Dupas v The Queen - [2010] HCATrans 92

[2010] HCATrans 092

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M20 of 2010

B e t w e e n -
PETER NORRIS DUPAS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 15 APRIL 2010, AT 10.18 AM

MR C.B. BOYCE: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR L.C. CARTER, for the appellant. (instructed by Victorian Legal Aid (Criminal Law Section))

MR J.D. McARDLE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.L. SONNET, for the respondent. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Vic))

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Boyce.

MR McARDLE: Your Honours, can I raise something first? A day or two ago we served and filed a summons and a short affidavit in support of an application for an abridgement of time concerning a notice of contention I understand that has come to the Court’s attention.

FRENCH CJ: Yes.

MR McARDLE: The position being this, that we think that the proper presentation of the argument from our point of view is that it would be necessary to challenge the finding of Justice Ashley and Justice Nettle that it was a singular or extreme case, preferring the view of Justice Weinberg, and that after some hesitation, and the fault is entirely mine as far as the delay is concerned, we thought it probably necessary to have a notice of contention filed, but we are out of time.

FRENCH CJ: Mr Boyce, is that opposed?

MR BOYCE: It is, your Honour. Your Honours, the respondent seeks to vitiate the conclusions made expressly by two members of the Court of Appeal, those two members of the court having subjected the evidence relied upon, in our submission, on the stay application and how that evidence related to the court or to the course of the trial to rigorous examination. The analysis performed by Justices Ashley and Nettle does not in terms, we would submit, appear to be rejected by Justice Weinberg, and such submission as is made in the respondent’s submission which encapsulates, as they would put it in their supporting affidavit, in essence what we are told what the respondent wants to say about this, do not, in our submission, reveal an arguable case.

We cannot say that we are taken completely by surprise, your Honours, as the respondent foreshadowed an argument of this type in the special leave documents. The material, as your Honours will be aware, that is exhibited to Mr Bentley’s affidavit, and was the material that was placed before their Honours on the hearing of this appeal, that is, the material and the evidence that relates to the pre‑trial publicity, is voluminous, and we did expect to be here, I might say, your Honours, to discuss principle. If the Court does grant the enlargement of time…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dupas v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Dupas v The Queen [2010] HCATrans 92
Case: [2010] HCATrans 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Mr. Dupas against his conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations and the fairness of the trial process.

The High Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in circumstances that may have infringed the appellant's rights. Specifically, the court examined whether the evidence was obtained in contravention of the *Crimes Act 1958* (Vic) and, if so, whether it should have been excluded under the common law or statutory provisions governing the admission of improperly obtained evidence. The court also considered whether the cumulative effect of certain alleged errors during the trial amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The High Court applied established principles regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of statutory provisions and the discretion of a trial judge to exclude such evidence. The court analysed the nature of the alleged breaches and the potential prejudice to the appellant. It considered the balance between the probative value of the evidence and the unfairness that its admission might occasion. The court also reviewed the principles governing appeals against conviction based on alleged miscarriages of justice, including the assessment of whether an error, if established, was material to the verdict.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence and no miscarriage of justice.

Orders