his shirt. It became apparent that the passenger was a leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.•He dropped the passengers off near a cemetery. The Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq leader threatened him with his gun, photographed his vehicle and took his phone number.•The applicant apologised to the men. He was told that the apology would only be accepted if he joined Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. •He reported the incident to the police. They wrote an incident report but told him that nothing more could be done.•He has received two phone calls from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.•If he returned to Iraq, he would do so as a failed asylum seeker from the West. However, the delegate recorded that she did not accept that:•The AAH sought to recruit [the appellant].•He received letters from the AAH, threatening him for not joining their group.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first issue arises from the sentence at A[8] emphasised in the following extract (emphasis added):In considering whether the applicant would remain of any interest to the AAH after some four years, he contended in his statutory declaration that in August 2013 his family found a threat letter saying that “death is coming even after a while”. The delegate asked the applicant about this at the PV interview. The applicant stated that his parents had received the letter but when he asked them to send it to him in Australia they said they no longer had it. The applicant however then provided two further typed documents bearing the AAH letterhead and watermark. These documents are dated 22 February 2013 and 8 September 2014 … In his statutory declaration of March 2016 the only threat letter mentioned was that of August 2013, which he now states his parents did not keep. I am not satisfied that the documents provided at the PV interview are genuine. I am not satisfied that any threat letter has been received by his family at any point since he has departed Iraq. The use of the word “now” in the underlined passage might suggest that the Authority considered the appellant had changed his account of relevant events – that is, that he had previously stated his parents had kept the letter, but “now” (presumably at the PV interview) asserted the contrary. If the Authority had so reasoned, that would have involved error. There was nothing in the material before this Court (or the Federal Circuit Court) which indicated that the appellant had previously stated that his family had kept the August 2013 letter. However, neither Counsel contended that the underlined sentence should be read as indicating that the Authority considered the appellant had changed his account in relation to whether his parents had kept the August 2013 letter. Accordingly, the first issue can be put to one side. I would note that the underlined sentence indicates that the decision-maker took an adverse view as to the appellant’s credibility on this issue. The Authority’s use of the word “now”, read in the context of A[8] as a whole, implies scepticism or disbelief in the account the appellant gave at the PV interview. The sentence is immediately followed by two sentences which necessarily involve adverse credibility findings. Perhaps the Authority considered it was implausible that the appellant’s family would not have kept the August 2013 letter if it had truly been received. Perhaps it considered that, for some reason, the appellant should have mentioned earlier than he did that his family had not kept the August 2013 letter. The reasons do not expose why the Authority took the adverse view it did. The appellant’s evidence referred to at A[8] – that when he asked his parents to send him the August 2013 letter they said they no longer had it – was not inherently implausible. There could have been any number of explanations for his parents not keeping the letter, none of which appears to have been explored. The Second Issue