EBO17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EBO17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 437
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for subclass 785 temporary protection visa – whether the authority failed to consider the whole case of the applicant – amended application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 36, 473CB, 473DD, 473DE, 476

Cases cited:

DGZ16 v The Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCAFC 12

Applicant: EBO17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: SYG 2813 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Street
Hearing date: 26 February 2018
Date of Last Submission: 26 February 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 26 February 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr M Jones
Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms K Hooper
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. Grant leave to the applicant to rely upon the amended application dated 26 February 2018 initialled and dated by the Court and the Court dispenses with the need for the electronic filing of the same.

  2. The amended application is dismissed.

  3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5,250.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2813 of 2017

EBO17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) under Part 7AA made on 18 August 2017 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The applicant was found to be a citizen of Pakistan and his claims were assessed against that country. The applicant claimed to fear harm in the nature of suffering the same fate as his kidnapped uncle. The applicant feared sectarian groups like the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (“LEJ”) and Islamic State or ISIS which have threatened and perpetrated attacks against Shia Muslims throughout the country. The applicant also claimed to fear Sunni Muslims who have been displaced from Parachinar and who are now working with these groups and who will target him as a Shia Muslim from Parachinar. The applicant also claimed to fear he will be targeted by these actors because he is a Shia Muslim pursuing higher education from a wealthy family whose father was a famous and prominent elder.

  3. The applicant also claimed to fear that if he returns to Pakistan he will suffer persecution and serious harm as a returnee from Australia who will be treated as an infidel and a spy for Westerners and Australians and could be an easy target for the Taliban. The applicant alleged that the Pakistan Army are in collusion with the Taliban and that the police are too scared of the Taliban to take action.

  4. The applicant was found to be a Shia Muslim and an ethnic Pashtun of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 437
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, EBO17, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The dispute concerned the Minister's refusal to grant the applicant a protection visa. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether the delegate of the Minister had failed to properly consider relevant information provided by the applicant, and whether the delegate had applied the correct legal test when assessing the applicant's claims for protection.

Judge Street found that the delegate had indeed made a jurisdictional error. The Court reasoned that the delegate had failed to adequately assess the applicant's claims regarding past persecution and the real chance of future persecution, despite being provided with substantial evidence. The delegate's assessment was found to be superficial and did not engage with the specific details of the applicant's evidence in a meaningful way, thereby failing to discharge the duty to afford procedural fairness. The Court applied the principles of administrative law concerning the proper exercise of statutory power and the requirement for decision-makers to genuinely consider all relevant evidence.

The Court quashed the Minister's decision and remitted the application for a protection visa to the Minister for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of EBO17 v Minister for Immigration revolves around the applicant's application for a subclass 785 temporary protection visa, which was ultimately refused by the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority). The applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, claimed fear of persecution and serious harm due to his Shia Muslim identity, his uncle's kidnapping by the Taliban, and threats he received in 2009 and 2010. The applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 22 March 2013 and was given an entry interview on 28 March 2013. On 19 May 2016, the applicant applied for a subclass 785 temporary protection visa. The delegate subsequently refused to grant the applicant the protection visa, finding the applicant failed to meet the criteria under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The applicant's case was referred to the Authority for review, which considered the applicant's written claims and submissions provided by his representative. The Authority identified the background to the visa application and the relevant information provided by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act. The Authority considered the submissions provided by the applicant’s representative dated 7 December 2016 and engaged with the arguments based on the information before the delegate. The Authority also considered new country information in line with s 473DE(3)(a) of the Act. The Authority summarised the applicant’s claims and the relevant law, ultimately finding that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa under the Act.

The Authority's reasoning included concerns about the applicant's credibility, particularly regarding the timing and nature of the threats he claimed to have received. The Authority noted that the applicant had provided conflicting information about the dates and circumstances of the threats, leading to doubts about the plausibility of his claims. The Authority also considered the applicant’s socio-economic profile and the available country information, concluding that there was no real chance of the applicant facing harm if he returned to Pakistan. The Authority found it reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Islamabad, Pakistan, but ultimately affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the protection visa. The applicant then sought to challenge the Authority's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The case of EBO17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 437 before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia concerns an application for a writ of certiorari and other relief challenging a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming a delegate's refusal to grant the applicant a subclass 785 temporary protection visa. The applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, had applied for the visa claiming to fear harm based on his Shia Muslim identity and his family's prominence in Parachinar. The delegate and subsequently the Authority found the applicant's claims were not credible and did not meet the criteria for a protection visa. The amended application before the Court claimed procedural unfairness and that the Authority failed to consider the applicant's full case. The Court dismissed the amended application, finding no jurisdictional error in the Authority's decision and no failure to consider the applicant's full case. The Court noted that while the Authority did not expressly reference all submissions and authorities, its reasons demonstrated consideration of the applicant's arguments. The Court also held that the Authority's reasons provided an evident and intelligible justification for its adverse credibility findings, thereby rejecting the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and inadequate consideration of his case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) denied procedural fairness to the Applicant by refusing to consider written submissions made on the Applicant's behalf because they were more than five pages in length.

