DZACV v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZACV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2012] FMCA 678
MIGRATION – Review of decision of Independent Merits Reviewer – whether the Reviewer asked the wrong questions – whether the Reviewer failed to consider the claims of the applicant – whether Reviewer required to make finding in relation to s.91R(1) and (2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Reviewer did not consider process by which applicant’s father could apply for visa – where Reviewer found that applicant obtained his own valid passport – whether Reviewer failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Reviewer failed to provide substance of adverse country information to applicant – whether Reviewer’s decision may have been affected had substance of information been provided to applicant – whether failure to provide substance of information error of law – credibility – whether finding of credibility an essential and significant element of decision – whether jurisdictional error.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 91R(2)(f)
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
SZQGA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 593
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
Applicant: DZACV
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: CHRIS PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
File Number: DNG 8 of 2012
Judgment of: Raphael FM
Hearing date: 24 July 2012
Date of Last Submission: 24 July 2012
Delivered at: Sydney by video-link to Darwin
Delivered on: 7 August 2012

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms N Karapanagiotidis
Solicitors for the Applicant: Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Liveris
Solicitors for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. Application dismissed.

  2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of $6,471.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

DNG 8 of 2012

DZACV

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

CHRIS PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant who arrived in Australia on 21 November 2010 at Christmas Island as an unauthorised entrant claimed to be an undocumented stateless Faili Kurd from Ilam in Iran.  Having made a claim to be a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations he was interviewed by a RSA officer on 25 January 2011.  The officer found that he did not have a genuine fear of harm and that there was not a real chance of persecution occurring should he return to Iran.  That decision was made on 15 March 2011.  The applicant then requested an Independent Merits Review of the decision.  He attended a hearing before an Independent Merits Reviewer[1] together with his migration agent. On 5 January 2012 the Reviewer found that he did not meet the criterion for a protection visa set out in s.36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[2] and that he…

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Details
Case
[2012] FMCA 678
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DZACV v Minister for Immigration, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The central issue was whether the Minister's failure to provide procedural fairness constituted a jurisdictional error, thus invalidating the decision, or whether it merely constituted a breach of procedural fairness that might entitle the applicant to relief. The case hinged on interpreting the authorities concerning when a denial of procedural fairness might lead to the invalidation of a decision, as well as the broader context of administrative law principles.

The court addressed several legal issues, primarily focusing on whether the procedural errors identified were material to the decision-making process. It considered whether the errors contributed to the decision in a way that might have changed the outcome. The court examined previous cases such as SZQGA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah, and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond to understand how errors of law and denial of procedural fairness might affect the validity of a decision.

Barker J concluded that while not every error of law constitutes a jurisdictional error, a denial of procedural fairness often leads to the invalidation of a decision. The court reasoned that it is difficult to determine the potential impact of procedural errors on the decision, and it is not the role of the court to speculate on what the decision might have been if procedural fairness had been observed. The court further noted that even if the procedural errors were trivial, they still constituted a breach of procedural fairness that could invalidate the decision. Ultimately, Barker J held that the failure to provide procedural fairness rendered the decision invalid, leading to the dismissal of the application.

ORDERS:
1. Application dismissed.
2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of $6,471.00.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Application dismissed.

2.

Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of $6,471.00.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

