FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EEI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1071
Appeal from: EEI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 2900 File number: WAD 259 of 2020 Judgment of: JACKSON J Date of judgment: 13 September 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from dismissal of application for judicial review of decision by Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse application for medical treatment visa - Tribunal found that appellant did not genuinely intend to stay temporarily for medical treatment as required - no bias - no illogicality or irrationality - appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 29, 31, 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.01, 2.02, 2.03, Schedule 1 item 1214A, Schedule 2 cls 602.2, 602.211, 602.212, 602.215
Cases cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Hutchinson v Comcare (No 2) [2021] FCA 284
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
Zaki v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1822
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 39 Date of hearing: 7 September 2022 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Papalia Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 259 of 2020 BETWEEN: EEI20
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JACKSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 SEPTEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant must pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed on a lump sum basis.
3.On or before 4.00 pm AWST on 27 September 2022, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs.
4.In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs is referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JACKSON J:
This is a migration appeal concerning an application for a Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) visa (subclass 602). The Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it then was) dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse the…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1071
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the AAT had not made a mistake in its review, as the appellant had failed to identify any error in the decision. The court also found that the AAT had properly considered the appellant's medical treatment, as it had engaged in detail with all the medical evidence presented. Furthermore, the court held that the AAT's finding that the appellant did not genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of receiving medical treatment was not illogical or irrational, and was based on the evidence before it. The court concluded that the appellant's migration history and other factors supported the AAT's conclusion that the appellant sought the medical treatment visa as another 'available option' to remain in Australia. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed on a lump sum basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed on a lump sum basis.
3. On or before 4.00 pm AWST on 27 September 2022, the parties must file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs.
4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs is referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant filed no written submissions despite having been directed to do so, and his brief oral submissions will be described in the course of considering the appeal, to which I now turn.Consideration Generally, if a proposed new ground has no merit, there will be no justification for permitting it to be raised for the first time before the appellate court: see VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [48]. Here, ground 1 has no merit, so leave to raise it will be refused. The ground refers by way of particulars to statements made in the Tribunal's reasons which indicate that the Tribunal had formed views adverse to the appellant, to the effect that there were reasonable inferences open based on his migration history; that he only sought an appointment with the doctor because the Tribunal had asked for evidence of treatment; and that he sought the medical visa for the primary purpose of extending his stay in Australia. The ground also mentions that the Tribunal accepted and the Federal Circuit Court affirmed that the appellant suffered from depression and anxiety. It is not clear how that point bears on the subject of proposed ground 1, prejudgement or bias. But I infer that the appellant's point is that the acceptance that he was suffering from depression and anxiety should have led inexorably to a conclusion that he genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose of treating those conditions. He appears to contend that the Tribunal's contrary conclusion indicates that it was biased or, at least, would cause a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal's mind was closed to persuasion. The difficulty for the appellant is that he is relying on the Tribunal's expression of its reasons for reaching the decision as a basis to assert bias. But the mere fact that the Tribunal has reached adverse conclusions by the time it starts to give its reasons for decision cannot establish prejudgement or a reasonable apprehension of bias. By that time, the hearing has occurred and the submissions and other material put to the Tribunal have been considered. It is to be expected that the Tribunal has formed definite views by then. In Hutchinson v Comcare (No 2) [2021] FCA 284 at [47] I said that it is 'possible to conceive of a case in which the preponderance of material in front of a decision-maker is so overwhelmingly in favour of a certain outcome that, when the decision-maker does not refer to the material, that bespeaks prejudgment and bias'. But, as von Doussa J said in SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38], it will be a 'rare and exceptional case where actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons for decision'. On no view is this such a case, and nor does any reasonable apprehension of bias arise (assuming in the appellant's favour that such an objection can be put after the decision is handed down). The Tribunal's reasons show no more than it had considered the evidence and information before it and reached conclusions on the basis of that material. The Tribunal's reference at para 25 (reproduced at [14] above) to it having formed an initial view about the reason the appellant made his first appointment with the doctor does not bespeak prejudgement or bias. There is no requirement for decision‑makers to keep their minds entirely free of any view on any aspect of a matter until the last moment of making a decision: see e.g. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [192]; Zaki v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1822 at [104]. Further, an allegation of actual or apprehended bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved: Jia at [69]. And to the contrary of any suggestion of bias here, the Tribunal gave the appellant three hearings and multiple opportunities and reminders to provide information in support of his visa application. It also, as I have mentioned, gave him the benefit of the doubt on several points, describing his evidence on such points as 'light'.