FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EBO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1227
Appeal from: EBO17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 437 File number: NSD 431 of 2018 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 17 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application to further amend notice of appeal to raise and rely only on three grounds of judicial review which were not before the primary judge – Held: leave refused, appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA Cases cited: AYF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 129
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 158 ALD 198
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1
Date of hearing: 15 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 58 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Swan Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hughes Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 431 of 2018 BETWEEN: EBO17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted to the appellant to file the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018.
2.Leave for the appellant to rely on the grounds of appeal set out in the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018 is refused.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
Introduction
This appeal is from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 26 February 2018. By those orders the appellant was granted leave to rely on his amended application dated 26 February 2018 but the amended application was dismissed, with costs.
The appellant arrived in Australia by boat on 22 March 2013 and he was given an entry interview on 28 March 2013. On 19 May 2016 the appellant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection visa (TPV). A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate) refused to grant the visa on 9 November 2016, and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) referred the matter to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) on 16 November 2016.
On 18 August 2017, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the appellant a TPV.
The appellant is a national…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues in this case were whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal and if the appeal itself should be dismissed. The court had to consider the interests of justice, the risk of the appellate court becoming the court of first instance, and the adequacy of the appellant's explanation for not raising these grounds earlier.
The court found that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the appellant leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal. The court reasoned that the appellant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for not raising these grounds before the primary judge and that granting leave would risk turning the appellate court into the court of first instance. The court also considered the apparent merits of the proposed new grounds, finding them to be without merit or legally flawed. The court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to rely on these new grounds, and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The court's final orders included granting leave to the appellant to file a further amended notice of appeal, refusing leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal, dismissing the appeal, and ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted to the appellant to file the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018.
2. Leave for the appellant to rely on the grounds of appeal set out in the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018 is refused.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant's case initially came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where a decision was rendered. The appellant then sought to appeal this decision. In the course of the appeal process, the appellant applied to further amend the notice of appeal to include new grounds of judicial review that were not presented before the primary judge. This application was considered by the court, which ultimately decided on the leave to rely on these new grounds and the appeal's outcome.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the Minister submitted that new information in terms of s 473DC was, relevantly, a document that was not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision. The three documents of which the appellant complained fell into the category of the departmental file. The first document was one which the appellant apparently provided to the delegate and so it was not new information. That showed that it was not a legitimate form of reasoning to say that only the pieces of country information footnoted in the delegate’s decision were before the delegate. There was plainly a category of material that was before the delegate because the appellant provided it. The same applied to the other two documents. The Court Book was an inadequate factual record to be deciding this factual question. There was also an issue, counsel submitted, as to the materiality of these documents.Consideration Counsel for the appellant accepted that each of the three issues he sought to agitate on the appeal were new: they were not before the primary judge. It follows, as counsel accepted, that the appellant needs leave to rely on these new issues. One factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave is whether or not the appellant was legally represented before the primary judge. He was. He accepted that there was no adequate explanation for why the grounds now sought to be advanced were not raised before the primary judge. Another factor to bear in mind is the risk of this Court in its appellate jurisdiction becoming the court of first instance as the primary judge has not considered these proposed new grounds. This consideration has an added dimension where questions of fact are involved. The overall question is the interests of justice in the particular case. The apparent merits, or lack of merits, of the proposed new grounds are relevant. Turning to proposed ground 1a, I am not prepared to assume that the certificate was not drawn to the appellant’s attention. There is no application before me pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. I find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. I refer to [52]-[54] above. Leave to rely on this ground is refused. I am also bound to follow BBS16 and AYF16. I do not accede to the invitation on behalf of the appellant to grant leave to rely on this ground and refer the matter to a Full Court. In relation to proposed ground 1b, I also find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. I refer again to [52]-[54] above. As articulated, the proposed ground has no merit. It comes close to saying that because the Authority could have exercised the power, it was legally unreasonable for it not to have done so, compare Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [15] per Kiefel CJ. Leave to rely on this ground is refused. In relation to proposed ground 1c, I am not prepared to assume or to draw the inference that the material mentioned in the impugned footnotes was not before the delegate when the delegate made the decision under s 65 and I am therefore not prepared to assume or infer that the material was “new information” within the meaning of s 473DC(1). The date of the primary decision was 9 November 2016. The material in the footnotes dates from 2008, 2012 and 2013. Indeed, footnote 4, as I read it, refers to an article provided by the appellant at the TPV interview. It seems likely that the material in the other two footnotes is in the same category. I am certainly not prepared to find the opposite. Again, there is no application before me under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. This proposed ground in particular shows the risk of this Court on appeal being asked to perform for the first time the task of the Federal Circuit Court. I find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. Leave to rely on this ground is refused.Conclusion and orders