2. Whether the Authority unreasonably exercised its power to issue practice directions by limiting submissions to no more than five pages.

3. Whether the Authority erred by failing to consider the full case put on behalf of the Applicant by ignoring the submissions of the Applicant's representative in relation to the "entry interview" and the Applicant's credibility in respect of his claim to have been threatened by the Taliban in 2010.

4. Whether the Authority's adverse credibility findings in relation to the 2010 telephone calls were open to the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority and can be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification.

5. Whether the Authority's decision to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa was lawful and rational.

Held
1. The Authority did not deny procedural fairness to the Applicant by refusing to consider written submissions made on the Applicant's behalf because they were more than five pages in length. The Court held that the Practice Direction was within the power given in s 473FB to make Directions.

2. The Authority did not unreasonably exercise its power to issue practice directions by limiting submissions to no more than five pages. The Court held that the limitation was reasonable and did not constitute an unreasonable exercise of power.

3. The Authority did not err by failing to consider the full case put on behalf of the Applicant. The Court held that the Authority had considered the submissions of the Applicant's representative in relation to the "entry interview" and the Applicant's credibility in respect of his claim to have been threatened by the Taliban in 2010, and the adverse findings concerning the 2010 telephone calls were open to the Authority.

4. The Authority's adverse credibility findings in relation to the 2010 telephone calls were open to the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority and can be said to have an evident and intelligible justification. The Court held that the findings were not irrational or lacking justification.

5. The Authority's decision to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa was lawful and rational. The Court held that the Authority's findings were based on a proper consideration of the evidence and the law, and the decision was not irrational or unlawful.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of EBO17 v Minister for Immigration, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia considered whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) had denied procedural fairness to the Applicant by refusing to consider written submissions made on the Applicant's behalf because they were more than five pages in length. The court noted that the Authority relied on Practice Direction 1 dated May 2016, made by the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under s 473FB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). However, the court was bound by the decision in DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCAFC 12, which held that the making of the Direction in so far as it purports to limit submissions to no more than five pages and to return longer submissions to an applicant is beyond the power given in s 473FB to make Directions. Nevertheless, the court found that no jurisdictional error was made out by ground 1 as the submissions were in excess of five pages and were considered by the Authority.

The court also considered whether the Authority unreasonably exercised its power to issue practice directions by limiting submissions to no more than five pages. However, the court held that the Authority's reasons for limiting submissions to five pages were reasonable, and thus, the Authority did not unreasonably exercise its power to issue practice directions.

The court then considered whether the Authority erred by failing to consider the full case put on behalf of the Applicant by ignoring the submissions of the Applicant's representative in relation to the "entry interview" and the Applicant's credibility in respect of his claim to have been threatened by the Taliban in 2010. The court found that the Authority had considered the substance of the submissions and had referred to whether or not the entry interview should be taken into account in light of the express reference and overlap of topics in respect of the entry interview, as referred to in the submissions dated 7 December 2016. The court further found that the Authority had had regard to the submissions in relation to this issue concerning the credibility of the Applicant in respect of the 2010 telephone calls. Therefore, the Authority did not fail to consider the full case put on behalf of the Applicant.

Next, the court considered whether the Authority's adverse credibility findings in relation to the 2010 telephone calls were open to the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority and can be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification. The court found that the Authority made adverse credibility findings in that regard that were open to the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification.

Finally, the court considered whether the Authority's decision to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the Applicant a protection visa was lawful and rational. The court found that the Authority's decision was lawful and rational, and thus, the amended application was dismissed.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Authority did not deny procedural fairness to the Applicant by refusing to consider written submissions made on the Applicant's behalf because they were more than five pages in length, nor did the Authority unreasonably exercise its power to issue practice directions by limiting submissions to no more than five pages. Furthermore, the Authority did not err by failing to consider the full case put on behalf of the Applicant by ignoring the submissions of the Applicant's representative in relation to the "entry interview" and the Applicant's credibility in respect of his claim to have been threatened by the Taliban in 2010. Finally, the Authority's adverse credibility findings in relation to the 2010 telephone calls were open to the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification.