Dua17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DUA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2110

Appeal from: DUA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1712
File number: NSD 1276 of 2018
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 16 December 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION - appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court - first appellant a teacher in China - claimed to fear persecution in China - alleged membership of educational society - first appellant opposed to alleged enforced teaching of communist ideologies in primary school - Tribunal not satisfied society existed - adverse credibility findings - whether discrete issue should have been expressly put to first appellant - whether denial of procedural fairness - whether Tribunal misunderstood facts - whether findings as to credibility and evidence disclosed unreasonableness - appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425
Cases cited:

ABV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 184

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen [2001] HCA 10

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28

SAAK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 86; (2002) 121 FCR 185

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 138; (2008) 172 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 18 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Christopher Levingston & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLP Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1276 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DUA17

First Appellant

DUB17

Second Appellant

DUC17

Third Appellant

DUD17

Fourth Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Dua17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was brought by two Chinese nationals against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm the delegate's decision to refuse their application for a protection visa. The appellants were a married couple, with the first appellant a teacher in China who claimed to fear persecution due to her opposition to the alleged enforced teaching of communist ideologies in primary schools and her alleged membership in an educational society. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the society existed and made adverse credibility findings against the first appellant. The appellants argued that the Tribunal failed to put discrete issues to the first appellant, denied procedural fairness, misunderstood facts, and made unreasonable findings about credibility and evidence.

The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Tribunal breached its obligations under the Migration Act to provide a real and meaningful hearing, whether it misunderstood parts of the first appellant's evidence, and whether the Tribunal's findings relating to the first appellant's credibility were legally unreasonable. The appellants argued that the Tribunal failed to disclose certain issues that arose on the review and misunderstood parts of their evidence. They also contended that various findings about the first appellant's credibility were legally unreasonable.

The Court rejected the appellants' claims. It found that the Tribunal had sufficiently put the relevant issues to the first appellant, including the question of whether the Society had ever reached out to other groups in China or Australia. The Court held that the Tribunal's conclusions on the evidence were open to it and did not reflect any misunderstanding of the first appellant's evidence. The Court also found that the Tribunal's findings relating to the first appellant's credibility were not legally unreasonable. The Court considered the transcript and the inherent advantage available to the Tribunal in assessing the appellant's demeanour and found that the Tribunal's findings were reached with an evident and intelligible justification.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellants pay the Minister's costs to be assessed if not agreed. This decision upheld the Tribunal's findings and the delegate's decision to refuse the appellants' application for a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first appellant, a teacher from China, claimed to fear persecution in China due to her opposition to the alleged enforced teaching of communist ideologies in primary schools. She alleged membership in an educational society that aimed to promote alternative teaching methods and ideologies. The existence of this society was central to her claim for a protection visa. The Migration Review Tribunal did not accept the existence of the society, found adverse credibility findings against the first appellant, and rejected her application for a protection visa. The appellants subsequently sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court, which was dismissed. This appeal followed, focusing on whether the Tribunal correctly identified and communicated issues to the first appellant, whether it misunderstood her evidence, and whether its findings regarding her credibility and evidence were unreasonable.

This case originated from an application for a protection visa by the first appellant, which was rejected by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellants sought review of that decision before the Migration Review Tribunal, which also rejected their claims. The appellants then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge dismissed their appeal, leading to this appeal to the court. The appellants raised three grounds of appeal concerning the Tribunal's handling of the case, focusing on alleged procedural errors and the reasonableness of the Tribunal's findings. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's process and findings were legally sound.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I do not consider a case for unreasonableness with respect to particular (a) is made out.Particular (b): The Tribunal erred in finding that the first appellant's evidence was 'vague, hesitant and uncertain' The appellants refer to para 30 of the Tribunal's reasons, reproduced above. The Tribunal flagged during the hearing that it would raise certain issues separately with the first appellant's husband. Those issues included the circumstances of her first disclosure of her dissident activities to him and her hurried departure from China. It was with respect to such matters that the Tribunal found the first appellant's evidence was then 'vague, hesitant and uncertain'. The appellants submitted that the finding about the first appellant's evidence is contradicted by the transcript. They refer to particular pages from the transcript and note that the questions asked were answered in a straightforward way. Having reviewed the transcript, there are a number of occasions during the hearing where the first appellant's response could be characterised as vague, hesitant and uncertain. The examples referred to include evidence given after the Tribunal member asked the second appellant to leave the hearing room. In particular, there are passages where the Tribunal member clearly had difficulty eliciting a straightforward response as to whether the second appellant had met the first appellant's friends who allegedly established the Society with her, and as to how often and where the Society members met. Having regard to those parts of the transcript and recognising the inherent advantage available to the Tribunal in the assessment of the first appellant's demeanour, I do not consider that the Tribunal's finding was reached in the absence of an evident and intelligible justification.Particular (c): The Tribunal erred in finding that the first appellant's account of the goals of the Society were 'generalised and repetitive' The appellants submitted that the Tribunal did not provide any justification for why it found the first appellant's account of the goals of the Society 'generalised and repetitive', and that this finding is inconsistent with the evidence provided by the transcript. Additionally, the appellants submitted that the Tribunal did not ask questions on how the objectives of the Society were to be achieved. However, a review of the transcript reveals that the Tribunal asked the first appellant for specific examples of what the Society wanted to achieve and how. The first appellant responded at the highest level of generality. The Minister referred to the following example of an exchange from the transcript:THE MEMBER: So [the Appellant], I would now like to talk to you - talk about your claims that you set up the society. So when did you do that and why did you decide to do that?THE INTERPRETER: I established the society at February 2007.THE MEMBER: And what was the reason? THE INTERPRETER: Like I said, I have long been unsatisfied with a lot of rules and regulations about the school management and the Young Pioneer group but I was angry without having the opportunity to say something about it and then after the death of the student I had a very strong wish to - I had a very strong desire to establish an organisation of my own as then I established this society to promote our own teaching methods and allocation ideologies and also I hoped that I could recruit more people to join our society so that we can turn over the - so that we can turn over the Young Pioneer group.THE MEMBER: Just explain to me, please, when you say 'to promote my ideology' and as I understand from what you've said so far you simply don't agree with the Young Pioneers being in schools and ultimately the Young Pioneers are part of the - an instrument of the Community Party, so really it's just you don't agree with the Communist Party propaganda as in to young children? Is that it or was there something else that your society was trying to promote, maybe an alternative or something more precise or was it simply opposition to the Young Pioneers?THE INTERPRETER: In fact, our main purpose is to turn over this Young Pioneer group in schools and we also have other purposes. For example, we would like to promote and enhance the reform of our education system in China because we have found that there are some corruptions and the very unfair events in our teaching and education systems.THE MEMBER: Can you be more - can you give me a precise -1 don't know- you know, again, that's a problem that the Chinese government experiences at all levels, so can you just give me one concrete example of the kind of corruption of that you were thinking - or, you know, of what your group was planning to do?THE INTERPRETER: So I can give some examples of the corruption in primary school.THE MEMBER: No. I'm not asking you about examples of corruption, sorry. Just to clarify, I'm asking for an example of what your group intended to do?THE INTERPRETER: For example, we would have some meetings and share our teaching experience and our teaching thoughts with each other, especially some experience from other countries, particularly about human rights and freedom.THE MEMBER: And so the plan was to have discussions groups. Was there anything apart from discussion groups?THE INTERPRETER: And then we discuss about how to - how we can turn over the Young Pioneer group.THE MEMBER: Okay. And what- but help me understand what that means because you could try overturning the Communist Party, you could try overturning the Young Pioneers and what was your group hoping to achieve, a small group of people apart from having some nice discussions?THE INTERPRETER: As for some specific plan, in April 2013 we drafted an initiative and we sent these initiatives to the department of education in Hubei Province.THE MEMBER: Do you have a copy of that initiative?THE INTERPRETER: I do have the copy of these initiative but - because it was drafted by another two - the other two officers in our society but all the society members discussed and - discussed about the content of these initiatives and we together made a plan.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Given its overall assessments of her activities and adverse view of her credibility, the Tribunal did not accept that the first appellant had a political opinion about the Chinese primary education system that warranted protection.Conclusion Having rejected all claims based on involvement in the Society, and given that the first appellant advanced no claims on the basis of her ethnic or religious background, the Tribunal found that the appellants did not satisfy either the refugee criteria or the complementary protection criteria. It therefore affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the appellants' protection visa application.Before the Federal Circuit Court The appellants raised four grounds of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court. Three are relevant to this appeal. The first claim was that the Tribunal breached its obligation under s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to provide a real and meaningful hearing, in that it failed to disclose to the first appellant issues that arose on the review, being whether she had considered whether there were other groups in China or Australia with objectives similar to the Society. The first appellant relied upon an absence of direct questioning. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had asked the first appellant the question of whether the Society had ever reached out and made contact with other groups in China or Australia that might be interested in discussing education reform in primary school. His Honour held that taking into account that the question of credibility was expressly raised with the first appellant, it could not be said that she was not on notice of the relevance of whether or not she had explored connections with other groups. The second claim was that the Tribunal had misunderstood parts of the first appellant's evidence. The primary judge stepped through the alleged misunderstandings in turn, and found that each of the impugned conclusions was open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and did not reflect any misunderstanding of the first appellant's evidence. The third claim (numbered four before the primary judge) was that various findings relating to the first appellant's credibility were legally unreasonable. The appellants referred to some 11 findings. The primary judge considered each of these in turn with reference to the transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal, and found that no jurisdictional error was made out. The particulars of unreasonableness upon which the appellants relied are essentially repeated in the appeal before this Court and are set out below.Grounds of appeal before this Court The appellants rely on three corresponding grounds of appeal in this Court. Ground 1 The first ground is as follows:(1)The Court erred in finding that the second respondent (the Tribunal) did not act in breach of s. 425(1) of the Migration Act.Particulars(a)Error in finding that there was no failure on the part of the second respondent (the Tribunal) to disclose to the applicant an issue that arose on the review, being whether she had considered whether there were other groups in China with objectives similar to the Society for Primary Education (the Society).(b)Error in finding that there was no failure on the part of the Tribunal to disclose to the applicant an issue that arose on the review, being whether she had considered whether there were groups in Australia with objectives similar to the Society.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court dismissed the appeal and found no error in the decision of the Tribunal. In considering the first ground of appeal, the Court found that the Tribunal had sufficiently put the issue of the existence of other similar groups in China and Australia to the first appellant. The Court noted that the Tribunal had explicitly questioned the appellant about whether the Society had contacted other groups, and this was sufficient to put the appellant on notice of the relevance of such connections. Consequently, the Tribunal was not in breach of its obligations under s 425(1) of the Migration Act.

Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Court examined the specific instances where the appellants claimed the Tribunal misunderstood the first appellant's evidence. The Court found that each of the Tribunal's conclusions was open to it based on the evidence and did not reflect any misunderstanding of the first appellant's testimony. The Court considered the transcript and determined that the Tribunal's findings on the appellant's demeanour and the content of her evidence were reasonable and supported by the material before the Tribunal.

In relation to the third ground of appeal, the Court evaluated the appellants' claim that the Tribunal's findings on the first appellant's credibility were legally unreasonable. The Court reviewed each of the alleged unreasonable findings in light of the evidence and concluded that none of them demonstrated a jurisdictional error. The Court emphasised that the Tribunal had the advantage of observing the appellant's demeanour and was entitled to make findings based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's responses during the hearing. The Court found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were justified and not unreasonable.