At first sight, the failure appears to be minimal in relation to the decision as a whole but that is not the test. In SZQGA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 593, Barker J considered in some depth the authorities in relation to when a failure to provide procedural fairness might constitute a jurisdictional error, or otherwise entitle a party to relief. He noted at [134-135] that:“[134]Since Craig, the High Court has held that denial of procedural fairness may also constitute jurisdictional error: see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22 ; (2001) 26 CLR 57.[135]Having regard to Craig, however, it is clear that not every error of law will amount to “jurisdictional error”. See also Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57 ; (2000) 204 CLR 82.”It is worth setting out at length His Honour’s reasons at [146-149]:“[146] However, whether the demonstration of any error of law or any apparent denial of procedural fairness will automatically entitle a party to the relief of injunction or declaration, if sought, may be doubted. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 (Bond), a decision of the Tribunal was challenged on a ground permitted by s 5(1)(f) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) on the basis that “the decision involved an error of law”. Chief Justice Mason at 353 said that a decision does not “involve” an error of law unless the error is material to the decision in the sense that it contributes to it, so that, but for the error, the decision would have been or might have been different. The Chief Justice said:The critical question on this aspect of the case is whether, but for the alleged error of law on which the respondents rely, the decision might have been different by reason of the possibility that the Tribunal would not have made the findings of fact relating to the settlement in the terms in which they were made.[147] In their joint judgment in Bond, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in a similar way emphasised that, for the purposes of this statutory ground of judicial review, for an error of law to be “involved in a decision” something more than the mere occurrence of error is necessary. Their Honours said, “The error must have contributed to the decision in some way or, at the very least, it must be impossible to say that it did not so contribute”. Their Honours added that conversely, an error is not involved in a decision if it did not contribute to the decision or if the decision must have been the same regardless of the error. Thus, to show that an error of law is involved in a decision it is necessary, at the very least, to show that the decision may have been different if the error had not occurred.[148] Justices Toohey and Gaudron added, however, that the approach just adumbrated may be compared with the operation of the rules of natural justice where an allegation is made to which a person has had no opportunity to respond. Their Honours referred to what was said in this regard in Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 603, where Wilson J said that a deportation order in respect of the appellants should be set aside for want of procedural fairness “with some reluctance” because at most it awarded a very slender technical victory to the appellants. His Honour noted that given the immigration policy it was difficult to see how even an emphatic reversal of the imputation in the successfully impugned reasons for decision could affect the result. However, his Honour considered that, having decided that decisions under the Migration Act must be attended with procedural fairness, “it would frustrate the purpose of the A.D.(J.R.) Act if a breach of the rules of natural justice were to be condoned, in the exercise of the discretionary powers of disposition conferred … merely because the breach was not shown to have affected the decision”.[149] It also seems generally to be accepted that it is no answer, where denial of procedural fairness is demonstrated, to resist relief on the basis the error involved is “trivial”: see for example, Ex parte Aala at [59] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ).” [emphasis added]His Honour went on to consider Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 and referred in particular to the judgment of Gaudron and Gummow JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, where their Honours stated:“No doubt the discretion with respect to all remedies in s 75(v) is not to be exercised lightly against the grant of a final remedy, particularly where the officers of the Commonwealth in question do not constitute a federal court and there is no avenue of appeal to this Court under s 73 of the Constitution141. The discretion is to be exercised against the background of the animating principle described by Gaudron J in Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission. Her Honour said:"Those exercising executive and administrative powers are as much subject to the law as those who are or may be affected by the exercise of those powers. It follows that, within the limits of their jurisdiction and consistent with their obligation to act judicially, the courts should provide whatever remedies are available and appropriate to ensure that those possessed of executive and administrative powers exercise them only in accordance with the laws which govern their exercise. The rule of law requires no less. (Footnote omitted.)"”Barker J concluded at [157] that:“The position … in relation to denial of procedural fairness is less ambiguous. Ultimately the decision in Ex parte Aala, following Stead, is that denial of procedural fairness, while not falling into a distinct category of its own, will often lead to the effective invalidation of an impugned decision. One can understand how this is so. It will often be extremely difficult to say what decision might have been made by an administrative decision-maker if there had been no denial of procedural fairness in a given case — and it is not for the review court to speculate. To try to reconstruct a decision-making process or to rework the apparent basis upon which a decision has been made, in order to state with any confidence what the result might have been or would have been but for denial of procedural fairness, is likely to be a speculative and unproductive task and certainly one likely to lead to injustice, because the judicial reviewer is not equipped and is not charged with responsibility to make the sort of administrative decision that the primary decision-maker has been set up to determine.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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