EBO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EBO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1227

Appeal from: EBO17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 437
File number: NSD 431 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 17 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application to further amend notice of appeal to raise and rely only on three grounds of judicial review which were not before the primary judge – Held: leave refused, appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA
Cases cited:

AYF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 129

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 158 ALD 198

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 15 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: Swan Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 431 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EBO17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is granted to the appellant to file the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018.

2.Leave for the appellant to rely on the grounds of appeal set out in the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018 is refused.

3.The appeal is dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 26 February 2018.  By those orders the appellant was granted leave to rely on his amended application dated 26 February 2018 but the amended application was dismissed, with costs.

  2. The appellant arrived in Australia by boat on 22 March 2013 and he was given an entry interview on 28 March 2013.  On 19 May 2016 the appellant lodged an application for a Temporary Protection visa (TPV). A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate) refused to grant the visa on 9 November 2016, and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) referred the matter to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) on 16 November 2016.

  3. On 18 August 2017, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the appellant a TPV.

  4. The appellant is a national…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1227
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of EBO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellant, a Pakistani national and Shia Muslim from Parachinar, who sought to appeal the decision of the Authority to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant claimed to face persecution in Pakistan due to his religion, ethnicity, and perceived associations with groups opposing the Taliban. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed his appeal, and the appellant sought to amend his notice of appeal to include three new grounds of judicial review that were not before the primary judge.

The key legal issues in this case were whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal and if the appeal itself should be dismissed. The court had to consider the interests of justice, the risk of the appellate court becoming the court of first instance, and the adequacy of the appellant's explanation for not raising these grounds earlier.

The court found that it was not in the interests of justice to grant the appellant leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal. The court reasoned that the appellant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for not raising these grounds before the primary judge and that granting leave would risk turning the appellate court into the court of first instance. The court also considered the apparent merits of the proposed new grounds, finding them to be without merit or legally flawed. The court concluded that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to rely on these new grounds, and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

The court's final orders included granting leave to the appellant to file a further amended notice of appeal, refusing leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal, dismissing the appeal, and ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the appellant to file the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018.

2. Leave for the appellant to rely on the grounds of appeal set out in the “Further Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia” dated 8 August 2018 is refused.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant is a Pakistani national, a Shia Muslim, and an ethnic Pashtun from the Pesh-e-Imam neighbourhood of Parachinar city in the Kurram Agency. He arrived in Australia on 3 March 2013, having previously lived in the United Arab Emirates. The appellant claims to fear harm from the Taliban due to his religion, his ethnicity, his status as a returnee from a Western country, and his association with a group working against the Taliban. He asserts that he was a target for abduction and killing by the Taliban and Sunni Muslims in Pakistan due to his Shia identity and his family's prominence. The appellant also claims that he was threatened by the Taliban because of his support for the Haidari Blood Bank group. He believes that returning to Pakistan would put him at significant risk of persecution and serious harm.

The appellant's case initially came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where a decision was rendered. The appellant then sought to appeal this decision. In the course of the appeal process, the appellant applied to further amend the notice of appeal to include new grounds of judicial review that were not presented before the primary judge. This application was considered by the court, which ultimately decided on the leave to rely on these new grounds and the appeal's outcome.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant is a national of Pakistan, a Shia Muslim, and an ethnic Pashtun who originated from the Pesh-e-Imam neighbourhood of Parachinar city in the Kurram Agency. He claimed to fear harm from the Taliban due to his religion, his ethnicity, as a returnee from a Western country, and because of his association with a group working against the Taliban. The decision of the Authority The Authority, at [7], said that it had obtained new information about Shia Muslims in Pakistan and about Shia Muslims from Parachinar and Upper Kurram specifically. All of this information was published after the date of the delegate’s decision and, given this, and given that the information provided updated information about the developing situation in Pakistan for Shia Muslims, and for Shia Muslims from Parachinar and Upper Kurram specifically, the Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this information. The Authority, at [8], summarised the appellant’s claims as follows:•From 2008 to 2009 he was studying pre-engineering in Peshawar with a view to matriculating to university. He resided at a Peshawar student hostel with other Parachinar Shia students and in May 2008 one of his friends from the hostel was found dead in Peshawar having been shot by unidentified men. After this the applicant and some other students began to receive threating telephone calls. The hostel frequently received letters from the Taliban threatening the Parachinar Shia students who stayed there. He claims that in November 2009 his uncle was abducted from Peshawar while they were shopping together and that his uncle’s kidnappers subsequently informed the applicant that he (the applicant) had been their target. The applicant returned to Parachinar where he received several further threatening telephone calls from his uncle’s abductors. The applicant suspects that the perpetrators were either the Taliban and/or Sunni Muslims who had to leave Parachinar in 2007. He considers that he was targeted because he was a Parachinar Shia pursuing higher education.•In May/June 2010 the applicant began to drive a taxi within Parachinar in Shia areas, and sometimes he supported the Haidari Blood Bank group by driving employees around to different areas for blood donation. Some time at the end of 2010 he received threatening calls from the Taliban. They told him that he was supporting the Shia community by supporting the medical system for Shias and that he was on their target list to kidnap and kill. His life was in danger because they would kill him as an infidel, and at this time they were targeting all who were supporting the Shia community. He considers that he may also have been targeted because he came from a wealthy family and his father was a famous and prominent elder.•He decided to leave the country and in February 2011 he travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where he worked as a taxi driver until early January 2013, when he was deported from the UAE with many other Shia Muslims. He was too scared to return to Parachinar other than to briefly visit his family, and was too scared of the Taliban to continue living there. He went to Islamabad and departed from the Islamabad airport on 3 March 2013 with the intention of travelling onward to Australia.•He fears that he will suffer the same fate as his kidnapped uncle. He fears sectarian groups like the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Islamic State (or ISIS) which have threatened and perpetrated attacks against Shia Muslims throughout the country. He also fears Sunni Muslims who have been displaced from Parachinar and who are now working with these groups and who will target him as a Shia Muslim from Parachinar. He also fears that he will be targeted by these actors because he was a Shia Muslim pursuing higher education, from a wealthy family, whose father was a famous and prominent elder. He also fears that if he returns to Pakistan he will suffer persecution and serious harm as a returnee from Australia who will be treated as an infidel and a spy for westerners and Australians, and would be an easy target for the Taliban. The Pakistan army commanders work in collusion with the Taliban and the police are too scared of the Taliban to take action.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Minister submitted that new information in terms of s 473DC was, relevantly, a document that was not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision. The three documents of which the appellant complained fell into the category of the departmental file. The first document was one which the appellant apparently provided to the delegate and so it was not new information. That showed that it was not a legitimate form of reasoning to say that only the pieces of country information footnoted in the delegate’s decision were before the delegate. There was plainly a category of material that was before the delegate because the appellant provided it. The same applied to the other two documents. The Court Book was an inadequate factual record to be deciding this factual question. There was also an issue, counsel submitted, as to the materiality of these documents.Consideration Counsel for the appellant accepted that each of the three issues he sought to agitate on the appeal were new: they were not before the primary judge. It follows, as counsel accepted, that the appellant needs leave to rely on these new issues. One factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave is whether or not the appellant was legally represented before the primary judge. He was. He accepted that there was no adequate explanation for why the grounds now sought to be advanced were not raised before the primary judge. Another factor to bear in mind is the risk of this Court in its appellate jurisdiction becoming the court of first instance as the primary judge has not considered these proposed new grounds. This consideration has an added dimension where questions of fact are involved. The overall question is the interests of justice in the particular case. The apparent merits, or lack of merits, of the proposed new grounds are relevant. Turning to proposed ground 1a, I am not prepared to assume that the certificate was not drawn to the appellant’s attention. There is no application before me pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. I find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. I refer to [52]-[54] above. Leave to rely on this ground is refused. I am also bound to follow BBS16 and AYF16. I do not accede to the invitation on behalf of the appellant to grant leave to rely on this ground and refer the matter to a Full Court. In relation to proposed ground 1b, I also find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. I refer again to [52]-[54] above. As articulated, the proposed ground has no merit. It comes close to saying that because the Authority could have exercised the power, it was legally unreasonable for it not to have done so, compare Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [15] per Kiefel CJ. Leave to rely on this ground is refused. In relation to proposed ground 1c, I am not prepared to assume or to draw the inference that the material mentioned in the impugned footnotes was not before the delegate when the delegate made the decision under s 65 and I am therefore not prepared to assume or infer that the material was “new information” within the meaning of s 473DC(1). The date of the primary decision was 9 November 2016. The material in the footnotes dates from 2008, 2012 and 2013. Indeed, footnote 4, as I read it, refers to an article provided by the appellant at the TPV interview. It seems likely that the material in the other two footnotes is in the same category. I am certainly not prepared to find the opposite. Again, there is no application before me under s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act. This proposed ground in particular shows the risk of this Court on appeal being asked to perform for the first time the task of the Federal Circuit Court. I find it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to rely on this new ground. Leave to rely on this ground is refused.Conclusion and orders